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discLaimer
the views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the 
united nations, including unDP, unicef, un Women, or the un member states. the research and analysis in the 
publication was conducted solely by the author(s); neither united nations member states, nor agencies of the 
un system, including unDP, unicef, and un Women, are in a position to verify the information contained within 
the study.
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summary
a. pLacing informaL Justice systems in conteXt
until recently, informal justice systems (ijs) were relatively invisible in development partner-assisted justice inter-
ventions. yet, ijs form a key part of individuals’ and communities’ experience of justice and the rule of law, with over 
80 percent of disputes resolved through informal justice mechanisms in some countries.1 ijs may be more acces-
sible than formal mechanisms and may have the potential to provide quick, relatively inexpensive and culturally 
relevant remedies. given this central role and increasing government and partnering donor interest in ijs, it is key 
to build an understanding of ijs and how best to engage with them for the strengthening of human rights, the 
rule of law and access to justice.
in many countries, there is a prevalence of ijs, which demands that governments and development partners 
take these systems more seriously, especially with regard to ijs and women’s and children’s rights. this does not 
mean that development organizations should promote ijs at the expense of a functioning unitary legal order 
or that they should oppose the existence of ijs. rather, it is recognition that ijs are an empirical reality, albeit a 
complicated one.
at the same time, growing numbers of countries are requesting un assistance to engage with ijs and strengthen 
their ability to provide justice and legal protection. the un’s approach to engagement on rule of law and access 
to justice is as an effort to ensure international norms and standards for all who come into contact with the formal 
and informal justice system, including victims, witnesses or alleged offenders. ijs are complex and deeply varied; 
many drawing their normative structures and legitimacy from the local communities and society in which they 
operate. the un does not presume that engagement with ijs can adopt a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. like all legal 
mechanisms, ijs function within changing societies and communities and can be responsive to the particular 
individual circumstances of a case in the application of cultural norms.
the obligation to respect, protect and fulfil human rights, including through the provision of justice and legal 
remedies, extends to formal and informal systems alike. Both types of justice systems can violate human rights, 
reinforce discrimination, and neglect principles of procedural fairness. ijs in many contexts deal with issues that 
have a direct bearing on the best interests of women and children, such as issues of customary marriage, custody, 
dissolution of marriage, inheritance and property rights. the operative questions surrounding ijs and the rights 
of women and children are significant. While it is especially important to note that the structures, procedures and 
substantive decisions of some ijs neither safeguard nor promote women’s rights and children’s rights, the exist-
ence of ijs does not of itself contravene international human rights principles. indeed, ijs can provide avenues for 
the delivery of justice and the protection of human rights, particularly where formal justice systems lack capacity, 
and ijs can enjoy widespread community legitimacy and support.
the study seeks to identify how engagement with ijs can build greater respect and protection for human rights. 
it highlights the considerations that development partners should have when assessing whether to implement 
programmes involving ijs, the primary consideration being that engagement with the ijs neither directly nor 
inadvertently reinforces existing societal or structural discrimination – a consideration that applies to working 
with formal justice systems as well. the study also examines the value of ijs in offering, in certain contexts, flexible 
structures and processes, cost-effectiveness and outreach to grassroots communities.
1  Wojkowska, ewa 2006: How Informal Justice Systems can contribute, oslo: united nations Development Programme, oslo 
governance centre.
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in structure, this summary of the study, first describes ijs across the range of degrees of formality and informality 
and interaction with the state. it identifies the combination of factors that influence individuals’ or communities’ 
preferences and pressures to bring matters before ijs rather than before formal justice systems. these factors influ-
encing preferences for ijs vary from geographical isolation, economic concerns, familiarity, trust and the percep-
tion that ijs better reflect local values. it then places ijs in the context of human rights, with particular attention 
to the rights of women and children. finally, it frames the principles of programming engagement with ijs and 
suggests possible entry points for engagement with ijs, so that strategic engagement can strengthen ijs to better 
deliver justice and human rights.
methodoLogy
commissioned by unDP, unicef and un Women, the study involved a comprehensive literature review and 
country-specific case studies. Qualitative and quantitative data collection was carried out in Bangladesh, ecua-
dor, malawi, niger, Papua new guinea and uganda. the country studies were selected in consultation with the 
three un agencies and the methodology was developed through a pilot case study in malawi. the country stud-
ies employed a uniform methodology, and all of the country studies use identical or very similar categories of 
analysis. interviews were conducted with individuals and groups representing various stakeholders at the local 
and national levels on the basis of an interview guide developed for each of the target categories. the quantitative 
part of the country studies included surveys for users of informal justice and informal justice providers, following a 
generic questionnaire format that allowed comparison across countries.
Desk studies of 12 countries were also conducted on the basis of literature from academia, un agencies, ngos, 
governments, websites and conferences. Wherever possible, they were developed in consultation with national 
experts on the informal and the formal justice systems, including scholars and human rights experts. the desk 
studies assessed the nature and characteristics of ijs (composition, decision-making, procedures), linkages among 
the different justice providers (particularly with formal justice systems), legal frameworks, human rights aspects 
and efforts made to date in programming by governments, national and international ngos, the un and other 
development partners.
definitions of informaL Justice systems
any attempt to define ijs must acknowledge that no definition can be both very precise and sufficiently broad to 
encompass the range of systems and mechanisms that play a role in delivering rule of law and access to justice. 
ijs vary considerably, encompassing many mechanisms of differing degrees and forms of formality. Degrees of 
formality vary with respect to legal or normative framework, state recognition, appointment and interaction, 
control and accountability mechanisms, and systems of monitoring and supervision, including the maintenance 
of case records and the implementation of referral procedures. ijs also encompass systems that might have formal 
state recognition, such as alternative dispute resolution that operate at the community level, either facilitated by 
traditional mechanisms or facilitated by ngos.
the study employs a relatively broad definition of ‘informal justice system’ encompassing the resolution of disputes 
and the regulation of conduct by adjudication or the assistance of a neutral third party that is not a part of the judi-
ciary as established by law and/or whose substantive, procedural or structural foundation is not primarily based 
on statutory law.
in some settings, the word ‘informal’ may carry value-laden assessments, according to which a system may be 
held in lower esteem because of the ‘informal’ label. the study uses the word with no such value judgments. it 
is used rather than the term ‘non-state’ justice systems, as there are many forms of ijs that are tolerated, partially 
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state-linked or recognized along the formal-informal continuum. for example, customary courts or local courts 
are categorized as ijs, but are regulated under specific legislation, have a state-determined procedure for appoint-
ments, and may be attached to the judiciary.2 such courts seek to gain community legitimacy through their roots 
in a history of justice provision prior to the existence of the modern state or through their claim to draw on the 
local norms and customs of a specific locality of the country. the study looks at a wide range of systems outside 
classic state structures that include hybrid models of customary, religious and state-run ‘parajudicial’ systems. 
however, the study does not consider systems for the maintenance of law and order and local security nor the 
administration of rules by commercial or professional organizations.
the study distinguishes among informal justice mechanisms anchored in (i) customary and tribal/clan social struc-
tures, (ii) religious authorities, (iii) local administrative authorities, (iv) specially constituted state customary courts, 
and (v) community forums specially trained in conflict resolution, particularly in mediation. types (iii) and (iv) often 
present a hybrid (parajudicial) model where officials of a state system apply customary norms. nevertheless, these 
rough distinctions do not fully capture reality, which contains varying mixtures of these elements in which, for 
example, customary and administrative authority are combined.
this typology is used as a framework to examine ijs, looking at the composition of dispute resolution bodies, their 
relationship to the state, the jurisdictional limits and substantive norms applied, typical processes used to resolve 
disputes and the binding or voluntary nature of outcomes.
LinKages betWeen formaL and informaL Justice systems
the nature of ijs and the extent to which they are incorporated into formal systems largely depends on the histori-
cal circumstances of each country. the legal system inherited from a colonial power and the new legal and state 
system established during decolonization influenced the role and status of customary law and ijs as well as the 
interaction between the ijs and the formal justice system.
in most countries, there are functional linkages between state justice providers and ijs’ providers. state law may 
define such linkages and provide for official forms of collaboration (including appeal procedures, referrals, division 
of labour, advice, assistance and so forth), but, even where this is not the case, there are often various forms of 
unofficial collaboration. there may also be the possibility of appeal to a court in the formal system and, in some 
circumstances, this could be precisely what renders it possible for people to trust informal mechanisms of justice. 
thus, the formal system can exert influence even where its mechanisms are not directly invoked. linkages may 
also be negative, with competition over jurisdiction including overt opposition or even hostility. aside from func-
tional linkages, there are instances of overlaps or ‘borrowing’ of norms, rules and procedures between ijs and state 
providers. such norm and rule-based linkages may derive from long histories of interaction and coexistence. they 
point to the changeability and adaptability of different primary justice providers and/or to their interdependency.
the origins of the existence and tolerance of ijs are many and varied. tolerating ijs or incorporating traditional, 
customary or religious law into formal systems may be a way for the state to accommodate different religious or 
ethnic traditions in a single state. it may also allow the state to regulate non-state or customary justice providers 
by, for example, limiting their scope of jurisdiction by defining tradition or custom as applying only to certain 
domains. the concept may also be invoked by ijs’ providers claiming knowledge of custom as a source of authority 
and spaces of power as compared to state officials.
2  examples of such structures are local courts in sierra leone and Zambia, the Village courts in Papua new guinea and the 
community courts in mozambique
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ijs deal with many cases that could have been brought to formal court. the study surveyed users’ preferences and 
choices of system (preference between ijs or formal system), as well as the profiles of the individuals in the ijs who 
adjudicate, mediate and make decisions in the ijs. in the analysis of the data gathered, gender was included as a 
variable in all cross tabulations.
explanations for individual preferences of system combine a number of factors, ranging from the in/effectiveness 
and popular il/legitimacy of the formal justice system, to power relations and social pressure. the study posits eight 
significant, partly interrelated aspects that can influence people’s choices and uses of ijs. (see box 1)
boX 1:  factors infLuencing peopLe’s choices and uses of  
informaL Justice systems
1. in/effectiveness and popular il/legitimacy of the formal justice system: this could include the 
geographical distance and costs of access to the system as well as outcomes inappropriate for local 
preferences. there could also be a perception of corruption or of discrimination in the formal system 
against a particular community, causing people to question the legitimacy of the formal system itself.
2. ijs case settlement procedures: this involves a preference for less formalized settlement procedures, 
such as voluntary participation and the reaching of decisions on the basis of mutual consent.
3. ijs case settlement outcomes: the emphasis by many ijs on reconciliation, restoration, compensation 
and reintegration is preferred over the custodial sanctions that dominate many formal criminal  
justice systems.
4. economic concerns: the emphasis of ijs on compensation as a symbol of reconciliation ensures that 
the victims’ and offenders’ families do not become economically destitute. ijs are not always preferred 
as the least expensive option; this depends on the context as some ijs charge fees.
5. cultural, religious and/or customary beliefs and practices: the perception that ijs’ procedures and sub-
stantive norms, compared to those of formal justice systems, are more in accordance with the local 
cultures and the social relations of people. this is particularly so where the formal justice system is an 
inheritance from the colonial past.
6. habits or routines: a preference is based on individuals’ or communities’ long interaction with ijs for 
dispute resolution.
7. Power relations and social pressure: Preferences might be based on community, structural or societal 
pressures and on the view that certain systems support specific power relations associated with social 
status and identities (age, gender, ethnicity, class).
8. legitimacy and authority of ijs’ justice providers: Preference might be based on the individual or 
community perception that a justice provider, such as a traditional leader or religious leader, has the 
legitimate authority to adjudicate, decide or mediate a case. 
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b. framing informaL Justice systems in human rights terms
Providing accessible justice is a state obligation under international human rights standards, but this obligation 
does not require that all justice be provided through formal justice systems. if done in ways to respect and uphold 
human rights, the provision of justice through ijs is not against human rights standards and ijs can be a mecha-
nism to enhance the fulfilment of human rights obligations by delivering accessible justice to individuals and 
communities where the formal justice system does not have the capacity or geographical reach.
human rights obligations apply to ijs and states have an obligation to ensure the respect, protection and fulfil-
ment of human rights, including where ijs are the main provider of justice. analysing ijs for human rights compli-
ance is complex. Both ijs and formal systems need to be analysed together in terms of their ability to deliver 
human rights-compliant structures, procedures and outcomes. in some circumstances, the human rights defi-
ciencies will be common to the formal system and the ijs alike; in others, the ijs might show benefits over the 
formal justice system. for example, ijs could be a positive tool to divert juveniles from the more retributive aspects 
of formal criminal justice systems. Where there is limited or no access to formal juvenile justice mechanisms, ijs 
can emphasize restorative justice that, seeking harmony in the local community, attempts to reintegrate young 
offenders into the community.
human rights standards offer the possibility of fairness in three dimensions of justice: structural, proce-
dural and normative. the structural dimension consists of participation and accountability. Particular attention 
must be paid to the rights of groups not strongly represented in ijs, which include women, minorities and chil-
dren. Procedural justice consists of guidance for adjudication processes that ensure that the parties to a dispute 
are treated equally, that their case is decided by a person with no interest in the case, who is obliged to render 
a decision solely on the basis of facts and objective rules rather than on personal preferences, and that anyone 
making an assertion or accusation must provide verifiable evidence to support it. finally, normative justice consists 
of substantive rules that protect the vulnerable. examples include the prohibition against marrying off children for 
the economic benefit of parents or guardians or the guarantee of the right of widows to inherit.
the human rights issues with respect to operation of ijs commonly involve decisions that are inconsistent with 
basic human rights, such as cruel and inhuman forms of punishment, or decisions that perpetuate the subordina-
tion of women or the exploitation of children. Weaknesses in procedural justice also mean that ijs do not always 
give the accused the chance to be heard or to be adequately represented. ijs can hold individuals accountable to 
social collectivities and broader social interests.
the key question for engagement with ijs must be the provision of effective rights protection in the particular 
context. in some countries formal justice mechanisms are inoperative or inaccessible to ordinary people, and are 
unlikely to be able to fill the gap in the short and medium terms. in such contexts, ijs may be better placed to 
achieve the principles of impartiality, accountability, participation and protection of substantive human rights.
it can be concluded that, in many contexts, the best access to justice and protection of human rights will be 
afforded when the different systems and mechanisms, formal and informal, are allowed (a) to exchange with and 
learn from one another, (b) to cooperate with one another, (c) to determine the best division of labour, guided by 
user preferences as well as state policy imperatives, and (d) to develop in order to meet new challenges.
12
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Women’s rights
Discussion of respect for women’s rights often remains tethered to the notion of ‘balancing’ these rights with 
culture and custom rather than taking a more dynamic and process-oriented view of culture. on the one hand, 
deeply embedded attitudes are often linked to patterns of economic survival and ethnic, religious or social iden-
tity. consequently, ijs, especially custom and religion-based ijs, are likely to uphold rather than to challenge the 
values of the society around them, including attitudes and patterns of discrimination. on the other hand, the 
flexible and adaptable approach of customary law can allow it to change in ways that reflect changing values in 
society. the human rights committee (hrc) notes that states should ensure that “traditional, historical, religious or 
cultural attitudes are not used to justify violations of women’s rights to equality before the law and to equal enjoy-
ment of all covenant rights.”3 even if there is no clear state recognition of ijs or other delegation of state functions 
to traditional chiefs, or enforcement or consideration of settlements reached through informal justice, the state 
remains obliged under article 2 of the ceDaW to extend protection.4 the hrc notes that inequality in the enjoy-
ment of rights by women is often deeply embedded in tradition, culture and religion, so that many frequently 
occurring violations of women’s human rights originate from social custom, belief or practice rather than (or as well 
as) from state law, and are perpetrated by individuals and social groups rather than by the state.
iJs affect the rights of women in diverse and context-specific ways. the study identified various ones 
that include:
access and procedure: this includes legal capacity and 
women’s right to a remedy as well as barriers to women as 
witnesses or litigants. many of the hindrances to women’s 
access to formal justice systems also apply to ijs, such as 
the lack of access to economic and other resources, persis-
tent fear of intimidation, and victimization by officials such 
as members of the ijs or community members. While the 
paucity or absence of procedural rules in ijs may facilitate 
women’s access and participation, this may also disadvan-
tage women by permitting prejudice and creating condi-
tions for the abuse of power. an additional procedural 
barrier in ijs can be the potential lack of privacy and confi-
dentiality, making women less willing to litigate personal 
and intimate rights violations such as those related to 
domestic violence.
Women’s rights in the area of family life, including dissolution of marriage separation and/or divorce: 
some communities consider separation and divorce to be similar to the destruction of the social fabric and conse-
quently these matters are not administered by some ijs. marital problems are resolved, if at all, through family and 
community intervention. several social pressures coerce women to remain silent about abuse in the family rather 
than to seek the protection of any legal system. the study notes that, since the practice of polygamy or polygyny is 
widespread in most regions where ijs also play a critical role in regulating family and marriage relations, there is not 
always community recognition of the practice’s harmful economic and emotional consequences for women and 
their children and its violation of women’s right to equality. indirect ways to reduce the prevalence of this practice, 
3  human rights committee, general comment 28, equality of rights between men and women (article 3), u.n. Doc. ccPr/c/21/
rev.1/add.10 (2000). 
4  in the americas, the article 4 j) of the Belem do Para convention stipulates that every woman has the right to equal access to the 
public service of her country and to take part in the conduct of public affairs, including decision-making. in africa, article 9 of the 
maputo Protocol deals with the equal right to participation, including through affirmative action. thus, article 9.2 provides that 
states Parties shall “ensure increased and effective representation and participation of women at all levels of decision-making.”
boX 2.  addressing barriers to 
Women’s access to Justice
there are many social, economic or procedural 
factors that prevent women from bringing a 
matter before ijs. the malawi country study 
describes how women were more likely to bring 
certain cases to village mediators (ijs facili-
tated by ngos) rather than to traditional chiefs 
because mediation process offered confidential-
ity, whereas the traditional ijs offered by local 
chiefs involved public discussion of personal and 
intimate matters. the prominence (or absence) 
of women among the village mediators was also 
an important factor.
13
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such as measures to tackle child marriage, forced marriage, teenage pregnancy and discontinued schooling which 
are likely to affect rates of polygamy may produce the most positive results.
Women’s rights to property, including owning real property: Women’s access to land – often the most 
important economic resource – is in many contexts through marriage or a woman’s father. traditional mecha-
nisms of land allocation may involve a purely male hierarchy and a traditional legal system that reinforces this 
arrangement. in some contexts inequalities arise out of the failure of the formal justice system to protect women’s 
property rights where jurisdiction over land is not under customary laws. in many contexts, both formal justice 
systems and ijs fail to protect women from discrimination in regard to property rights. While custom may not be 
in favour of practices such as property-grabbing (often committed against widows), ijs in many contexts have not 
been able to protect vulnerable women against such practices.
Women’s rights to personal integrity and physical security: the study finds that women have little faith in 
the capabilities of either formal or informal systems to protect them and to prosecute offenders. the widespread 
practice of ‘payment of dowry’ and ‘bride price’, which in some countries may be considered necessary for the 
validity of a customary marriage, may be closely connected to extreme forms of violence against women. many 
issues can complicate how both formal systems and ijs handle gender-based violence. national law may not 
recognize a criminal offence of rape within marriage, for example. While recognizing the various factors that limit 
women’s access to justice in the formal system, as well as the importance of women’s participation in ijs, the study 
finds that rape and sexual violence should not be dealt with in ijs, but referred to ordinary courts. this principle 
must be known and accepted within ijs in order to be enforced. it is important that the key challenges of women’s 
own aversion to taking what society might consider ‘family matters’ before formal justice institutions and the barri-
ers and societal pressures against turning to formal justice systems must be addressed.
Patterns of discrimination against women can be reflected in low levels of participation by women as adjudica-
tors in ijs and, in some contexts, in the barriers to access and participation as parties and witnesses that women 
face. Provisions of the ceDaW and regional declarations and protocols obligate states to ensure representation 
of women in bodies exercising public authority.5 the participation of women as adjudicators or justice officials is 
vital to ensuring that women can bring sensitive matters to the attention of justice providers. in the same way that 
women’s participation as police officers and in victims service units is a key part of dealing effectively with domes-
tic violence and rape, it is equally important to foster their participation in ijs.
5 ceDaW article 9.2.
boX 3. informaL Justice systems and doWry or bride prices
many social, economic or procedural factors prevent women from bringing a matter before ijs. the 
payment of dowry and bride price is widely practiced and may be considered necessary for the validity of 
customary marriages. although the practice of dowry payments by the wife’s family has been legally abol-
ished in some countries, including india and Bangladesh, dowry disputes reportedly still frequently arise 
in ijs in these and other countries. the ugandan non-governmental organization mifumi has made bride 
price a campaign issue, having worked on the question for a decade or more using advocacy and strategic 
litigation (see http://www.mifumi.org/ ). a legal petition to have the custom declared unconstitutional (on 
grounds that it leads to violence against women and treatment of women as chattels) was defeated in the 
constitutional court of uganda in march 2010. the court criticized the lack of a factual foundation for the 
petitioners’ assertions, possibly indicating that the petition may have stood a better chance if the factual 
basis for the petition had been made clearer. the case has been appealed to uganda’s supreme court and 
judgment was pending at the time of writing.
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although ijs do not fully respect and protect women’s 
rights in many contexts, the study finds that women 
creatively seek a just resolution and the protection of 
their rights. While women may fare better in formal or 
parajudicial systems, they are often acutely aware of the 
necessity of maintaining collective structures that bene-
fit communities as a whole. they also face social pres-
sure and logistical and economic difficulties preventing 
them from accessing the formal justice system. thus, 
they often seek to change ijs structures from the inside 
rather than to discard them outright. engagement with 
ijs should therefore also be tied to raising awareness 
within ijs of women’s rights and of the range of choices 
and access available to women to seek justice, remedy 
and protection.
chiLdren’s rights
there is little literature and research on children and ijs, although important issues arise regarding the rights 
of children in relation to ijs. children have the same basic rights as any other person in proceedings before ijs, 
including the right to be heard, the right to a fair and impartial hearing, and the right to protection from arbitrary, 
cruel or inhumane punishment. in practice, however, these rights are often poorly respected and are more likely to 
be violated.
the convention on the rights of the child (crc) recognises four principles that should guide the inter-
pretation of the other articles, and must be taken into account in all matters concerning the rights of 
children. they are: 1) the primacy of the best interests of the child, 2) the prohibition of discrimination, 3) the 
survival and development of the child, and 4) the right to be heard and to have one’s views taken into account.
a number of instruments have been adopted that provide guidance on how these fundamental international 
standards about children and justice should be implemented. these instruments were designed mainly for appli-
cation in formal legal systems, but much of the guidance they contain is also relevant to ijs. the most relevant are 
the standard minimum rules on the administration of juvenile justice and guidelines on justice in matters involv-
ing child Victims and Witnesses of crime.
recognition of and respect for the principles of the crc is linked, to some extent, to the type of ijs, and to the 
nature of the linkages to the formal justice system. ijs that are linked to the formal system such as parajudicial ijs 
often have an obligation to apply legislation as well as traditional law. such ijs including those to which cases of 
juvenile offenders are diverted to avoid formal prosecution tend to have a better understanding of the rights of 
children and are more likely to respect them. however, links with the formal legal system and an obligation to 
respect the legislation does not of itself guarantee full respect for the rights of children.
in many societies, traditional values attribute little or no importance to the opinions and wishes of children, and 
many ijs ignore the right of children to be heard in matters that affect them. in addition, in many systems the 
extended family or the village community, rather than the nuclear family, has the responsibility for protecting 
the child. While this often serves to protect children, problems may arise when issues are brought before ijs. if 
the group responsible for protecting the child is also a party to the dispute, or participates as decision maker, the 
child’s views and interests may not receive a fair and impartial hearing and the outcome might not be in the best 
interests of the child.
boX 4.  participation of Women 
as adJudicators in infor-
maL Jusice systems
in many countries, customary authorities play a 
role in the nomination of candidates for office in 
parajudicial systems, with a judicial service system 
commission or government ministry making or 
approving the final appointment. it is possible to 
introduce affirmative action measures, particu-
larly in parajudicial systems, as have been done 
with the local council courts in uganda and 
the Village courts in Bangladesh and Papua new 
guinea, where quotas for female representation 
have been set. 
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ijs could also enforce norms that are incompatible with rights recognised by the crc. the application of norms 
regarding custody based on the child’s sex and/or age, that fail to take into account the views and best interests of 
the individual, is another example. norms regarding guardianship that perpetuate the practice of child marriages 
are yet another. some ijs discriminate against children born outside of marriage, who have been orphaned or who 
have lost their father. some fail to protect orphans against abuse of property rights by guardians, or fail to protect 
the property rights of widows, which, of course, has an adverse impact on dependent children. the failure of ijs to 
protect such property rights effectively can have profound consequences for the child’s right to development, to 
protection against exploitation and even survival.
reconciling the procedures followed by ijs with notions of procedural due process recognised by international 
human rights law often poses difficult challenges. in the criminal domain, the right of persons accused of a crime 
to legal representation and the confidentiality of proceedings involving children are not always recognised in 
ijs. some ijs apply collective punishments, leading to the punishment of children for the acts of parents or 
other relatives.
Deeply held attitudes regarding the role of children can present a 
major challenge for engaging with ijs. in some communities, chil-
dren are viewed as property under customary norms, and child 
marriages can be seen as matters for the family or local community 
rather than a crime. some ijs tolerate honour killings and killings 
related to sorcery. the limited reach of the formal justice system 
and strength of traditions authorising such violent enforcement of 
customary norms may lead ijs to tolerate such practices, even when 
the ijs do not directly enforce them. equally, however, ijs can be 
more responsive to changing cultural attitudes, such as in uganda 
where there is a preference for taking “defilement” cases before ijs 
because the formal system does not distinguish between sexual 
exploitation of a minor by an adult and consensual sexual relations 
between adolescents.
states have an obligation to make efforts to ensure that ijs respect the rights of children, and the study found 
some examples of such efforts. in south africa, the law reform commission carried out research on the compat-
ibility of customary law with the rights of children before deciding the extent to which legislation would recognise 
customary law. in Bangladesh, legislation bans the application of corporal punishment by ijs. 
it is clear that no single approach will be appropriate for every country, or society. the kinds of measures that may 
help to bring ijs into greater harmony with the rights of children will depend on the nature of the ijs and other 
circumstances, including the interaction between the formal system and the ijs. the most difficult and enduring 
barriers to children’s access to justice are likely to be social and cultural, not formal, such as perceptions of the 
role of the child. familiarity with the attitudes of young people to ijs is also important to understanding children’s 
experience of justice in formal and informal mechanisms. in certain contexts, young people may be aware of the 
real power of ijs, but could feel alienated from the customs or society that the ijs represents. social perceptions of 
children and young people are not static and ijs’ flexibility to adapt to these changes is an important element to 
take into account when engaging with ijs to advance the rights of children.
boX 5.  the right to be 
heard and infor-
maL Jusice systems
ijs can contain recognition and 
elements of children’s right to be 
heard, which can provide the basis  
for dialogue on the issue. in ecuador, 
in ijs cases within the family, the child 
would be represented by someone – 
generally another family member –  
to speak for the child’s interests. 
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c.  programming in informaL Justice systems –  
principLes of engagement
until recently, engagement with ijs was not a part of development interventions in justice systems. consequently, 
there is relatively little documentation on the outcomes and impact of programmatic interventions, although 
there is now more consideration of ijs in sector-wide approaches to justice programming. the study found that, 
despite some overall similarities, a chief characteristic of ijs is their degree of adaptation to their socio-economic, 
political and cultural contexts. consequently, programming for ijs needs to take its outset in the context in which 
they operate, including how they interact with formal systems. in addition, recognition of value of ijs to a society 
or a community and of their flexibility to individual circumstances can help avoid programming that would distort 
the positive elements of the ijs. rigorous analysis of official and unofficial linkages, and explicit policy and opera-
tional choices based on these realities, are thus a prerequisite to programming. What is likely to work or succeed is 
highly context-specific and programmes should be open to a wide range of tools.
attempting to engage with the cultural practices that are expressed in ijs’ demands a multi-pronged and long-term 
approach that is sensitive to local communities’ own priorities for development and survival. as ijs’ programming 
does not occur in isolation to wider justice and human rights engagement, ijs’ engagement should incorporate 
other justice, human rights and development interventions. engagement with ijs may have limited impact unless 
it is part of broader efforts to build dialogue on values and beliefs, for example acceptance of the right of children 
to be heard. thus, the holistic thinking behind sector approaches to formal justice systems, involving complemen-
tary interventions with a number of institutions, needs to be adapted and applied to ijs as players in the provision 
of primary justice.
principLes of programming
1.  Whether to engage with informal Justice systems
at the level of official policy, development organizations have little difficulty in agreeing that all engagement 
with ijs should promote compliance with human rights. strictly applying a criterion not to engage with ijs that 
violate human rights excludes many ijs from potential support, and applying the same criterion to formal systems 
would produce similar difficulties. in particular, the choice of whether to engage with ijs that discriminate against 
women and children is an unavoidable dilemma for development partners wishing to engage with ijs. the ques-
tion should rather be one of openness to adapt to international obligations and changing societal norms. target-
ing or affecting ijs must evidently be premised on realistic prospects of sustainable improvement in the fulfilment 
of human rights, particularly women and children’s rights, underpinned by the principles of ‘do no harm’.
While pragmatism is unavoidable in engagement on the ground, there can be no concessions in principle regard-
ing the minimum international norms against which justice provision is measured. What some may consider the 
best or only choice in one context might be unacceptable in another. in extreme circumstances, programmers may 
boX 6. informaL Jusice systems and chiLd protection
in Papua new guinea, unicef has been working together with the Village courts secretariat within the 
ministry of justice to establish national training documentation, referral, monitoring and evaluation systems 
for village court judges and officers. this encompasses children’s, women’s and other constitutionally guar-
anteed rights and juvenile justice instruments. the study found this to be a positive example where ijs 
providers were incorporated into a child protection system, became familiar with international and constitu-
tional child rights standards, and were placed in a network where they could seek external assistance or refer 
particular cases.
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face a choice between supporting informal justice mechanisms that occasionally allow plainly abusive outcomes 
or countenancing trends that are even worse. a key consideration would be whether the engagement with ijs
would directly or indirectly promote structural discrimination or other human rights violations. engagement with 
ijs would best be based on mutual acceptance of core human rights principles, including gender equality and 
children’s rights, and on a willingness to work to achieve goals that are themselves compatible with human rights.
engagement with ijs should always consider alternatives and should not be a substitute for strengthening national 
justice systems. alternatives to ijs’ engagement could produce stronger justice and human rights outcomes. such 
alternatives could include improving community policing, improving access to first instance and small claims 
courts, increasing community involvement in the formal court system through the employment of lay assessors, 
increasing the use of restorative and non-custodial punishment in criminal cases, and reducing the formality and 
adversarial nature of proceedings in the formal system. the consideration of whether to engage in ijs or in the 
formal system should be based on an understanding of why people do not choose the formal system in the first 
place; there may be engagements with the formal system that could address these barriers far better than working 
with ijs.
2. inclusion of informal Justice systems in sector-Level programming
after deciding that engagement with ijs should be included in justice-sector strategies and programmes, the 
central question concerns the combination and sequencing of various kinds of interventions. to date, however, 
there are few reviews of ijs’ programming to draw upon to assess progress and pitfalls.
many of the lessons that have been learned about justice-sector programming can and should also be applied to 
ijs, including the need to holistically combine various forms of interventions and to coordinate the work of differ-
ent actors and approaches. in a similar way to planning for sector interventions generally, a thorough baseline 
analysis is a necessary starting point if wishing to work with ijs. While planning for support of justice sector institu-
tions requires information on caseloads, resources and linkages as well as needs, programming for informal justice 
demands greater understanding of people’s legal preferences, needs and choices, as well as the cultural, social and 
economic realities that condition these needs. the assessment therefore should consider the whole justice system, 
not ijs in isolation, to encourage an understanding of the boundaries between the justice systems present.
Baseline studies should not only assess the capacities, resources, strengths and weaknesses of the formal and ijs, 
but also explicitly begin by identifying social realities, including the barriers to access to the formal justice system 
and ijs, each systems’ responsiveness to the justice needs of ordinary people, and by disaggregating according 
to social and economic status. the studies would reveal why people choose ijs instead of the formal systems and 
would discuss the attitudes of young people to ijs and whether young people acknowledge the role of the system 
to administer justice that affects them.
it is also important to understand why a state or ‘polity’ chooses to permit or encourage ijs as part of justice provi-
sion. state leaders may have the same or different motivations than users for favouring or allowing ijs. they may 
favour one model over another to achieve political goals, such as to allow a particular group or community a degree 
of autonomy. clarity on national goals and an explicit consideration of these goals by development partners are 
boX 7. eXampLes of baseLine studies
in niger, unicef and national agencies carried out a study on the protection of women’s and children’s 
rights that included analysis of ijs. in 2009, timor-leste conducted an independent needs assessment that 
showed that the formal system suffered from low capacity and outreach (despite important recent improve-
ments) and that the informal system enjoyed familiarity, trust and accessibility. 
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important for programming. Development organisations and governments should guard against simply finding a 
cheap solution to the problem of satisfying the obligation to provide justice (‘poor justice for the poor’), in engag-
ing with both formal systems and ijs. While pragmatic solutions, such as strengthening ijs in communities that 
are geographically isolated from the formal justice system, may be necessary in the medium term, these measures 
should be consistent with a value-based long-term vision of a human rights-based justice system. thus, baseline 
studies should provide the contextual analysis so that any intervention is based on an understanding of the power 
dynamics at play, particularly where certain communities are excluded from access to formal justice systems.
as human rights are a state obligation, the human rights dimension would be a clear part of the analysis at every 
stage of the programming cycle, including at the baseline study and planning phases. Principles of a human 
rights-based approach such as participation, accountability and empowerment can apply equally to the baseline 
study as to the programme of engagement with ijs. the baseline study should involve the participation of repre-
sentatives of grassroots organizations, community groups, national human rights institutions, and gender equality 
bodies where they have the capacity to contribute to the analysis. it can help to determine which issues, wrongs or 
offences the ijs is capable of addressing, as well as the consequences of intervention or non-intervention. Prelimi-
nary assessments of human rights compliance must critically examine ijs’ willingness and ability to change; in 
some contexts, the advancement of human rights would be better achieved through change in the formal justice 
system. just as ijs are dynamic, formal justice systems can be too, as can the public attitudes to both of them. a 
popular mistrust of the formal justice system, for example, may be grounded in recent experiences of conflict or 
authoritarian or corrupt governance and can be addressed directly.
While the study looks primarily at how iJs can be harnessed to improve access to justice, policy will 
occasionally go in the opposite direction: towards the scaling-down of the role and reach of ijs and the 
creation of a more integrated formal court system. for example, social barriers may either prevent women and 
children from taking any steps at all to formally resolve legal problems or from using particular avenues or reme-
dies. this information may be vital in determining the best programming approach. if social custom or pressure 
is discouraging women and children from availing themselves of – otherwise available – formal systems, support 
to ijs may have to balance very carefully between the palliative of attempting to improve ijs’ procedures and 
remedies and the danger of reinforcing the social norms that make it ‘unacceptable’ for women and children to 
seek justice in the formal system.
3. programming in different types of informal Justice systems
the possible modes and means of intervention with ijs will differ significantly, depending on the kind of system 
under consideration. each kind of system is likely to have weaknesses and strengths for programming. govern-
ments are often likely to favour systems linked to state structures, such as state customary courts (community, 
local, traditional) or those linked to administrative systems (e.g., local council courts in uganda), which may have 
the advantages of having administrative procedures and some infrastructure in place, of being easily reachable 
for large integrated programming, and of being somewhat amenable to change and regulation, particularly the 
building of stronger links to formal systems. there may be political considerations or implications inherent in the 
adjudicative and other functions of such bodies. in some cases, these parajudicial systems are based on volun-
tarism and are not always able to deliver on the large expectations placed on them. large-scale programming 
might place further burdens on such ijs.
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custom-based mechanisms would appear to present the advantages of sustainability and legitimacy, having 
stood the test of time and being solidly anchored in communities. they may, however, have difficulties in extend-
ing their reach beyond tightly knit communities that may be small and local. changes in structures, procedures 
and the substantive standards applied by these bodies stand the chance of being adopted by the community and 
thus becoming sustainable. as with all programming, an influx of funds to such mechanisms could create depen-
dency. at first sight, customary or traditional mechanisms are more difficult to reach by development partners, as 
there may be few obvious structures through which programming can be carried out.
like custom-based mechanisms, religious ijs are likely to be relatively sustainable and legitimate within their 
communities. they may offer outcomes that will be respected because of strongly held values, although these 
values may not, or only partly, accord with principles in international human rights law, and religious doctrine 
may be resistant to change. in some countries, there may be either a high degree of state involvement in religious 
affairs or the presence of large and complex organizational structures – often with close links to the state – that 
would make some form of centralized programming initiative possible.
Working with religious ijs could raise sensitivities, but not necessarily more sensitivities than working with other 
ijs. for example, while the issue of women’s right to own land may be a stumbling block with traditional leaders, 
it is rather uncontroversial to many religious authorities. religiously sensitive themes, including women’s repro-
ductive rights, women’s rights upon dissolution of marriage and women’s inheritance rights, may be difficult to 
address at the beginning of a partnership, but issues of procedural equality, children’s rights or improved participa-
tion may be easier to approach. it is important to remember that religion is only one influencing factor of ijs and 
that the application of religious doctrine differs according to social, economic and political factors.
ngo-based village or community mediation schemes, where ngos are able to work in communities to assist them 
in devising new ways of solving disputes based on taught mediation schemes, can be freer of social pressure and 
the interests of powerful groups in the community. the schemes range from confidential forums to open public 
mechanisms adopting elements of traditional mechanisms or of learned mediation practice. these diverse ngo 
mechanisms all have in common that they are in principle based on volunteerism and are free of charge. experi-
ence shows that much work, outreach and time is necessary to build acceptance of such schemes among local 
leaders, including traditional and religious leaders, as well as police and district officials. Where this has been done 
sensitively and carefully, these leaders have usually been well-disposed to the schemes.
boX 8. programming in custom-based Justice systems
the malawi Primary justice Programme of the faith-based organization, catholic commission for justice 
and Peace, is the largest programme with a custom-based ijs in the countries reviewed in this study . the 
programme trained headmen and chiefs in all districts of malawi, and was implemented at the local level 
through local government and ngos. the programme developed a manual for the training (in english 
and chichew) and a case record book for use by traditional adjudicators. the programme also seeks to 
increase knowledge of legal rights among individual men, women and children in the targeted communi-
ties by means of semi-monthly meetings, facilitated by community-based educators. the Primary justice 
Programme likewise facilitates opportunities for cooperation and coordination between chiefs and other 
primary justice actors, including through interaction with court users’ committees. 
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specific programming interventions
under the framework of justice sector programming, the study identified specific interventions, which 
include support in6:
1. state law reform processes to enhance compliance with international human rights guarantees
2. selection and mandate of adjudicators
3. education of adjudicators
4. education of users
5. Procedural regulation and self-regulation
6. accountability mechanisms: transparency, monitoring and oversight
7. linkages among primary justice providers
8. linkages to paralegals and legal aid providers
9. linkages to wider development programming
it is important to emphasize that the programming initiatives described here are in no way exhaustive. one impor-
tant caveat relates to the limited scope of the study, which focuses mainly on ijs rather than on formal justice 
systems, which frequently need greater understanding of ijs and customary law and governance. the country 
studies reveal that formal justice actors often know little about the informal systems that most people use and law 
school curricula, for example, pay little attention to customary law. agents of formal justice systems often attempt 
to fill this gap by gathering knowledge of customary law in ad hoc ways, such as by consulting court personnel 
or others in their immediate circle. supplementing formal justice providers’ knowledge about ijs is a necessary 
element of an overall strategy of engagement on ijs.
1. state Law reform processes to enhance compliance with international human 
rights guarantees
there are synergies between ijs’ programming interventions and 
broader human rights engagement, such as encouraging the rati-
fication, domestication and implementation of international human 
rights instruments, as well as the implementation of recommenda-
tions of international treaty bodies. Programmatic interventions to 
enhance compliance with international human rights guarantees 
may seek to bring ijs more clearly within the ambit of legislative and 
constitutional standards. law reform is one – perhaps limited – way 
to influence structural, normative and procedural standards and 
practices surrounding ijs. as the study reveals widespread failure of 
ijs to comply with formal law, the impact of legislation should not 
be overestimated. success may be more likely where an ijs is directly 
dependent on the state, as in the case of parajudicial ijs’ mecha-
nisms. even so, change is dependent on ijs’ adjudicators’ knowledge 
and understanding of the law, as the literature on ijs as well as the 
findings of the study confirm. second, the study found that the 
question of any possibility of oversight would influence the degree 
and prevalence of respect for the law by ijs.
6 the study’s approach was not to provide an exhaustive list rather a range of options.
boX 9.  LaW reform and 
internationaL 
treaty bodies
When Zambia underwent the univer-
sal Periodic review process of the un 
human rights council, one of the 
recommendations made concerned 
the country’s constitution. the consti-
tution exempts customary law from 
the guarantees for equal treatment 
for women. Zambia supported the 
recommendation of the universal 
Periodic review to strengthen the 
prohibition of discrimination in the 
constitution as part of the constitu-
tional review process in Zambia. 
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linked to law reform is the tool of strategic litigation, which activist organizations can use to bring about change 
in legal standards. Where the legal environment is favourable, strategic litigation can help to change the law, raise 
awareness and build coalitions. national and regional courts as well as global un treaty bodies can be relevant 
here.7 Depending on context, strategic litigation may be an effective strategy to advance the protection of rights. 
in states where the rule of law remains relatively weak, expectations should be realistic as to results.
the process of law reform in iJs does not differ from law reform in other areas, except that it needs to 
take particular account of stakeholder groups that are often far from the policy-making process: the 
rural poor, indigenous communities and women. any attempt at law reform should recognize that norms draw-
ing from religion and/or custom are woven into the fabric of cultural, social and economic life, and are often not 
written down. some sections of the population, including some justice officials, would resist the implementation 
of the required new laws. legal change is not likely to succeed without parallel public outreach and awareness-
raising and, in some circumstances, change must be incremental. transitional measures would be required to 
regulate the situation and status of people who have organized their lives according to existing laws and rules.
law reform or other programming can also attempt to intervene directly in the rules, customs or law applied by 
ijs. this can happen in various ways, although not always successfully. one intervention is laws that limit the appli-
cation of customary laws to certain domains. another is the attempts of the colonial (and the immediate post-
colonial) era at ‘codification’ of custom. in numerous efforts at codification during the immediate post-colonial 
period, governments were quite explicit in their aims of not merely codifying or restating custom, but in actively 
modifying it to suit their values and purposes. this often contributed to rejection of the new codes. there are few 
recent examples of successful codification of customary law, especially across ethnic or tribal groups. thus, legisla-
tion aiming at codification across the board has lost its appeal as a policy option in most contexts.
7  the inter-american and african human rights systems as well as the increasing human rights role of regional judicial organs (under 
the regional economic commissions) are relevant.
boX 10. eXampLe of seLf-statement method
in namibia, the process of ascertaining and recording customary law took place within the community itself 
and resulted in a product created within the community and binding upon it. it consisted of ten steps:
1. identify the target community/ies
2. conduct legal background research with respect to the communities
3. Draft policy on ascertainment of customary law
4. Develop a comprehensive enquiry guide
5. agree with the community on the ascertainment process and structures
6. recruit and train ascertainment assistants
7. conduct and supervise the ascertainment project
8. conduct complementary research on identified communities
9. Promote the compilation of the ascertainment texts
10. Prepare publications in at least two languages (the vernacular and the official languages)
While the process might not be immune to the power of local elite to control the outcome and  
procedures, it contains important participatory mechanisms that can empower community members.
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ascertainment of customary law has also been attempted through the recording of decisions and precedents. 
ascertainment methods that engage communities as a whole accord more with democratic principles and with 
the human rights-based principle of participation. Where the resulting norms and standards are to be applied by 
community-based structures, the ‘self-statement’ method seems to be a good starting point.8 the ascertainment 
process should be open to facilitating any debates about the ijs’ norms and processes for adjudicating disputes 
and whether more open, participatory and accountable processes should be adopted. Where the exercise seeks 
to assist parajudicial systems in ascertaining and applying custom, the human rights-based approach would still 
require consultation of more than tribal elders and local chiefs and would aim at including all members of the 
community, or at least a representative sample of them.
2. selection of adjudicators
a productive area for programming is to increase transparency and equality in the selection of adjudicators. the 
study confirms that measures to encourage gender equality in the selection of adjudicators are critical and will 
strongly influence women’s preferences and access to justice. the approach will necessarily differ according to the 
type of ijs concerned. a state body such as a judicial service commission that plays a role in the selection of ijs’ 
adjudicators for parajudicial mechanisms may be free to rewrite qualification rules and modernize selection proce-
dures, making them more transparent and gender-equal. similarly, it may be able to improve the enforcement of 
rules on disqualification and discipline (including removal) of adjudicators.
Village or community mediation schemes that are initiated by ngos may be able to significantly influence the 
formulation of requirements concerning the qualifications and profiles of community mediators, including require-
ments for gender balance. required qualifications could include educational attainment (both general educa-
tion and specific courses and requirements concerning the function of adjudicators). specialized courses could 
typically include elements and examinations on issues of national law, judicial organization and ethics as well as 
human rights standards.
Where local elders choose traditional leaders and adjudicators, it is difficult to influence selection rules and proce-
dures. nevertheless, these bodies generally do need to be legitimate in the eyes of the communities they serve. 
in some countries, government authorities finally appoint or approve traditional leaders, an arrangement that 
provides state leverage. Village headmen may also be upwardly accountable to a chief or a hierarchy of chiefs. in 
some contexts, women play a key role in choosing traditional leaders. in such contexts, programmatic interventions 
8  for the description of the self-statement method in namibia, the authors are indebted to the paper by Professor hinz and his 
references to the restatement project of the school of oriental and african studies (soas) of the university of london under 
anthony allott. hinz, manfred o., 2009, the ascertainment of customary law: What is it and what is it for?, paper presented at 
conference at usiP, Washington D.c., 18 november 2009.
boX 11.  seLection of adJudicators
in some countries, the state has exercised some leverage over the selection of traditional leaders. in south 
africa, legislation demands that 40 percent of the membership of traditional councils must be democrati-
cally elected and 33.3 percent be female (traditional governance and leadership framework act, 2003).
Village or community mediation schemes that are initiated by ngos, such as the Village mediation Project 
in malawi, may be able to have some influence in relation to the qualifications and profiles of community 
mediators, including in gender balance. in the malawian project, gender balanced selection was done in 
consultation with village headmen and chiefs.
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could attempt to engage with the criteria that women use in choosing a leader and to build on structures to 
enhance accountability through voluntary codes. such engagement will be possible only on the basis of trusting 
relationships with the communities or hierarchies concerned.
3. education of adjudicators
education interventions can target training of current, practicing adjudicators. the content of training can, of 
course, encompass a range of subjects, from guidance on the law in relevant domains, to techniques of documen-
tation, dispute resolution, legal procedure, as well as professional ethics, human rights and judicial organization. 
training could be specific to build the awareness and capacity of adjudicators in relation to children’s and women’s 
rights. training could also be provided to other participants in the proceedings, such as those who represent and 
assist children, fulfilling the right to be heard.
it may be perceived as easier to programme for the education and training of parajudicial adjudicators who are 
recruited, regulated and paid in state structures, than for the ijs’ providers who are not part of the state structure and 
whose jurisdiction, functions and powers are not uniform and regulated. sets of rules, practice guides and manuals 
already exist for adjudicators in many parajudicial systems, and education and training can be matched to these 
functional tools. however, the possibility of working with traditional justice systems should not be discounted. 
the study confirmed that traditional adjudicators are often eager to attend education and training courses. it is 
also notable that where women have succeeded in becoming traditional leaders, they have often been chosen 
because they are among the most successful and well-educated members of their communities.
human rights training is often at the centre of educational efforts in the engagement with ijs. training that is 
contextualized to fit the circumstances and mandate within which adjudication of disputes takes place is more 
effective. for example, training should not focus on abstract principles of constitutional or international law, but 
rather on the rights aspects of the kind of cases that adjudicators encounter. it should be recognized that human 
rights training for ijs’ adjudicators is but one engagement and where ijs is upholding customs or beliefs that 
violate human rights, a broader approach would be more appropriate to address societal attitudes underpinning 
boX 12. programming to address harmfuL traditionaL practices
the malawi human rights commission’s report of 2006 on cultural practices highlighted some key  
recommendations on programming, such as:
1. changing harmful traditional practices is a complex process that must involve all stakeholders,  
including traditional leaders, community members and religious groups that may be reluctant to  
speak out about the practice, and the government.
2. it is important to understand the details of a practice and its cultural underpinnings. offering substitute 
activities or a modified version of a practice is constructive, since the abolition or the practice would 
leave a vacuum.
3. the balance of power must be understood. Women and children may be especially vulnerable because 
of their lower social and economic status. outreach programmes on gender equality targeting all sec-
tors of society need to create public awareness through information.
4. ministries of health should take a leading role in promoting healthy cultural practices by giving advice 
to all participants in cultural practices, such as circumcision, and discouraging the unhygienic practices.
5. education for women is vital to the realization of their rights. unless girls’ education is promoted so that 
they realize their full potential, the status of women in malawi will remain low and women’s rights will 
likely continue to be violated.
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these customs and beliefs. an attempt to modify practices that are deeply culturally embedded may require that 
matters of education, health, protection and justice all be addressed in an integrated manner through interven-
tions that extend far beyond the justice sector.
4. education of users – Legal awareness-raising
the raising of legal awareness and public information outreach efforts targeting the general population can 
usefully be developed in conjunction with the training of adjudicators. strengthening legal awareness extends 
knowledge of rights, provides an important foundation for the community to demand the protection of those 
rights, and offers remedies where those rights have been violated. a lack of awareness and understanding of their 
rights often disproportionately affects the most disadvantaged groups in society, including women, the poor and 
geographically isolated communities. community empowerment through the heightening of legal awareness is 
vital to encouraging ijs to be responsive to the community and mitigates the risk that the ijs could be captured 
by an elite.
many programming initiatives include a legal awareness component, often focusing on educating the community 
on human rights and providing information about the institutions, mechanisms and procedures available to the 
community. Partnership with government or local authorities through the development of communication strate-
gies to promote legal awareness is a useful entry point. ngos also have considerable experience in undertaking 
initiatives to raise legal awareness. such communication strategies should respond to the needs of disadvantaged 
groups by, for example, adopting user-friendly formats in local languages and informing those who face substan-
tial physical, cultural or economic barriers to access.
in some contexts, the use of media, radio and television campaigns are effective. among the other means of 
educating people are street theatre, information kits or flyers on how to initiate legal action or bring a dispute to 
ijs. legal information kiosks or mobile legal clinics can also travel particularly to remote areas to conduct commu-
nity education initiatives on legal rights. trusted and familiar social networks, such as teachers, religious leaders, 
community groups or others with non-legal specialty skills, can substantially contribute to public awareness of the 
law and legal rights. in summary, a legally aware community translates into increased demand and higher expecta-
tion that ijs will deliver justice and be more accountable.
5. procedural regulation and self-regulation
emphasizing international human rights standards in ijs’ procedures offers avenues for interventions. this is 
particularly important for meeting the obligation under the convention on the rights of the child to respect the 
views and interests of children. ijs address many issues, such as ones involving land, custody and guardianship, 
directly relevant to children, so hearing and respecting the views of children is a critical procedural and substantive 
boX 13.  aWareness-raising about viLLage courts in bangLadesh
in Bangladesh, the ministry of local government Division, unDP and the european commission are jointly 
undertaking a programme entitled, activating Village courts in Bangladesh, which supports the justice 
system in 500 selected union Parishads. one key component is a comprehensive community awareness 
programme at the local and national levels on legal rights. using several communication methods, it aims 
to raise awareness about the roles and functions of village courts among potential users, among commu-
nity-based organizations, schoolteachers and religious leaders.
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consideration. Programming can influence ijs’ procedures to better incorporate international guidelines on child 
victims and witnesses, and to all situations where the interests of the child are affected.9 the challenge is to do 
so in such a way that places child rights firmly on the ijs’ agenda without overwhelming and thereby alienating 
ijs’ providers.
Practice manuals and guidelines promote adherence to procedures and are relatively common among paraju-
dicial ijs (though they are often out of date and not always available to all adjudicators), which are generally 
obliged to follow a defined set of procedural, jurisdictional and substantive rules. ngo-sponsored mediation 
schemes may also use manuals and schematic guidelines. improving, updating and distributing such tools are 
worthwhile programming activities and provide greater procedural transparency, consistency and fairness in ijs. 
such guides can be extremely useful, but literacy levels and language proficiency must be taken into account. 
While it is less likely that manuals and guidelines will be used in custom and religion-based ijs, with sufficient time 
and engagement in education at the community level, good practice and procedures can be transmitted without 
written guides.
many countries have national organizations or a state organ where traditional leaders are represented. these struc-
tures could play constructive roles in setting standards for the structures, substantive norms and procedures of ijs, 
for example, through voluntary codes or charters or through advice for and debate with the legislature. encour-
aging the elaboration and adoption of an easily understandable text for ijs with fundamental substantive and 
procedural standards to which ijs’ providers could declare their adherence, could be an initiative capable of broad 
societal reach through national organizations.
6. accountability mechanisms: transparency, monitoring and oversight
accountability in ijs can be strengthened through mechanisms that build greater transparency, oversight and 
monitoring of ijs. requiring or promoting the recording of case outcomes is one measure that can promote trans-
parency, enhance oversight, strengthen enforcement mechanisms and, in some circumstances, promote legal 
certainty. recording is generally useful if the parties obtain copies, and the adjudicator safeguards a record for 
possible future reference. recognizing that legal certainty is a value of formal systems and that ijs will typically be 
more concerned with flexibility and the circumstances of each individual case, it should be noted that the inter-
vention could in some circumstances distort the nature of ijs.
avenues of appeal are effective mechanisms to promote accountability of ijs’ decision makers. the recording of 
decisions can facilitate an appeal or the registration or approval of these decisions by other structures, including 
a formal court. the outcomes of most parajudicial mechanisms are generally subject to appeal to the ordinary 
courts, though, in some instances, cases have to recommence ab initio. tradition- or religion-based systems also 
often have hierarchies of authority through which cases can be appealed.
other than appeal, accountability can involve the monitoring of decisions by outside parties, be they members 
of the public, organizations representing stakeholders, hierarchically superior adjudicators or official inspectors. 
engagement with monitoring systems could be a valuable entry point for programming. the study found that 
parajudicial ijs and ngo-sponsored mediation schemes are most likely to have established mechanisms of inspec-
tion or monitoring. systems that are subject to a defined set of rules and procedures and are directly subordinate 
to state authorities can naturally be more readily inspected than ones that are anchored in community structures 
and operate according to tradition.
9 un guidelines on justice matters involving child Victims and Witnesses of crime,2005.
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Parajudicial systems generally have regulations providing for an 
official inspection and supervision framework, but they are often 
ineffective because supervisory organs lack resources. in some 
countries, supervision of parajudicial systems is also difficult because 
of unclear and overlapping supervisory mandates and the various 
monitoring frameworks are sometimes not coordinated with one 
another. supervision by executive agencies also raises issues of the 
independence of the judiciary. monitoring should take its point of 
departure in the mutually supportive role of ijs and (other) organs 
of the state. it should thus afford providers with an opportunity to 
voice their concerns. a monitoring system that is purely top-down 
and seen by the ijs’ providers as an instrument that only serves to 
criticize them is unlikely to be successful.
requirements of public hearings and open 
admission to the court or adjudication forum, 
including for the general public and observ-
ers from civil society organizations and the 
media, provide clear transparency measures. 
Where recording of decisions is not possi-
ble (perhaps due to literacy levels) or not 
accepted in ijs, public hearings can provide an 
accountability and transparency mechanism 
between ijs and the community. community 
groups, such as grassroots women’s groups, 
can develop their own records of the proceedings and monitor the pattern of the decisions as well as procedures 
followed in ijs. although not appropriate for sensitive cases (possibly where children are involved), public hear-
ings can also strengthen the likelihood of enforcement of ijs’ decisions, as such decisions will be more widely 
known and therefore accepted in the community. a further step would be to involve community groups in the 
decision-making; this could be done through consultation or jury-type assemblies. such mechanisms could allow 
for women’s participation, particularly where women are not represented among ijs’ adjudicators.
monitoring and oversight often require record keeping (and thus literacy) among providers and a clear structure 
that takes account of a set of standards (structural, procedural and normative) against which ijs are to be assessed. 
ijs providers may be working for no or very little compensation, and the imposition of additional work burdens 
may be unwelcome or unrealistic. adjudicators and monitors may need to be trained in the reporting and moni-
toring methodology. these interventions can be costly and must be weighed against the benefits of using similar 
resources for other institutions.
7. Linkages among primary Justice providers
ijs should be seen as operating in conjunction with other avenues of primary justice. in many contexts, there could 
be several kinds of ijs operating in addition to formal systems. the numerous linkages in many countries between 
different primary justice providers, be they functional or norm-/rule-based, official or unofficial, ultimately chal-
lenge any notion of entirely separate and distinct legal systems. the propriety of programming aimed at better 
alignment between formal and informal systems will depend on the context of national justice policy, the jurisdic-
tional division between formal and ijs, and an analysis of the desired and factual links between the two. in certain 
circumstances, the value of promoting linkages will consist of fostering better understanding between the systems 
and allowing for a discussion about division of labour, respective jurisdictions and better mechanisms for referral.
boX 14.  monitoring  
by ngos
unless it is developed in careful 
dialogue with ijs and the community, 
outside monitoring may be seen 
as an unwelcome intrusion into a 
traditional structure. in Bangladesh 
and malawi, ngos were able to gain 
access to traditional ijs by providing 
support and obtaining the trust of the 
leaders and communities.
boX 15. pubLic hearings in bangLadesh
Public hearings can be an effective way to promote enforce-
ment of ijs decisions, including through ensuring publicity 
for the hearings. the Shalish courts in Bangladesh use a 
highly public forum for decision-making and publicizing 
case outcomes. the recording of the decision takes place 
in the minds of community members rather than on paper 
and the collective conscience of the community is commit-
ted to enforcement.
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Programming should look at the totality of actors, preferences and patterns of justice provision at the local level. 
addressing jurisdictional limits, de facto divisions of workload, and patterns of interaction may assist in developing 
useful synergies across different forms of ijs, law enforcement, administrative and political structures, statutory 
courts and legal service providers. for example, programming would not want to encourage ijs to handle serious 
criminal cases, but cooperation between ijs and the formal system may be precisely what is needed to ensure 
that these cases are transferred to the formal system and such referral could quite easily be a ‘goal’ to be achieved 
through the course of an intervention rather than a prerequisite to engagement.10
in some situations, the linkages required are not between ijs and formal justice systems, but between differ-
ent forms of ijs. such linkages would address similar issues such as jurisdictional limits, division of case burden, 
and building greater mutual understanding. Programming can work to build dialogue and mutual understand-
ing between different types of ijs that could lead to a smoother relationship allowing for referral of cases. these 
programming initiatives can serve as a forum for learning and for improvement. the study illustrates that such initi-
atives also promote an interesting spillover effect between different systems, as when women who are educated 
and empowered in relation to one mechanism feel emboldened to work for their rights in relation to others.
ensuring that programmes affect outlying and isolated communities is also an important factor for strengthening 
the provision of justice. many programmes building linkages are in or close to provincial capitals because they are 
close to institutional and political hubs. however, community justice programmes may be especially needed in 
communities where there are no formal mechanisms, particularly if communal violence is an issue. While it might 
be more difficult to achieve results for programming, the establishment or strengthening of ijs in such commu-
nities can have long-term benefits in the form of peace, stability and legal empowerment. in some instances, 
though, the strengthening of ijs would be a temporary measure while formal justice systems develop the capacity 
to reach out and provide appropriate justice services to these communities.
8. Linkages to paralegals and Legal aid providers
Programming that fosters closer relations between ijs and local legal aid providers, such as paralegals, has had 
some positive results. not all ijs will allow legal aid providers to act as representatives in proceedings, but even 
where this is not possible, such providers can advise individuals involved in those proceedings. Paralegals can 
also assume observation roles where proceedings are public. government and non-government actors can be 
involved in making provision for legal aid and paralegal service.11 strategies can include institutionalization of 
community services to draw on law graduates and retired professionals in legal clinics. Paralegals and legal aid 
providers can offer particular services such as advice and assistance about whether a matter needs to be taken 
before a justice system or can be settled in another way. Paralegals can also coordinate referrals to non-legal exper-
tise; for example, some matters might require health care intervention or financial assistance.
10  Wojkowska cites a reduction in forced marriage of widows as the successful outcome of a project in somalia. Wojkowska, ewa 2006: 
how informal justice systems can contribute, oslo: united nations Development Programme, oslo governance centre
11  carried out with the judiciary section responsible for local courts and two ngos that provide legal services to rural women. from 
an unpublished paper entitled ‘summary of reports on monitoring the impact of training local court justices and Paralegals in the 
southern and eastern Provinces of Zambia’, under a gtZ-supported project ‘improvement of the legal status of Women and girls in 
Zambia’, by tina hofstaetter, gtZ, lusaka, july 2006.
boX 16.  interaction among different informaL Justice systems
in malawi, interaction was promoted among the custom-based ijs and the ngo-sponsored Village media-
tion Project. in the areas where both are present, the ngo worked to build relationships between the medi-
ation system and traditional cases. there are indications that an understanding of the division of the case 
burden has arisen; traditional leaders retain land cases, leaving family disputes to the mediators. linkages to 
the police and the formal justice system are also a key part of the Village mediation Project.
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Programming in linking ijs to legal aid and paralegal mechanisms requires particular efforts to ensure sustainabil-
ity and cost-effectiveness. legal aid schemes are usually expensive and governments often do not accord them 
priority. this is where university clinics and the participation of bar associations, paralegals, legal aid providers and 
other public advocates can play a key role and also be a lobby to ensure the continued provision of resources.
9. Linkages to Wider development initiatives
attention to the proper sequencing of development initiatives, as well as respect for the human rights-based 
approach principles of participation and empowerment of local communities and individuals, require that ijs not 
be treated in isolation from other aspects of life and development. the entry point for discussion of justice issues 
can be through vital health, education or livelihood issues, rather than through treating justice as an isolated sector.
Phenomena that are visible in ijs, including discriminatory practices regarding marital and family relations, prop-
erty ownership and inheritance, or superstitious practices and punishments, are not simply expressions of justice 
standards, but are expressions of how societies are structured. the best ways to change this may include broader 
development initiatives in education, livelihoods and public health. Broader development initiatives are also key 
to creating an environment where human rights can be respected and fulfilled. consequently, it is important that 
ijs be included in child protection programmes that work to build protective environments for children. similarly, 
national strategies and action plans to implement crc or ceDaW should include a specific component on engag-
ing with ijs for the implementation of these conventions.
engagement with ijs therefore must be integrated as a component of broader development initiatives. this is an 
oft-ignored area of justice programming, but the efficacy of working with ijs requires that it be complemented 
by engagement with the formal justice system and with development programming that addresses the broader 
social, cultural, political and economic context of ijs.
boX 17.  paraLegaLs and informaL Justice systems
in Zambia, a gtZ training programme of local court justices with the assistance of ngos and together with 
community paralegals helped break down barriers between the two groups. consequently, it became possi-
ble for paralegals to enter into and observe proceedings in local courts and monitor how the justices and 
court personnel treated women. the success indicators measured the degree to which intimidating language 
was used against women and whether women were allowed to speak before the court without being 
accompanied by a male relative, as these were problems observable in the baseline data. 
boX 18. community Justice and confLict resoLution
in eastern highlands and simbu provinces of Papua new guinea, there are a number of communities that 
have successfully resolved communal conflict through the establishment of their own peace-restoring and 
dispute resolution forums. in Kup District of simbu Province, the organization Kup Women for Peace (KWP) 
was founded by a group of women in the village who wanted to fight back against the communal violence 
that was killing their husbands and sons and causing women and girls to live in fear of physical or sexual 
assault. KWP have also provided training on victim’s rights, on the crc and ceDaW to village leaders and to 
village court officials. KWP together with village leaders decided to appoint ‘community police officers’ who 
could be a link between the community and the nearest police station in Kundiawa. 
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introduction
aims and approach
until recently, informal justice systems (ijs) were relatively invisible in development partner-assisted justice system 
interventions. an evaluation of Danish justice sector support in 1999 found that “future justice, constitution and 
legislation assistance needs to be more responsive to existing, informal systems of justice, to understand the local 
context better and to focus more on the local rather than the central level.” the present study follows other efforts 
by governments and multilateral and bilateral development partners to redress this imbalance. specifically, this 
study seeks to:
Produce a consolidated conceptual understanding of ijs based on academic research from different regions and 
countries, particularly from developing countries.
  clarify international normative frameworks and informal justice processes and systems.
  identify the human rights implications of these informal justice processes, particularly concerning the rights of 
women, children, and vulnerable and marginalized groups, and the context in which ijs operate.
  Determine the potential for strengthening in ijs with respect to human rights principles and practices, includ-
ing accountability and transparency mechanisms, and identify key programming opportunities to strengthen 
alignment with human rights standards, including coordination between informal justice processes and formal 
justice systems.
  a framework based on access to justice and a human rights-based approach (hrBa) informs the study’s analysis 
and programming. this entails addressing norms and standards, the accessibility of providers and institutions, 
the effectiveness and fairness of procedures, and the availability and effectiveness of remedies. the access to 
justice factors lead to a rather individualistic approach, which takes less account of societal interests in justice. 
nevertheless, the human rights principles of accountability, participation, equality and the protection of the 
vulnerable can counterbalance this. Participation and accountability have collective and individual dimensions. 
the study also discusses concepts of justice and the relationship between society and the individual, although 
less prominently.
scope: the chaLLenge of defining informaL Justice systems
any attempt to define ijs must acknowledge that it cannot be sufficiently precise and broad to encompass the 
range of systems and mechanisms that could help the un and other agencies develop and improve access to jus-
tice. this study posits the definition as (i) the resolution of disputes and the regulation of conduct by adjudication 
or the assistance of a neutral third party that (ii) is not a part of the judiciary as established by law and/or whose 
substantive, procedural or structural foundation is not primarily based on statutory law.
Within this framework, the study encompasses the principal relevant systems in the countries concerned. the 
definition includes customary, religious and ‘parajudicial’1 systems, as well as mediation schemes supported by 
organizations typically promoting human rights and development goals.
1 the word ‘parajudicial’ is used in the usa to describe personnel such as law clerks and staff attorneys who assist judges in their 
work. the meaning of the word in the present context would be different, as ijs adjudicators officially decide or conciliate in 
cases rather than assist judges to do so, and usually in contexts where judges are not present. the word ‘parajudicial’ would thus 
be analogous to ‘paralegal’, which covers a number of functions where non-professionals provide legal services, usually in the 
absence of legal professionals in developing country contexts. the term is thus useful and here describes adjudicators in state 
sponsored informal and customary systems. thus, the word refers to systems where a court or court-like body is presided over by a 
non-jurist who exercises state judicial authority in a structure that is separate from the judiciary. 
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the definition also imposes certain necessary limitations. systems of great importance for the maintenance of law 
and order, local security and ‘protection’ are not within the scope of this study.2 Because the distinction between 
security and justice in informal systems can be very fluid, this limitation is unavoidable. the country studies looked 
at rural or peri-urban areas rather than typically urban settings. the limitations that this causes for the kinds of sys-
tems studied are likewise acknowledged; for example, phenomena such as ‘town chiefs’ are not studied in depth. 
the study also does not deal with systems used by outlawed organizations or ad hoc groups for maintaining inter-
nal order. While the administration of sets of rules by commercial or professional organizations could in principle 
fit into the definition, such systems did not form part of the study. the definition also excludes processes and 
practices by formal justice sector actors who may employ alternative dispute resolution (aDr).3 While this study 
does not treat these as ijs, the country studies and the main study analyse linkages between formal and informal 
justice processes.
formaLity and informaLity
it is more correct to speak of a continuum between informal and formal justice providers or systems than of a sharp 
set of distinctions. the continuum ranges from different degrees of state recognition and interaction, accountabil-
ity, monitoring and supervision by the state, referral mechanisms and guiding legal or normative frameworks. the 
systems encountered in the context of this study and the literature on this subject show that the notion of ‘formal-
ity’ has different aspects. formality can be measured by different parameters, of which state recognition is only 
one. other parameters include written versus oral procedures and records; written versus oral substantive norms; 
the degree to which the system favours conformity with rules rather than finding solutions satisfactory to the two 
parties; the binding or non-binding nature of outcomes (as seen by state law); and the stability and durability of 
the structures and procedures.
this study does not proceed from the assumption of a dichotomy between ‘state’ and ‘non-state’, as many of the 
systems most used by people have a basis both in state law and regulation or in other forms of state recognition.4
nevertheless, the state/non-state dichotomy is frequently the basis for understanding the separation between the 
two spheres that is shared by communities and officials, and it thus cannot be disregarded. so the study attempts 
to attenuate such a sharp dichotomy by using a ‘continuum of formality’: informality that includes the state/non-
state dichotomy, but does not rely upon it exclusively. the section on the conceptual framework defines this fur-
ther. it is emphasized that no value judgment is intended by the use of the word ‘informal’.
LegaL pLuraLism
this study posits legal pluralism as a fact. such pluralism exists when sets of norms and institutions that people use 
to regulate conduct derive from sources other than state legislation and jurisprudence, and many states legally rec-
ognize these. even in the absence of state recognition, there are many norms and institutions in all countries. this 
is particularly apparent in post-colonial states. the study recognizes that custom and society are ever changing.
Pluralism can engender tension in the different sources of legitimacy existing with a state, ranging from legitimacy 
based on elections, lineage, local authority or on religious faith and learning.
2 for an excellent recent treatment of non-state security systems in developing countries, see Baker, 2010.
3 ‘informal justice systems’ are distinct from alternative dispute resolution. the latter would include informal practices and processes 
by the formal system. the commission of the legal empowerment of the Poor defines informal justice differently, placing 
government-affiliated third-party arbitration systems under the rubric of informal justice. for purposes of policy-making and 
programming, though, it may be relevant to make a clearer distinction with the aid of different terminology for these practices 
and processes. in many countries, and particularly in european and other Western countries, such practices are termed ‘alternative 
dispute resolution’. 
4 on the various parameters that are of relevance in relation to legal pluralism, de sousa santos uses official/unofficial,  
formal/informal, traditional/modern and monocultural/multicultural. see de sousa santos, B., 2006.
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it may be better to conceive of this power rather as ‘authority in the social sphere’ to which people may freely 
submit in conformity with their beliefs and preferences. traditional and religious leaders are not chosen by uni-
versal democratic suffrage of the people over whom they exercise authority. all individuals do not have equal 
ability to put themselves forward as candidates for these ‘offices’. furthermore, traditional leaders might exercise 
their power on assumptions of status, class and gender roles that might be incompatible with principles of non-
discrimination enshrined in the international human rights framework. however, some mechanisms might be in 
place for traditional leaders to be downwardly accountable and participatory, and may offer greater capacity to 
uphold human rights than highly imperfect state structures.
states seek structures that accommodate social, cultural and historical realities. many states rely on sources of 
legitimacy outside democratically elected legitimacy; monarchies and state churches in europe are examples of 
this. moreover, because the mechanisms of participation and accountability in the state structure are sometimes 
highly imperfect, traditional structures enjoy trust and legitimacy at least equal to or even greater than that of state 
organs. colonial and post-colonial states, in most cases, have structurally accommodated authority that may be 
based on indigenous structures or religious authority. the terms of this accommodation and its ultimate aims have 
political and administrative dimensions as well as judicial ones.
the terms of the agreement by which non-state actors may provide security and exercise judicial function are at 
the core of debates on legal pluralism. this study discusses the different models found to manage that agreement. 
some ijs are accommodated by the state on the basis that the ijs are a temporary measure until the state system 
develops the capacity to reach all geographical areas and social and legal domains. in other cases, the assumption 
is that pluralism is fundamental to the recognition of religious, cultural or ethnic identity. in yet other cases, state 
founders might have deliberately not resolved the issue of accommodating pluralism because they thought that 
it was too contentious.
the six country studies carried out under this study, as well as references to other situations, present various per-
spectives on the role of policy and politics in state involvement with ijs. as these studies demonstrate, politics – 
understood as strategies to gain and maintain political power or economic advantage – may be apparent at the 
local as well as the national levels.5 the adjudication of important questions of resource allocation may be a vital 
– and contested – component of the maintenance of power, particularly where it is combined with other forms 
of power.6
typoLogy of informaL Justice systems
this study distinguishes among mechanisms anchored in (i) customary and tribal/clan social structures, (ii) reli-
gious authorities, (iii) local administrative authorities, (iv) specially constituted state customary courts, and (v) com-
munity forums specially trained in conflict resolution and particularly in mediation. types (iii) and (iv) often present 
a hybrid model where officials of a modern state system apply customary norms. nevertheless, these distinctions 
do not fully capture reality, which contain varying mixtures of these elements in which, for example, customary 
and administrative authority are combined.
chapter iV uses this typology as a framework to examine ijs, looking at the composition of the dispute resolution 
body, the relationship to the state, the participation of women, the jurisdictional limits enforced, the substantive 
norms applied, the typical processes used to resolve disputes, and the binding or voluntary nature of outcomes. 
the typology is likewise an important basis for the discussion of programming interventions.
5 see again, DfiD, 2004.
6 see, for example, uganda, huriPec Working Paper no. 12, isBn 9970-511-11-X, ‘local governance and access to justice in Post-
movement uganda’. 
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the linkages and relationships between formal and ijs are examined in this study in terms of functional or oper-
ating linkages, normative and rule-based linkages, and overall state policy. chapter iV shows how links are at so 
many levels and of so many kinds that it is impossible to speak of ‘parallel systems working in isolation from one 
another’. chapter iii compares ijs with comparative law and the world’s main recognized legal families and how 
these typically relate to ijs.
the approach to deaLing With informaL Justice systems  
and human rights
this study assumes that the normative framework of human rights is universally applicable, including to ijs. as 
an-na’im and other scholars have demonstrated, the view that human rights are simply a product of the West is 
no longer tenable.7 the conceptual framework on dealing with the question of universalism and cultural relativ-
ism illustrates that it is more useful today to focus on (i) the relationship between individual rights and collective 
cultural rights and (ii) the issues arising from the ‘translation’ of abstract, general standards and principles of rights 
into concrete contexts where culture, power relations, resources, legal systems and relations all play a role.
When dealing with informal justice and customary law, the human rights world has often exclusively considered 
legislative and constitutional standards, not always coming to grips with the reality of places where the rule of law 
is weak or almost non-existent. the literature on women’s rights and access to justice has gone further, as has a 
growing body of work that critically examines how the intentions of human rights law and policy fare when they 
meet the embedded cultural understandings, social patterns, inadequate institutional resources and political reali-
ties that underlie the challenge of building a state based on the rule of law. some current scholars and researchers 
bring sharp analytical skills to bear on the meeting between (partly) human rights-inspired justice reforms, with 
their paraphernalia of planning frameworks, project language and training methodology, on the one hand, and 
state officials or ngo representatives, on the other. in the analyses in this study, previous debates on universalism 
versus relativism give way to an examination of the two-way process of ‘translation’.
While a critical approach to these issues is valuable, this study assumes that the standards and prescriptions of 
human rights law provide an analytical frame of reference that is systematically applicable to ijs. this may, though, 
be possible only if human rights standards as a whole are applied to the ijs. the analysis should not base its argu-
ments solely on particular violations of human rights, but instead look at issues of structure, process and substantive 
norms and outcomes comprehensively in terms of human rights. in general, criticisms of particular human rights 
violations committed by ijs are unhelpful if they do not consider the human rights strengths and weaknesses of ijs 
together with an honest comparison of the successes, failures and prospects of the formal justice system.
7 an-na’im, a. a., 2000.
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methodoLogy
commissioned by unDP, unicef and un Women, this study comprehensively reviewed the literature related to 
ijs and conducted country-specific case studies. Qualitative and quantitative data collection was carried out in 
Bangladesh, ecuador, malawi, niger, Papua new guinea and uganda. the country studies were selected in consul-
tation with the three un agencies and the methodology was developed through a pilot country study in malawi. 
the country studies were carried out according to a uniform methodology, and identical or very similar categories 
of analysis are used in all of the country studies. interviews of individuals and groups were conducted with vari-
ous stakeholders at the local and national levels, following an interview guide developed for each of the target 
categories. the quantitative part of the country studies included surveys for 1) users of informal justice and 2) 
informal justice providers, following a generic questionnaire format to make it comparable across countries. annex 
1 contains a comprehensive outline of the methodology, including the limitations of the study.
Desk studies of 12 countries were also conducted, based on available literature from academia, un agencies, ngos, 
governments, websites and conferences. as much as possible, the studies were developed in consultation with 
national experts, including scholars and human rights experts, on informal as well as formal justice systems. the 
studies assessed the nature and characteristics of ijs (composition, decision-making, procedure), linkages between 
various justice providers (particularly in relation to the formal justice system), legal frameworks, human rights, and the 
programming efforts of governments, national and international ngos, the un, and other development partners.
the study consists of three parts that look respectively at the background and context of ijs, their operation, and 
programming in relation to them. chapter ii develops the conceptual framework for understanding ijs based on 
theoretical and academic research. chapter iii examines factors influencing the evolution of ijs and how the past 
and present have shaped them. chapter iV sets out a typology of some ijs and examines their characteristics. 
chapter V discusses user preferences and providers’ opinions on the basis of the study’s hypotheses and examines 
how the study’s quantitative methods can be useful. chapter Vi evaluates some key human rights issues that are 
generally applicable to ijs. chapters Vii and Viii then look at women’s and children’s rights, respectively. finally, 
chapter iX considers the implications for programming of the study.
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situating informaL Justice systems
introduction
this chapter provides the conceptual framework for the study and defines and discusses many key concepts and 
issues surrounding ijs. it is not intended as an academic study and cannot do full justice to the variety and depth 
of work of scholars, particularly on the complex issues of legal pluralism and how relativism and universalism relate 
to human rights.
informaL Justice systems – parameters of anaLysis
ijs vary considerably and encompass many concepts. they exhibit different degrees and/or forms of:
1. formality/informality with respect to legal or normative framework, state recognition, appointment and inter-
action, control and accountability mechanisms, and systems of monitoring and supervision, including case 
records, referral procedures, etc.
2. justice, including the perception of justice, conformity of outcomes with legal norms as opposed to ad hoc 
solutions, individual vs. communal justice provision, different objectives of the ijs, the level of compliance 
with human rights standards (both as to process and outcome), etc.
3. system, including the level of standardization of norms and procedures, the level of internal coherence, insti-
tutionalization, guarantees of impartiality, independence and equal treatment, and legitimacy of the office 
holder/judge, including of election or appointment procedures.
related noteworthy studies have attempted to define ijs. unDP has used the term ‘informal’ “when referring to 
dispute resolution mechanisms falling outside the scope of the formal justice system. the term does not fit every 
circumstance, as many terms exist to describe such systems (traditional, indigenous, customary, restorative, popu-
lar), and it is difficult to use a common term to denote the various processes, mechanisms and norms around the 
world. […] the term informal justice system is used here to draw a distinction between state-administered formal 
justice systems and non-state administered informal justice systems.” 8
to address programming needs in nepal, steven golub also employed a practical definition that, if used outside 
the nepali context, would appear to exclude the ‘parajudicial’ systems relevant for this study: “informal justice sys-
tems (ijs) are those types of alternative Dispute resolution (aDr) that operate on the community level, either as 
traditional mechanisms or as those facilitated by ngos.” however, he then broadens the discussion considerably to 
discuss aDr: “alternative dispute resolution (aDr) more broadly than in the present context is used to denote any 
alternative to court trials in settling disputes between individuals. it includes mediation that judges may conduct 
or have conducted by lawyers or other persons and dispute resolution (often arbitration) by quasi-judicial forums 
that decide on issues such as land conflicts. finally, the term includes forums and processes through which com-
munity members help resolve disputes between other persons from their area, including many family matters that 
may have very important implications for the way in which women and children are treated by a community and 
for their human rights.”9
8 Wojkowska, unDP, 2006.
9 Proposed formulation for subcomponent 2.B (access to justice) for Phase iii of Denmark’s human rights and good governance 
Programme (hrggP-3) in nepal, final Draft annexes, paper prepared for DaniDa programming in nepal. the author did not 
necessarily intend this definition to be generally valid for numerous contexts and countries. 
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given the many and ambiguous relationship(s) between the state and the many justice providers in many states 
today, any precise definition that demands distinctness from the state is likely to exclude many mechanisms and 
systems worthy of study. likewise, the terms ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ are multidimensional and subject to interpreta-
tion according to different parameters. Besides the parameter of state control of structures, other parameters of 
norms and procedures include:
1. Whether procedures and records are written or oral
2. Whether substantive norms are written or oral
3. the degree to which the system is oriented toward conformity with rules rather than toward finding solu-
tions satisfactory to the two parties
4. Whether outcomes are binding
5. the stability and durability of the structures and procedures.10
6. thus, neither the ‘state/non-state’ dichotomy nor the ‘formal/informal dichotomy’ is fully satisfactory on its 
own, and the definition must include – but not rely exclusively on – the parameter of state links.
consequently, this study takes as its definition the resolution of disputes and the regulation of conduct by adjudi-
cation or the assistance of a neutral third party that is not a part of the judiciary as established by law and/or whose 
substantive, procedural or structural foundation is not exclusively based on statutory law. nevertheless, these fac-
tors alone would still leave the field very open in terms of the many other systems to be analysed. thus, the systems 
examined are those that have a degree of effectiveness, stability and legitimacy within a relatively broad local or 
national constituency. as stated in the introduction, this study omits systems that national law treats as illegal.
continuum of formaLity/informaLity and state recognition
it is more correct to speak of a continuum between informal and formal justice providers or systems than of a set of 
sharp distinctions. the continuum ranges from different degrees of state recognition and interaction, accountabil-
ity, monitoring and supervision by the state, referral mechanisms and guiding legal or normative frameworks. the 
phrase ‘official/unofficial continuum’ refers to a political-administrative definition of what state law recognizes as 
state-originated (official) and what is not (unofficial). Between these two extremes, there is a continuum of degrees 
of official status granted to ijs and different degrees of linkages to the state, including ijs that were established by 
the state or originated from state institutions. Different types of ijs can shift their position within the continuum 
if there are changes in state legislation.11 the following is a table of the continuum of formality/informality and 
state recognition.
10 the work of yrigoyen fajardo, rady and Phan on cambodia (2007) is among the most useful on the ‘formal/formal dichotomy’. 
forsyth (2007) employs an analytical typology of the relationships between justice orders that is similar to the continuum of state 
recognition below. this is discussed further in the final chapter of this study.
11 consider, for example, the ban that some african states placed on customary courts after gaining independence. 
36
c
H
a
PT
er
  i
i
a stuDy of informal justice systems: access to justice anD human rights
Ta
bl
e:
 C
on
Ti
n
uu
m
 o
f 
fo
rm
al
iT
y/
in
fo
rm
al
iT
y 
an
d 
ST
aT
e 
re
Co
gn
iT
io
n
Sta
te-
ba
nn
ed
 or
 cr
im
ina
lize
d: 
Sy
ste
ms
 or
 pr
ov
ide
rs 
tha
t a
re 
ba
nn
ed
 by
 st
ate
 le
gis
lat
ion
 or
 pr
os
ec
ute
d b
y s
tat
e i
ns
titu
tio
ns
. Th
e o
rig
ins
 
of 
the
se 
IJS
 ar
e u
su
all
y l
oc
al 
for
ms
 of
 vi
gil
an
te 
org
an
iza
tio
ns
 or
, m
ore
 ra
rel
y, t
rad
itio
na
l/c
us
tom
ary
 st
ruc
tur
es.
 Th
ere
 m
ay
 be
 sit
ua
tio
ns
 
wh
ere
 th
ey
 ha
ve
 pr
ev
iou
sly
 en
joy
ed
 so
me
 st
ate
 re
co
gn
itio
n (
su
ch
 as
 cu
sto
ma
ry 
co
ur
ts,
 re
co
gn
ize
d b
y c
olo
nia
l le
gis
lat
ion
, b
ut 
ba
nn
ed
 
by
 so
cia
list
 re
gim
es,
 or
 so
cia
list
 m
ilit
ias
/vi
gil
an
tes
 ba
nn
ed
 by
 de
mo
cra
tic
 re
gim
es)
.
Sta
te-
ori
gin
ate
d: 
Sy
ste
ms
 or
 pr
ov
ide
rs 
tha
t a
re 
en
tire
ly 
co
ns
titu
ted
 by
 st
ate
 la
w,
 w
hic
h 
ref
ers
 by
 de
fin
itio
n t
o f
orm
al 
jus
tic
e s
yst
em
s (
FJS
).
un
of
fi
Ci
al
 
of
fi
Ci
al
No
t S
tat
e-
rec
og
niz
ed
/Ig
no
red
: S
yst
em
s o
r p
rov
ide
rs 
en
tire
ly 
ou
tsi
de
 st
ate
 le
gis
lat
ion
, ig
no
red
 by
 fo
rm
al 
sta
te 
ins
titu
tio
ns
 
an
d t
hu
s w
ith
ou
t e
ve
n i
nfo
rm
al 
co
lla
bo
rat
ion
 be
tw
ee
n F
JS 
an
d I
JS.
 Th
eir
 or
igi
n i
s u
su
all
y t
rad
itio
na
l, c
us
tom
ary
 or
 lo
ca
l, 
bu
t th
ey
 m
ay
 ha
ve
 pr
ev
iou
sly
 en
joy
ed
 so
me
 st
ate
 re
co
gn
i-
tio
n a
nd
 re
gu
lat
ion
 (s
uc
h a
s c
us
tom
ary
 co
ur
ts,
 re
co
gn
ize
d 
by
 co
lon
ial
 le
gis
lat
ion
, b
ut 
ba
nn
ed
 by
 pr
ese
nt 
leg
isla
tio
n, 
or 
so
cia
list
 pe
op
le’s
 co
ur
ts 
cre
ate
d b
y f
orm
er 
leg
isla
tio
n)
.
No
t S
tat
e-
rec
og
niz
ed
/To
ler
ate
d: 
En
tire
ly 
ou
tsi
de
 st
ate
 le
gis
lat
ion
, 
bu
t to
ler
ate
d. 
To
ler
an
ce
 m
ay
 im
ply
 fo
rm
s o
f in
for
ma
l co
lla
bo
rat
ion
 
be
tw
ee
n s
tat
e i
ns
titu
tio
ns
 an
d I
JS.
 Us
ua
lly
 of
 tra
dit
ion
al,
 cu
sto
ma
ry 
or 
loc
al 
ori
gin
, b
ut 
ma
y h
av
e p
rev
iou
sly
 en
joy
ed
 so
me
 st
ate
 re
co
gn
i-
tio
n a
nd
 re
gu
lat
ion
 (e
.g.
, cu
sto
ma
ry 
co
ur
ts,
 re
co
gn
ize
d b
y c
olo
nia
l 
leg
isla
tio
n, 
bu
t b
an
ne
d b
y p
res
en
t le
gis
lat
ion
, o
r s
oc
ial
ist
 pe
op
le’s
 
co
ur
ts 
cre
ate
d b
y f
orm
er 
leg
isla
tio
n)
.
Sta
te-
rec
og
niz
ed
/U
nre
gu
lat
ed
: 
Fu
lly
 re
co
gn
ize
d b
y l
eg
isla
tio
n, 
bu
t 
un
reg
ula
ted
 by
 th
e s
tat
e. 
Re
lat
ive
ly 
au
ton
om
ou
s c
oe
xis
ten
ce
 w
ith
 FJ
S, 
no
 offi
cia
l p
roc
ed
ura
l li
nk
s. M
ay
 
ha
ve
 st
ate
 or
igi
n, 
bu
t m
ore
 of
ten
 
tra
dit
ion
al,
 cu
sto
ma
ry 
or 
loc
al.
Sta
te-
rec
og
niz
ed
/R
eg
ula
ted
: F
ull
y r
ec
og
-
niz
ed
 by
 le
gis
lat
ion
 an
d r
eg
ula
ted
 by
 th
e 
sta
te 
(ap
pe
al 
pro
ce
du
res
, co
mp
lia
nc
e w
ith
 
leg
isla
tio
n m
on
ito
red
, fi
na
nc
ial
 or
 m
ate
-
ria
l su
pp
ort
), b
ut 
co
ex
ist
en
ce
 ra
the
r th
an
 
int
eg
rat
ion
. O
rig
in 
pe
rha
ps
 le
gis
lat
ive
 or
 
tra
dit
ion
al,
 cu
sto
ma
ry 
or 
loc
al.
Sta
te 
int
eg
rat
ion
: In
teg
rat
ed
 in
to 
FJS
, fu
lly
 
rec
og
niz
ed
 by
 le
gis
lat
ion
, b
ut 
diff
eri
ng
 
fro
m 
FJS
 by
 ha
vin
g n
on
-st
ate
 pe
rso
nn
el 
an
d u
sin
g p
roc
ed
ure
s a
nd
 no
rm
s t
ha
t g
o 
be
yo
nd
 st
ate
 la
w.
 Th
e o
rig
in 
of 
the
se 
IJS
 
ma
y b
e e
nti
rel
y b
ase
d o
n s
tat
e l
eg
isla
tio
n 
or 
be
 tra
dit
ion
al.
 cu
sto
ma
ry 
or 
loc
al.
 
fo
rm
al
/i
n
fo
rm
al
 C
on
Ti
n
uu
m
Ad
 ho
c o
r s
po
nta
ne
ou
s G
rou
ps
We
ll-
de
fin
ed
 gr
ou
ps
, o
fte
n b
ase
d o
n e
thn
ic o
r re
gio
na
l id
en
tity
We
ll-
de
fin
ed
 gr
ou
ps
, o
fte
n b
ase
d o
n 
eth
nic
 or
 re
gio
na
l id
en
tity
Pe
rso
na
l ju
ris
dic
tio
n d
ete
rm
ine
d b
y l
eg
isla
-
tio
n (
oft
en
 on
 ba
sis
 of
 id
en
tity
  
or 
ge
og
rap
hy
)
Fix
ed
 in
sti
tut
ion
s
Ne
go
tia
ble
 no
rm
s
No
rm
s a
nd
 st
an
da
rds
 re
lat
ive
ly 
sta
ble
, su
bje
ct 
to 
gra
du
al 
ch
an
ge
 
thr
ou
gh
 in
ter
pre
tat
ion
, so
me
 bo
rro
wi
ng
 fro
m 
sta
te 
sys
tem
No
rm
s a
nd
 st
an
da
rds
 re
lat
ive
ly 
sta
ble
, su
bje
ct 
to 
gra
du
al 
ch
an
ge
 
thr
ou
gh
 in
ter
pre
tat
ion
, so
me
 
bo
rro
wi
ng
 fro
m 
sta
te 
sys
tem
No
rm
s a
nd
 st
an
da
rds
 in
 a 
fra
me
wo
rk 
set
 by
 
sta
te 
leg
isla
tio
n o
r ju
ris
pru
de
nc
e
Fix
ed
 le
ga
l n
orm
s (
co
difi
ed
/st
atu
tor
y/
law
 or
 w
ell
-e
sta
bli
sh
ed
 ju
ris
pru
de
nc
e)
Ne
go
tia
ble
 pr
oc
ed
ure
s
Pro
ce
du
res
 re
lat
ive
ly 
fix
ed
, th
ou
gh
 un
wr
itte
n a
nd
 ca
pa
ble
 of
 ch
an
ge
, 
so
me
 bo
rro
wi
ng
 fro
m 
sta
te 
sys
tem
Pro
ce
du
res
 re
lat
ive
ly 
fix
ed
, th
ou
gh
 
un
wr
itte
n a
nd
 ca
pa
ble
 of
 ch
an
ge
, 
so
me
 bo
rro
wi
ng
 fro
m 
sta
te 
sys
tem
Pro
ce
du
res
 fle
xib
le,
 bu
t w
ith
in 
a f
ram
ew
ork
 
set
 do
wn
 in
 st
ate
 st
an
da
rds
 of
 du
e p
roc
ess
Fix
ed
 pr
oc
ed
ure
s (
by
 st
atu
te)
Ne
go
tia
ble
 pe
na
ltie
s o
r re
me
die
s
Pe
na
ltie
s a
nd
 re
me
die
s r
ela
tiv
ely
 fix
ed
, so
me
 bo
rro
wi
ng
 fro
m 
 
sta
te 
sys
tem
, so
me
 ad
ap
tat
ion
 to
 ca
sh
 ec
on
om
y a
nd
 ot
he
r  
co
nte
mp
ora
ry 
co
nd
itio
ns
Pe
na
ltie
s a
nd
 re
me
die
s r
ela
tiv
ely
 
fix
ed
, so
me
 bo
rro
wi
ng
 fro
m 
sta
te 
sys
tem
, so
me
 ad
ap
tat
ion
 to
 ca
sh
 
ec
on
om
y a
nd
 ot
he
r c
on
tem
po
rar
y 
co
nd
itio
ns
, so
me
 in
for
ma
l re
gu
lat
ion
 
by
 st
ate
 bo
die
s (
e.g
., d
isc
ou
rag
e-
me
nt 
fro
m 
tak
ing
 cr
im
ina
l ca
ses
)
Fix
ed
 pe
na
ltie
s o
r re
me
die
s (
by
 st
atu
te)
Un
sta
ble
 in
sti
tut
ion
/h
igh
ly 
ne
go
tia
ble
Sta
ble
 in
sti
tut
ion
/m
os
tly
 ne
go
tia
ble
 
no
rm
s a
nd
/o
r p
roc
ed
ure
s
Sta
ble
 in
sti
tut
ion
/fi
xe
d &
 ne
go
tia
ble
 
no
rm
s o
r
Pro
ce
du
res
Ve
ry 
sta
ble
 in
sti
tut
ion
/m
os
tly
 fix
ed
37
c
H
a
PT
er
 ii
a stuDy of informal justice systems: access to justice anD human rights
the term ‘informal justice’ may have negative connotations in languages other than english.12 in some contexts, 
including where new ‘plurinational’ constitutional dispensations have been adopted in latin america, the term 
‘informal’ may be resisted because it is seen as an indication of the “lesser” value or status that was sometimes 
accorded to customary or indigenous systems of justice. in those contexts, terms such as ‘indigenous jurisdictions’ 
are preferred. this study assigns no value to the term ‘informal’.
Justice systems
for the purpose of clarity, it is necessary to explore what is meant by ‘justice systems’. there is often a distinction in 
legal writing between ‘legal systems’ and ‘justice systems’. While the notion of a legal system is broad and generally 
considered to encompass the system of laws as such, including principles of how laws and branches of govern-
ment relate to each other, the phrase ‘justice system’ usually has a more limited application, referring to the institu-
tions that interpret, apply and enforce the law rather than to the normative framework of laws applied.
the choice of ‘informal justice systems’ rather than ‘legal systems’ seems more appropriate for this study, as it is 
today rarely possible to speak of ‘informal legal systems’.13 thus, Barbara oomen states that:
“[t]here is no such thing as a ‘system’ of customary law, there is a flexible pool of shared values, ideas about 
right and wrong, and acceptable sources of morality, that are commonly acknowledged and rooted in local 
cultural orientations.”14
even if this view is debatable (and may actually go to the heart of debates on legal pluralism and the nature and 
definition of law), this distinction between justice and legal systems holds for the purposes of the present, practi-
cally oriented study.
the ruLe of LaW
the major legislative and policy documents of many states and international organizations refer to the rule of law and 
any attempt to devise policy or programmatic interventions for ijs may have implications for the rule of law. it would 
be useful to have a definition of this concept. ian Brownlie’s well-known definition includes the following elements:15
1. officials’ action is based upon authority conferred by the law
2. the law conforms to substantial and procedural standards
3. there is a separation of power  – the judiciary is not subject to the executive
4. all legal persons are subject to the law on a basis of equality
5. there is an absence of wide discretionary powers in the government
the united nations secretary-general has proclaimed that the rule of law refers to “a principle of governance in 
which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws 
12 During the niger study, justice actors felt that the term had pejorative connotations. 
13 the customary law frameworks in question (including their normative frameworks) do not fulfil the stringent criteria laid down 
by scholars such as austin, Kelsen or more modern writers such as j. raz (1970) as to what constitutes a legal system. see Kelsen, 
2002. moreover, as the literature on customary law and governance shows, a clear separation of powers is not generally a feature 
of these systems, so that it is often difficult to distinguish clearly between political and legal governance. legislation often takes 
place through a gradual development in adjudicative forums rather than through any distinct legislative process. even in the case 
of religion-based systems of law such as mosaic or islamic law, the field of application today is generally reduced to particular 
domains (especially family and personal law), so that it is no longer really possible to speak of these as complete legal systems. see 
references to the work of authors such as an-na’im below.
14 oomen, B., 2003.
15 see Brownlie, i., 1998.
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that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with 
international human rights norms and standards. it requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the princi-
ples of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, 
separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural 
and legal transparency.”16
these principles are similarly applicable when assessing the accountability of ijs procedures and providers. 
although discussions of legal pluralism are often concerned with the fourth of these elements (i.e., the equality of 
all before the law), all of these elements are useful in assessing ijs on their own terms.
access to Justice
there have also been attempts to define the concept of access to justice. unDP’s 2004 Practice note on the sub-
ject, going beyond mere access to institutions, deals with access to justice as a process leading from grievance to 
remedy and requiring the following elements:
1. legal protection (in terms of the legal framework that sets down acceptable substantive and  
procedural standards)
2. legal awareness
3. legal assistance (of various kinds, including legal aid and counsel)
4. adjudication of disputes
5. enforcement or remedies
6. oversight of the operation of the system
international standards and the work of practitioners and scholars elaborate these elements and their applicable 
criteria. later chapters of this study explore this and, together with the qualitative and quantitative studies, use 
well-established parameters of accessibility, including distance, cost, time and opportunity cost, familiarity and 
complexity of procedures, and social and psychological barriers.
LegaL pLuraLism
Providing accessible justice is thus a state obligation according to (most) national and international human rights 
standards.17 these standards do not necessarily require that all justice provision be centred in state courts or be 
based uniquely on national legislation. ultimately, human rights law is concerned with results – the effectiveness 
of protection and enjoyment of rights – rather than with its sources or mechanisms. thus, human rights law as such 
is not opposed to legal pluralism or ijs.
legal pluralism is a fact, though a complicated one, and this study remains principally neutral on the subject. it 
neither advocates nor opposes development organizations’ promotion of legal pluralism at the expense of a func-
tioning unitary legal order. it does take as its outset, though, that states and international actors are obligated to 
respect, protect and fulfil human rights, including through the provision of justice and legal remedies.
a legally pluralistic approach does not relieve states of their human rights obligations, and it is a potential way to sat-
isfy those rights. a variety of mechanisms for the delivery of justice may present fewer difficulties for human rights 
than a variety of normative sets and frameworks. indeed, a pluralistic approach to normative sets, mechanisms 
16 report of the secretary-general on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and Post-conflict societies,  
un document (s/2004/616).
17 rights to a remedy, a fair trial and equality before the law, among other things, are relevant.
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and systems may provide or even enhance compliance with human rights. the key question concerns how states 
facilitate the compliance with these sets, mechanisms and systems with standards of human rights.
Whereas the notion of informal justice typically focuses on systems and mechanisms, legal pluralism often focuses 
primarily on the normative frameworks and standards applied.18 Besides recognizing or accepting non-formal 
providers of justice, states may also recognize a plurality of normative frameworks applicable to different groups 
or classes of persons in the society, often based on religious or ethnic identity. the various normative frame-
works applied may coincide with the variety of institutions adjudicating disputes and dispensing justice. in some 
instances, the same state court may apply different sets of norms, depending on the religious, ethnic or social iden-
tity of litigants, as is the case when indian or sri lankan courts apply family law on the basis of religious identity. in 
other cases, courts or adjudicative forums apply only one legal framework and may have jurisdiction in relation to 
a particular ethnic or religious group. While the latter situation is within the scope of this study, the former is gener-
ally not.19 thus, while legal pluralism is closely related to this study, it is not identical to it.
some scholars of legal pluralism point out that it is primarily state agents (policy makers, legislators, legal experts 
and judges) who maintain the state vs. non-state dichotomy as the most significant way to distinguish among 
systems of rules. they note that strict distinctions between state law/institutions and non-state norms or systems 
exist only in representations (policies and rules) and do not reflect everyday practice. many cases show that there 
are multiple mergers – an untidy but creative mixing – among sources of law or rules applied by adjudicators and 
that these rules change in relation to each other. the mutually constitutive nature of these legal orders central to 
these scholarly studies renders notions of separate but equal systems of law untenable.20
all countries have legal pluralism; there is no single source of legal rules. anne griffiths, john griffiths21 and others 
have written extensively on pluralism that goes beyond a notion of the state as the only source of law. this applies 
to industrialized Western countries and to developing countries.22 Developing countries often especially exhibit 
this, due to the legacy of colonialism.
the oft-heard call from policy makers for state law and customary law to ‘work better together’ may erroneously 
assume that there are indeed separate but complementary systems, beyond the separations that exist in legisla-
tion. a long tradition of scholarship in legal pluralism has challenged this dualistic notion of law.23 numerous schol-
ars of the post-colonial condition have noted that the plurality of justice providers is not the same as the plurality 
of different, internally coherent systems of law, customs or rules. in its broader version, legal pluralism pertains to a 
situation in which behaviour is pursuant to a legal order that need not be state-centred.
legal pluralism as a policy concept (as recognized in constitutions and laws) may have a clear political dimension. 
adopting a plural legal order may be a way for the state to acknowledge the existence of non-state systems or 
to domesticate non-state or customary justice providers by, for example, limiting their scope of jurisdiction, by 
defining tradition and custom as applying only to certain domains, or by otherwise attempting to ‘domesticate’ 
what is outside the control of the state.24 the concept may also be invoked by ijs’ providers claiming knowledge of 
custom as a source of authority to discriminate against some groups or as the foundation for their claim of spaces 
18 a useful text on the history and development of ’legal pluralism‘ is the chapter by griffiths, a. in Banakar and travers, 2002.
19 even this distinction is nevertheless hard to maintain in practice, and an exception is made in the country study on niger, where 
state courts apply the customary law of the parties. omitting this would result in an incomplete picture in the country study.
20 Demian, m., 2003: 111.
21 1986.
22 ilo convention 169 deals with indigenous law. amnesty international in october 2009 highlighted the case of Khristian oliver in texas, 
usa, where jurors referred to Biblical passages from the old testament in deciding to impose the death penalty in a murder case.
23 see griffiths, a., 1997; and Demian, m., 2003: 111.
24 an-na’im points out how the field of application of islamic law was originally much wider than its most frequent current 
application, which is to matters of family and inheritance. a report of the Zambian law reform commission on the local courts 
leaves no doubt that the government’s intention in creating them was effectively to ‘kill off ’ the traditional justice systems. 
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of power vis-à-vis state officials. Plural legal orders often exist in order to accommodate different religious or ethnic 
traditions in a single state.
universaLism versus reLativism of human rights
the old dichotomy between universalist and (cultural) relativist views of human rights, where representatives of 
both sides of the argument frequently adopted a static view of culture, has lost some of its relevance, given the 
complexity of interactions between the local and the global.25
culture is inherently dynamic, despite occasional tendencies to see it as unchanging. the static view of culture 
is an unfortunate continuation of colonial-era tendencies to attempt to codify culture and to fix structures and 
relationships that were fluid. human rights are not a static, fixed quantity, either. new instruments, interpreta-
tions and understandings emerge from a constant interplay between standards and the legal, social, institutional, 
economic and political contexts in which they are applied. for the most part, this is a positive dynamic, leading 
over the longer term to increased freedom and rights. at the same time, human rights are (a) developed from a 
multiplicity of normative sources, (b) are not uniform, (c) are often contested,26 and (d) are inconsistently applied 
and advocated.
While a main virtue of ijs might be their strong roots in local cultures, it may be a mistake to overemphasize the 
‘local’ element over the variety of possible sources and influences. likewise, migratory movements from rural to 
urban areas or across national borders often transfer norms and practices from one region to another and change 
these norms.27
an excellent brief treatment of recent literature on this subject is in the international council on human rights 
Policy (ichrP) study Plural Legal Orders and Human Rights.28 the present study largely agrees with the viewpoints in 
that study, including on questions of rights within cultural systems.29 further, as the ichrP report notes, the tension 
between culture and rights is a dynamic process rather than a pair of static opposites. People are bearers of culture 
and of rights. they influence one another and the rights paradigm itself is a cultural phenomenon.
today, it is more useful to focus on discussions of (i) the relationship between individual and collective cultural 
rights and (ii) the ‘translation’ of abstract and general standards and principles of rights into concrete contexts 
where culture, power relations and resources, as well as legal systems and relations, play a role. this study sees the 
normative framework of human rights as being universal, including within ijs. however imperfectly realized, the 
wider importance of human rights relates to the prevalence of the nation-state model in the world today.30
recent human rights declarations adopted within the un system, such as the 2007 un Declaration on the rights 
of indigenous Peoples, emphasize the collective right to promote and develop culture, customs and institutions 
in accordance with standards of human rights.31 the ichrP cites authors such as merry, yrigoyen fajardo, charters 
and an-na’im in support of a non-static view of culture that gives room for rights-based social and political devel-
opment within cultures.
25 griffiths, a., 2007; hellum, a., 1999: 418; cowan, Dembour and Wilson, 2001.
26 a recent example of lively contestation is the question of freedom of expression and what was referred to as ’defamation of 
religion‘ up to the 2009 Durban ii conference.
27 see, for example, mobile People, Mobile Law, edited by anne griffith and von Benda-Beckmanns, 2005, ashgate.
28 international council on human rights Policy, 2009.
29 see international council on human rights Policy, 2009, paragraphs 60 – 71.
30 an-na'im, a. a., 2000.
31 see article 34 of the Declaration.
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cuLturaL rights and the LinK to Questions of autonomy, seLf-
determination and sovereignty
article 2 of the convention on the elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (ceDaW) empha-
sises the need to take all appropriate measures to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and prac-
tices that constitute discrimination against women.32 this is relevant particularly in view of the discrimination 
against women that a resort to cultural values may often mask. Dialogue on addressing such discrimination is 
one approach and would have to include and empower women to participate on equal terms. as described in 
the country study, the ecuadorian constitution’s provisions on indigenous justice reflect an emphasis on dialogue:
Article 171 The authorities of the indigenous communities, peoples and nationalities will exercise 
jurisdictional functions, based upon their ancestral traditions and law, within their territorial area, 
with the guaranteed participation of and decision by women. The authorities will apply their own 
norms and procedures for the solution of their internal conflicts, and which are not contrary to the 
Constitution and the human rights recognized in international instruments.
The State guarantees that the decisions of indigenous jurisdiction will be respected by the public 
institutions and authorities. The said decisions will be subject to constitutional control. The Law will 
establish mechanisms of co-ordination and co-operation between the indigenous jurisdiction and 
the ordinary jurisdiction.33
the question of cultural rights and distinct cultural identities is inextricably linked to political debates and strug-
gles on autonomy, separatism and sovereignty. the 2007 un Declaration and instruments such as ilo convention 
169 represent a certain level of international consensus on these issues as they affect indigenous peoples and 
communities. at the time of publication, though, latin american countries, first and foremost, had ratified the 
latter instrument.34 this reflects the important mobilization of indigenous peoples and communities that has taken 
place there since the 1970s and 1980s and the constitutional developments (including the recognition of ‘pluri-
culturalism’ and territorial and collective land rights) that these changes have led to, as discussed in the country 
study on ecuador.35
similarly, article 190 of the 2009 constitution of Bolivia36 in relation to the indigenous native/aboriginal rural juris-
diction provides that:
32 hellum, a., 1999; griffiths, a., 2007; Banda, f., 2004.
33 unofficial translation by Dihr.
34 http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ratifce.pl?c169. there are currently 20 ratifications, 14 of which come from latin america. outside 
latin america, some countries in europe and asia (including nepal and fiji) have ratified the convention. no african countries have 
done so.
35 see Van cott, D. l., 2000.
36 la constitución politica del estado de Bolivia, 2009.  
capítulo cuarto jurisdicción indígena originaria campesina 
Artículo 190. i. las naciones y pueblos indígena originario campesinos ejercerán sus funciones jurisdiccionales y de competencia 
a través de sus autoridades, y aplicarán sus principios, valores culturales, normas y procedimientos propios. ii. la jurisdicción 
indígena originaria campesina respeta el derecho a la vida, el derecho a la defensa y demás derechos y garantías establecidos en 
la presente constitución. Artículo 191. i. la jurisdicción indígena originario campesina se fundamenta en un vínculo particular 
de las personas que son miembros de la respectiva nación o pueblo indígena originario campesino. ii. la jurisdicción indígena 
originario campesina se ejerce en los siguientes ámbitos de vigencia personal, material y territorial: 1. están sujetos a esta 
jurisdicción los miembros de la nación o pueblo indígena originario campesino, sea que actúen como actores o demandado, 
denunciantes o querellantes, denunciados o imputados, recurrentes o recurridos. 2. esta jurisdicción conoce los asuntos 
indígena originario campesinos de conformidad a lo establecido en una ley de Deslinde jurisdiccional. 3. esta jurisdicción se 
aplica a las relaciones y hechos jurídicos que se realizan o cuyos efectos se producen dentro de la jurisdicción de un pueblo 
indígena originario campesino. Artículo 192. i. toda autoridad pública o persona acatará las decisiones de la jurisdicción indígena 
originaria campesina. ii. Para el cumplimiento de las decisiones de la jurisdicción indígena originario campesina, sus autoridades 
podrán solicitar el apoyo de los órganos competentes del estado. iii. el estado promoverá y fortalecerá la justicia indígena 
originaria campesina. la ley de Deslinde jurisdiccional, determinará los mecanismos de coordinación y cooperación entre la 
jurisdicción indígena originaria campesina con la jurisdicción ordinaria y la jurisdicción agroambiental y todas las jurisdicciones 
constitucionalmente reconocidas.
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i. the indigenous native/aboriginal rural nations and peoples exercise their jurisdictional functions and respon-
sibilities through their authorities, and apply their principles, cultural values, own norms and procedures.
ii. the indigenous native/aboriginal rural jurisdiction respects the right to life, and the right to the defence of 
the other rights and guarantees established in the present constitution.
moreover, article 191 defines the users of indigenous justice and the personal, subject matter and territorial juris-
diction of this justice, while also referring to a future law on jurisdictional limits. it is also interesting that public 
authorities and persons must respect indigenous justice decisions and that the state promotes and strengthens 
indigenous ‘native/aboriginal rural jurisdiction’.37
some latin american countries, particularly colombia, have important judicial precedents on constitutional issues 
concerning the relationship between the law and justice systems of indigenous communities and those of the 
non-indigenous majority. the legal protection of rights and the relationship between individual and collective 
rights have been central questions for much of this jurisprudence. issues such as the constitutional, rather than the 
ordinary legislative, basis of the law-making and jurisdictional authority of indigenous peoples and communities 
have come to the fore. colombia’s 1991 constitution was one of the first in latin america to recognize indigenous 
authorities’ exercise of judicial functions.38 the constitution foresaw the adoption of legislation regulating the coor-
dination of jurisdiction between indigenous justice and the ordinary justice system. Due to a failure to pass such 
legislation, the constitutional court had to attempt to regulate aspects of the relationship in its jurisprudence, 
finally settling on a far-reaching interpretation of the judicial autonomy granted to indigenous peoples and com-
munities.39 the discussion of human rights and ijs in chapter Vi deals with some of these issues in greater detail.
When dealing with ijs, the process by which norms, rules and regulations are translated from the international to 
the regional, national and local levels is very important. this process assumes various forms with differing effects 
that involve what sally engle merry has termed the ‘vernacularization’ of human rights.40 as harry englund points 
out,41 people involved in the process of translation may nominally invoke the language of human rights in order to 
create or consolidate unequal social relations.42
the importation of rights frameworks and the ‘translation’ process do not necessarily diminish the position of cus-
tomary law as a normative framework for ijs. there are many similarities between the core values of human rights 
and customary law. in some areas, ijs may offer greater compliance with human rights standards than the formal 
justice system, either normatively or practically.43 the question of the relationship between culture and rights then 
becomes one of how to square norms and practices with human rights without undermining the authority and 
cohesiveness of local communities and their systems of governance.
exploring this question requires an analysis of how values and norms become contextualized and subject to change. 
it also requires an effort to negotiate or adjust the norms, structures and procedures of ijs that do not comply with 
human rights. What was formerly a confrontation may change into a concrete and practical discussion about 
37 translated texts of these provisions are in the ecuador country study.
38 see article 246 of the constitution of colombia.
39 Van cott, D. l, 2000, op cit.
40 merry, s. e., 2006.
41 see Prisoners of Freedom: Human Rights and the African Poor, california series in Public anthropology, 2006.
42 a valuable recent contribution to this literature is State Violence and Human Rights by steffen jensen and andrew jefferson, 2009.
43 this is particularly true of the right to a remedy and to process-oriented rights more generally. ijs generally avoid the violations of 
human rights that are associated with dysfunctional criminal justice systems, such as prolonged detention without trial and poor 
conditions of detention.
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who approaches the informal justice provider and how.44 any approach should begin with a human rights-based 
approach: through dialogue, participation and empowerment rather than in a top-down and invasive manner.
the universaLity and indivisibiLity of human rights
the interdependence and indivisibility of human rights45 are relevant to this study. Practically, it is natural that orally 
based and local systems of governance and justice retain their importance when a large part of the population is 
illiterate and relatively immobile. the inability of many to use systems based on writing may in some ways make 
oral systems more egalitarian than mechanisms that confer power on a small literate elite. even the absence of 
pens, paper and a reliable method of preserving written records may be an obstacle where many users of ijs suffer 
extreme poverty. systems of health and medicine, education, transport and communication are key priorities. the 
development of justice cannot be seen apart from human and social development more generally. respect for 
the guarantees of a legal remedy for human rights violations or for a fair trial requires infrastructure and resources 
as well as education or health services. Development of the requisite infrastructure to meet these guarantees 
requires long-term commitment and planning as well as much coordination, as experience from many justice 
reform programmes shows.46
LegaL pLuraLism and the diversity of normative bases  
of informaL Justice systems
faith-based ijs have a specific mandate or derive their authority from notions of ‘divine authority’ and they are 
examined, like other ijs, from the point of view of access to justice and compliance with human rights standards. 
While the different normative bases of these systems and, in some cases, explicit state commitment to upholding 
religious values (which even leads some states to make formal reservations to international human rights instru-
ments) require special consideration, conformity with international standards of human rights and accessibility 
and amenability to development and change all remain the keys to analysis and discussion in the study.
the country case studies show that faith interacts with custom and state law in various ways. custom is rarely free 
of metaphysical beliefs and religious doctrine often becomes mixed with local tradition. faith and custom are two 
complexly interrelated normative frameworks that often underlie ijs. the study analyses how ‘divine authority’ 
as a normative basis influences how a faith-based informal justice provider administers justice, whether, in fact, 
this makes a significant difference to the provision of justice and the possibilities for influencing justice provi-
sion through policy and programmatic initiatives. another issue is how the ijs function differently, depending on 
whether the state is secular or faith-based, whether the state religion differs from that of the ijs, etc. the context of 
how social actors more generally use faith or religion in their decision-making illustrates this.
When attempting to understand and develop policies or programmes on the roles and mandates of ijs, it is impor-
tant to address each informal justice system not in isolation, but as part of the wider landscape of primary justice 
providers in each particular context. state institutions and the laws that regulate them are significant and the pri-
mary justice providers referred to as representing ijs seldom, if ever, exist in isolation from formal state institutions. 
as subsequent chapters explore, there are multiple layers of overlap, collaboration, competition and/or mutual 
interdependence between state institutions and ijs. the mandates, roles and legitimacy of ijs are often defined 
and understood in relation to the state and its justice institutions. this may be in the form of laws or decrees that 
recognize, regulate and/or establish ijs.
44 this was, for example, the case during a workshop on ijs in relation to a conference on legal aid in africa (rwanda, December 
2008) at which legal practitioners and researchers debated the issue.
45 especially as declared in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of action of 1993.
46 on the need for an integrated approach to development generally, as well as within the particular field of justice reform, see, for 
example, sen, a., 2000, and an-na’im in The Amherst Series in Law, Jurisprudence, and Social Thought, edited by thomas r. Kearns 
and austin sarat.
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understandings of ijs in relation to the state are also manifested in the popular views of users. People’s com-
parisons of ijs to the state courts often determine whether they turn to ijs. moreover, ijs providers often define 
themselves in relation to the state. they can do this positively or negatively: ijs providers may claim to derive their 
authority from their distinctness from the state or from the state’s recognition of them. there is a corollary to this in 
how state justice systems rely on their differences to ijs to constitute their identity.
concepts of Justice
While it is beyond the scope of this study to present a treatise on the many meanings of ‘justice’, it is necessary to 
explore this theme briefly to achieve conceptual clarity.
adJudication, distribution and Justice
this study is generally concerned with ‘adjudicative’ justice, i.e., the settlement of disputes and the sanctioning of 
wrongs against the rights and entitlements of individuals and society. While adjudication will often include disposi-
tions on the distribution of wealth, goods and burdens, justice systems are not the forum in which larger concerns 
of the distribution of wealth and private and public goods in society are determined. thus, social or distributive 
justice on this scale is not the central focus here. nevertheless, economic, social and cultural rights will be relevant 
in the adjudication of private disputes and the state’s responsibilities toward those rights.
restorative and retributive Justice
the notion of adjudicative justice contains elements of restoration and retribution. the balance between these 
is a matter of societal values and political choices, within an overall framework provided by international human 
rights standards. restoration focuses on restoring the victim, the perpetrator and the surrounding society to a pre-
existing or desired balance. retribution may ultimately have the same goal, but the immediate focus may be on 
the necessity of sanctioning a wrong as an instrument to establish social order and the sense of right of the victim. 
it is often motivated by a strong element of deterrence. human rights law places limits on what is acceptable as 
retribution (outlawing the death penalty as well as torture and placing limits on who is liable to be punished and 
for what, especially in the case of juveniles). human rights law also makes certain prescriptions for restoration. in 
the case of juveniles, the requirements are even more pronounced.47 Discussion on this subject sometimes suffers 
from a misleading dualism, whereby ‘Western’ justice is seen as retributive and ‘customary’ justice as restorative. 
in fact, all justice systems contain mixes of both elements and modern justice systems in Western countries are 
replete with restorative elements. it may be true that, in post-colonial countries, only the retributive aspect of state 
justice systems touches the majority of the population, leading to this perception.
pubLic and private, and coLLective and individuaL aspects of Justice
crimes are wrongs against the collective interest of society as well as against the individual victim. society’s inter-
est in deterrence and social harmony can take priority over individual motivations in relation to restoration and 
retribution. the line between public and private is fluid and socially and politically defined. in some legal systems, 
crimes are often also civil wrongs and the adjudication of one of these often influences the other. some wrongs 
that were often traditionally considered to exist in the private sphere, such as domestic violence, have become a 
matter of public concern.
47 this is explored in more detail in chapter Vii on children’s rights and ijs under the heading ‘ijs and children in the criminal 
justice system’.
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the country studies show that the line between crimes and civil wrongs is often blurred in customary law, where 
the nature of ‘society’ as a collective may be based more on extended family, clan and tribe structures than on 
formal states and where the demands of conformity differ accordingly. in the custom of many countries, responsi-
bility for wrongs and the duty to make amends and avoid repetition rests on families, villages or clans rather than 
on individuals. the Papua new guinea country study notes how the rupture caused by a dispute is not considered 
healed through the formal criminal justice system alone and requires reconciliation through the customary social 
structures. even non-criminal matters of private law (such as the regulation of family law) and performance of 
social duties (such as attending funerals or engaging in communal work) are semi-public matters. religions or 
social orders may seek to regulate them for moral or social reasons or because of the influence of societal interests 
and human rights claims related to empowerment.
substantive and proceduraL dimensions of Justice
human rights law imposes a clear set of structural and procedural justice standards, particularly in relation to crimi-
nal law. While not as detailed, there are also clear rules and principles in relation to civil and administrative justice. 
Basic principles such as the obligation to hear both parties on equal terms and the obligation of an adjudicator to 
be impartial perhaps exist in some form in all cultures. a further set of rules applies to particular sets of persons, 
particularly juveniles, and recent human rights law on the rights of persons with disabilities is also relevant.
Beyond the (minimum) standards of human rights law,48 academic work in the study of access to justice empha-
sizes various aspects of procedural justice, subdividing the quality of procedure into the strictly procedural as well 
as the interpersonal and the informational categories.49 substantive justice is closely related to legality at several 
levels, both in relation to entitlements in national legislation and higher-level guarantees in constitutions and 
human rights instruments.
transitionaL Justice
according to the international centre for transitional justice (ictj), transitional justice is a response to systematic 
or widespread violations of human rights. it seeks recognition for victims and promotes possibilities for peace, 
reconciliation and democracy. transitional justice is not a special form of justice, but justice adapted to societies 
transforming themselves after a period of pervasive human rights abuse. in some cases, these transformations 
happen suddenly; in others, they may take place over many decades.50
transitional justice is chiefly concerned with truth, justice and reconciliation at the societal level and the necessity 
of the individual level for truth. an initial focus of the field on the possible tension between political settlements 
and criminal law retribution, increasingly in contexts of societal division and weak rule of law infrastructure, has to 
some extent given way to a broader focus that also includes restoration of economic and social rights and entitle-
ments. nevertheless, this study does not focus on the use of ijs in contexts involving transitional justice.
the concepts defined and presented here should be useful in the discussion and policy debate on ijs. these dis-
cussions are simplified when ijs are seen as a way of supplementing or complementing formal systems that share 
fundamental values. although there are different orientations between formal and informal systems, open con-
sultative processes can reach fundamental agreement on values and aims. more difficult issues arise where value 
sets differ, but dialogue on basic concepts and some values on access to justice can produce greater harmony 
between the systems.
48 see infra, chapter Vi on human rights guarantees in ijs.
49 see Klaming and ivo giesen, Access to Justice: the Quality of the Procedure, university of utrecht, 2008.
50 see the international centre for transitional justice for more information: www.ictj.org , and traditional justice and reconciliation 
after Violent conflict learning from african experiences, international iDea, 2008.
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the infLuence of history and LegaL famiLies
introduction
this chapter explores aspects of how (primarily) civil and common law systems have addressed ijs. many studies 
have noted that the nature of traditional and ijs and the extent to which they are incorporated into formal systems 
largely depends on a given country’s history.51 the commonly accepted view is that the legal system inherited 
from the colonial power and the legal and new state system established during decolonization influenced the 
role and status of customary law and ijs as well as the interaction between ijs and the formal justice system.52
this chapter also briefly examines the distinction between civil law and common law systems inherited from the 
colonial power, and considers whether such a historical perspective and basic legal divide are now relevant for 
programming and working with ijs.
the reLevance and impact of historicaL circumstances on infor-
maL Justice systems and their reLation to formaL Justice systems
richard Dowden summarizes a difference between the British approach of indirect rule and that of french or Por-
tuguese colonialism in africa:
“While the British never pretended that their subject nations would be British, the French and 
Portuguese based their empires on the Roman empire, planning their colonies to be as French as 
Paris, as Portuguese as Lisbon. They created administrative systems in Africa similar to their own 
domestic structures. They tried to turn the chiefs into official administrators. In practice, they still 
had to deal with chiefs as traditional rulers. Under all imperial systems traditional kings and chiefs 
had little direct power, though they could exert considerable influence. If they co-operated with 
the imperial rulers they could become local dictators without the checks and balances of Africa’s 
traditional political systems. On the other hand, if they disobeyed the orders of their imperial 
bosses, traditional rulers were removed and replaced. Most pursued their own interests, helping, 
hindering or obstructing the imperial power as it suited them.”53
the differences to which these two approaches gave rise are still apparent in the country studies. for example, the 
state is deeply involved in the selection and the functions of chiefs in niger (a former french colony) and in the 
application of customary law by ordinary courts. this contrasts with the more ‘hands-off’ approach taken to chiefs 
in some anglophone countries.
it is difficult to generalize about the colonial powers’ influence on the different transitions toward independence 
and ijs. Post-colonial states themselves have influenced the current situation of ijs and their degree of recognition. 
While the intentions of individual colonial powers may have differed, those powers were dealing with locally deter-
mined situations, and it is not clear whether the various colonial projects changed or even intended to change the 
nature of traditional authority.
country examples show that historical processes are relevant for today’s ijs. gundel explains how “[i]n somalia, 
the traditional structures developed and changed hand in hand with the socio-political structures established by 
the colonial rulers. […] the attempts by the modernising independent somali state to suppress and eradicate the 
51 Penal reform international, 2001; schärf, W., 2005; international council on human rights Policy, 2008.
52 mamdani, m., 1996.
53 Dowden, Africa: Altered States, Ordinary Miracles, Portobello Books, london, 2008.
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traditional authority structures failed because the traditional social structures of the somali clan system remained 
vital for the survival, protection and cultural identity of the somalis.”54
When colonies became independent, various transformations occurred. in this respect, “the process by which the 
state configured itself in the decolonisation period, the post-1960s” is important for understanding the nature 
and shape of informal and non-state justice systems in developing countries.55 the maintenance of ties with 
the former colonial master is also relevant. according to mamdani, “[m]ost post-colonial states in africa did not 
fundamentally alter the basic edifice of colonial law except in some cases to alter the basic frame from racial to 
ethnicity or tribal origin”.56
there were two parallel but somewhat opposite trends in the newly independent states. on the one hand, post-
colonial states needed to supervise their existing customary institutions more closely in order to ensure the 
respect of their international obligations, particularly over time as human rights became increasingly enshrined 
in international law. ijs could be seen as a threat to the unity of the new state: “for political elites in fledgling 
independent states, both the diversity of systems and the lack of judicial control were seen as problematic and 
potentially divisive.”57 on the other hand, customary law was gaining legitimacy in some parts of the world as part 
of a movement away from both colonial rule and, later, Western hegemony. the recognition of customary law in 
such cases is also a way to legitimize state authority and to extend that authority throughout the territory: “the 
state may well be seeking to enhance the power and legitimacy of its own law even while riding on the ‘greater 
popular legitimacy’ of the customary.”58
civil law, common law, islamic law and socialist law have often been recognized as the world’s four major legal 
families and all are relevant for the countries in this study. nevertheless, their relevance for the role played by ijs 
in a specific state must be seen in combination with a number of other factors that are particular to the specific 
state context. furthermore, limiting consideration to these four legal families risks denying proper consideration 
of the nature of customary law. for these reasons, there is a brief discussion of typical characteristics of customary 
law below.
none of the four main legal families is monolithic, and the phrase ‘customary law’ also represents a great diversity 
of substantive norms. there are significant differences within each group (for example, both iran and saudi arabia 
have islamic law systems, but observe them very differently) and they have influenced one another for historical 
reasons. there are ‘mixed systems’ that combine aspects of common and civil law systems, as in south africa, scot-
land, the Philippines and Quebec. civil law systems are by no means uniform and can be classified again in major 
subgroups, such as french civil law, german civil law, Polish civil law or scandinavian civil law. the legal systems of 
the socialist law family generally owe a lot to the civil law family.
sociaList systems of LaW
socialist law is based on the ideology of marxism-leninism, and can involve communist Party members who 
play a central role in legal, judicial and political decision-making processes rendering decisions of justice. in this 
system, law is often largely subordinate to Party policy, which was more important than the rule of law. the socialist 
states and legal regimes have often been hostile to sources of law and legitimacy that are anchored outside the 
ruling party. one example is mozambique, where the frelimo revolutionary government abolished the powers 
54 gundel, j., 2006, pp.42-43.
55 schärf, W., 2005.
56 mamdani, 1996, cited in ichrP, 2008.
57 chirayath, 2005: 7.
58 ichrP, 2008.
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of traditional authorities after gaining power in 1975,59 replacing them with local ‘People’s courts’, which, in turn, 
were replaced by community courts or tribunais communitarios in 1994. adaptations to particular circumstances 
of time and place nevertheless temper the overall picture of hostility to custom. socialist power holders’ manner of 
resolving disputes appears to have been pragmatic, especially at local levels and during revolutionary periods. in 
attempts to win support, they often gave room to the resolution of conflicts according to the intuitive sense of the 
local people. in such cases, local custom may have combined with party ideology, at least in the short term. some-
times, the pre-eminence of Party policy, rather than the strict letter of the law, made it easier to adopt a pragmatic 
approach to conflict resolution, as long as this did not conflict with Party directives.60
some authors dealing with legal pluralism in china61 highlight the importance of the traditional use of social 
networks to conduct business (the so-called ‘guanxgi rules’). there are indications that custom remains relevant in 
the settlement of disputes in rural areas of the country. chinese courts, like their counterparts all over the world, 
are overburdened and are attempting to ease case pressures through mediation. an experiment in yaodian that 
attempted to bring justice closer to the rural people of the area introduced ‘special mediators’ who played a variety 
of roles in the administration of justice locally, including mediation and conciliation of disputes. local custom is 
reportedly among the sources used.62
isLamic LaW
islamic law is based on Shari’ah, the primary sources of which are the Qur’an (seen as the word of god) and Sunnah 
(the life of the Prophet mohammed). legal methodology in classical islamic law is closely similar to that of the 
common law system in that islamic scholars’ jurisprudence or interpretation (fiqh), rather than codified legislative 
texts, plays an important role. in modern islamic states, including the islamic republic of iran, though, there is an 
islamic civil code.
in classical islamic law, courts, like all other official institutions, are subordinate to the Shari’ah. in former times, 
islamic law functioned in many legal domains, including contracts, business and economics as well as penal and 
family law, besides regulating matters of social conduct, sexuality, diet, personal hygiene and the religious obliga-
tions of adherents of islam. in several countries of the middle east63 and north africa, as in some West african states, 
religious courts deal with matters of family law and inheritance. in states with large muslim populations, including 
india or lebanon, matters of family law and the personal status of muslims may be left outside the adjudication 
of the courts, being regulated instead by Shari’ah and interpreted and applied by religious authorities. islamic law 
exists also as an informal source of law in some countries, often through customary law and traditional practices, 
as, for example, in West africa (mali, niger, and parts of Benin and Burkina faso). the niger country study looks at 
the confluence of islamic law and customary law, which blends the two traditions across variations among differ-
ent ethnic groups. .
scholars such as an-na’im have pointed out how, in countries with muslim communities, the prevalence of islamic 
norms exclusively in family law is a relatively recent phenomenon, being historically linked to colonialism and the 
59 see, for example, carbone, g. m., 2003.
60 see, for example, Wei, D., 2005. the article refers to the ’ma Xiwu itinerant‘ justice in the 1940s, for which no structures – such as 
court buildings – were necessary. 
61 see, for example, Zhang, j.and jing, y., 2006: 208.
62 ibid. “the ’special mediators‘ are either village cadres, villagers who are recognized as trustworthy, or respected older persons. 
these village elites, after a short training in law, can act as jurors during cases, and as mediators at the court to settle disputes and 
help resolve conflicts, while acting as educators on the law for the population. each village generally has between three and five 
special mediators, chosen jointly by the court and the legal administration of the locality. they carry out several functions. When 
civil cases are heard in the framework of a simple procedure, magistrates have the legal documents conveyed by the mediators, 
and question them about the context of the case and about local customs.
63 including israel.
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emergence of modern nation states.64 according to this view, as Shari’ah ceased to be an overall framework for 
political and economic life as such, its focus and control over matters of personal and family life increased.
civiL and common LaW systems
judges create and develop common law. a decision in a given case depends on decisions in previous cases and 
affects the law to be applied in future cases according to the well known doctrine of stare decisis. When there is 
no authoritative statement of the law, judges have the authority and duty to make law by creating precedent that 
is binding on future decision makers. such setting of precedent frequently considers the prevailing moral views 
and standards in the community. historically, the system has allowed considerable flexibility and local variation, 
notably through the influence of juries. the relatively wide scope given to the judicial role and to community 
standards has perhaps influenced the acceptance of customary and religious law in common law countries. even 
today, customary and religious law enjoys some recognition in the legal system of england and Wales in family 
law, and there has been much public discussion about whether to extend this recognition to religious traditions 
that are newer to the uK.65
in contrast, legislation is the primary source of law in civil law, also known as ‘continental’ or ‘roman’ law. courts 
base their judgements on the provisions of codes and statutes, from which solutions in particular cases are to be 
derived. courts have to reason extensively on the basis of general rules and principles of the code and statutory 
law, which include drawing analogies from statutory provisions to fill lacunae in the law and to achieving coher-
ence. judges are not supposed to or are even forbidden from creating law (according to a strict separation of 
powers). nevertheless, jurisprudence plays an increasing role in civil law systems.
it is well documented that europe had many legal norm systems and justice mechanisms until the renaissance 
and even beyond.66 the continental european tradition’s tendency toward greater centralization and codifica-
tion, going back to roman law and its revival in medieval times, was by its nature less disposed to adopt inputs 
and processes from local custom, which could have disturbed the certainty and uniformity of roman legal doc-
trines. the strong tendency of the napoleonic system toward codification was carried to french colonies in africa 
and beyond.
common law legal systems are widespread in those countries that trace their legal heritage to england, such as 
the united states, and in other former colonies of the British empire, including much of eastern and southern 
africa, india, canada, new Zealand, australia and hong Kong. there is nevertheless an important sub-division 
within this legal family between those countries that followed the us republican model, in which the judiciary has 
a prominent role in adjudicating constitutional (and especially human rights) questions,67 and those that, like the 
uK, stuck to a more traditional notion of parliamentary supremacy. most former British-ruled countries and territo-
ries use common law, except those that other nations had previously colonized.
customary LaW
in an attempt to generalize about customary law in order to consider it alongside legal families, this study notes 
some assertions or postulates about customary law. although these inevitably involve simplification and gen-
eralization, it is perhaps useful in the context of this study to consider customary law as a family on a par with 
64 an-na’im problematizes this development whereby legal norms in one area of life remain anchored (though through modern 
legislation) in religious tradition and are separated from laws governing other aspects of life. see na’im, a. a., 2002.
65 see, for example, BBc news story of 7 february 2008, ‘sharia law in uK is “unavoidable”’, retrieved at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
uk_news/7232661.stm
66 see, for example, tamanaha, 2008.
67 australia, india and the republic of ireland are examples, and the majority of former British colonies do in principle allow for 
constitutional adjudication.
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others. the first assumption is that customary or traditional law generally aims at preserving peace and community 
harmony in a society where people’s attachment to family and clan defines the people themselves, their role and 
their status. customary law will generally value these aims more than the vindication of individual legal claims that 
are founded on a literal reading of the law.68 consequently, there is no clear distinction between criminal and civil 
wrongs, and responsibility for wrongs is placed on collectivities as much as or more than on individuals. second, 
the customary law processes are mostly oral and its procedures flexible and simple. standards of proof are based 
on assumptions of probability. adjudicators are chosen through mechanisms that are often based on status or 
reputation, and sometimes on heredity. the mechanisms to ensure accountability of such providers are often 
found in community bonds, mutual obligations and reputation, so that failure to live up to the demands of fairness 
and impartiality would bring shame and a consequent loss of status. substantive rules are derived from tradition 
that people may think has existed since time immemorial and that common sense and perceptions of community 
consensus then supplement. such rules may be developed and change gradually through negotiation, discus-
sion and the various influences that prevail on the community. the system is often oriented to a local framework 
and a stable social structure that is conscious of well defined social and gender roles, with corresponding rights 
and obligations.
in a report dealing with customary justice forums in malawi, Wilfred schärf and his colleagues observed that cus-
tomary justice was based on the following key principles:
“The constitution of the legal subject is an integral part of a community in which there are ongoing 
reciprocal dependencies. By contrast the state system constitutes the legal subject as a single social 
atom, separated from others and devoid of reciprocal dependencies.
•	 Reconciliation
•	 Restoration of social harmony
•	 The application of traditional and customary law
It is forward-looking towards the maintenance of social harmony rather than backward-looking at 
the act, which precipitated the dispute to be brought to the customary justice forums. The question 
is to what extent the customary justice system applies customary law as opposed to custom. The 
law applied is uncodified and therefore more subject to flux from area to area.”69
the importance of precedent and the roLe of the Judiciary
there are many differences between common law and civil law mainly regarding the place of case law and statu-
tory law, and the place of codification, on the one hand, and the recruitment, training and roles played by judges, 
prosecutors and police (especially in criminal proceedings), on the other hand. nevertheless, the actual differences 
between the two systems are less sharp.
in parallel, the importance of jurisprudence and case law for the development of the law has increased in civil 
law systems, and traditionally common law countries have moved toward increased legislative regulation and 
codification in recent decades, so that the gap between the two systems has narrowed. increased international 
harmonization of legislation and the greater prominence of international judicial organs have also played a role in 
this. some authors point out how conditions in developing countries, where a lack of codified law in many areas 
renders it necessary for the higher courts to play a more active role in determining the law, belie the standardized 
68 see, for example, manfred o. hinz in ‘justice for justice and justice for Peace: legal anthropological observations on traditional 
and informal justice systems’, hinz and mapaure, 2010.
69 see schärf, Banda et al. on malawi, 2002. 
51
c
H
a
PT
er
  i
ii
a stuDy of informal justice systems: access to justice anD human rights
models of common and civil law.70 there are similarities between the more expansive role of the judge in common 
law systems and the latitude given to adjudicators in traditional systems, although the latter would sometimes 
appear to have more latitude in relation to the obligation to follow precedent.
an important feature of international human rights law is that civil law systems generally adhere to a monist 
doctrine concerning the relationship between national and international law. this doctrine proclaims the unity 
of national and international legal orders, so that duly ratified international treaties are immediately applicable 
in national courts on the same basis as national legislation.71 as a general rule, the dualist doctrine prevails in 
countries of the common law tradition. according to this approach, international law is a different sphere of law, 
binding on states in their dealings with one another, but whose guarantees cannot be invoked in national courts 
unless those guarantees have been transformed or incorporated into national law. the doctrine remains a stum-
bling block for the application of international standards in common law countries.
proceduraL distinctions betWeen civiL and common LaW systems
the main distinctions between the civil and common law systems concern the role of judges, the law of evidence, 
and judicial procedures, especially in criminal matters. the highly technical and specialized law of evidence that 
is a feature of common law systems is in many ways a response to the role that juries play as the main arbiter of 
questions of fact.72 in civil law countries, rules of evidence are generally less technical, reflecting trust in the ability 
of judges to sort the testimony heard, and, where relevant, to instruct juries accordingly. the role of juries in civil 
proceedings has declined steadily over the past 150 years in most common law countries with the professionali-
zation of the judiciary and the use of technical experts in many fields. most common law countries in africa have 
moved away from the use of jury trials, with a correspondingly less technical approach to the law of evidence.
even where distinctions remain, there is some evidence of a trend toward convergence. international criminal 
courts and tribunals, such as the international criminal tribunal for the former yugoslavia, the international crimi-
nal tribunal for rwanda and the international criminal court, have adopted features from both systems. especially 
in europe, the influence of the european court of human rights and harmonization efforts under the justice and 
home affairs pillar of the european union have contributed to this convergence. countries like the uK have in 
recent decades introduced reforms owing something to civil law systems, such as the introduction of a specialized 
prosecution service, while trials for minor criminal offences in magistrate’s courts, as well as an increasing number 
of more serious offences in crown courts, are held without juries. reforms to the civil law in common law countries 
have increased the role that judges play in directing civil proceedings by means of case management practices, so 
that the traditional role of the judge as a somewhat passive neutral arbiter has to some extent given way to a more 
proactive role more commonly associated with civil law systems.
a further point of comparison between common and civil law systems relates to an issue of structure. it is well 
known that judges in common law countries are generally chosen from among the more senior ranks of the legal 
profession, rather than, as generally happens in civil law systems, recruited and trained as judges from the begin-
ning of their careers. this is often linked to (a) greater independence of the judiciary in common law systems and 
(b) greater uniformity of practice in civil law systems. in addition, the uK has a long tradition of lay magistrates that 
persists to this day. finally, the role of juries as the exclusive arbiters of fact is a feature of common law systems that 
does not apply in civil law systems. these factors may have influenced the willingness of common law systems to 
‘delegate’ matters of custom to adjudicators outside the realm of the state.
70 jan michiel otto, 1998, op. cit. “in this respect niger’s realities have falsified the grand design of comparative law which 
distinguishes continental law families from common law families by contrasting codified law with judge-made law.” 
71 or, depending on the status given to international legal obligations in constitutional texts, international obligations may have 
primacy over ordinary legislation.
72 in civil law criminal justice systems, judges often determine the facts in cooperation with the jury.
52
c
H
a
PT
er
  i
ii
a stuDy of informal justice systems: access to justice anD human rights
historicaL paraLLeLs to the graduaL convergence of state and 
non-state LaW in post-coLoniaL states?
in europe, the historical development from local systems of law based on the power of communities, feudal lords 
or ecclesiastics toward norms and standards common to larger political units has been long and gradual. Develop-
ments in the rate at which legislation could be passed, communicated and applied have broadly followed devel-
opments in the technology of transport and communication as well as of systems of political and administrative 
control and the political struggle for parliamentary supremacy in legislation.
many of the traditional features of the common law system show clear origins in community or informal justice. 
these include the use of judge-made law and precedent that allow some organic development and local variation 
(with some parallels to the use of customary law), a strong element of community involvement in the extensive 
role of juries, and reliance on local intellectual and social elites in the widespread use of non-professional, non-jurist 
magistrates (or justices of the peace) as judges.
these parallels to the ijs raise the question of whether similar features of ijs can be incorporated into formal 
systems, as this would bridge the gap between the two domains. the formal systems of former British colonies 
introduced some of the popularly rooted features of common law systems, but those features did not survive very 
long after decolonization. Professional judges replaced justices of the peace or lay magistrates in countries such 
as india, Pakistan and malaysia. juries are not prominent in post-colonial common law countries, although lay 
assessors have been re-introduced in post-apartheid south africa and are also used in some other common law 
countries, where they are seen as a way of enhancing popular participation and the legitimacy of the legal system.
the reLevance of the different LegaL systems for the interaction and 
LinKs betWeen the formaL system and the informaL Justice systems
the types of law involved in the interaction between the formal system and ijs is an important issue. in terms of 
judicial organization, there is a difference between the solution adopted in many former British colonies in africa – 
where state ‘customary’ or ‘local’ courts apply customary law73 and remain distinct from the ordinary court system 
– and the chambres coutumières that are part of the ordinary courts of first instance in some countries that were 
formerly french colonies. 74 here, judges of the formal courts apply customary law, usually with the assistance of 
customary assessors. as discussed in the country study on niger, the roles of and relationships between judges 
and customary assessors are also decisive.
the incorporation of informal and customary law as common law in the decision-making process in common law 
systems seems a more likely possibility than an eventual codification of customary law. thus, the stare decisis, or 
precedent system, may offer some opportunities for interaction through the recognition of notions of customary 
law in state courts. the doctrine of precedent, if it succeeds in gaining ground among ijs providers as a system, 
may also help ijs to incorporate norms derived from state law and constitutional and human rights. this study 
contains some examples from Zambia of the interaction between the development of legal doctrines in courts 
applying customary and statutory law. so-called ‘repugnancy clauses’ and what might be called their successors 
that require conformity to constitutional norms can play a role. chirayath observes that “[m]ost colonial regimes 
introduced colonial repugnancy clauses, thereby recognizing customary law only to the extent that it conformed 
to european legal norms. similarly, most african constitutions now recognize customary courts only insofar as they 
do not violate any of the fundamental rights enshrined in state constitutions.”75 While the wording of these clauses 
73 the successors to what were called ‘native’ courts in colonial times.
74 including niger, mali and cameroon.
75 chirayath, 2005: 9.
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may differ slightly between countries that were formerly french and British colonies, their intention is the same. 
there is a legal difference in that the ‘escape clauses’ (from constitutional equality provisions, for example) found in 
some former British colonies are not found in the former french ones.
certain legal systems may be more amenable than others to the incorporation or extension of recognition to ijs. 
nevertheless, the country studies show that the sheer variety of factors at play excludes an analysis solely on the 
basis of this aspect. moreover, civil and common law systems have each found their own ways of interacting with 
customary and informal justice, particularly in the all-important areas of family and real property law. the differ-
ences in outlook are not fundamental, especially given the importance of global standards. the demand for effec-
tive justice institutions from the poorest communities will dictate a continued role for ijs, but the programming 
strategy – specifically, the extent to which a programme energetically promotes links between formal and informal 
justice mechanisms – will vary depending on the operating context.
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toWard a typoLogy of  
informaL Justice systems
introduction
this study speaks of a continuum between informal and formal justice providers or systems rather than of a set of 
sharp distinctions. Depending on their context, different types of ijs occupy different points on the continuum 
between informal and formal according to their structural, procedural and normative features. this chapter pro-
vides a short overview of different categories of ijs outlining their main characteristics, which include composition 
and appointment, sources of legitimacy, organizational structure, process and outcome, linkages to the formal 
system, normative and legal frameworks, monitoring, supervision, appeal mechanisms and fees and costs.
this study considers the following types of ijs:
1. traditional leaders
2. religious leaders
3. local administrators with an adjudicative or mediation function
4. customary or community courts where the adjudicator is not a lawyer
5. community mediators
the first two types will often not have official or formal links to the state, although this may depend on the nature 
of the state. the third and fourth categories involve typical ‘parajudicial’ systems, regulated by law and subject to 
state authority. the fifth category, community mediators, are rarer and play a smaller role than the other providers. 
their function in dispute resolution often originates in initiatives from civil society organizations and systematic 
training programmes, sometimes inspired by human rights principles and national legislative guarantees. in addi-
tion to these five categories, other actors, including paralegals, trade organizations or community groups may 
often resolve disputes on a more ad hoc basis. their work generally falls under the rubric of legal services, occasion-
ally mediating or conciliating disputes, and they sometimes represent one party rather than a neutral third party.
given the great variety of mechanisms around the world and even within particular countries, this typology inevi-
tably involves generalization. often, the border between types is rather fluid. chiefs may function as administrative 
authorities at the local level or the term ‘customary court’ may refer to 1) a local administrator with adjudicative 
functions in one country, 2) a state-established court that is part of the judiciary in another country, and 3) a chief’s 
court in a third. the local courts in uganda fit partly into the two of the types (categories 3 and 4), depending on 
the level of the local court involved. moreover, there may be many systems or mechanisms that do conform to the 
somewhat standardized typology.
in describing the processes that ijs employ, attention needs to be paid not only to the description of the pro-
cess, but also what actually happens. an example is the word ‘mediation’, which is sometimes falsely applied to 
conciliation processes (where an external party encourages the parties to make concessions to bring them closer 
together), or even ‘arbitration’, rather than to mediation per se, whereby a neutral third party, purely by facilitating 
discussion, assists the parties in exploring their interests and needs in order to reach a solution. the madaripur 
mediation model in Bangladesh or the council of the Abunzi in rwanda are examples of ‘meditation’ processes that 
actually have elements of conciliation and arbitration.
the country studies illustrate various processes employed in ijs; some of these are very public, while others are 
closed and private. Depending on the level of public ‘stake’ in the outcome and the precedent it creates, there may 
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be good reasons why people prefer private processes in some cases and public ones in others. in local communi-
ties, social expectations and sanctions may be just as effective as formal enforcement of a court judgment. this 
is especially so for enforcement in more public processes, as in, for example, the madaripur mediation model in 
Bangladesh. on the other hand, some members of the community, particularly women, may appreciate the confi-
dentiality of more private mediation processes that enable them to broach issues that remain socially taboo, as seen 
in the malawi country study. in the malawi country study, women often cited the confidentiality of the process as 
one of the primary reasons for preferring the community-based mediation alternative, as it allowed them to discuss 
issues – domestic violence, for example – they would not be able to take up as part of the dispute in other forums. 
in ecuador, cases are mainly addressed in public at the general assembly of the community, although, in some 
cases (such as in intra-familiar questions), the users interviewed mentioned the possibility of a more private process.
types of informaL Justice systems
traditionaL Leaders
a system of kinship-based leadership provided justice in many developing countries prior to colonization. today, 
this is often referred to as ‘traditional authority’ involving chiefs and headmen. in the colonial period, there was 
often mutual adaptation between the colonizers and these traditional authorities, depending on the ideology and 
policies of the colonizer. many authors on africa, such as mahmood mamdani, have explored how these traditional 
authorities were drawn into state governance, a process that decreased their power in some ways, yet consoli-
dated or even strengthened it in others.76
the persisting influence of the colonial era should not be underestimated in relation to the powers of the chiefs 
and the norms applied by such chiefs’ or headmens’ courts. in the post-colonial period, the formal legal powers of 
chiefs in many countries were severely curtailed, if not abolished outright, as in tanzania and mozambique. since 
the 1990s, many states have returned formal legal powers to chiefs as part of a wider process of recognizing tradi-
tional authority, including in justice enforcement matters, to varying degrees.77
for traditional chiefs, the adjudication of disputes is only one function among many. chiefs and headmen may 
allocate rights concerning land and represent the community, clan or tribe in relations with other groups and offi-
cial state authorities. they may often have certain administrative and law-and-order-related functions on behalf of 
the state.78 at a daily, practical level, development workers and researchers know well that it is necessary to get the 
permission of chiefs before undertaking any activities in communities.
composition and appointment
the local community may elect or select traditional leaders on the basis of moral standing, integrity or heredity. 
in some southern african countries, such as malawi, Zimbabwe and mozambique, there is a combination of these 
two factors: certain families have the right to the chieftaincy, but the person in those families who is seen as the 
best candidate actually is selected. generally, tradition establishes whether a male or female will be chief. most 
chiefs are males, though there are instances of a division of authority between senior males and females. While 
there are few matriarchal societies, some are matrilineal, so that the (male) chieftaincy is passed down through 
76 see, for example, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda, Princeton university Press, 2001.
77 see, for example, Buur and Kyed (2007) and the work of Barbara oomen on south africa.
78 a norwegian funded report on traditional chiefdoms in southern Zambia found that “[t]he traditional leaders are important not 
only as custodians of tradition and custom, but in almost all aspects of people’s lives, as they tend to represent the only authority 
that is within people’s reach. they play an important role in upholding law and order in the chiefdoms. they pass laws, enforce 
them, as well as being the ones people report to in case of an offence or a dispute. the traditional leaders also control land 
allocation, keep a register of the population, call community meetings to discuss issues of importance for the community, and 
will often play a central role in the management of development projects (government as well as ngo projects).” study on drivers 
of change in three chiefdoms of southern Province in Zambia, commissioned by the royal norwegian embassy in lusaka oslo, 
august 2007.
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a female line, and there may be some governmental and important ceremonial functions that women perform. 
there are also some examples of patrilineal societies where females can become chiefs. it is rare for the whole 
population within a given chieftaincy area to have the right to elect chiefs. usually, representatives of the most 
important families in an area participate in elections. Where the state recognizes traditional authority, as in mozam-
bique, Zambia and Zimbabwe, the government has sometimes interfered in the choice of a candidate to suit state 
or political interests, even though this is not part of official procedure. the same occurred during colonial rule.79
in other countries, such as niger, the state will officially and directly play a role in choosing and appointing chiefs.
the ijs will typically be composed of the chief and a (generally elder male) council of elders.80 like the traditional 
authority structure, generally, it will most often exist at several levels, so that a dispute would initially be brought 
to a village headman (often after having been discussed at the family level), with a hierarchy extending through 
zones, districts and chiefdoms. in some cases, there might be a cross-national paramount chief (as with the ngoni 
in southern africa) or a regional government-like structure (as with the Kuta court system in Zambia). While this 
structure exists mainly in africa, there are similarities in the structures in Bangladesh and Papua new guinea.
state Links
the workspace of traditional chiefs may sometimes be physically located in local administration offices.81 the state 
may pay salaries to traditional leaders. Particularly if they undertake administrative tasks in addition to providing 
justice, they are more likely to receive a stipend or a contribution to running costs from the district administration. 
in most cases, though, this is paid only at the top level of the structure (i.e., the chieftaincy). the payment is unlikely 
to be large. Where this is done, the traditional leaders are likely to be linked more closely to the administration 
(executive) than to the district court. Where there is a direct link between the traditional leaders and the formal jus-
tice system in the form of appeal mechanisms and enforcement procedures, the link to the formal justice system 
may be closer. this is generally the case only where the traditional leaders’ courts are legally a part of the judicial 
structure, as in Zimbabwe,82 or, to a lesser degree, where the traditional leaders can nominate or be represented as 
adjudicators in the state system, as in Zambia.
the ecuador study notes that latin american countries are taking a somewhat different direction. the constitu-
tional changes recognizing the traditional councils’ exercise of judicial power could, in some cases, give those 
councils full autonomy to handle cases covering all kinds of subject matter, and the constitutional court may 
exercise the power of review only guardedly.
typical normative frameworks employed and Jurisdiction
traditional leaders generally use custom as the main normative source, but they may combine this with elements 
of statutory law. in some countries, some attempts at codification of customary law may have influenced standards 
and procedures toward greater formalization, and the interaction with formal justice system actors over a long 
time may also have influenced things in this direction. in countries where the state recognizes ijs, traditional lead-
ers are almost always obliged to provide justice in compliance with national legislation and human rights (Kenya, 
Zimbabwe and ethiopia are exceptions). there may, though, be exemptions to equality provisions.83
79 see, for example, Kyed and Buur, 2007. 
80 see country studies on malawi and niger.
81 in the Karamoja region in northeastern uganda, the office of the chief’s council is located on the premises of the district administration.
82 customary law and local courts act, cap. 7:05, laws of Zimbabwe (nos. 2/90, 22/92, 22/95).
83 see chapter Vii on women’s rights and ijs for discussion of the exemption of customary and family law matters from the equal 
treatment clause of the constitution, including in Kenya. one report on the customary system in Kenya states, “[t]here is no specific 
statutory authority, except for a broad mandate under the chiefs’ authority act to maintain law and order. the quasi-judicial 
powers they exercise are not officially recognized, so there are no guidelines and the practice is very uneven from one location to 
the next.” nyamu-musembi, c., 2003, p. 23.
57
c
H
a
PT
er
  i
v
a stuDy of informal justice systems: access to justice anD human rights
the types of cases that traditional headmen’s or chiefs’ courts deal with range from civil cases such as divorce (of 
customary marriages), land disputes and conflicts and inheritance, to severe criminal offences, but this depends 
very much on country context. a distinction should be made between the formal legal powers of chiefs’ courts 
and their actual practices. legislation may have curtailed the powers of chiefs’ courts, and this may be more or less 
effectively enforced. state recognition (especially in africa) may confer authority to deal only with certain types of 
cases, such as certain civil matters and petty crimes.
some country studies (e.g., those of niger, uganda and malawi), show that, even where traditional leaders do 
not try serious criminal cases, they may take preliminary measures, such as detaining suspects in unofficial cells, 
waiting for the police to arrive or waiting for the suspect to be brought to the police (which can take a long time, 
depending on distance and resources). unofficially, though, some chiefs’ courts have tended to continue to handle 
serious criminal cases, despite this having been declared illegal. in Karamoja in the northeastern region of uganda, 
the traditional courts, which are councils of (male) elders, continue to deal with all disputes, including all civil and 
criminal matters, despite attempts to (re)establish the formal structure. specific areas such as witchcraft and land 
disputes may also be under the adjudication of the chiefs, even in countries where state law does not recognize 
witchcraft as an offence or where land tribunals have been created.
typical processes employed and force of outcomes
most often, traditional leaders follow a process of discussion, negotiation and arbitration, with the council of elders. 
the traditional leader conducts the process through which the parties are heard and the traditional leader formally 
makes a final decision on outcome or sanction; this decision is then seen as the consensus. many traditional ijs 
proceed on the basis of a degree of consent from the parties that they will accept a decision of the chief, who may 
be reluctant to embark on an adjudication process without assurances that the parties will abide by the outcome.84 
the process of mediation, which involves listening to the parties and helping them to reach a mutually acceptable 
solution, seldom occurs in such forums. in niger, the law prescribes that chiefs can only conciliate in cases, though 
it is widely acknowledged that they do not confine themselves to this role. one weakness of traditional leaders’ 
systems is that they may apply only to those perceived to be members of the group, so that those falling outside 
clan or lineage structures may have no customary entitlement to protection and thus no right to be heard.85 this 
may also compromise the ability of these systems to deal with inter-group disputes.
only rarely do processes in traditional courts have a formally binding outcome. When they do, this may be due 
to a link to the formal system, so that people know that the decision will be directly enforced through the formal 
system (which is possible in niger if the decision is registered with the court) or where the ijs themselves have 
the authority and the means to enforce a decision. this is the case in Papua new guinea and, to a certain extent, 
in the local courts in sierra leone with the chiefdom police. in some contexts, as in central mozambique, chiefs’ 
courts may also combine binding with non-binding litigation, with the former being enforced through informal 
procedures. for example, in cases involving the violation of sacred places or accusations of taking life through the 
use of witchcraft, the offenders are obliged to pay a fixed fine to the chiefs’ court and to the families of the victim. 
the country studies show that traditional leaders’ ijs often have difficulty in complying with rules and guidelines 
requiring that case outcomes be written and recorded. Where this is a problem, the main obstacles are literacy, 
habit and access to materials. the wish to record a ‘verdict’ may itself distort the character of traditional systems. 
Penal reform international (Pri) notes how traditional processes may often result in mutual apologies, criticism of 
both sides to a dispute, and an airing of the pre-existing hostility between the parties that may underlie the imme-
diate dispute. a written ‘verdict’ may well have difficulty in reflecting this complexity.
84 Penal reform international 2000, p. 32.
85 see international Development law organization 2010.
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Processes in traditional systems are often public. Where the wider community is involved in the process, the public 
presence may also suggest a good way to resolve a case. social pressure may also result from this wider process 
or consensus, bringing the process closer to conciliation or even arbitration rather than to mediation. in some 
instances, traditional justice systems may still resort to ‘supernatural divination’ and ordeals, although this is now 
less common in many countries than before.86
as the Papua new guinea country study illustrates, outcomes are most likely to be restorative, involving the pay-
ment of compensation and the offering of conciliatory gestures, often from both parties, although there may occa-
sionally be the imposition of corporal punishment and banishment. Detention and imprisonment were unknown 
in most societies prior to the arrival of colonial powers, but now exist. Pri reports that ijs do not impose corporal 
punishment on women and girls in traditional justice in sub-saharan africa.87 the country studies uncovered no 
evidence to the contrary.
appeal and oversight
in traditional or customary systems, cases can be referred to a higher level within the same system if the traditional 
leader at the lower level fails to resolve them. Difficult cases may be referred to a higher level before they are tried 
in the lower ‘court’. in countries like nepal, there is a great variety of ijs: almost one informal justice system for each 
ethnic group, of which there are an estimated 96. in this case, the referral options are limited because numerically 
smaller ethnic groups have fewer levels of chiefs within a given structure. there are only a few examples of tradi-
tional systems where monitoring consistently occurs.88
fees and costs
many courts of traditional chiefs charge a fee or demand some form of payment, such as cash, livestock or food, 
for dealing with disputes and hearing cases. some chiefs’ courts also issue fines as punishment. one difficulty with 
this tradition is that no standard payment is set; consequently, one party can try to gain favour by making a better 
offering than the other party. the parties may also cover the cost of paper and pens.
reLigious Leaders
religious organizations are often very interested and involved in justice issues. the commissions on justice and 
Peace (or justice Development and Peace) that operate under the auspices of the catholic church in many coun-
tries frequently provide legal assistance and mediation services may be a part of the package of services offered. 
likewise, many other christian churches and organizations linked to them, such as the yWca or the catholic 
commissions for justice and Peace, often provide legal services to poor people. such involvement of religious 
organizations is often important in programming for primary justice and thus for informal justice. nevertheless, this 
kind of work in itself is beyond the scope of this study, which limits itself to an examination of religious leaders or 
authorities directly adjudicating or settling disputes.
religious officials or leaders often settle disputes in settings of varying formality. People, whether individually, 
in couples or in groups, may consult a religious expert for an answer to questions about the propriety of per-
sonal conduct or other particular questions. more formally, a matter may be submitted to a religious official 
for determination.
86 Pri 2000.
87 ibid., p. 33.
88 one is the ngo-modified Shalish court system in Bangladesh. here, of course, ngos rather than the state do the monitoring, 
which is therefore not official. in addition, it is debatable whether these courts are a traditional system. the heavily regulated 
gacaca genocide courts in rwanda were subject to a relatively rigorous monitoring system, with a specially constituted unit in the 
country’s supreme court, in addition to monitoring by national and international ngos and a high level of research interest. this 
modernized version of gacaca could hardly be deemed a traditional system, though.
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there are few examples of religious courts on matters affecting lay people outside islam. jews in many countries 
refer to religious authorities (beth din courts) on some matters of family law. in some countries, such as israel and 
the united Kingdom, legal recognition is given to settlements reached in these frameworks. catholics may occa-
sionally seek the annulment of a catholic marriage, and canon law procedure and rules deal with this.
the significance of all of these examples (and probably others) of ‘legal’ approaches pales in comparison to the 
role of shari’ah law and of religious officials in islam. islamic law is generally considered to be one of the major 
world legal traditions. millions of muslims in many countries rely on shari’ah courts and the precise prescriptions 
of Qur’anic religious law or other islamic sources of interpretation to settle various questions, particularly ones of 
family law and inheritance. in its consideration of religion-based ijs, this study thus exclusively treats the role of 
islamic courts and religious officials.
composition and appointment
Imams, cadis (judges) or marabouts (religious leader or teachers) are not usually members of an organized clergy, 
but rather are community leaders recognized and locally selected for their piety and knowledge. Depending on 
the size of a particular mosque or muslim community, a local imam or cadi may interpret or apply islamic law. simi-
larly, the judgement of scholars, who are variously called sheikhs or muftis, may be sought to pass judgement and 
to formulate general interpretations (fatwas) on different questions.
state Links
given the variety of countries where islamic law is practiced in some way or another, it is difficult to generalize 
about its relations to the state. many secular states with large muslim communities employ normative legal plu-
ralism, whereby a set of state laws that incorporate precepts of islam governs matters of family law and personal 
status. the country study of niger shows that state links are unofficial but deeply embedded. this is distinct from 
countries that explicitly proclaim adherence to islam, such as saudi arabia, iran or sudan, or parts of federal states, 
such as nigeria, where Shari’ah-based penal laws are in force and generally applicable.
some other countries permit legal recognition of arbitration settlements reached by religious bodies or officials. 
in recent years, countries such as canada have had vigorous public debate about recognizing such settlements. in 
tanzania, state courts apply muslim religious law in family matters. other countries, such as lebanon, may assign 
responsibility for family and inheritance law to religious courts for the muslim community, with parallel arrange-
ments for other religious communities. the legislation of some states allows a choice between civil or religious 
marriage and family law regimes. Kenya, for example, allows muslims to regulate matters of personal status in 
religious courts under islamic laws. the courts and legislations of some states have left marriage and family law 
relatively unregulated, leaving the field mainly to religious law and authority.
typical normative frameworks employed and Jurisdiction
there are a few countries where islamic law applies to penal matters. today, family law (marriage, divorce, guard-
ianship) and inheritance matters are the main fields in which islamic law applies. the laws and constitutions of 
many predominantly muslim countries formally recognize the legal determinations of islamic religious authorities 
in these fields. the normative frameworks applied generally have their basis in the Qur’an and other sources of 
islamic law, as interpreted by religious scholars of the different islamic traditions. the more direct source of law in 
some countries, such as in egypt and morocco, may be codified family and inheritance law, which, while rooted in 
the Qur’an, has been somewhat modified.
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typical processes employed and force of outcomes
Proceedings of religious-based ijs are generally in vernacular languages, though senior religious officials will often 
be conversant in arabic. in matters likely to have a clear legal interpretation, adjudication by a religious authority 
is likely to have the character of a ruling, and thus to be somewhat akin to an arbitration or litigation process. it is 
nevertheless very possible that particular imams or other religious authorities or advisers will attempt to reconcile 
the parties, perhaps through a mediation-like process within the framework of a clear set of values. in niger, most 
religious officials interviewed clearly favoured doing everything possible to promote reconciliation in marital dis-
putes and emphasized the importance of the ’cooling off‘ period set down in islamic law regarding repudiation 
of a wife. the combined roles of legal authority and spiritual and social adviser may result in a holistic approach to 
problem solving.
the process is unlikely to be public. settlements or decisions may gain their force from the authority of the reli-
gious official within the community. Depending on the relations between the state and religious authorities, state 
authorities may officially or unofficially recognize and enforce such settlements.
appeal and oversight
in some countries, it is unlikely that the state will supervise religious courts, though a government ministry may 
exercise general oversight of the activities of religious communities (as in egypt and turkey). it may be possible to 
refer matters of legal interpretation from a local mosque to a higher religious authority.
fees and costs
Practice regarding fees and costs vary greatly. in countries where religious courts are formal (as in jordan and 
malaysia), court fees are payable. Where the system is a non-state ijs, donations may be given or expected. in niger, 
there were some reports of payment of ‘summons fees’ to islamic organizations or payment of a share of the value 
of the litigation. Payment may be waived for poorer people.
LocaL administrators With an adJudicative function
many places in africa and asia have a decentralized government structure in which the lowest level consists of 
local administrators. these administrative structures may either be established by the modern state or confer state 
functions on traditional governance chiefs, systems and structures. this continues, to some degree, the model 
established in colonial times and is especially true of former British colonies. in several countries of southern africa, 
the pre-existing ‘traditional or customary authorities’ (as they are called in malawi) have been engaged as local 
administrators. the pattern in malawi is broadly similar to that found elsewhere in southern africa, including in 
mozambique and Zimbabwe. local administrators take on tasks such as sensitizing community members on 
development issues, election issues and/or other issues.
Where courts and other state authorities are distant, a government official may enjoy much status and power in 
the community, so that people turn to the official’s authority to solve a dispute. in this way, local officials have long 
helped to solve local disputes, even those that are unrelated to the exercise of administrative power. in some coun-
tries, this role has been formalized so that local officials are formally authorized to solve disputes either through 
mediation or with some binding force. in ecuador, local administrators formerly had an adjudicative function, 
which has now been abolished by law.
in uganda, the judicial tribunals of the kingdoms were abolished when the country became independent. the 
local council system (initially the resistance committee council and court system), springing from its revo-
lutionary origins in the national resistance movement (nrm) insurgency, was established nationwide with an 
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adjudicative function from its origin.89 the local council courts (lc courts) were set up to provide ‘grassroots’ jus-
tice, to ‘popularize’ the administration of justice, and to reconnect the people with their customary traditions.90
the local council system introduced important innovations, especially in the representation of women, requiring 
that a minimum of 30 percent of representatives be women and that the roles of chair and vice-chair be equally 
distributed between men and women.
composition and appointment
local administrators with adjudicative functions may be popularly elected, as in the Philippines or in uganda. they 
can also be administratively appointed, as with the administrative officials in malawi and mozambique, who often 
settle disputes like in many other developing countries. in many instances, they may be fulfilling an adjudicative 
function without a clear legal basis to do so. the administrators’ close links with the executive branch are a major 
challenge for this type of mechanism. in uganda at the village and parish levels, the lc court is entirely comprised 
of members of the executive committee elected in local elections. at the district level and above, the executive 
committee appoints the members of the lc court. the village courts in Bangladesh present an interesting model, 
whereby five-member panels are composed on a case-by-case basis with the participation of the parties, with 
representation by elected Union Parishad (uP) representatives and members of the community. Parties to a case 
can claim that the uP chairman is disqualified due to potential bias.
state Links
local administrators are typically salaried by the district or sub-regional administration, although the salary may 
be insufficient as full-time employment and many local administrators at the village level have other sources of 
income, such as farming (in addition to income-generating court functions). in uganda, the principle of voluntari-
ness in the lc court system is emphasized where only the pper levels of the system receive an allowance or salary. 
inadequate ‘facilitation’ (provision of support and resources) of lc court officials is usually the reason for the failure 
to comply with the fee structure, with much higher fees charged for the services and incidents of corruption. in 
the countries where this model is prevalent, there is a persistent question about the government agency or agen-
cies to which the courts belong. there are often links to ministries responsible for local government (Bangladesh, 
uganda), but many respondents believe that it is desirable to strengthen institutional links to the judiciary and the 
ministry for justice. as mentioned above, the combination of executive, political and judicial functions gives rise 
to difficulties.
typical normative frameworks employed and Jurisdiction
in principle, these adjudicative bodies should usually settle civil disputes without violating state law. legal texts are 
seldom available, known or understood. local custom and a pragmatic approach to dispute settlement are likely 
to be paramount. generally, bodies such as these are supposed to confine themselves to civil matters and petty 
crimes (as in uganda and Bangladesh). the lc courts in uganda have sometimes been criticized for overstepping 
their legal mandate and deciding matters of criminal law. in both uganda and Bangladesh, the restricted jurisdic-
tion of courts at this level motivated litigants to take their cases ‘downward’ to informal village-level Shalish courts 
rather than, as intended, upward to the District courts.
typical processes employed and force of outcomes
the types of processes and the force of decisions or outcomes vary, often depending on the degree of state control 
and involvement, but also on the levels of literacy and the seriousness of the matter. the lc courts in uganda reach 
formal decisions after public hearings that resemble court hearings, though without technical rules of evidence 
89 the 2006 local council courts act now governs lc courts.
90 Kane, oloka-onyango and cole, 2005.
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or legal representation; decisions are binding. Decisions of the Barangay justice system in the Philippines are like 
binding arbitration settlements that the courts can enforce. hearings do not resort to rules of evidence. legal 
representation is generally not allowed.
appeal and oversight
in uganda, lc court decisions can be appealed through the lc court system up to the chief magistrate. the chief 
magistrate, who is supposed to visit to check records and orders issued by the lc courts, has the legal mandate 
to supervise the lc courts. the local government structure is also responsible for monitoring, but, because of 
the large number of lc courts at all levels and the limited resources available to the local governments and the 
judiciary, the monitoring of the lc courts is not considered a priority. While the court function of the lc court 
system is under the judiciary and the ministry of justice, the local council system is tied to the administrative local 
government structure and is under the ministry of local government. this not only creates potential problems 
of coordination, but also entails that the responsibility for monitoring and supervising of the lc court function is 
neither clear nor exercised.
fees and costs
lc courts in uganda are authorized to charge fees and may also levy fines. in recent years, there has been increased 
regulation of this in an attempt to prevent abuses, yet it remains problematic. in the Barangay justice system in the 
Philippines, small filing fees are payable.
customary or community courts Where the adJudicator is not a LaWyer
customary courts or community courts categorized as ijs can be distinguished from the category of traditional 
leaders mainly by the method of appointment, which is through a state agency, and the specific legislation regu-
lating them, which imparts uniformity of structure and procedure. they are distinguished from local administrators 
because they have only an adjudicative, rather than executive, function and they may be attached to the judiciary 
and made subject to codes of judicial discipline and ethics. the local courts in sierra leone and Zambia, the village 
courts in Papua new guinea, and the community courts in mozambique are examples of community courts, as 
they do not have an administrative function. such courts attempt to gain legitimacy by having roots in a history 
of justice provision prior to the existence of the modern state and/or by claiming to draw on the local norms and 
customs of a specific locality of the country. these structures’ norms and hereditary power are often rather tenu-
ously related to tradition and custom. the reason for this is that the state has re-established or modified some of 
the local court and mediation structures with more or less focus on their original features and traditional sources 
of legitimacy. the Abunzi in rwanda is an example of an innovative institution in a context where cataclysm and 
reconstruction have dramatically changed the face of traditional patterns of power. the community courts estab-
lished by law in mozambique in 1994 after the civil war are, on the other hand, based on the former popular courts, 
which were part of the socialist-revolutionary system that sought to substitute the traditional courts that were 
abolished after the country gained independence. consequently, the community courts have a history of strong 
affiliation with the ruling party, frelimo, although today they are supposed to be independent institutions with 
locally elected judges.
While they are often respected locally, these courts may not enjoy respect from legal professions (the private legal 
profession and the judiciary). nevertheless, this varies greatly among different localities, often depending on the 
personal attitude of, for example, magistrate or district court judges toward the local courts.
composition and appointment
Persons locally elected or appointed on the basis of their reputation (good moral standing) or heredity (or both) 
preside over these ijs. justices and judges are very unlikely to have had legal training. Where appointment is not 
based on heredity, there is usually a relatively standardized procedure of appointment. the law may also provide 
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for clear selection criteria and contain provisions on discipline and dismissal. in Zambia, a judicial commission 
appoints local court justices on the basis of nomination by local chiefs, whom the president appoints. local coun-
cils in Zambia were originally associated with state and political party power. in sierra leone, the minister of local 
government appoints the chairperson of the local court and the other officials are a panel of elders, a court clerk 
and the chiefdom police.
some years ago, an afronet report on the local courts in Zambia91 pointed out shortcomings in relation to judicial 
independence, as the minister for justice is effectively able to establish and abolish local courts at will. the process 
of appointment lacked transparency and was dominated by headmen and chiefs, and local court justices (now 
local court magistrates) tended to have a background in the civil service. in recent years, the Zambian judiciary 
has made efforts to broaden the recruitment base of local court magistrates and to make the process more trans-
parent by advertising vacancies. the minister of local government in sierra leone appoints and has the power 
to remove local court officials, which effectively means that the tenure of the officers depends on the executive 
branch; this opens the system to political abuse.92
state Links
the chief’s courts in Botswana are part of the country’s formal legal hierarchy of justice. they apply customary and 
common law, but have limits to their jurisdiction and they are at the bottom of the formal legal system. the local 
courts in Zambia and sierra leone are at the lowest level in the judicial structures. they administer customary law, 
and have jurisdiction over all cases of a customary nature as well as minor criminal cases. the community courts 
in mozambique are not part of the formal legal hierarchy of justice, but they are allowed by law to deal with civil 
cases and petty crimes not subject to imprisonment. although created by law, they have no formal links (such as 
appeal mechanisms) to formal state courts. in practice, though, many refer cases to the police or the district courts 
and vice versa, if only informally.
typical normative frameworks employed and Jurisdiction
there is likely to be use of customary93 and statutory legal orders. the material or substantive jurisdiction of sierra 
leonean or Zambian local courts varies with respect to types of cases, the size of civil awards, and the gravity of 
crimes that they are legally mandated to deal with. local courts have no discernible tendency toward a wider 
mandate than that of ijs that are not integrated into the state. While remedies for certain civil wrongs may be more 
standardized in local courts than in chiefs’ or headmen’s courts, this might not always be the case. in some cases, 
statutory law stipulates remedies and sanctions, while customary law guides the process and the investigation of 
the case (as in Papua new guinea). there may be some competition between local or customary courts and other 
mechanisms of justice, such as traditional chiefs. this would involve competition over clients and the handling of 
specific cases. there are also reports of local courts exceeding their mandates. in Zambia, the intestate succession 
act of 1989 was introduced to, among other things, ensure that women get a share of the joint estate, a move 
deemed necessary because traditional customs among most ethnic groups hinder or prevent women from inher-
iting property. reports say that some local courts sometimes subvert the clear intention of this legislation, using 
the local courts act to override the intestate succession act. the fines that these courts impose for property-
grabbing are very low and inadequate to tackle the problem.94 conversely, policies designed to limit jurisdiction 
might have unintended effects in some situations. the Papua new guinea country study shows that, when the 
authority of the village courts to handle some matters is limited to a relatively low monetary ceiling, disputes are 
brought not to the (formal) District court, but rather to even less formal traditional mechanisms.
91 op. cit.
92 Kane, oloka-onyango and cole, 2005.
93 customary legal orders are occasionally even faith-based, as in the case of niger.
94 african human security initiative, Zambia, 2009.
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typical processes employed and force of outcomes
such courts do not use technical rules of evidence. legal representation may be expressly excluded.95 Procedures, 
such as those in Zambia, may be more formalized than those in traditional justice systems, but may nevertheless 
borrow from local custom. local languages will be used. the Zambian local courts are obliged to follow the rules 
and procedures set down in specific national legislation (legal representation is not permitted before them) and 
are subject to some supervision and control by (and support from) state officials at the district, provincial and 
national levels; this support and supervision may be strong or weak, according to the resources and competences 
available to the supervising officials. conversely, there is currently no state system of supervision and control in 
mozambique, as the draft law regulating community courts has never been passed. consequently, there is ample 
room for a variety of relationships between community courts and the state administrations and district courts.
appeal and oversight
there may be a close link or direct appeal mechanism to the magistrate or first instance courts. nevertheless, this 
may pose some difficulties in that (in Zambia, for instance) the local courts are not considered to be courts of 
record. thus, all factual issues must be fully heard and determined again from scratch. the same applies to the rela-
tionship between community courts and district courts in mozambique. While the 2007 organic law of the judi-
cial courts (law 24/2007) notes that judicial courts “may articulate with other existing conflict resolution instances”, 
it does not spell out any clear procedures for appeal mechanisms. When such appeals are made, they are based on 
local initiatives by the judges themselves, which leads to a lack of uniformity across the country.
fees and costs
customary courts of this kind are generally authorized to charge fees, which may be centrally determined (as in 
Zambia). ignorance of the fee structure may be a problem, permitting clerks and adjudicators to demand other 
payments. the Papua new guinea study notes how adjudicators of the village courts are grossly underpaid, even 
compared to local representatives, although their workloads are similar.
community mediators
in many parts of the world, ngos train members of local communities to mediate in local disputes. this is too often 
done on an ad hoc basis and suffers from the weakness that there may often be only a single training session with 
no follow-up. this study does not include ‘mediators’ who are not part of a structure or system with institutionalized 
procedures and support.
in some parts of the world, community mediation structures have been developed. the country studies of Bang-
ladesh, malawi and Papua new guinea provide some examples of this, and there are also fairly well known pro-
grammes of this kind in countries such as nepal and albania. the community mediation structures are very often 
ngo-initiated, usually with the help of financing from external donors. the cooperation between the two is often 
based on a shared wish to introduce alternatives that take more account of human rights, including gender equal-
ity, than traditional structures. there may also be an intention to alter those local power balances, which may be 
seen as corrupt and nepotistic. in most cases, and partly for similar reasons, actors in the formal justice sector 
approve of the mediation schemes, seeing them as supplementary to the formal system and to the justice provi-
sion by traditional leaders. justice system actors may also see these efforts as presenting an opportunity to ease 
the burden of large case backlogs on lower court systems. this also seems to be the view of local administrators 
who have an adjudicative function.
95 see south african law commission, Discussion Paper 82, referring to some examples.
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composition and appointment
the target groups for the appointment of mediators may be paralegals, representatives of local cBos and the staff 
of police-linked victim support units. they may be ordinary people who volunteer to participate in training and 
projects of this kind. mediation structures are generally embedded in the local communities themselves. trainers 
and coordinators – these are paralegals in malawi and lawyers in nepal – serve as backup and supervisors for the 
mediators. a village mediation committee was established in Bangladesh; it consists of ordinary community mem-
bers who are trained in monitoring the mediation process to ensure that it is fair and in accordance with human 
rights. Depending on the approach of the particular ngo or agency promoting such initiatives, local authorities, 
traditional leaders, or local community-based organizations may influence the choice of persons chosen for train-
ing as mediators.
state Links
in albania, a legal framework has been established that recognizes the community mediation programme within 
the context of the provision of justice. the same type of legislation is under way in nepal and is being considered 
in malawi. community mediation structures are sometimes connected to the local administrative structures (see 
below). in nepal, the village development committees house the community mediation programme in some 
places and the office of the village development committee can host mediations as well.
typical normative frameworks employed and Jurisdiction
in such schemes, village mediators receive cases involving civil issues and petty crimes. in the examples in this 
study, there is an emphasis on compliance with human rights standards and principles and with national law, 
though custom and ideas of equity are also likely to play a role. thus, mediators are trained in the nature of more 
serious cases and instructed to refer them to the formal court system or to the traditional leaders, depending on 
the case. in this way, they also serve as diversion agents within the local community. in nepal, malawi, and Ban-
gladesh, the mediation programmes ‘work’ (their efforts are voluntary) parallel to the provision of justice by the 
traditional leaders. the country studies address some of these systems in an attempt to determine, for example, 
who uses these systems and why.
typical processes employed and force of outcomes
the established methodology for such efforts is usually third-party mediation rather than arbitration or concilia-
tion. evidence from some contexts nevertheless suggests that the ‘mediators’ occasionally stray from mediation 
processes and engage in arbitration or other activities to influence outcomes, often out of a (legitimate) concern 
to protect the weaker party, and ngos may be playing more than one role in the process, facilitating, advising 
adjudicators and assisting parties. While the process of mediation is confidential in nepal and malawi and therefore 
differs from the communal process that traditional leaders conduct, the mediation process in Bangladesh looks 
very much like the dispute resolution process that traditional leaders pursue within the Shalish system.
appeal and oversight
the level of ngo supervision and interaction with the mediation processes largely depends on factors such as 
the mediators’ and supervisors’ level of training and the amount of working time and resources available. unstable 
ngo funding may play a role. the malawi country study shows that some representatives of the judiciary are 
interested in the community-based mediation programme as a way to divert civil and potentially minor criminal 
cases from the formal system, with the possibility that the courts could enforce settlements; this has yet not been 
piloted or implemented.
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fees and costs
the programmes encountered generally promote free services, instructing mediators not to charge fees for their 
services. a dependence on external funding is a weakness of this model. Potentially closer integration with the 
formal structure (i.e., with the judiciary or local government) could strengthen the sustainability of the programmes.
LinKages betWeen informaL Justice systems  
and formaL Justice systems
in most operating contexts, there will be certain functional linkages between state providers and ijs’ providers. 
state law may define such linkages and provide for official forms of collaboration (including appeal procedures, 
referrals, division of labour, advice, and assistance), but even where this is not the case, there are often various 
forms of unofficial collaboration. linkages may also be negative, with competition over jurisdiction and even overt 
opposition or hostility.
aside from functional linkages, there are instances of overlaps or ‘borrowing’ of norms, rules and procedures 
between ijs and state providers. such norm and rule-based linkages may derive from long histories of interaction 
and coexistence. they point to the changeability and adaptability of different primary justice providers and to 
their interdependency.
functionaL LinKages
functional linkages between primary justice providers refer to the kinds of collaboration that exist in the handling 
of cases; examples include appeal procedures, the sharing of information, cross-referrals, jurisdictional division 
of labour for types of cases handled, financial and logistical support mechanisms, regulation and monitoring of 
performance by the state of ijs providers, etc. such functional linkages may exist directly between primary justice 
providers, such as between the lowest level state courts and customary courts, or they may be through interme-
diaries, such as the state police or paralegals. it is important to distinguish between official and unofficial linkages, 
which often coexist.
official functional Linkages
official functional linkages are those written into state law; they exist where there is some state recognition of 
informal (including non-state) justice providers. these may include linkages between state and non-state primary 
justice providers and among different non-state providers (such as within a hierarchy from state customary courts 
to traditional authorities consisting of chiefs, headmen and village heads). generally, levels of state recognition can 
be placed on a continuum between independent coexistence, limited integration and substantial incorporation 
of state and non-state justice systems (see the continuum of formality/informality and state recognition table 
in chapter ii).
‘coexistence’ pertains, for example, in the handling of disputes by chiefs and community courts in mozambique. 
officially, functional linkages are confined to the state, which recognizes the non-state providers and stipulates the 
basic rules for how they should be constituted (i.e., the s/election of adjudicators) and the boundaries of their juris-
diction. legislation outlines the types of cases that they are allowed to treat, namely, only civil and family-related 
cases. coexistence does not involve legally established procedures of appeal, cross-referrals and formal sharing 
of information between the state courts and the non-state providers. thus, state law understands the handling 
of cases by non-state providers, which the state recognizes in mozambique, as taking place separately from the 
formal justice system. they handle distinct types of cases: the formal system handles criminal cases and the infor-
mal systems handle (some) non-criminal cases. this division is not watertight, though, and permits some forum 
shopping, depending on knowledge and resources.
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‘limited integration’ refers to situations where a range of legal procedures link the functioning of state-recognized 
ijs to formal state courts and the police, but where the ijs are not part of the official hierarchy of courts. Procedures 
of recourse, from the informal to the formal, the sharing of information, documentation of cases, and the like, coex-
ist with various state mechanisms for the regulation and monitoring of ijs performance. examples include the 
Rondas Campesinas in Peru, the traditional courts in south africa, and the customary courts in Zimbabwe (or the 
local courts in Zambia or sierra leone). in these situations, the types of cases that ijs and state courts handle may 
overlap, but there are usually limitations on the mandates of ijs (they are not, for example, permitted to handle 
serious criminal cases). there are also often limitations on the amount of compensation or damages they can 
award in a civil suit. in countries where the formal state courts can also apply customary law, ijs may be subject to 
such monetary limitations. in Zimbabwe, the local courts act of 1990 provides for strong functional links between 
the headmen’s and chiefs’ courts, which constitute the local court structure, and the magistrates’ courts. Despite 
the links, the two are seen as distinct structures. the chiefs’ courts are considered first instance courts with limited 
monetary jurisdiction. if damages exceed that amount, the case must be sent to the magistrates’ court, irrespec-
tive of whether customary law is applied. moreover, the chiefs’ courts must register any ruling with the clerk at the 
magistrates’ court.96 thus, legislation concerning limited integration defines different jurisdictions on the basis of 
the degree of criminality or the amount of compensation or damages that may be awarded, rather than in terms of 
entirely distinct cases handled by each. according to this model, local or customary courts may not be considered 
courts of record, so that cases restart from the beginning in the magistrate’s court and factual matters need to be 
proved afresh.
‘substantial integration’ (also referred to as ‘incorporation’) refers to situations in which ijs are an integrated com-
ponent of the formal court system – for example where customary courts are the lowest tier of the formal court 
system below the magistrate’s court. this is the situation in Botswana with chiefs’ courts or chiefs’ kgotlas; other 
examples are the village courts in Papua new guinea and the island of Bougainville. generally, ijs that are substan-
tially integrated into the formal state system are granted roles or mandates that apply to civil disputes, small-scale 
conflicts or petty crimes. this is based on the idea that they can help end conflicts that would otherwise become 
severe, which would require the intervention of the police and higher courts. substantial integration can thus also 
be a way to reduce the burden on formal state institutions. in many contexts, such as in Papua new guinea and 
Bougainville, the incorporation of ijs into the formal court structure can also involve a distinction between the 
kind of law and procedures applied, such that, for example, the lowest level courts apply primarily customary law 
and use informal procedures, whereas higher level courts apply common law and formal legal procedures.
in some cases of substantial integration, cases that are heard before the ‘customary’, local, community or similar 
court can be appealed to a higher court within the formal system. Whether this is possible in the specific context 
may depend on whether ijs use case records and whether the decisions of ijs accord with national legislation and 
applicable international human rights standards. even when there is no option of direct appeal, it may be possible 
to bring the case again at courts of first instance in the formal court system. in some contexts, such as the Abunzi 
in rwanda, the established scheme provides that only those cases in which there has been an attempt to resolve 
the dispute through ijs are eligible for consideration by the court.
the different degrees of state recognition reflect the variety of official functional linkages between ijs and formal 
state providers; assessment of these depends on the country context. the categories above, while perhaps a useful 
guide, are not exhaustive and it may be difficult to determine the most appropriate category in some cases. never-
theless, it is noteworthy that not all ijs within a given country may be subject to the same kind of state recognition: 
some may coexist, others may be integrated in a limited or substantial way, and others may not be recognized at 
all. there are also instances in which state recognition reaches farther than the categories discussed here. chapter 
96 african rights 1996 in Penal reform international, 2001. 
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Vi on human rights notes that the colombian constitution and the jurisprudence on its interpretation by the 
constitutional court provide for some delegation of judicial power that amounts to de facto federalism, with only 
limited power of judicial review left to the constitutional court.
moreover, irrespective of the official model employed (coexistence, limited integration or substantial integration), 
unofficial practices may be more important in practice than formal functional linkages in many contexts.
unofficial functional Linkages
Despite the lack of legislation outlining linkages, unofficial functional linkages between state and non-state provid-
ers can be established. court officials of formal courts and adjudicators of ijs may collaborate with each other in 
various ways. usually, this happens on an individual basis, based on the judgement and interest of particular indi-
viduals within the formal state system and their relationship to informal justice providers. this necessarily implies 
a lack of uniformity across a given country: different layers of collaboration exist in different regions and are not 
centrally regulated.
one example is mozambique, where there are different kinds of unofficial functional linkages between chiefs’ 
courts, community courts, the police and the district courts. in the central part of the country, for example, the 
state police have communicated ‘informal rules’ for how ijs should perform and relate to each other and the state 
institutions. the police have assumed the role of distributing caseloads and litigation between the informal and 
formal courts. they also communicate informal rules for the division of labour and even jurisdictional boundaries 
among different informal courts and between these and the police. these rules include a prohibition on informal 
courts from settling criminal cases, reserving ‘traditional’ cases for chiefs and civil cases for community courts. the 
police unofficially punish the informal justice providers if they do not abide by the informal rules. community 
courts are situated within the premises of the lowest level state administration and use papers and official stamps 
from the state administration on their notifications. the police strongly encourage chiefs to use handwritten noti-
fications when passing on cases to other informal courts or to the police. While links to the police are strong, func-
tional linkages to the formal district court are weak in this part of the country.
in other areas of mozambique, the (formal) district courts also play a role in formulating informal rules with chiefs’ 
and community courts. case studies show that, in some areas, the police and the formal courts bring in traditional 
leaders to provide advice or evidence in court cases. in mueda in the north, there is much informal collaboration 
between the district court, the community courts and chiefs’ courts that includes joint discussions of division of 
caseloads, definition of sanctions, and referral mechanisms. in practice, this institutionalizes informal appeal proce-
dures between the ijs and the official courts, even if this is not based on legislation. in other areas of the country, 
state administrations informally assist the community courts by providing basic stationery, official stamps on noti-
fications and declarations, and logistical support.97
the reasons behind such forms of unofficial functional linkages vary, but usually depend on the views and interests 
of the individual justice providers. in particular, local state judges’ and police officers’ personal views of customary 
authorities can influence the extent to which they collaborate. state officials do not always share the same views. 
in the sussundenga district in central mozambique, the local police were clearly interested in working directly with 
chiefs, whom they considered to be important for reducing crime and conflicts, but the district judge had no such 
interest, as he saw the chiefs’ courts as backward and irrelevant to the administration of justice in his court. the 
opposite was true in mueda in the north, where the district court judge viewed collaboration with chiefs as a key 
element in providing evidence and information and in handling civil cases.
in contrast to these examples, there are other cases in which justice officials do not abide by official functional link-
ages in the context of limited or substantial integration. the country study on uganda, for example, describes how 
97 De sousa santos, B. and trindade, j. c., 2003; Kyed, h., 2007. 
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some lc courts do not refer cases to the magistrate court, even when such cases are beyond the official jurisdic-
tion of the lc courts.98 on the other hand, power relationships and informal agreements manifest themselves in 
various ways. Before consenting to take a case, other state institutions often require letters of referral from the lc
courts showing that there has been an attempt to solve it at the lc court level. ordinary people feel that they may 
suffer from the lc courts if they bypass it, although there is no provision for this in the relevant law or regulations. 
in Zimbabwe, there have been instances in which chiefs’ courts ignore state law by handling cases that exceed the 
maximum amount for damages or compensation as well as by failing to report cases to the magistrate.99 in Kenya, 
hostility towards ijs by higher and lower ranking state court judges results in functional linkages being ignored or 
downplayed in some contexts.100 thus, while officially there might be a high level of integration or incorporation, 
state courts and local non-state courts may operate relatively independently, leading to a kind of de facto coexist-
ence. seldom, however, is such coexistence by abstention completely free of conflicts and contradictions. rather, 
abstention may be a way for non-state courts to avoid the kinds of state regulation and restrictions that accom-
pany functional integration with the state legal system, as is the case with some chiefs’ and lc courts in Zimbabwe 
and uganda, respectively. abstention from collaboration can also be seen as a kind of resistance to state regulation 
(particularly on the part of ijs). it should therefore not be taken for granted that primary justice providers always 
equally endorse functional linkages.
norm and rule-based Linkages
norm and rule-based linkages refer to overlaps, intermixes or ‘borrowings’ of norms, rules and procedures among 
different primary justice providers. such linkages often derive from long histories of interaction and coexistence, 
whether based on official or unofficial functional linkages or a combination of both. many case studies show that 
ijs draw on different normative sources. there are also examples of formal state institutions drawing on legal 
sources other than statutory law.
informaL Justice systems appLying different LegaL orders – LegaL 
pLuraLism in the practice of informaL Justice systems
the same justice provider can apply different sources of law or norms to treat different types of cases, such as state 
criminal law to deal with homicide and customary or traditional rules to deal with marital issues. there are, how-
ever, also examples in which different sources of law are applied as explanations for the same result, either by the 
same justice provider or as the case moves from one justice provider to another.
intermixing occurs when norms deriving from different sources of law are applied to the same incident. one 
example of this, taken from rural mozambique, involved an incidence of theft. the case was perceived as both a 
crime and a manifestation of evil spirit possession: the offender served a prison sentence and, when released, paid 
compensation to the victims and underwent an exorcism.101 in this case, the two systems and their respective 
normative bases operate in parallel. in other cases, the two may operate together, applied by the same justice pro-
vider. thus, in Papua new guinea, the local village courts, headed by salaried magistrates (laymen), mix elements 
of state law and custom within the process of settling a single case. in niger, there is a merger of islamic law and 
local custom, as that country’s study examines.
thus, when speaking about norm or rule-based linkages, it is useful to distinguish between 1) situation-specific 
shifts between legal systems or types of laws in which justice providers explicitly refer to different sets of laws (state 
law, customary law, religious law, etc., as is the case with higher courts in Papua new guinea) and 2) mergers of 
98 Khadiagala, g., 2001. 
99 african rights, 1996.
100 nyamu-musembi, c., 2003.
101 Kyed, h., 2007.
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standards in which there is no explicit distinction between legal systems or types of laws (as is the case with village 
courts in Papua new guinea). legal hybrids, or what academic literature refers to as ‘interlegality’,102 occur where 
a rule or ruling combines elements originating from different and often contradictory legal orders or normative 
systems. in such situations, it can be difficult to clearly distinguish between state and non-state law. there may also 
be a blurring of the historical periods to which different types of law belong. an adjudicator (state or non-state) 
may invoke hybrids or mixtures of standards to deal with a particular case and new legal orders, thereby creating 
new legal meanings and actions.103
there is necessarily a qualitative difference between situation-specific shifts and legal hybrids. in the former, adju-
dicators consciously invoke a particular law to handle particular cases. their choice can therefore be predictably 
based on certain interests and convictions that they might have or on regulations to which they are bound. in the 
latter instance, mergers of elements originating from different sets of rules or law are implicit and may therefore 
result from historical developments rather than from explicit interests, choices and/or regulations.
state poLicies defining LinKages betWeen LegaL orders
examples of state policies that forge official linkages between rule and norm-based systems include:
1. state codification of customary law applied by non-state providers, which fixes oral traditions, rules and 
norms in legislation
2. state regulations that oblige non-state or customary justice providers to adopt procedures that are similar to 
state legal procedures, such as documenting or reporting cases, etc., even if these cases involve the enforce-
ment of customary law according to ‘informal’ procedures (as in uganda, Zimbabwe, and Zambia)
3. cultural or religious exceptions written into state law, for example, within the area of personal law (marriage, 
divorce, land inheritance, etc.). (see, for example, Kenya, Zambia, sierra leone and Zimbabwe, where indig-
enous customary law overrules the constitution with respect to religious and marital issues.)104
4. legislation to regulate formal courts’ consideration of compensation payments made in customary or infor-
mal forums, as in certain legislation in Vanuatu105
5. so-called ’repugnancy‘ clauses
6. some less invasive successors of repugnancy clauses, where appellate or collateral review106 is built into 
the statutory courts’ powers of oversight to ensure conformity with legislative and constitutional standards 
having primacy
7. codification and integration of customary, indigenous or religious norms and procedures into written state 
law to be applied by formal state courts, as in the case of states with predominantly muslim populations
these different types of state policies share some recognition of non-state law by state law or state legitimiza-
tion of the authority of non-state or customary justice providers. nevertheless, such policies simultaneously imply 
102 De sousa santos, B., 2006: 46.
103 ibid., pp. 46-47.
104 ichrP, 2008: 8-9. on how Kenya’s constitution protects customary and religious family law systems (often to the detriment of 
women’s rights), see nyamu-musembi, c., 2003: 28. note that this does not take account of the changes to the constitution 
adopted in august 2010.
105 the Penal code, (amendment) act, 2006 moved the legal position from one that permitted the courts to consider compensation 
to one that compelled them to do so.
106 David Pimentel proposes collateral review as a possible option that is less invasive and more respectful of custom and of the 
dynamism and flexibility of customary justice systems. see, for example, ‘legal Pluralism in Post-colonial africa: Principles for 
linking statutory and customary adjudication in mozambique’, a conference paper presented at ‘state and non-state Public 
safety and justice Provision: the Dynamics of legal Pluralism in mozambique’, international conference, maputo, 28-30 april 
2010. collateral review would normally refrain from re-examining the merits of claims. higher courts would confine themselves to 
ensuring that lower courts respect fundamental guarantees of human rights and due process.
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transformation of customary, indigenous or religious norms, as these become subject to codification and regula-
tion by state law. they become fixed and non-negotiable state law until legislative amendment or judicial inter-
pretation changes them. there may be restrictions on the authority of customary courts to redefine customary 
law. an example of this was in Zambia, where some local courts began accepting cases for ‘marriage interference’, 
whereby wives pursued legal action against their husbands’ new ‘partners’. the practice was a break with tradition, 
which permitted only husbands to bring actions against wives for adultery. the high court issued an instruc-
tion forbidding the local courts from entertaining such actions, reminding them that only the legislature could 
introduce new legal remedies. in some cases, codified customary law may also exclude elements of ‘lived’ or oral 
customary rules. such limitations play a role in restrictions placed on the adjudications of, for example, customary 
courts that are not allowed to handle witchcraft or dowry cases, as in south africa and Bangladesh, respectively. 
state recognition on the basis of coexistence, limited integration or substantial integration (incorporation) always 
involves some restrictions on the substantive jurisdiction of non-state justice providers. these restrictions can be 
on the maximum permissible monetary compensation, the subject matter, the gravity of the offence, or permis-
sible remedies and sanctions. thus, while official functional linkages may imply that the state endorses and recog-
nizes the role and importance of non-state justice providers, those linkages can also enable the state to regulate 
or domesticate non-state providers. it places limits on the scope of operations of non-state providers, as it brings 
them under the authority of state law and institutions.
through state codification and recognition, the state also assumes the authority to define customary, religious or 
indigenous law. this harks back to the approach that colonial powers took when they allowed indigenous com-
munities to decide customary law – as long as it supported the values and interests of the colonial state. With codi-
fication, the authority of definition is however largely removed from the non-state domain (i.e., from the authority 
of clan elders, priests, indigenous leaders and chiefs). this is even more so with respect to ‘repugnancy clauses’. 
While the integration of religious and traditional procedures into state law might be an instance of adapting the 
(inherited) legal system to local or contemporary conceptions and norms, it can sometimes also be a means to 
boost the popular legitimacy and authority of the state. many observers have noted the particular position and 
religious authority of the monarchy in relation to the changes to family law in morocco in recent years, which have 
significantly improved the status of women.
in the case of cultural or religious exceptions being written into state law, cultural exceptions have come about 
not simply as a benign recognition of cultural differences, but also as a way for the state to avoid conflicts with 
traditional and religious authorities.107 this is important because the national political leadership depends on the 
allegiance of these authorities to maintain its power base.
from the perspective of non-state providers, the codification of customary law can be both a straightjacket and a 
source of additional authority. it can be a straightjacket because it fixes rules and reduces the scope for adapting to 
new challenges and for negotiating settlements according to the procedures and norms that have been custom-
arily used. it also reduces non-state providers’ ability to define customary law. nevertheless, the process of change 
and redefinition may continue where most customary law is practiced. conversely, non-state providers can make 
claims to represent customary law as a means to assert authority vis-à-vis the state and the local population. they 
may also challenge state codifications or restatements of what constitutes customary law.
in short, the official norm and rule-based linkages provided by state policies simultaneously recognize and trans-
form ijs. ijs become ‘official’, yet remain distinct from state law. importantly, different interests of authority and 
regulation are at stake, a fact that influences the respective authority of the state and non-state institutions. indeed, 
as the ichrP has concluded,108 the state may use the recognition of customary law just as much to strengthen the 
107 nyamu-musembi, c., 2003.
108 2009, op. cit.
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power and legitimacy of its own law and institutions as to assert control or exercise influence over ijs. conversely, 
non-state providers may also draw, unofficially, on state law and recognition as a means to bolster their authority 
to enforce decisions within the domain of ‘informal justice’.
‘state’ law can also incorporate norms and precedents from ijs. griffiths (1997) gives examples of how state law on 
divorce in Botswana was transformed by a customary norm that was applied to exclude estate cattle from forming 
part of the matrimonial property that was being divided according to non-customary rules of law.
the roLe of poWer and individuaL interests
Power and interests also influence the operation of functional linkages and the effects of those linkages on the 
roles and mandates of different primary justice providers. local state officials may develop unofficial functional 
linkages not only as a means to ease their work through collaboration, but also to ensure that non-state provid-
ers do not perform the functions that state institutions claim as their monopoly (such as handling cases of seri-
ous crime). in mozambique, for example, local state police prohibited chiefs from dealing with any criminal case, 
although they had been accustomed to doing so in the past. the prohibition underpinned strict regulation in 
practice of the performance of chiefs.109 some scholars refer to such kinds of state recognition through regulation 
as ‘weak legal pluralism’, which is opposed to ‘strong legal pluralism’ in which non-state legal systems are allowed 
to operate on their own terms.110
Weak legal pluralism underpins aspects of power and authority and is often more in the interest of the state than 
in the interest of those non-state providers that the state recognizes. it does so by drawing boundaries between 
the jurisdictions of state and non-state providers and integrating non-state authorities into the lowest tier of the 
state hierarchy of courts. this can affect the popular authority of non-state providers in the eyes of users. this is 
particularly the case when non-state providers have traditionally laid claims to roles and jurisdiction that overlap 
with those of formal state courts.
in mozambique, the prohibition on settlement of criminal cases by chiefs considerably undermined their legiti-
macy among the people. it prevented chiefs from dealing with offenders ‘on the spot’ and from enforcing the kinds 
of compensation that people preferred in cases of theft, arson and homicide, for example. instead, collaboration 
with the police obliged chiefs to refer crimes to state authorities, which, in the eyes of users, could be a cum-
bersome process that could lead to a failure to obtain compensation when the case ended up in the statutory 
court. consequently, some chiefs sometimes refused to collaborate with the police and continued to settle crimes 
according to the wishes of the users.
chiefs in Zimbabwe also felt that state recognition of their role as first instance courts in the state hierarchy endan-
gered their popular legitimacy. here, state integration imposed a limit for the jurisdiction of chiefs in terms of the 
amount of damages/compensation they can issue not only in criminal, but also in civil cases. as one chief noted: 
“We feel we are very much restricted over which cases we should sit and over which cases we should not. take, for 
instance, lobola [marriage payment] cases where one claims five or six head of cattle. if you value them [at Z$500], 
this court has no jurisdiction to try that case or settle the dispute between the parties. We have to refer them to the 
magistrates. it is a very big problem because lobola cases are the most common in the area. the claimants don’t 
like to have to go all the way to the magistrate’s court [a trip over 40 kilometres long on a dirt road, taking over 
eleven or twelve hours by bus and costing at least Z$8 round-trip]. it involves a lot of expense.”111
109 Kyed, h., 2009. 
110 griffiths, j., 1986; Vanderlinden, 1989 in Benda-Beckman, 1997. 
111 african rights, 1996: 33.
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according to african rights (1996), this situation led some chiefs to refuse to collaborate with the state112 and 
to some people seeking justice from those customary authorities that were not integrated into the state court 
system. these cases show that functional linkages are not simply technical issues related to the establishment of a 
division of labour between different justice providers with respect to court hierarchies or jurisdictions. functional 
linkages can also challenge or reduce the authority of non-state providers vis-à-vis the state. in practice, this often 
gives way to a complex interplay of collaboration and competition in which it can be difficult to define the respec-
tive mandates and roles of state and non-state justice providers. Power aspects are apparent in the widespread 
competition for litigants and jockeying for ultimate authority to decide significant cases related to people, land 
and property. Paradoxically, this competition may coexist with cooperation and collaboration among the different 
providers. consequently, the relationship between ijs and the state is often profoundly ambivalent, varying at dif-
ferent levels and deeply embedded in micro and macro-political considerations.113
Policies on legal pluralism often ignore such issues and tend to claim that the formal state legal system and cus-
tomary or other non-state providers represent distinct, internally coherent systems of norms and rules, which can 
fulfil different mandates either in terms of the types of cases they deal with or the scale of problems they handle.114 
often, policies assume a division of labour, but ignore how state and non-state providers often make claims to the 
same or similar areas of jurisdiction. moreover, this analysis also ignores how different histories of functional link-
ages, official and unofficial, have given rise to various layers of mergers and intermixing of the norms and rules that 
state and non-state providers actually apply.
While distinctions between the systems are certainly present in political practices and representations (in official 
texts or oral descriptions), the jurisdictional boundaries are usually blurred in everyday case settlement. linkages 
among different primary justice providers often involve an ambiguous relation of interdependence and competi-
tion. functionally, formal state courts may rely on non-state providers to provide social order and to help prevent 
petty conflicts from escalating into severe crime and disorder. at the same time, non-state or informal providers 
may pose a threat to the authority of state legal institutions, as they claim jurisdiction that state agents perceive as 
their monopoly. conversely, non-state providers may rely on state recognition as a source of authority to enforce 
resolutions in their communities, yet thereby simultaneously risk inadvertently ceding authority to state institu-
tions. the multiple linkages in countries between different primary justice providers, whether functional or norm/
rule-based, official or unofficial, ultimately challenge any notion of entirely separate and distinct legal systems.
112 in, for example, providing records of cases to the magistrate.
113 ichrP, 2008: 5. 
114 starr and collier, 1989, cited in Benda-Beckmann, 1997. 
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user preferences and provider profiLes
introduction
this chapter looks at methods to gather information on user preferences and provider profiles in order to con-
tribute background information and, to a certain extent, analyses the preferences of users and providers of ijs. 
this chapter is thus partly based on quantitative data acquired though the six country studies. While quantitative 
data does not necessarily provide the ‘full picture’, it does provide an indication of preferences and profiles. the 
first part concerns users’ preference and choice of system, which various conditions of access, including cost, dis-
tance, familiarity, time spent, complexity, and case type, influence. the second part on provider profiles gives some 
insight into the legitimacy, authority and (legal) sources of ijs.
rather than making an attempt to compare across countries and continents, this chapter presents the results of 
an exploration of methodologies to gather and analyse quantitative data about ijs. it is safer to conclude that the 
factors affecting choice (if there is any at all) are many and varied, and so it is not easy to draw conclusions about 
the relative significance of different factors.
for experimental purposes, the quantitative surveys operated with a very comprehensive survey instrument. in 
practice, it is necessary to narrow down the questions to a limited number of possible factors influencing choice.
LegaL domains/subJect matter of case
Variation is also to be expected, depending on the type of case at stake. in a survey of widows involved in inherit-
ance disputes in malawi, 44 percent of those who decided to seek help referred their cases to the district assembly 
(administrative personnel), 33 percent went to chiefs, 15 percent went to a family member, while the remaining 8 
percent went to their deceased husband’s employer.115
the survey similarly shows that preferences greatly vary depending on whether the issue is a civil matter, a criminal 
case, or a matter related to domestic violence. civil and criminal matters in this table cover three specific types of 
cases for civil matters (i.e., land disputes, divorce under customary marriage, and wife desertion) and for criminal 
cases (i.e., road accidents, theft and capital offences). analysis of the data for preferences of criminal cases indicates 
a tendency to prefer the ijs and to avoid the formal system (such as in cases involving theft). the table below 
illustrates how types of cases influence people’s preferences, although this should presumably also be related to 
the types of available providers in the country as well as the other contextually dependent data, such as the legal 
framework, customary law and traditions and perceptions of justice.
it is useful to keep in mind comparable research from industrialized countries. in a study of access to justice in 
scotland published in 1999,116 researchers found that about 26 percent of the population had, within the five-year 
survey period, experienced legal problems (of a civil nature) for which there was a legal remedy. People’s responses 
to problems for which there was such a remedy were as follows:
scotland  england and Wales
no action taken . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5%
self-help  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35%
outside advice sought . . . . . . . . . . . 65% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60%
115 see chiweza, asiyati, l., 2005.
116 glenn, h. g. and Paterson, a., 2001. 
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People typically sought outside advice from a solicitor or a citizens’ advice Bureau. of those who sought advice, 
very few actually resorted to legal proceedings. this study found that “[a]lmost nine in ten justiciable problems 
were dealt with either successfully or unsuccessfully without any legal proceedings being commenced, without 
an ombudsman being contacted or any other aDr processes being used. this is despite the fact that almost two in 
three members of the public took some advice about trying to resolve their problem, and that of those, about half 
received advice from a solicitor at some point about their problem.” this indicates that professional advice about 
the options available, e.g., process, costs, time and the merits of the case, is equally important to an external solu-
tion. allowing an informed choice by providing adequate information and advice through informal mechanisms 
of justice can help to keep cases from entering the formal justice system and possibly reduce the pressure on it.
these statistics do not indicate that public funding should not be spent on the court system. the ultimate pos-
sibility of court action may in fact be precisely what moves people to work toward an agreement or engage in 
informal mechanisms of justice. scholars and commentators refer to this as ‘the shadow (or indeed the light!) of 
the law’. thus, the law exerts a great influence even where its mechanisms are not directly invoked. likewise, as 
the ichrP study warns,117 the temptation to conflate empirical realities with normative guidance or to interpret 
these realities as the expression of satisfaction with the status quo must be avoided. organizations like Pri (2001), 
echoing galanter,118 suggest that an approach that recognizes many ‘rooms of justice’ is favourable, as it provides 
people with a variety of choices. this is, however, a policy option only when there are justice alternatives; in many 
places, ijs are the only choice available.
the choice of informaL Justice systems over formaL state  
LegaL systems
Questions frequently asked about ijs include, “What aspects of ijs tend to influence why so many people in some 
countries use them? how do perceptions of the formal state legal system influence people’s use of ijs?” currently, 
the academic literature provides two main explanations to these questions:
1. the state failure explanation: the physical and economic inaccessibility of the formal system and its incapacity 
to deliver justice are principal reasons behind poor citizens’ use of ijs. state courts are geographically distant 
and costs to travel to state courts and file cases prevent people from using them. state institutions lack capac-
ity (human and material) and are corrupt, bureaucratic, inefficient, and slow in processing cases. moreover, 
they are seen as serving the rich and the powerful rather than as being impartial and independent.119 the fail-
ure or crisis of the state legal system to live up to its official mandates explains the success of ijs.120
2. the culturalist explanation: the specific characteristics of ijs themselves vis-à-vis the nature of the modern 
state justice systems explain why people use them. the procedures and substantive norms used and rem-
edies that ijs dispense are, when compared with the state justice system, more in accordance with the 
local culture and the social relations of people in small-scale societies of developing countries. Where state 
justice systems are an inheritance from the colonial past, ijs are significant because they address cultural 
or religious beliefs, norms and practices that state courts and legislation ignore. these include, for example, 
witchcraft and sorcery, behaviour around sacred places, marital norms, and beliefs in the spiritual dimensions 
of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. the use of reconciliation and restorative types of justice centred 
on compensation and restoring social relationships in the community – strong elements of many ijs – is 
117 ichrP 2009 study on plural legal orders. 
118 galanter, m., 1981: 1-25.
119 Penal reform international, 2000: 6; abel, 1982. 
120 this is naturally more acute in collapsed, failed or war-torn states (see, for example, scheye, 2006).
76
c
H
a
PT
er
  v
a stuDy of informal justice systems: access to justice anD human rights
perceived as the most appropriate form of justice in small-scale societies with multiplex relationships (i.e., 
ones in which there are close relationships that are based on economic and social dependence and which 
intersect with ties of kinship).121 
in contrast, state justice systems are often associated mainly with retributive justice and incarceration. the 
uganda study discusses how people prefer informal mechanisms in cases of defilement, while the Bangla-
desh study notes how jurisdictional restrictions on village courts sometimes tend to push cases ‘downward’ 
into Shalish adjudication rather than upward into district courts, as intended by the legislator. the view that 
state justice systems are only retributive (and informal ones are only restorative) may result from the fact that 
the penal system is usually the most visible aspect of formal systems. ordinary people in some countries may 
be unable to access state civil justice, even if it may actually employ restorative approaches. the language 
used by ijs can be more comprehensible to local people, who feel alienated by the technically, legally and 
linguistically foreign languages used in formal state courts. according to the culturalist explanation, the 
popular perceptions and accessibility of justice, informed by cultural differences, rather than the institutional 
availability and effectiveness of justice providers, explain the success of ijs. the state legal system, on the 
other hand, is based on a concept of justice that diverges from local perceptions.
3. jurisdictional rules: the third, rather obvious factor is that the state legal system often lays down rules about 
jurisdiction. in many countries, traditional leaders are the legal arbiters of matters concerning customary 
land122 (at least at first instance) and various other issues. forms of ijs are also the recognized first instance 
of adjudication in (customary) family, inheritance and some matters of criminal law.123 there may be rules or 
practices mandating recourse to some form of ijs in almost all civil cases.124
none of these explanations alone is adequate to explain the contemporary significance of ijs. as documented in 
the country studies (particularly the ugandan study), a combination of factors, as well as power relations, social 
control and pressure, account for the preference of ijs. Based on these considerations, the following eight signifi-
cant, partly interrelated aspects can influence people’s choices and use of ijs:
1. the in/effectiveness and popular il/legitimacy of the state Legal system
When explaining the significance of ijs to people’s access to justice, it is important to analyse how the state legal 
system functions in each context and how users view it. this requires an assessment not only of its formal man-
dates and legislation, but also of its actual practices and scope of operation, including geographical outreach and 
transactional and opportunity costs.
People’s use of ijs cannot be seen in isolation from other available options. People often weigh ijs against alterna-
tives, especially the state system, which might not be easily available. People often associate state courts with the 
following characteristics and thus choose ijs instead:125
  unavailability: state courts and/or the police are far away and expensive to travel to. ijs are closer to the people.126
  excessive cost: fees and other costs in state courts may simply be too high for most people.
121 see, for example, Penal reform international, 2001: 22. 
122 including malawi; see malawi country study.
123 including with the lc courts in uganda; see uganda country study.
124 ibid.
125 see Penal reform international, 2001; unDP, 2006; scheye, e., 2006; Kyed, h., 2007. 
126 in addition, there may be situations in which state courts and the police no longer operate, as in the case of failed or collapsed 
states. here, ijs are simply the only option available, often operating in parallel to or controlled by transient forms of security 
providers such as militias, vigilantes, warlords, etc. 
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  ineffectiveness: settlement of cases takes a long time due to bureaucratic procedures and the necessity of 
‘hard’ evidence.127 ijs tend to settle cases ‘on the spot’.
  inappropriate outcomes: state courts tend to dispense types of justice (especially in criminal justice) that do 
not satisfy the people, who prefer the restorative justice that many ijs apply. Police, prosecutors and state 
courts may not have such a broad range of approaches in criminal cases and may be seen as overly retributive, 
imposing harsh penalties.
 inadequacy: state courts do not deal with all the types of cases that emerge in rural societies, but ijs do (i.e., 
witchcraft, misbehaviour around sacred places, misconduct, insults, adultery, etc.).
  inappropriate procedures/unfamiliarity/alienness: state courts apply legal formal language and seldom trans-
late proceedings into local dialects, making procedures incomprehensible to many people.
 illegitimacy: People may see the state legal system as illegitimate not only due to the above characteristics, but 
also, in some situations, due to the history of state-citizen relations in particular areas; the existence of corrup-
tion exacerbates this view. People see ijs providers as more legitimate because those providers are part of the 
local community and serve its interests.128
the data across countries and contexts are presented here with reservations. it would be misleading to draw con-
clusions of purported general validity on the basis of the surveys in this study. the graphs on preferences below 
are thus illustrations of how one might conduct quantitative surveys at the country level rather than a basis for 
global conclusions about preferences.
Distance to the formal state legal system is evidently a barrier to access. nevertheless, the data from the surveys 
suggest that it is far from being the only important factor. even for people living within five kilometres of the formal 
courts and the police, various forms of ijs are still the preferred justice provider. it is important to point out that 
this is not conclusive in itself, as the significance of a distance of five kilometres depends very much on contextual 
factors such as the state of roads, the availability of transport, cash income, the ability of women to travel on their 
own, etc., as well as on issues of jurisdiction and availability. the following graph is an illustration of the relation 
between the data on the preferred justice provider and the measured distance to the formal court.
127 in many countries, people are also dissatisfied with the police and formal system when people accused of and arrested for a crime 
are released due to lack of hard evidence. 
128 south africa under apartheid, where people preferred to resort to local people's courts when available, was a particularly striking 
example of this. these, though, were often not identical with the ‘traditional’ structures that the apartheid government co-opted 
and used. 
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nevertheless, the data also appear to support a finding that distance has an influence on the choice of ijs if more 
than one provider is available to the community, as the example from Bangladesh illustrates below. this should 
again be approached with reservations, as the data conflate all kinds of cases, and other factors can play a role.
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the graph and figures below illustrate, not surprisingly, that, of the 12 types of justice providers included in the 
survey instruments, the formal state justice institutions, (i.e., the police, public prosecutor and the magistrates’ 
courts) alone incur inhibitive costs .
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2. informal Justice systems’ case settlement procedures
the literature often highlights the less formalized case settlement procedures and the voluntary nature of partici-
pation and the role of mutual consent in reaching decisions as significant to people’s preference for using ijs pro-
viders.129 nevertheless, the question of power is always present.130 many ijs combine consent or voluntarism with 
coercion and negotiable with non-negotiable rules. furthermore, not everyone might perceive the procedures as 
just: procedures associated with reconciliation, consensus and holism do not preclude discrimination or selective 
rulings. there has been mention that respondents in Bangladesh preferred uP officials’ organization of Shalish 
mediations over adjudication in the village courts.
3. informal Justice systems’ case settlement outcomes (types of remedies,  
resolutions, and punishments) related to Local conceptions of Justice
remedies available in ijs dispute settlement are very significant to people’s preference for ijs and say a great 
deal about particular conceptions of justice. yet, when assessing what remedy types mean to people’s sense of 
adequate access to justice, it is also important to examine sustainability and time (i.e., timely remedy).
reconciliation, restoration, compensation and reintegration dispensed by ijs are important to many rural people’s 
sense of adequate access to justice, i.e., vis-à-vis the custodial sanctions, which still dominate criminal cases in 
the state system, despite efforts to encourage alternatives to custody. there are economic, cultural, and religious 
reasons for this.
4. economic concerns
a preference for ijs associated with restorative justice outcomes, such as compensation, is very significant in many 
poor societies for important economic reasons. aside from being a ‘symbol’ of reconciliation, the significance of 
compensation is closely related to sustaining the local economy. it can ensure that victims’ and offenders’ families 
do not become economically destitute. the local economy of informal justice is not without disadvantages for 
users. Various material exchanges surround dispute resolution. these can give way to corruption among ijs pro-
viders and the more powerful can use them to exploit the less powerful. it is also incorrect to assume that people 
prefer ijs because ijs are cheap or free. this is very context-dependent. in some countries, there are reports of 
traditional leaders pegging their ‘court fees’ to the same level as the lowest level of the state system.131
5. cultural, religious and customary beliefs and practices
Preferences for types of justice associated with compensation, restoration and reintegration can evidently not be 
divorced from people’s particular world-view, associated with cultural, religious and/or customary beliefs. it is rel-
evant to analyse how people perceive notions of right/wrong or good/evil, as such notions inform how they think 
justice can best be achieved and wrongs be corrected.
culture, religion and custom also influence how different categories of people are differently treated in the dis-
pensation of justice. During hearing procedures, social attitudes may reinforce inequalities based on gender, age, 
etc.132 there are also cultural practices that inform discriminatory outcomes, such as inheritance rules or marital 
rules that discriminate against women (such as rapists being required to marry the women they have raped). such 
cultural practices are clearly context-specific and any understanding of how they impact access to justice for dif-
ferent categories of people must be assessed empirically.
129 see Penal reform international, 2000; unDP/Wojkowska, 2006. 
130 see abel, r.l., 1981. 
131 Discussion with ngo representative in Zambia, 2009.
132 Penal reform international, 2000: 127.
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6. habits or routines
although habits and routines tell us little about people’s subjective sense of adequate access to justice, they may 
be important in explaining why people use a particular ijs provider rather than other available options. the quan-
titative studies were unable to measure this factor.
7. power relations, social pressure and social control
in many descriptions of ijs, the focus on reconciliation, consensus and public participation tends to overshadow 
the significance of power relations and social control mechanisms in case settlement. egalitarian ideals associated 
with small-scale communities in many understandings of informal justice are often flawed.133 While overt power 
struggles are prevalent, such as those over land and resources, there is also a more structural level of values and 
norms that support specific power relations associated with social status and identities (age, gender, ethnicity, 
class, etc.). the latter play a fundamental role in the way justice is dispensed. simultaneously, power interests con-
test and manipulate the meanings of norms, values and justice, which often are not equally shared.134
8. Legitimacy and authority of Justice providers
Public perceptions of justice providers are another important factor that influences peoples’ choice to take (or not 
to take) their cases to a given justice provider.135 central to such perceptions are the authority of a justice provider 
in the eyes of users and the sources of legitimacy on which such authority is based. authority here refers to ‘an 
instance of power which seeks at least a minimum of voluntary compliance and thus is legitimated in some way’.136
it therefore neither refers to pure coercive power nor to simple persuasion presupposing equality. authority is a 
hierarchical relation that requires recognition of the legitimacy of the ruler or the person executing compliance.
133 mccold and Wachtel, 1997: 2. 
134 ichrP, 2008: 15. 
135 as discussed earlier, though, aspects of social pressure and power may constrain the freedom of such choices. 
136 lund, c., 2006: 678.
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preferences and gender of users
in the data analysis, gender has been included as a variable in all cross tabulations. on this broad and generalized 
level, the samples did not clearly establish that gender alone influences users’ choice of providers; the graph below 
illustrates this. nevertheless, the country studies further explore the relevance of gender for a person’s preference 
of ijs, where it is related to qualitative analysis. again, though, no conclusions should be drawn here, as the exercise 
did not allow sampling where women had a real choice of provider for the cases most relevant to them. neither 
was it possible to survey for factors such as variations where female providers were available. significantly more 
work is necessary to identify the effects of such factors .
GENDER AND PREFERENCE
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informaL Justice in the vieW of the providers137
Legitimacy: access to positions With informaL Justice systems
according to the providers, people rise to high positions, such as that of chief council member of ijs, mainly 
through election, although suffrage may not be universal. When looking at the country data, there are subtle differ-
ences. in Bangladesh, most ijs providers seem to be elected, although some are also chosen by the leadership or 
a superior judge. in ecuador and Papua new guinea, they are mainly elected. in malawi, the village head is usually 
chosen, but can be elected or even inherit the position from his or her father or mother.
authority: gender and age of Justice providers
a general assumption is that informal justice providers are typically elderly men. the graph below presents provid-
ers’ impressions of the gender balance of ijs. in general, ijs are indeed mainly composed of men, although it is 
interesting to see that, according to the providers in ecuador, there is quite a high proportion of women. accord-
ing to some interviewees in the qualitative survey, wives of community leaders may be perceived as leaders, too, 
although they have not necessarily been directly elected as leaders. in all countries surveyed, women are present 
in ijs. in malawi and Papua new guinea, women apparently represent approximately one third of the providers.
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another general assumption is that ijs’ providers are mature or elderly, although, according to the providers, there 
are some variations. in Bangladesh, malawi and Papua new guinea, between 40 percent and 50 percent of the 
providers are above 50 years of age. in ecuador, more than half and, in malawi, approximately one third of the pro-
viders are between 36 and 49 years old.
137 as concerns data on providers, the data from mali did not include sufficient samples for to be able to be used. consequently, this 
part considers only data from Bangladesh, ecuador, malawi and Papua new guinea. 
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KnoWLedge and use of LaWs and LegaL documents
the providers in all of the surveyed countries confirmed that laws and legal sources and documents are used in ijs 
and that the sources vary greatly. customary law is a central source (27 percent), which, in combination with the 
views of the traditional leaders (13 percent), is a significant normative source for ijs. moreover, nearly 30 percent 
of written legal sources and documents derive from the formal justice sector (18 percent) and other government 
and state institutions (11 percent). interestingly, church, mosque or religious writings accounted for 17 percent of 
the sources in the sampled countries. this could indicate that many of the laws and documents used in ijs are not 
necessarily customary sources of law.
Church (Or Other Religius Writings)
Formal Justice Sector (Courts or Ministry)
Other Government/State Institutions
NGOs/CBOs
Customary Law Documents
Other
The Traditional Leaders/Chiefs Themselves
3%
13%
11%
27%
17%
11%
18%
12. Main Document – Page 92
Total Number of Responses from Justice Providers: 1029
DO YOU USE ANY WRITTEN DOCUMENTS THAT YOU REFER TO WHEN YOU 
DECIDE CASES? IF YES, WHERE DO THESE DOCUMENTS COME FROM?
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KnoWLedge of state LaW recogniZing informaL Justice systems
there was considerable variation in the responses to the question about recognition of the ijs’ ‘court’ in national 
legislation or regulations. the graph below illustrates ijs’ providers’ varied opinions and ideas on the matter in 
malawi. according to the majority of group or village heads in malawi, the ijs are legally recognized, whereas 
nearly equal proportions of the chief council members agreed or disagreed about this and some replied that they 
did not know. this indicates that justice providers were unaware that national legislation recognizes ijs .
IS THERE ANY NATIONAL/STATE/GOVERNMENT LAW (THE CONSTITUTION 
AND OTHER KINDS OF LAWS OR POLICY DOCUMENTS) THAT RECOGNIZE 
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case outcomes
Providers indicate that there are many possible outcomes in the form of remedies and sanctions. Data from all 
surveyed countries reveal that pecuniary compensation accounts for 22 percent of outcomes, while apologies and 
the restoration of relations account for 19 percent. in-kind compensation, accounting for 16 percent, is also rela-
tively high. imprisonment and physical disciplining are mentioned as outcomes. Providers also acknowledged the 
existence of measures for the offender through spiritual exorcism and even banishment from the community. of 
these mechanisms, imprisonment, banishment and physical disciplining are human rights issues, especially if they 
involve torture or inhuman or degrading treatment as outlined in cat. Data about the type of crimes or offences 
for which these punishments were inflicted was not included in the survey .
WHAT KINDS OF RESOLUTIONS DO YOU AWARD IN THIS 
COURT/DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM?
3%
9%
5%
4%
6%
3%
19%
13%
16%
22%
14. Main Document – Page 94
Total Number of Responses from Justice Providers: 3039
Fines to the Court/Dispute 
Resolution Mechanism by Oender
Monetary Compensation 
to Victim by Oender
In Kind Compensation to Victim 
(Or Victims Family) by Oender
Imprisonment
Relations are Restored 
and Apologies Given
Banishment from the Community
Physical Disciplining
Public/Community Work
Other
Reparation of the Oender 
Through Spiritual Exorcism
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human rights and informaL Justice systems
introduction
this chapter reviews the applicability of human rights law to ijs and the typical human rights challenges related to 
ijs. the obligation of the state under human rights law to provide justice and remedies to its people for violations 
of their rights encompasses at least three distinct areas, all of which have given rise to detailed bodies of human 
rights law and discussion. they can briefly be described as:
  the obligation to provide remedies for violations of rights committed by the state or its agents (e.g., article 2.3 
of the iccPr or similar obligations under the uncat)
  the obligation to provide the possibility of a fair hearing to determine the “civil rights and obligations in a suit 
at law” of all persons, thus encompassing many issues of private legal relations between individuals (article 14.1 
of the iccPr)
  the obligation to protect people against violations of their rights (usually crimes) committed by private persons 
(rights to bodily integrity, freedom and property, as per article 2.3 of the iccPr) and the parallel obligation to 
treat those accused of such crimes according to fair trial standards (article 14 of the iccPr)
the first important issue in examining the applicability of human rights norms to ijs (i.e., those that are not admin-
istered by state agents) is whether, to what extent, and under what conditions the state can satisfy its obligation 
to provide justice through available systems and mechanisms of informal justice. a second issue arises when ijs 
exist and operate independently from the state and to what extent these systems (i) are bound to respect human 
rights norms in their processes and decisions and (ii) are legally and practically capable of respecting human 
rights norms.
the un treaty body system and, to a certain extent, the charter-based special procedures have addressed some 
issues relating to customary law and justice in their concluding observations and recommendations. Where ijs 
have been addressed in analytical or policy documents by un bodies and agencies (e.g., the un Permanent forum 
on indigenous issues), two issues are highlighted: 1) the importance of incorporation of and/or respect for tra-
ditional cultural norms and practices and 2) a concern that such norms and practices may violate international 
human rights norms and/or hinder certain groups, such as women, children or minorities, from obtaining access 
to justice and equal treatment.
nevertheless, there is a pressing need for more legal and sociological research about the interplay among ijs, 
formal justice systems and international norms. nhris can play a key role in developing the understanding and 
engagement with ijs. the 2008 international conference of nhris recognised the important role that nhris play 
in ensuring an effective administration of justice138.
appLicabiLity by incorporation or recognition of the informaL system
human rights norms can become binding on ijs through the formal incorporation of parajudicial systems into 
the state legal system (examples of this are seen in some african countries such as Botswana, Zambia, uganda 
or sierra leone, and village courts in Bangladesh, Papua new guinea, etc.). in this way, those systems become 
state organs and are thus bound by human rights norms (as a matter of international law). even if informal justice 
organs (typically chiefs, councils, etc.) are not formally recognized as part of the national system of justice, the state 
may robustly support them in some way, for example, by paying stipends or expenses to the chiefs for exercising 
138 nairobi Declaration of the ninth international conference of national institutions for the Promotion and Protection of human 
rights, 2008
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these functions or by legally recognizing their adjudicative powers or decisions. in these circumstances, there is 
a clear legal link to the state, so that the state is legally responsible for the decision or conduct of the informal 
justice organ.
appLicabiLity by virtue of the state’s duty to protect
the state’s duty to protect individuals against violations of their rights is the second way in which human rights 
norms may protect litigants in ijs. thus, in the cases where there is no legal nexus between the informal justice 
mechanism and the national justice system, a state may be legally obligated to actively suppress harmful practices 
and to protect the vulnerable. this is founded inter alia in the obligation in article 2(1) of the iccPr to “respect and 
ensure” the rights protected in the covenant. While the extent of the state’s obligation in this respect is limited 
and not wholly clarified in international law, it has been legally acknowledged, especially in relation to the right 
to life.139 subsequent chapters of this study discuss many other aspects of the state’s duty to protect women’s and 
children’s human rights.
appLicabiLity by virtue of the horiZontaL appLication of human rights 
norms or by virtue of ordinary LegisLation
the legal doctrine of the horizontal application of human rights offers a third possibility for the protection of 
human rights. according to this legal principle or doctrine, human rights are not only binding on the state itself, 
but are also incorporated as fundamental principles of the legal order and thus binding in legal relations between 
natural and legal persons. the doctrine is illustrated by the question of whether it is permissible for private indi-
viduals or corporations to discriminate on the basis of sex, religion, ethnicity, etc. in ways that would be illegal for 
the state to do. here, the picture varies from one country to another. section 8.2 of south africa’s constitution offers 
an example of the horizontal application of human rights.140
in other states, the issue of horizontal application may not be so clear and, indeed, an unequivocal constitutional 
mandate for such an application is comparatively rare. even in south africa, horizontal application will vary from 
one right or field of rights to another. in many countries, the protection of human rights between private individu-
als will depend on ordinary legislation rather than on direct invocation of the constitution, yet, even then, it may 
not apply in all areas. the prohibition of private discrimination, for example, may be relatively well anchored in 
legislation and judicial precedent, and the criminal law will typically outlaw many forms of behaviour that would 
violate civil and political rights. on the other hand, obligations pertaining to economic, social and cultural rights 
may not extend beyond the public sphere. thus, one cannot speak of a clear ‘either/or’ distinction between hori-
zontal and vertical application.
states parties to the iccPr (and some other human rights instruments that contain provisions relating to justice) 
are, in most civil legal domains that informal justice typically covers, legally obligated to ensure the possibility 
of equality before the courts and tribunals and a fair and public hearing before a competent, independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law. irrespective of whether states actually recognize or incorporate ijs into their 
national legal orders or whether customary justice systems are simply tolerated procedural aspects of ijs must be 
measured against this standard.
reguLating the reLationship betWeen individuaL and coLLective rights
human rights law is primarily interested in seeing the enjoyment of effective protection, whatever its source. in 
some spheres, informal justice may contribute to that protection particularly where the reach and effectiveness of 
the formal system is weak.
139 see, for example, the case of the european court of human rights: osman v. uK, judgment of the european court of human 
rights, 28 october 1998.
140 “a provision of the Bill of rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the 
nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right.”
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the contribution of ijs to human rights protection may not necessarily be only temporary or provisional. under 
certain conditions, recognition of traditional or customary justice may be seen as protection of the social, cultural 
and economic rights of indigenous groups or peoples. the cerD committee, for example, expresses this viewpoint 
in a general recommendation141 and developments in recent decades in some countries, particularly in latin 
america, as well as ilo convention 169 also reflect this. as the discussion of legal pluralism and ijs in chapter ii
shows, the rights of indigenous peoples and communities to enjoy cultural rights and the historical background 
of serious violations of those and other rights have led to various developments in international human rights law 
and national legal orders over the past three decades. latin america presents several examples of legal pluralism 
and some of the most remarkable of these are discussed below.
typicaL human rights chaLLenges: substantive, structuraL  
and proceduraL
in discussing human rights, this study divides human rights issues into three main categories: 1) substantive norms 
and standards that ijs and/or outcomes of cases apply; 2) structure related to ijs, particularly with respect to 
accountability and participation; and 3) procedural fairness. this categorization affords a reasonable possibility of 
assessing ijs according to the same criteria used to assess formal justice systems. Where a human rights assess-
ment is carried out that takes account of all of these criteria and is compared on all of these criteria with the perfor-
mance of the formal system, it may be that ijs afford greater possibilities of respecting human rights than formal 
systems. assessments of this kind can lead to a far more nuanced discussion of human rights and ijs.
the human rights issues that typically arise with respect to the operation of ijs are quite well known and numerous 
reports on the subject have cited them. Wojkowska (2006),142 for example, describes the following weaknesses in 
human rights protection in ijs:
i. ijs do not always give the accused the chance to be heard or adequately represented;
ii. ijs sometimes take decisions that are inconsistent with basic principles of human rights – for example, by 
imposing cruel and inhuman forms of punishment such as flogging or banishment – or that perpetuate the 
subordination of women or the exploitation of children; and
iii. ijs often hold individuals accountable to social collectivities and broader social interests by restricting free-
doms, such as that of young people to choose a spouse.
interestingly, almost all other weaknesses with ijs that Wojkowska (2006) describes could be characterized as fail-
ures of the ijs, the state or both to protect human rights:
iv. unequal power relations and susceptibility to elite capture
v. unfair and unequal treatment of women and minority groups
vi. unsuitability of ijs for certain disputes that are important for security and sustainable development (e.g., cases 
of serious crimes, inter-community disputes, dealings with government agencies or with private companies)
vii. insufficient accountability and opaque interface between informal and formal justice systems (e.g., lack of 
transparent procedures or documentation of the outcome reached, non-recognition of or failure to apply 
constitutional or statutory provisions that entrench fundamental rights, the inability to appeal from the deci-
sion of an informal tribunal).
141 general recommendation XXXi of the cerD committee on the Prevention of racial Discrimination in the administration and 
functioning of the criminal justice system, which states: 5. states parties should pursue national strategies the objectives of which 
include the following: (e) to ensure respect for, and recognition of the traditional systems of justice of indigenous peoples, in 
conformity with international human rights law; un Document a/60/18, 2005.
142 unDP/Wojkowska, 2006: 20-23.
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substantive issues
the core issue here is the state’s obligation to ensure that ijs do not breach fundamental human rights standards 
and, where such breaches occur, to apply appropriate remedial measures and policies for preventing future breaches.
the eXercise of criminaL Jurisdiction by informaL Justice systems
the un human rights committee observes in its general comment no. 32 that “[c]riminal charges relate in 
principle to acts declared to be punishable under domestic criminal law. the notion may also extend to acts that 
are criminal in nature with sanctions that, regardless of their qualification in domestic law, must be regarded as 
penal because of their purpose, character or severity.”143
thus, even if national law, including through recognition or delegation of jurisdiction to ijs, does not characterize 
ijs’ sanctions that can be meted out to individuals as penal per se, international human rights law may nevertheless 
regard them as such. the same general comment specifically addresses the question of customary or religious courts.
article 14 is also relevant where a state, in its legal order, recognizes courts based on customary law, or religious 
courts, to carry out or entrust them with judicial tasks. it must be ensured that such courts cannot hand down 
binding judgments recognized by the state, unless the following requirements are met: proceedings before such 
courts are limited to minor civil and criminal matters, meet the basic requirements of a fair trial along with other rel-
evant guarantees of the covenant, and their judgments are validated by state courts in light of the guarantees set 
out in the covenant which can be challenged by the parties concerned in a procedure meeting the requirements 
of article 14 of the covenant. these principles pertain notwithstanding the general obligation of the state to pro-
tect the rights under the covenant of any persons affected by the operation of customary and religious courts.
When ijs occasionally handle cases that human rights law or a formal system would consider petty criminal cases 
and when those systems may mete out punishments, including to juveniles, special issues and problems arise in 
relation to compliance with human rights standards. in some circumstances, these could include the potential 
criminal and civil liability of the ijs providers for deprivation of liberty or physical violence, in addition to state 
responsibility under national and international human rights law. the ecuador country study describes some of 
the punishments ordered by ijs in that country, including ones that may violate national law and human rights 
standards. as the country study describes, the relevant constitutional provisions in ecuador have not yet been fully 
clarified through the passage of ordinary legislation, so it remains unclear how far the delegation of jurisdiction to 
indigenous courts and organs of law enforcement will go.144 as the Papua new guinea country study notes, the 
distinction between criminal and civil cases, as well as between criminal acts and violations of other social norms 
(such as obligations to respect elders and to work hard), is often blurred in ijs.
if the courts and tribunals of indigenous jurisdiction are considered to be “courts based on customary law” within 
the meaning of unhrc general comment no. 32, other countries, such as colombia, have already gone further 
than what the human rights committee would consider permitted by the iccPr. there are no clear limitations on 
subject matter jurisdiction that would limit the jurisdiction of indigenous courts to minor criminal matters. citing 
national legal experts in colombia, yrigoyen fajardo notes their subject matter jurisdiction covers the most serious 
offences, including homicide.145 moreover, the indigenous organs are clearly understood to have wide-ranging 
coercive powers. yrigoyen fajardo writes:
143 human rights committee, general comment no. 32, article 14: right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, 
ccPr/c/gc/32 23 august 2007, ninetieth session geneva, 9-27 july 2007.
144 the courts and tribunals of indigenous jurisdiction are here considered to be “courts based on customary law” within the meaning 
of the above general comment. they are thus the general assemblies of the Kichwa communities surveyed.
145 Beyond Law, Informal Justice and Legal Pluralism in the Global South, Vol. 10, issue #27, 2004.
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“Acts of personal coercion derived from the exercise of the special jurisdictional function (within 
its territory and according to its laws) do not, by definition, constitute the usurpation of functions 
of ordinary jurisdiction, or the crime of kidnapping, illegal privation of freedom or any other type 
of crime, but are rather like the arrest, communal labour, imprisonment, seizure or containment to 
which people are subject under the legitimate order of ordinary jurisdiction. As recognized by the 
constitution itself, this represents the exercise of a right – the right of peoples and communities to 
exercise jurisdictional functions. As the exercise of a right cannot be considered a crime, not only 
can its exercise not be prohibited, it must moreover be protected and legitimized. The Constitutional 
Court of Colombia has repeatedly recognized these powers of special jurisdiction. This clearly 
includes not only general coercive powers, but also specific punitive powers which are outside of 
the realm of ordinary criminal jurisdiction.”146
What is more, the constitutional court found that collective cultural rights and the constitutional dispensation of 
autonomy had primacy over individual rights in many cases. Van cott explains that:
“The Court further defined the scope of indigenous special jurisdiction in a 1996 ruling on a claim […] 
that [a] cabildo (a form of community government imposed on Colombian Indians by the Spanish 
crown and later adopted and `indigenized’ by indigenous cultures) had violated [the defendant’s] 
right to due process, ruling that the standard for interpreting indigenous jurisdiction must be `the 
maximum autonomy for the indigenous community and the minimisation of restrictions to those 
which are necessary to safeguard interests of superior constitutional rank’. Restrictions on the right 
to autonomy must protect a more important interest than that of cultural diversity (i.e. national security, the 
right to life, prohibition of slavery and torture) and must represent the manner of protecting that right 
that is least destructive to indigenous autonomy. As the minimum basis for ‘intercultural dialogue’ the 
Court offered the limitation of indigenous autonomy by the right to life and freedom from torture and slavery, 
arguing that indigenous cultures in Colombia do not practice torture or slavery, but do sanction 
murder. According to these criteria, the defendant did not have a right to ’due process’, as that 
term is understood in Western law, but only to the legitimate procedures used by his community in 
similar cases.” [Emphasis added].147
Von cott also notes that the constitutional court nevertheless did impose some limits on the indigenous judicial 
organ, denying it the power to impose a sentence of imprisonment in a state prison on the grounds that the rel-
evant customary law did not permit this punishment. in doing so, the court implicitly recognized its own power 
to determine what constituted valid customary law. in terms of procedure, the constitutional court of colombia 
confirmed its policy of deferring the maximum possible authority to the indigenous courts by deciding that the 
indigenous organ should have the possibility of retrying the case thus imposing a more traditional sanction or of 
remanding the case to the ordinary courts.148
as mentioned above, it is as yet unclear whether legislation and/or judicial interpretation will take ecuador in the 
same direction as colombia in terms of the relationship between the ‘ordinary’ and ‘indigenous’ justice systems. Van 
cott cites one of the leading justices of the constitutional court for the view that “only a high degree of autonomy 
would ensure cultural survival”.149 these decisions should be seen and understood in the context of the extremely 
serious situation facing indigenous communities in colombia and of the historical legacy.
146 ibid., citing san martín, césar, 1999, Derecho Procesal Penal, Vol. i, grijley (ed.), lima, pp. 90-91.
147 Van cott, D.l., 2000, op. cit.
148 ibid.
149 Van cott, D.l., 2000, citing magistrate gaviria Diaz in case t-523, 1997.
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the path that the court has chosen in some of these decisions poses risks for the protection of human rights, 
including those of indigenous people, and differences of opinion among the justices of the court are acknowl-
edged. the thinking behind this and similar decisions of the colombian constitutional court would seem to show 
that it might be better to understand the constitutional order adopted as a version of federalism rather than as 
the delegation of some judicial powers to customary or traditional organs in accordance with the human rights 
committee’s general comment.
nevertheless, from the point of view of international human rights law, reference to the constitutional order 
adopted does not solve the problem of the indigenous judicial organ’s failure to observe international guarantees 
of a fair trial. the recognition of the dynamism of culture and customary law and the wish of the indigenous com-
munities to enjoy respect for their observance of human rights may nevertheless be the best way to motivate 
the indigenous judicial organs to respect rights of due process. the wide scope that the constitutional court in 
colombia has given to indigenous communities and peoples perhaps reflects a trust that they will indeed work 
toward these aims.
there are many similarities between the historical injustices perpetrated against indigenous peoples and com-
munities in colombia and those committed in other countries of the region, including ecuador and Bolivia. nev-
ertheless, the extreme circumstances of civil conflict are fortunately not present in ecuador or Bolivia and, as the 
proportion of indigenous inhabitants is higher there, it is possible that concerns around the cultural survival of the 
indigenous population are not as pressing.
another consideration is that many ijs traditionally adopt to bring about peace and reconciliation after there has 
been a crime that disturbs social harmony. as this study also observes elsewhere, imprisonment as a punishment 
for serious offences, including murder, was unknown in many societies prior to the advent of (most often) euro-
pean colonists. as there was no distinction between civil and criminal matters – a distinction ultimately derived 
from the notion that a communal society rather than a formalized state is the governing organ – homicide, for 
example, could be settled by the payment of a number of cattle.150 it is interesting here that human rights law, apart 
from laying down prohibitions on torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment (ciDtP), 
generally does not impose requirements about the propriety of penalties for particular categories of offences. this 
is a matter left to states parties to determine, and international law may thus offer no obstacle to recognizing some 
customary practices of these kinds, provided victims’ rights are respected.151
use of coercive poWers and the LacK of outreach of the formaL  
Justice system
the Papua new guinea study describes how the village courts, applying customary law, can impose penalties in 
the form of ‘work orders’. failure to obey a work order can result in an order for imprisonment, but the formal jus-
tice system (i.e., the district court magistrate) must approve this sanction. When there is any requirement of such 
approval, it is important to determine the extent to which it is actually exercised and followed. the study on Papua 
new guinea also notes providers’ acknowledgement that village courts do overstep their jurisdiction and that they 
are powerless to tackle the epidemic of violence related to accusations of sorcery in the highlands.
other country studies also deal with the difficulties that the lack of outreach of state justice institutions causes. 
the difficulties that justice systems in many poor countries have in complying with national and international 
standards related to the question of arrest and detention, including protection against arbitrary detention, are well 
150 see the uganda country study and the discussion of practices in Karamoja.
151 one important instrument is the un Basic Principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for Victims of gross 
Violations of international human rights law and serious Violations of international humanitarian law.
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documented.152 in this regard, it is particularly important to abide by time limits for bringing suspects before judi-
cial authorities, to regularly renew remand detention orders, to hold trials within a reasonable time, and to respect 
the right to legal assistance. When police lack necessities such as the presence of police posts within the reach of 
the communities that they are supposed to serve, transport necessary to carry out investigations, take suspects 
into custody and bring them before a judge, and telephones to maintain contact with witnesses, colleagues and 
local authorities, they and the local communities are left with few choices.
justice officials in various countries acknowledge this problem. in practice, many judges in developing countries 
are sensitive to the possibility of mob justice and to the fact that people may lose respect for the state and the law 
if they think that the justice system is ineffective. justice officials may often be taking a pragmatic approach to con-
cepts of ‘apprehension’ as opposed to arrest, ‘citizen’s arrest’ and detention by the police, in some cases effectively 
turning a blind eye to irregularities when the circumstances of the offence seem to justify detention. the uganda 
study illustrates some aspects of this dilemma. the problem is relatively mild in relation to lc courts in the centre 
of the country and rather extreme in the Karamoja region, where state justice has been almost absent for genera-
tions. in order to avoid the risk of conflict, dialogue must ease the assertion of state jurisdiction for serious crimes 
in such circumstances. state agencies beginning to operate must gain the trust of communities by being fair and 
effective and by cooperating with family, clan and chiefdom elders.
in some cases, the best way forward to overcome limitations in policing resources might be to give local officials 
limited power to detain persons, pending handover to the police and subject to rules on conditions of deten-
tion and supervision by the police. in some countries, though, chiefs previously had such powers, but frequently 
abused them (see the niger and malawi country studies).
the state can promote accountability, minimize the risk of abuse, and build informal-formal linkages at a sustain-
able level until it is able to extend the reach of law enforcement services to outlying districts and gain the trust of 
communities. it could promote local justice coordination groups similar to the pilot mechanisms that the ministry 
of justice in Papua new guinea is establishing, as discussed in chapter iX. in this way, the local ijs providers are 
accountable to others in the community who have an interest in and insight into matters of communal justice, 
security, rights protection, etc. such a group can be in periodic contact with the closest state law enforcement 
and justice authorities. in this way, the state can be kept informed about developments and can step in where a 
pattern of unlawful or rights-threatening conduct emerges. an approach such as this requires that relevant state 
officials have knowledge, sensitivity, and integrity and that the authority be flexible under responsibility. there is no 
‘risk-free’ strategy here. measures such as these are subject to abuse, and resources could continue to be a concern.
the probLem of accusations of Witchcraft
human rights implications are also present in the holding of individuals accountable according to norms based 
on animist religion, including witchcraft. it is well documented in various countries, and discussed in the malawi 
country study, that socially vulnerable persons (often especially including orphans or elderly widows) are both 
more likely to face accusations of witchcraft and to be less able to effectively rebut such accusations.153 likewise, 
women in positions of power are more likely than men to face such accusations.
152 see, for example, the literature and programmes of Penal reform international in many countries or the studies carried out by the 
open society justice institute: http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/criminal_justice/articles_publications/publications/
pretrial-detention-corruption-20100409/summary-pretrial-detention-corruption.20100409.pdf
153 see, for example, the cases cited by Wlsa malawi, as mentioned and cited in the country study. there are numerous reports 
from ghana on efforts to eliminate the traditional practice of ‘trokosi’. elsewhere, see: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2089875.
stm (mozambique). see, similarly, news reports on victimization of albinos in tanzania. on the vulnerability of children to such 
accusations, see http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/car_49658.html (central african republic, where witchcraft is an offence 
for which imprisonment is often imposed). see also: medical research council of south africa, factsheet Witch hunts in modern 
south africa: an under-represented facet of gender-Based Violence, yaseen ally, june 2009, retrieved from: http://www.mrc.ac.za/
crime/witchhunts.pdf
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this area is difficult to regulate in a way that gives satisfactory legal protection to all. as is seen in the case of 
malawi, existing laws make it an offence to accuse another person of practicing witchcraft, but this does not pre-
vent banishments from villages or settlements, nor does it even protect those suspected of witchcraft from being 
prosecuted on other charges. this, in turn, may perpetuate the power of some to play on superstition as a means 
to persecute others for personal gain.
the malawi case study discusses how criminalizing the accusation of a person for witchcraft means that these 
cases are often only taken to ijs rather than the formal system.
the Papua new guinea country study illustrates a particularly grievous phenomenon known in various countries 
whereby children become suspected of involvement in witchcraft, either alone or by association with their par-
ents, which leads to violence or banishment. formal and informal justice officials, community leaders and police 
might not intervene either because of their own fears in this respect or because of the strength of community 
sentiment in this regard. Violence related to witchcraft accusations can reach an epidemic level. it is to be empha-
sized that in Papua new guinea, the ijs neither order nor perpetrate this violence, but they are also currently often 
powerless to prevent it. the country study concludes that, in the short term, only the police can intervene against 
groups committing violence against people accused of witchcraft. courageous church organizations or ngos can 
perhaps protect the accused. in the longer term, community education on the true sources of illness, which is 
often attributed to witchcraft,154 is the only solution.
human rights issues and the structure of informaL Justice systems
some of the principal human rights issues here concern:
  ‘lawfulness’: are ijs’ rules made in accordance with oral or written laws where such laws exist or have been 
written down?
  Predictability (non-arbitrariness) of ijs’ decisions
  the process by which rules are adopted and changed: are they public, transparent and participatory?
  independence and impartiality of adjudicators/decision makers (including a consideration of s/election proce-
dures, panel composition with gender or other balance, the means by which tribunals address conflicts of interest)
  effective enforcement of ijs agreements and provision of appropriate remedies, where applicable; penalties for 
non-compliance, where appropriate
  the means to ensure the accountability of actors (adjudicators and ’gatekeepers‘) in ijs
as indicated above, the main issues here concern participation and accountability. Questions of participation 
essentially are: Who decides what is custom? how is this decided? Who sits and adjudicates cases? how are adju-
dicators chosen? accountability is, of course, closely related to participation, and some key questions to ask are: 
What mechanisms ensure that ijs adjudicators are accountable? What does this mean in practice? can they be 
used to remove or discipline corrupt or incompetent adjudicators? Do these mechanisms function effectively? Do 
ijs users have access to these mechanisms? Do users know ijs standards in advance? is the motivation behind ijs 
decisions transparent? are they comparable to decisions in other, but similar cases?
When there is a broad human rights view focussing on principles, the mechanisms for accountability do not have 
to be the same as those in formal systems. Whereas formal systems rely on appointment qualifications and proce-
dures, appellate review and formalized disciplinary procedures, informal systems may rely on the importance of 
154 in Papua new guinea, the word ‘sorcery’ is generally used to describe what it believed to be harmful magic. in some countries of 
anglophone southern africa, a distinction is sometimes made between ’witchcraft‘, which is seen as malign and evil, and ’sorcery‘, 
which may not always be ill intentioned and may incorporate elements of traditional religion and healing. 
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reputation in the community, the presence of various counsellors in the adjudication process, the impossibility of 
keeping secrets in a tightly knit society, and social pressure to hold adjudicators to account. a major focus should 
be the effectiveness of each set of measures in achieving accountability and participation.
issues reLated to the fairness of informaL Justice systems’ procedures
some of the principal human rights issues here concern:
  accessibility of the forum with respect to cost, distance, language, cultural familiarity, and procedure
  right of the parties to the dispute to be present at the hearing and to be heard
  issues of procedural fairness related to the opportunity to present evidence and witnesses and to the questions 
taken into account when determining the outcome of the dispute
  non-discrimination, participation
  means to ensure that the adjudication is based only on the material facts and the rules that are applicable to 
those facts
  the protection of the needs of vulnerable persons and groups, particularly children
  right of parties to be informed of the nature of the dispute and to understand the procedure and rules to 
be applied
  support mechanisms for forum users, e.g., legal assistance, representation, and protection of applicants and/or 
witnesses, psychological and material support
  effectiveness of forum, i.e., timeliness in processing and determining applications and cases and in enforcing remedies
  guaranteed right of appeal and non bis in idem
  use of coercion to enforce case resolutions
as in the discussion on structure, the key question here concerns the extent to which ijs actually succeed in 
protecting the acknowledged procedural rights. the country studies show that ijs will often actually ‘score’ highly 
in accessibility and perhaps in effectiveness. some of the other standards cited here are by their nature less appli-
cable to some forms of ijs. the issue of coercion is linked to the typology of the ijs concerned, the kinds of cases 
handled, and the procedural guarantees that are afforded. in general, the demands for procedural due process will 
be greater if ijs are recognized as having greater coercive powers. a completely voluntary and non-binding system 
will not be bound by rules of due process.
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impLications for programming
the primary question with respect to human rights and ijs must concern the provision of effective protection. 
if formal accountability mechanisms are often inoperative or inaccessible to ordinary people and are probably 
unable to fill the gap in the short and medium terms, the way is open to discuss how ijs compare to the formal 
justice system in terms of their ability to be impartial, accountable and participatory, to protect substantive human 
rights, and to offer accessibility, effectiveness and fairness in their procedures.
lack of human rights compliance by ijs is no reason in itself for development agencies not to work with ijs, any 
more than it is reason not to work with a failing formal justice system. a key consideration is whether engaging 
with ijs will strengthen the protection of human rights, which will necessarily be a gradual process of change. 
the protection of the customs and laws of indigenous and minority groups, at least to the extent that those 
customs and laws do not breach other international legal norms, is itself a concern of international human 
rights law. therefore, engaging with ijs should seek to make incremental improvements while simultaneously 
considering the longer-term perspective and also the rights of indigenous and minority groups to maintain 
their own cultural heritage.
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Women and girLs’ human rights and  
informaL Justice systems
introduction
asymmetrical and hierarchical gender division means that men and women do not have the same opportunities 
to achieve their potential. Widespread, serious gender-specific constraints on women and girls opportunities and 
choices exist in almost all parts of the world. this study takes as its point of departure the gendered world in which 
women and men operate and how their gendered roles with respect to access to resources affect their respec-
tive access to formal and informal systems of justice.155 Keeping in mind the legal and principled position that all 
human beings are born equal156 and that gender relations are about power,157 it is relevant to examine women’s 
human rights as a tool for creating gender equality, also in ijs.
over the years, the human rights movement has been criticized for failing to take women’s rights sufficiently seri-
ously, including through the maintenance of a distinction between the public and private spheres.158 however, “just 
as women’s gender-specific vulnerabilities can no longer stand as justifications for denying human rights protection 
to women more generally, neither should ‘differences among women’ be allowed to marginalize some women’s 
human rights problems, or to deny them equal solicitude and concern under the prevailing human rights regime”.159
the formal recognition that women are entitled to enjoy all of the rights in international human rights law is the 
result of sustained effort since the 1950s. in addition to the requirement of equality and the principle of non-
discrimination in the main human rights instruments, specific instruments such as the Declaration on the elimina-
tion of Discrimination against Women (1967) and the convention on the elimination of all forms of Discrimination 
against Women (ceDaW, 1989) require states to pay particular attention to eliminating discrimination in law and 
in practice.
the human rights committee (hrc) notes that inequality in the enjoyment of rights by women is often deeply 
embedded in tradition, culture and religion, so that many frequent violations of women’s human rights originate 
in social custom, belief or practice rather than (or as well as) in state law and are perpetrated by individuals and 
social groups rather than the state.160 the crucial state obligation in relation to these rights is to protect and fulfil as 
much as to respect, and thus the nature of the challenge in combating violations is also somewhat different. it is 
worth remembering here that culture can be a protector as well as a violator of human rights in the global south 
and north.
since the Beijing World conference and Platform for action (1995),161 impetus has come through developments 
such as the continuing work of the ceDaW committee; the entry into force of the optional Protocol to the ceDaW; 
and the inclusion of gender equality among the millennium Development goals. at the regional level, the entry 
into force of the (maputo) Protocol to the african charter on human and Peoples rights on the rights of Women 
in africa162 and the inter-american convention on the Prevention, Punishment and eradication of Violence against 
Women (convention of Belem do Para, 1994) and are also relevant developments. the clear recognition that 
155 see griffiths, a., 1997, and others, such as Wlsa publications.
156 uDhr, article 1.
157 Women’s power is often subordinate. 
158 see Peters, j. s. and Wolper, a. (eds.), 1995; and rebecca j. cook (ed.), 1995.
159 crenshaw, K. W., 2000.
160 see hrc general comment no. 28.
161 see full references and follow up at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/index.html
162 the Protocol entered into force in 2005.
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violence against women (VaW) is a human rights violation and the actions of ingos and the un special rappor-
teur have done much to redress the imbalance on the level of action by the international human rights system.163
Despite these positive developments, the ichrP notes that the discussion on respect for women’s rights often 
remains tethered to the notion of ‘balancing’ these rights with culture and custom, rather than taking a more 
dynamic and process-oriented view of culture.164 on the one hand, the deeply embedded patterns that the hrc 
refers to are often linked to patterns of economic survival and ethnic, religious or social identity. thus, custom 
or religion-based ijs are especially likely to uphold rather than to challenge the values of the society around 
them, including attitudes and patterns of discrimination. on the other hand, the syncretic, flexible and adaptable 
approach of customary law can allow it to change in ways that reflect changing values in society. the hrc notes 
that states should ensure that “traditional, historical, religious or cultural attitudes are not used to justify violations 
of women’s rights to equality before the law and to equal enjoyment of all covenant rights.”
it is sometimes difficult to isolate the adjudicative function of ijs mechanisms from the prevailing practices and 
norms within communities. the problems or human rights violations may indeed occur outside of or prior to any 
process of adjudication. from a programmatic point of view, it may thus be inadequate to address the adjudicative 
ijs without addressing the norms and even the world-views that inform them. in relation to the difficult area of 
real property and land allocation, the formulation of a national policy may itself be a major hurdle. norms having a 
basis in religious faith may require a specific approach best developed by women themselves.
tackling the social practices and beliefs themselves is outside the scope of this study. this recalls the treaty bodies’ 
recommendations of using multi-pronged strategies over time to address these issues. in practice, the same com-
munity leaders – traditional or religious – who would be called upon to adjudicate disputes in the event of a 
conflict are those who are upholding the problematic practices – including, for example, child marriages, and 
discriminatory inheritance practices.
a key challenge for agencies engaged in programming for justice support and reform when engaging with ijs is to 
combine the familiar tools of justice reform, such as processes for change in legislation and institutional practice, 
with sets of tools designed to be effective in more diffuse settings. there is wide recognition that ‘modifying social 
custom and practice’ requires multi-pronged and long-term strategies. change in ijs is likely to be associated with 
various factors, including women’s education, breaking the isolation of rural communities, and encouraging par-
ticipation in ways that represent a natural development rather than an abrupt intrusion.
this chapter looks at women’s rights in relation to:
1. legal frameworks: Discrimination and equal treatment
2. structure: the right to participation, and an analysis of nomination and appointment mechanisms 
3. Procedure: gender-related barriers and issues
4. substantive rights: Women’s rights and legal domains in ijs based on customary law (marriage, family, prop-
erty, inheritance, personal integrity and physical security)
163 one could also point to developments in international criminal law, including landmark decisions by the ictr recognizing 
systematic rape as constitutive of the crime of genocide.
164 ichrP, 2009.
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LegaL frameWorKs: discrimination and eQuaL treatment
the un and regional treaty systems and their reporting requirements are among the most important tools for 
addressing legal frameworks. the ceDaW obliges states to take all appropriate measures, including through leg-
islation, to strive for the full development and advancement of women and to commit to modifying social and 
cultural patterns to eliminate prejudices and customary practices based on the presumed inferiority of either 
sex.165 regional human rights instruments, including the maputo Protocol,166 impose almost identical obliga-
tions, whereas the Belem do Para convention167 mentions states’ measures to counteract prejudices, customs 
and all other practices based on the presumed inferiority or superiority of either sex.168 for those african states 
that have not yet acceded to the Protocol, the provisions of the african charter on human and Peoples rights 
remain essential.169
a legal analysis of some of the provisions of the african charter by un haBitat observes that:
‘“[T]he Charter (Article 18 (1)) recognizes that the family ‘as the natural unit and basis of society’ 
and the ‘custodian of morals and traditional values’ has to be protected by the State. On the 
other hand, Article 18 (2) and (3) makes clear that the States parties have to ensure that ‘every’ 
form of discrimination against women is eliminated and that the rights of women and children, 
as stipulated in international instruments, are protected. Thus, the possibility of considering an 
unequal relationship between men and women – as often found in customary laws and practices 
today – as a ‘traditional value’, is firmly ruled out: ‘every’ form of discrimination against women is to 
be eliminated and can therefore not constitute a traditional value. Moreover, the duty to preserve 
‘positive’ African cultural values in the spirit of tolerance, dialogue and consultation, as laid down 
by Article 29 (7), seems to indicate that not all African values have to be preserved and that some 
cultural values that are not seen as ‘positive’ may change over time.”170
states ratifying the ceDaW assume a positive obligation to promote social change wherever discrimination is 
found. this presents numerous difficulties, including political and institutional resistance and the limited effect of 
legislative change where the law and the state have limited reach. for example, Burkina faso’s rather modern and 
progressive 1989 family code is reportedly seldom followed in practice.171 the issues that customary and religious 
law most often adjudicate relate to personal and family status and questions of real and personal property, includ-
ing inheritance.172 moreover, ijs will often deal with perceived transgression of norms that relate to social conduct, 
including deeply held notions regarding gender and social roles and supernatural beliefs.173
165 ceDaW, articles 3 and 5.
166 the Protocol to the african charter on human and Peoples' rights on the rights of Women in africa
167 the inter-american convention on the Prevention, Punishment and eradication of Violence against Women 
168 see article 2 of the Protocol, which, at the time of writing of this study, 27 countries have ratified. http://www.africa-union.org/
root/au/Documents/treaties/treaties.htm
169 article 1 of the charter obliges states parties to undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to these rights 
and freedoms. article 2 stipulates that every individual is entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms laid down in the 
charter, without distinction of any kind, including that of a person’s gender. article 3 recognizes equality before the law and equal 
protection of the law for everyone without distinction, while article 25 obliges states parties to promote and ensure the respect 
of the rights and freedoms contained in the charter. in article 28, the charter extends into the private sphere by obliging every 
individual to treat others without discrimination, while article 29 speaks of the duty of every individual to preserve the ‘positive’ 
african cultural values in the spirit of tolerance, dialogue and consultation.
170 Women’s equal rights to housing, land and Property in international law, un habitat, 2006.
171 see oecD Development centre’s social and gender index: http://genderindex.org/country/burkina-faso. see also country specific 
Desk study on Burkina faso.
172 reference is made to chapter ii on conceptual framework and specifically on legal Pluralism.
173 Please refer to chapter ii on conceptual framework and specifically on legal Pluralism and chapter iV on typology.
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the ceDaW reporting guidelines174 provide that states’ reports should explain whether and to what extent the 
provisions of the convention are guaranteed by law. if not, information should be submitted on whether ceDaW 
provisions can be invoked before and given effect to by courts, tribunals and administrative authorities. the report 
should outline any restrictions or limitations imposed by law, practice or tradition, or in any other manner, on 
the enjoyment of each provision of the convention.175 the domestication of the ceDaW and other international 
human rights instruments, particularly in countries that subscribe to a dualist legal doctrine, is thus critical.
few african countries have made reservations to the ceDaW in respect of prima facie discriminatory customary 
law. thus, the concluding observations of the ceDaW committee frequently call on these countries to bring their 
national law into line with their obligations under the convention.176 an increasing number of states in africa have 
constitutional guarantees of equal treatment for women, thus complying with their obligations under the ceDaW. 
nevertheless, several african countries, including Zambia, Zimbabwe and sierra leone maintain constitutional 
provisions exempting customary law from the reach of constitutional guarantees of equality.177 the constitutional 
provision tolerating prima facie discrimination in customary law in Zambia, similar or identical to those in many 
countries in africa, has been taken up by un treaty bodies,178 including in the examination of Zambia under the 
universal Periodic review (2008). Zambia accepted the recommendation to strengthen the prohibition of dis-
crimination in the context of the current constitutional review process and to introduce legislation to give effect 
to the ceDaW.179 in recent years, the legislative tolerance of discrimination in customary courts has been removed 
in lesotho.180
the situation is different in states where the influence of islamic Shari’ah is behind a lack of equal treatment under 
national legislation. many states with predominantly muslim populations181 have made reservations to some of 
the ceDaW provisions on equal treatment in participation and marital relations182 and the ceDaW obligation to 
modify social customs and practices. reservations of these kinds are highly controversial and in some cases con-
sidered invalid.183 in these countries, there may be less readiness to change national legislation and constitutional 
provisions in accordance with treaty body recommendations. nevertheless, this will depend on the particular 
context of the country concerned.
Despite attempts to limit the application of the convention, these states, like all others, remain bound by similar, if 
less explicit provisions in other human rights instruments. few states have made reservations in respect to gender 
(in)equality in relation to the other instruments, including the iccPr, the icescr and the crc. the human rights 
174 hri/gen/2/rev.1/add.2, 5 may 2003.
175 ceDaW reporting guidelines, D.2.5.
176 see, for example, the list of issues regarding the examination of ghana, where the committee asked the government of the 
republic of ghana to “explain how the government plans to harmonize civil, religious and customary law with the convention, in 
particular in relation to article 16 of the convention”. ceDaW/c/gha/Q/5.
177 e.g., constitution of Zambia, article 23 (4), constitution of Kenya, 82 (4) (b) and (c), and constitution of Zimbabwe, s. 23 (3) (b). 
the 1999 magaya case in Zimbabwe obtained notoriety among women and human rights lawyers in southern africa when the 
supreme court found that the constitution effectively shielded discrimination against women in regard to inheriting land.
178 un document a/57/38(suPP) (ceDaW, 2001), paragraph(s) 251 bis.
179 un document a/hrc/8/43/add.1.
180 see us state Department report on human rights for 2006 for lesotho: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78741.htm
181 including niger, which is the focus of a country study. 
182 as observed elsewhere in this chapter, though, there is little uniformity of practice in respect of the convention among states with 
predominantly muslim populations or that have adopted islam as a state religion. While Pakistan, mauritania and saudi arabia have 
reservations purporting to subject the entire convention to the primacy of islamic law, saudi arabia’s neighbour yemen contents 
itself with a reservation in respect of binding arbitration under article 29, in common with many Western countries.
183 the ceDaW committee has repeatedly expressed alarm and concern at the number and extent of reservations to the convention. 
the committee considers articles 2 and 16 to be core provisions of the convention, in respect of which reservations are contrary 
to its object and purpose (un document a/53/38/rev.1). some Western countries have objected to the reservations, arguing that 
they are incompatible with the object and purpose of the convention (under article 28) and are therefore invalid, meaning that 
the convention would remain in force in its entirety. 
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committee and the committee on the rights of the child184 have made their position clear on the inconsistency 
of discriminatory customary law in marriage, divorce, inheritance, property and participation.185
human rights law recognizes several dimensions of this category of rights, including equality in relation to structure 
and participation, to access and process, and to substantive outcomes. through the obligation of states parties to 
establish legal protection on an equal basis with men through competent tribunals, etc., the ceDaW convention 
clearly recognizes the importance of access to justice.186
structure: the right to participation
for the purpose of ceDaW, any body that exercises public authority or power is a public authority or institution. 
this would include local, traditional or religious bodies to which the exercise of public authority187 may be del-
egated. even if there is neither a clear link between states and ijs in the form of recognition, nor some other del-
egation of state functions to traditional chiefs, nor enforcement or consideration of settlements reached through 
informal justice, the state remains obliged under article 2 of the ceDaW to extend protection. in the americas, 
article 4 (j) of the Belem do Para convention states that every woman has the right to equal access to her coun-
try’s public service and to participate in public affairs, including decision-making. in africa, article 9 of the maputo 
Protocol deals with the equal right to participation, including through affirmative action. thus, article 9.2 provides 
that states parties shall “ensure increased and effective representation and participation of women at all levels of 
decision-making”.
these provisions, like the corresponding obligations in the ceDaW,188 obligate states to ensure representation of 
women in bodies exercising public authority. it is clear from the work of the treaty bodies that adjudicative bodies 
are included as ‘decision-making’ or ‘public functions’.189 state recognition thus includes not only the formal delega-
tion of authority or the payment of stipends, but also the recognition of ijs settlements and possibly other forms of 
de facto recognition. the participation of women as adjudicators or justice officials is vital to ensuring that women 
can bring sensitive matters to the attention of justice providers. the reasons for determining how the police deal 
with domestic violence or rape and for establishing police victims’ service units (Vsus) apply similarly to ijs. atten-
tion must thus be given to the mechanisms of nomination and selection of judges, adjudicators, mediators, asses-
sors or other titles of persons exercising authority within ijs, insofar as they enjoy any sort of state recognition.
african countries with dualist legal systems, whereby state courts190 apply customary law, often do not comply 
with these obligations. Zambia exemplifies a typical pattern, yet some promising developments. according to 
Zambia’s local courts act,191 the judicial service commission appointed local court magistrates. the law was silent 
184 the committee on the rights of the child frequently includes a general recommendation to states to ensure that customary law 
conform to the provisions of the crc. this includes, of course, the non-discrimination provisions, crc, article 2. see, for example, 
the recommendations to Burkina faso: crc/c/15/aDD.193 (crc, 2002), paragraph 8.
185 on action by the human rights committee in relation to state equal treatment obligations under the iccPr, see, for example, the 
examination of gabon, ccPr/co/70/gaB (hrc, 2000), paragraph 9. the committee recommended that gabon 1) review legislation 
and practice to ensure women have the same rights as men (rights of ownership and inheritance); 2) increase involvement of 
women in political, economic and social life; 3) ensure there is no discrimination based on customary law (in marriage, divorce and 
inheritance); and 4) abolish polygamy, repealing article 252 of the civil code. the 2007 examination of Zambia by the hrc is also 
relevant, see: ccPr/c/ZmB/co/3 (hrc, 2007), paragraph(s) 13.
186 ceDaW, article 2 (c) and article 2 (d).
187 Be it executive, legislative or judicial. 
188 ceDaW, article 7.
189 see general recommendation no. 23 (16th session, 1997) article 7 (political and public life). “the obligation specified in article 
7 extends to all areas of public and political life and is not limited to those areas specified in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c). the 
political and public life of a country is a broad concept. it refers to the exercise of political power, in particular the exercise of 
legislative, judicial, executive and administrative powers.”
190 the local courts in Zambia or the tribunais communitarios in mozambique are a good example. 
191 section 6 of the law.
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on procedures for appointment. according to one report, the appointment process relied on local chiefs. several 
factors contributed to the local courts’ bias toward male justices, including the fact that “there are no standard 
qualifications laid down for the local court justices. secondly, these courts still carry the ancient stigma of being 
traditional courts where the male gender takes the centre stage. thirdly, in rural areas, whenever a vacancy occurs 
for a court justice, the local court officer requests the area chiefs to submit three names for consideration by the 
judicial service commission. We discovered that the chiefs were inclined towards male candidates.”192 in recent 
years, though, the Zambian judiciary has taken serious steps to begin to redress the balance. Qualifications require-
ments have become more standardized and vacancies are publicly advertised more often, especially in urban 
areas, where the chiefs hold less sway. the judiciary has become more conscious of gender.193
in many countries, traditional customary authorities play a role in the nomination of candidates for office in the para-
judicial or ‘hybrid’ systems involving local or customary court justices or, by extension, for customary assessors,194 
whereas a body such as a judicial service commission (jsc) or a government ministry makes or approves the final 
appointment. as long as most traditional customary chiefs are male, they are likely to perpetuate the exclusion of 
women, and any reform effort will probably need to start with the government body exercising some influence in 
the selection process. the Beijing Platform recommendation would demand that the bodies such as jscs adopt 
transparent criteria for the appointment of local court justices. these criteria should at the least be gender-neutral 
or even contain elements of affirmative action. in addition, instead of relying on an all-male group of chiefs to 
nominate candidates, government bodies such as jscs could consider introducing regulations to ensure that 
the nominating body itself adequately represent women. affirmative action measures have been taken with the 
local council courts in uganda and the village courts in Bangladesh and Papua new guinea, where quotas for 
female representation have been set.195 measures of this kind are possible to introduce – at least on paper – in the 
parajudicial systems.
the problem of a gender imbalance is likely to be more serious in traditional chiefs’ or headmen’s courts. if states 
recognize these courts, the function of chief or councillor is a public office and, consequently, the state is obligated 
to respect women’s right of access to these offices. article 3 of ceDaW outlines that:
“States Parties shall take in all fields, in particular in the political, social, economic and cultural fields, 
all appropriate measures, including legislation, to ensure the full development and advancement 
of women, of the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with men.”
in recent years, there have been some notable developments in this field. the 2007–2008 shilubana judgement 
of the south african constitutional court is particularly noteworthy.196 in that case, the court found in favour of 
a woman’s right to accede to the office of chief. it is interesting that the court was thus supporting the decision 
of the tribal councillors to overturn a discriminatory tradition in this respect and essentially found in favour of the 
right of the tribal authorities to apply a dynamic approach to culture that allowed them to change a tradition 
based on male succession. the south african commission for gender equality and a national ngo, the national 
movement of rural Women, intervened as amici curiae in favour of this dynamic interpretation. the chances of 
192 see afronet, 1998, ‘the Dilemma of local courts in Zambia’, http://www.oneworld.org/afronet/reports/l_courts.htm 
193 interviews in lusaka, february and march 2010.
194 found in many countries, such as niger, where the ministry responsible for local government approves the selection of traditional 
chiefs, while the ministry of justice does so in relation to customary assessors. see niger study. 
195 see country studies on uganda, Bangladesh and Papua new guinea. see also the discussion, in chapter V on typology, about the 
participation of women.
196 shilubana and others v. nwamitwa (commission for gender equality; national movement of rural Women; congress of traditional 
leaders of south africa as amici curiae), case cct 03/07, 2008, Zacc 9. available online at: http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/
Zacc/2008/9.html
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a full and satisfactory enforcement of a judicial decision like this one would undoubtedly have been more difficult 
had tribal elders opposed it.197 tribal elders might be more likely to propose women for these offices where there 
are women candidates available who, by virtue of their abilities and qualifications, are likely to benefit the com-
munity and/or where qualified male candidates are unavailable.
some countries operate local justice systems on the basis of local democratic elections. examples of these are 
the Barangay justice system in the Philippines or the local council court system in uganda. selection of Barangay 
officials in the Philippines and, through them, of local mediators, is through local democratic processes. the same 
applies to uganda, with the difference that there is a mandatory representation of at least three women out of a 
nine-member executive council.198 rwandan government policy stipulates that female judges should comprise 
one third of the Gacaca tribunals.199 as these mechanisms belong to the category of ijs that are run by locally 
elected administrations with an adjudicative function, the question of qualifications is less relevant. Qualifications 
to run for public elected office are typically fairly broad, but several studies as well as informants interviewed for the 
country studies actually point out that officials’ lack of formal training or qualifications affects the officials’ under-
standing and ability to follow the regulations.
there is some discussion as to whether affirmative action measures alone can make a difference in the local con-
text. the social status of women in the family and community can continue to limit their independence and 
decision-making power despite women’s representation in elected bodies. if these are the only women in deci-
sion-making positions in the communities, the impact might be limited. a male-dominated and conservative 
‘electorate’ that subscribes to traditional norms can also influence how progressively the elected women actually 
are in their action. more equal gender representation does not guarantee less bias against women litigants in 
adjudication processes. change here requires a more general shift in the social power structure.200 change is more 
likely to come from a multi-pronged strategy and will in all cases take time.
finally, few religious creeds traditionally welcome women in positions of authority. as discussed in the niger coun-
try study, this may be a barrier to women accessing positions of authority in secular and religious structures alike. 
article 7 of the ceDaW presents difficulties for countries delegating responsibility for legal matters – most often 
related to marriage, the family and inheritance – to traditionally all-male religious courts. the governments of israel 
and malaysia recognized this difficulty and chose to express formal reservations. israel’s reservation to the ceDaW 
concerned the religious laws of the country’s religious communities that prohibit the representation of women on 
religious courts, whereas malaysia’s concerned Shari’ah.201
access and procedure: LegaL capacity and Women’s right to a remedy
the iccPr guarantees the right to a remedy202 for violation of any of the rights laid down in the covenant, the 
equality of all persons before the courts and tribunals, and the right of all persons to be recognized everywhere 
as persons before the law. moreover, it lays down the entitlement of everyone to equal protection under the 
197 at the national level, the council of traditional leaders of south africa opposed the decision.
198 see the uganda country study below.
199 according to one estimate, 29 percent of judges were female. see Strategies For Increasing Women’s Participation In Government 
Case Study Of Rwanda, paper presented by mr. john mutamba, expert group meeting on Democratic governance in africa, 6–8 
December 2005, nairobi, Kenya.
200 see, for example, Kane, oloka-onyango and cole, 2005.
201 other states parties applying shari’ah have not followed suit, and one must therefore conclude that many states where Shari’ah 
courts exist are legally bound by international law to ensure representation of women on such courts. the list is long and includes 
Bahrain, egypt, jordan, iraq, Kuwait, lebanon, libya, morocco, niger, oman, syria and the uae. on the other hand, states parties 
such as saudi arabia, Pakistan and mauritania, which have made reservations to the convention, which are general and broad, 
would consider that the reservations also apply to this requirement.
202 Be it judicial or administrative.
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law, without discrimination.203 in africa, article 8 of the maputo Protocol focuses particularly on women’s right 
to access justice. states parties are obliged to take all appropriate measures to ensure women’s access to legal 
services, including legal aid, as well as structures and measures to educate women (and everyone) about their 
rights. it speaks particularly of equal representation of women in the judiciary and law enforcement organs and of 
equipping these organs to effectively interpret and enforce gender equality rights. it also repeats the obligation 
to reform discriminatory laws and practices. in the americas, the Belem do Para convention states that “[e]very 
woman has the right to the recognition, enjoyment, exercise and protection of all human rights and freedoms 
embodied in regional and international human rights instruments. these rights include, among others: […] f ) 
the right to equal protection before the law and of the law; [and] g) the right to simple and prompt recourse to a 
competent court for protection against acts that violate her rights.”204
the ceDaW obliges states to accord women equality with men in legal capacity and before the law, equal rights 
to conclude contracts and administer property, and equal treatment at court procedures. it also provides that all 
contracts directed at restricting the legal capacity of women shall be deemed null and void. the ceDaW commit-
tee points out that a woman’s right to bring litigation may be limited by law, by her access to legal advice and her 
ability to seek redress from the courts, or, in turn, by her status as a witness or because her evidence is accorded 
less respect or weight than that of a man.205
the violation of women’s rights in this area may lead to violations of the rights of others, particularly of depend-
ent children. the committee’s reference to women’s “ability to seek redress from the courts” covers a wide range 
of factors and difficulties. While some of the obstacles to women are common to the population in general (e.g., 
distance, cost, cultural and social accessibility), they may be more serious in the case of women. Women may be 
intimidated from seeking redress before state courts or ijs either by officials of the court systems or by members 
of their communities.
the ceDaW reporting guidelines require states to inform the committee of the range of remedies available to 
persons whose rights may have been violated in particular to provide information about “the judicial, adminis-
trative and other competent authorities having jurisdiction with respect to the implementation of the provisions 
of the convention.” for many states, these ‘authorities’ and remedies include ijs. any activities of bodies such as 
nhris, specialized commissions for women or equality, or ombudsman institutions in relation to ijs would also be 
relevant. While the committee’s recommendations refer to customary law mechanisms, these recommendations 
usually involve legal frameworks. an examination of states’ reports to the ceDaW or other treaty bodies (or the uPr) 
shows that little attention is given to the practical operation of ijs and customary law. When the treaty bodies do 
not receive information, they are unable to respond with observations and recommendations. Programming in ijs 
should increase the flow of information, both nationally and internationally, in order to facilitate a qualified dialogue.
gender-reLated barriers to access to Justice in practice
even when constitutions and family law have more or less recognized the concept of non-discrimination against 
women, the extent to which such legislation has helped to improve the situation of women remains in doubt.206 
as many scholars have pointed out, legislative reform is no guarantee of social change.207 law may fail to take 
account of the social reality of women’s lives, potentially exacerbating their problems. in Kenya, for example, state 
203 iccPr articles 2.3, 14 and 26.
204 excerpt from article 4 of the inter-american convention on the Prevention, Punishment and eradication of Violence against Women. 
205 ceDaW committee general recommendation no. 21.
206 an-na'im has warned of putting too much emphasis on law when it comes to human rights, especially in contexts where states 
are ’weak‘; see ‘the legal Protection of human rights in africa: how to Do more with less’. an interesting analysis of the obstacles 
to the realization of women’s inheritance rights in malawi is chiweza, a. l., 2005, 15: 1, 83-89. this article examines constraints at 
several levels, from threats of witchcraft to petty corruption and system dysfunctionality.
207 see cook, r. j., 1995, op. cit.
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laws formalized and individualized property rights in a way that impeded women’s right to property.208 thus, state 
laws may disenfranchise women by not considering the contextual realities of their lives.
in addition to existing gender-specific constraints, women also suffer from the generally dysfunctional state of jus-
tice systems. in this regard, research in Pakistan documented how normal procedures such as filing cases, getting 
cases ‘fixed’ for hearing, obtaining copies of court orders, and inspecting files are matters that never proceed with-
out payment.209 if women are poorer than men, they will be less able to pay. factors such as these will influence 
people’s choices between formal and informal systems. the enforcement of judgements and legal entitlements 
even where there is no litigation or dispute or where the matter has been settled in a court judgement is a major 
difficulty in many developing countries with relatively weak justice systems. the enforcement of judgements is 
usually left up to local executive officials or even traditional chiefs, which, on the one hand, can lead to problems if 
they are not in agreement with the principles of the law or the judgement. on the other, if they are subject to pres-
sure from powerful constituents, local notables or ‘big men’, then judgements or settlements may simply not be 
enforced. the section below on women’s property rights contains some examples of problems with enforcement. 
as mentioned below, community involvement, such as that in some of Bangladesh’s Shalish courts, may provide 
some protection against non-enforcement.
the probLem of LacK of aWareness
the lack of awareness of women’s rights is a major problem for users and providers of ijs, as the country studies 
acknowledge. indeed, the problem can be severe, amounting to much more than a lack of familiarity with the con-
tent of the ceDaW. it can involve deep ignorance of national legislation and may be coupled with wider exclusion 
of women from education and community education awareness-raising campaigns.210 addressing this problem is 
frequently a first step in the programmes of ngos (including those involved in the provision of legal aid), govern-
ment agencies and development organisations.
proceduraL barriers to Women as Witnesses or Litigants
there may be no basis for discriminatory treatment of women in the relevant law. this section should thus be seen 
together with the one below on social barriers. While written rules and procedures are less likely to be present 
in most ijs, this is not necessarily a problem in itself. nevertheless, the lack of procedural rules, while having the 
advantage of rendering proceedings less technical and easier for people to participate in without lawyers, can also 
permit prejudice and the abuse of power. in patriarchal societies, this can easily disadvantage women.
Procedural problems may be seen in some courts applying Shari’ah law. a section of one authoritative report 
dealing with the requirement that witnesses be present in order for muslim religious marriages to be valid states:
 “[I]n most systems based on Muslim laws, the presumption is that the two witnesses have to be 
male. However, the laws in Sudan and Yemen note that one man and two women may act as 
witnesses. Most laws do not expressly permit four women to witness a marriage. The lesser ‘worth’ 
of women as marriage witnesses is said to be based on Qur’anic provisions (2:282) regarding the 
witnessing of contracts involving future financial obligations.”211
In the legislation of some countries, such as Pakistan’s much criticized (former) Hudood laws, trials 
in religious courts explicitly required that rape be witnessed by four males in order to be proven. 
208 griffiths, a., 2007.
209 mehdi, 1994.
210 for more information on ’educational poverty’, see the efa global monitoring report on Deprivation and marginalization in 
education, unesco at http://www.unesco.org/fileadmin/multimeDia/hQ/eD/gmr/html/dme-3.html
211 see Women Living Under Muslim Laws, 2006.
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While law reforms in 2006 removed these cases from religious courts and thus improved the 
situation of women in relation to evidence, laws that give women’s testimony a lesser value than 
men’s persist in Shari’ah religious courts in many countries.212
other procedural issues, including the question of privacy and confidentiality, are very important to women’s par-
ticipation. the malawi country study shows that women were more likely to bring certain cases to village mediators 
rather than to traditional chiefs because this process offered more confidentiality than the public discussion of 
personal and intimate matters that would take place in the traditional ijs offered by local chiefs. the prominence 
of women among the village mediators was also an important factor. the experience in Bangladesh, as seen in the 
study of that country, is also instructive here in that ngo-sponsored Shalish courts systematically address women’s 
participation. in contrast to the confidential mediation offered in malawi, modified ngo-sponsored Shalish courts 
in Bangladesh retain emphasis on the tradition of community involvement. this can be a guarantee of enforcement 
of decisions and can play a pedagogical role in the community, including in relation to women’s status and rights.213
Written rules of procedure have the virtue of setting out an indisputable and transparent standard of conduct. 
People can use them as a tool for accountability only if the rules are available and they are aware of them. introduc-
ing new procedural rules and practices will require training and monitoring.
sociaL barriers
While women’s ignorance of their rights provided under national legislation is a major barrier to women’s empow-
erment, social constraints may in some circumstances be an even greater barrier than a lack of knowledge. Wom-
en’s resources cannot be determined a priori and are affected by age, religion, ethnicity and class.214
the country study in the ungai-Bena District in Papua new guinea shows that women live in constant fear for their 
lives: “When it comes to someone dying or being ill and the cause is decided (by the family) to be related to sorcery 
we just know one of us will be attacked, tortured or even killed. our husbands cannot stand up for us against the 
accusation unless we have given him many sons. We simply have no rights.”215
families, beyond being unhelpful, “can also be main source of threats and possible danger to a woman who 
embarks on a decision not of their making nor to their liking.”216 Women may face varying degrees of pressure from 
the ijs at every step when seeking justice. they may thus need assistance to cope with the social ramifications of 
their actions. Women may face implicit or explicit threats of social ostracism, further mistreatment or violence as 
the price of defying norms or powerful actors.217
in Baluchistan and afghanistan, where ijs are strong, women do not use the formal courts, as to do so would be 
taken as an action against the honour of a family.218 one researcher observes that many people associated with 
ijs in Pakistan perceive the formal state laws of Pakistan as representing a ‘rival’ legal power that threatens the very 
ideology and existence of ijs; consequently, most people would not invoke state laws for the purpose of justice, 
but rather only to negotiate their cases. these are some of the reasons why women stay away from state courts. 
as the niger country study reveals, violations of substantive and procedural rights can reinforce one another, in 
that the very existence of the possibility of ‘repudiation’ of a marriage can be a powerful disincentive for women to 
bring complaints, whatever the forum.
212 in its 2008 report Perpetual Minors: Human Rights Abuses Stemming from Male Guardianship and Sex Segregation in Saudi Arabia, human 
rights Watch documented how a male guardian is still required for women to be able to deal with many aspects of court proceedings.
213 it should be noted that sexual violence cases were not involved in either setting. 
214 see Bentzon et. al., 1998; griffiths, a., 1997.
215 focus group interview with women in ungai-Bena District, Papua new guinea, october 2009.
216 shaheed, f., 1997: 58.
217 see chiweza, a. l., 2005, op. cit.
218 mehdi, r., 2002: 171.
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programming considerations for tacKLing sociaL barriers in communities
addressing social barriers involves engaging the women themselves and their communities. this task goes beyond 
justice interventions, which must be coordinated with programming for women’s empowerment more generally. 
specific justice-related interventions help provide legal education and paralegal and legal services to the women 
themselves and raise awareness, a task that goes beyond the simple provision of information. this can be coupled 
with interventions addressing the knowledge and attitudes of traditional leaders. malawi provides some good 
examples. a DfiD-financed programme run by the catholic commission on justice and Peace (ccjP) trains tradi-
tional authorities and their communities in human rights, national legislation and mediation technique. another 
programme, run by the Paralegal advisory service, adopted a different approach, whereby mediators based in the 
villages are trained to assist people in resolving disputes. mediators noted the strong presence of women and the 
design of the training has been highly participatory and contextualized.
sociaL barriers refLected in Justice providers and institutions
there may be a widespread assumption that courts are not ‘meant’ for women. research in Pakistan found that 
the very atmosphere of state courts was harsh and unfriendly for women. the court buildings did not have female 
toilets, signifying that the courts of justice did not expect to host women at all.219 there are almost no female clients 
and males dominated the lower courts at all levels.220 similarly, issues of personal security many be important. state 
courts may be places associated with police, criminals and corrupt middlemen and may thus be perceived as inse-
cure and threatening environments. seeking justice may entail accusations of improper conduct. one researcher 
has noted that, in some divorce cases in Pakistan, advocates have added irrelevant moral accusations to the basic 
plea.221 sensitising adjudicators to prohibit conduct of this kind can be addressed through training and example 
setting by senior figures in the judiciary. the Shalish courts in Bangladesh that were exposed to significant external 
influence and reform through ngo involvement generally treated female and male litigants and witnesses sub-
stantially equally.222
programming considerations for tacKLing sociaL barriers present in 
institutions and providers
While many of these barriers may be present in any court, it may be easier to address them systematically in state 
courts or more recognized ijs than in other ijs. in Zambia, a gtZ training programme223 of local court justices with 
the assistance of ngos and community paralegals224 helped break down barriers between the two groups. conse-
quently, it became possible for paralegals to observe proceedings in local courts and to monitor how the justices 
and court personnel treated women. the success indicators measured the degree of intimidating language used 
against women and whether women were allowed to speak before the court without the accompaniment of a 
male relative, as the baseline data collected for the programme revealed these problems.225
219 mehdi, r., 2002: 98; ali, 2007.
220 mehdi, r., 2002: 133.
221 mehdi, r., own observations.
222 see the case study on Bangladesh for details.
223 carried out with the judiciary section responsible for local courts and two ngos that provide legal services to rural women.
224 ePWDa and laDa.
225 from an unpublished paper entitled ‘summary of reports on monitoring the impact of training local court justices and Paralegals 
in the southern and eastern Provinces of Zambia’, under the gtZ-supported project improvement of the legal status of Women 
and girls in Zambia, by tina hofstaetter, gtZ, lusaka, july 2006.
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substantive rights: Women’s human rights, customary LaW and 
informaL Justice systems
Women’s rights in marriage and famiLy Life, incLuding the dissoLution 
of marriage
article 17 of the iccPr prohibits arbitrary or unlawful interference with a person’s privacy, family or home and 
recognizes the right of every person to legal protection in this regard. article 23 (4) requires states parties to take 
appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses in the contracting of marriage, during 
marriage and in the event of its dissolution. article 16 of the ceDaW similarly entitles women and men to equal 
rights before, during, and at the dissolution of marriage and invokes various international standards of women’s 
equality in marriage and the family.
poLygamy
the un human rights committee226 adopts an unequivocal position against polygamy, which is elaborated by 
the ceDaW committee: “Polygamous marriage contravenes a woman’s right to equality with men, and can have 
such serious emotional and financial consequences for her and her dependents that such marriages ought to be 
discouraged and prohibited.” 227 the committee notes that, while most countries report that national constitutions 
and laws comply with the convention, custom, tradition and failure to enforce these laws in reality contravene the 
convention. as noted, some states have expressed reservations to article 16 of the ceDaW. many of these states 
have also done so in relation to article 23.4 of the iccPr, which deals with equality in marriage and the family.
given the extremely widespread practice of polygamy in africa, the middle east and parts of asia and the central-
ity of ijs in family law, the unequivocal stance of these two global human rights bodies on the issue of polygamy 
will undoubtedly cause debate on engagement with ijs that uphold and support the practice. reconciliation of 
these two positions is not easy. the issue raises particularly complex social and welfare issues in that a failure to 
recognize the reality of polygyny could injure the rights of women in polygamous marriages and their children in 
the short term.
programming considerations regarding poLygamy
While it is well known that islamic Shari’ah law permits polygamy, it does not require it, so regulation or even a 
prohibition at the level of national law is not necessarily excluded in predominantly muslim countries.228 given a 
favourable environment, strategic litigation on the issue can also have an impact. Benin is one of the few african 
countries to have legislated against polygamy, with the supreme court upholding the prohibition on the basis 
of constitutional guarantees of equality. the malawi country study shows that draft legislation and political state-
ments about the abolition of polygamy have been made, but not yet enacted. nevertheless, legislation or judicial 
decisions against polygamy are likely to be ignored in practice in many countries, and the niger country study 
shows that many in the judiciary would be reluctant to interpret the equality clause in the constitution as forbid-
ding polygamy. the Bangladesh country study notes legislation that, in principle, bans polygamous unions but 
provides a loophole whereby arbitration councils can approve such marriages.
furthermore, measures to tackle child marriage, forced marriage, teenage pregnancy and discontinued schooling 
are likely to affect rates of polygamy, so governments might best influence this practice through indirect means. 
Despite more than 20 years of advocacy and political discussion, uganda’s attempts to regulate such practices 
through a legislative compromise that would allow a man no more than two wives and to ensure economic sup-
port and equitable treatment for both of them, have not come to fruition. nevertheless, the widespread debate 
226 iccPr, general comment no. 28.
227 general recommendation no. 21 (13th session, 1994), equality in marriage and family relations.
228 morocco and turkey are examples.
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and increased awareness of the issues that the political process and legislative attempts have engendered should 
also be seen as programming results. such wide social change as that sought through such legislation requires 
time and a multi-pronged approach that may emphasize education, health and economic and social empower-
ment as much as – or even more than – justice.
customary and civiL marriage
the ceDaW committee notes that “many countries in their legal systems provide for the rights and responsibili-
ties of married partners by relying on the application of common law principles, religious or customary law, rather 
than by complying with the principles contained in the convention. these variations in law and practice relating 
to marriage have wide-ranging consequences for women, invariably restricting their rights to equal status and 
responsibility within marriage. such limitations often result in the husband being accorded the status of head of 
household and primary decision maker and therefore contravene the provisions of the convention.”229 thus, the 
committee has adopted a rather sceptical position regarding the compliance of customary marriages with the 
obligation to provide equal rights during marriage.
the ceDaW general recommendation230 outlines that states parties should also require the registration of all 
marriages, be they civil, customary or religious. this measure can help to ensure compliance with the convention 
and establish equality between partners, a minimum age for marriage, prohibition of bigamy and polygamy and 
protection of the rights of children.
programming considerations regarding customary and civiL marriage
good practices could involve providing for the option of civil marriage. this can be done through legislation and 
programming that extends the reach of the authorities empowered to celebrate civil marriages, as well as making 
the contracting of civil marriage less expensive. similar considerations apply to the dissolution of marriage. in 
some countries, dissolution of civil marriages requires a high court action that is expensive, time-consuming and 
procedurally cumbersome. nevertheless, the effect of measures such as this alone are likely to be only marginal, as 
the unavailability of civil marriage is not one of the main reasons that people usually prefer customary marriage.231
many countries have difficulty in making registration of civil status (e.g., birth, marriage and death) socially, eco-
nomically and geographically accessible to people in rural areas. late registration can be a demanding and expen-
sive procedure if it is not accomplished within a set period following one of these events.
the issue of marriage registration is linked to that of polygamy, as countries may permit civil marriage to only one 
spouse while permitting or tolerating polygamy according to customary marriage. registration of one union to the 
exclusion of others could harm the wives and children who are not the subject of the registered marriage. court 
action in a formal court may be possible or even legally necessary in some instances in relation to a civil marriage, 
but not to a customary one. the possibilities of differentiated treatment on this basis alone could cause injustice. 
the legal recognition of customary marriage and the issuance of certificates to this effect could possibly avoid 
these difficulties. this can provide better legal protection in case of desertion or death of a spouse. it may require a 
harmonization of the legal requirements necessary for the validity of a customary marriage. sierra leone took this 
step through legislation passed in 2009.232 Because the legislation is so recent, it is too early to evaluate its effects. 
it nevertheless contains interesting safeguards against child marriages as well as provisions for the recognition 
of ‘common law marriage’, defined as the parties’ cohabitation for five years. south africa passed legislation on 
229 general recommendations of ceDaW on article 16 (1) (c), paragraph 17.
230 ibid., paragraph 39.
231 Questions put to interviewees during the country studies in several countries confirmed that even educated, middle-class africans 
often prefer to enter into customary marriages.
232 see the registration of customary marriage and Divorce act, 2009, accessed at: http://www.sierra-leone.org/laws/2009-01.pdf
111
c
H
a
PT
er
  v
ii
a stuDy of informal justice systems: access to justice anD human rights
the recognition of customary marriages in 1998. unlike the sierra leonean act, the south african legislation also 
addresses the question of property ownership in marriage, providing for co-ownership and joint control of prop-
erty.233 Zambia’s law reform commission is also working on a draft bill on this.
arranged and forced marriages – the right to choose a spouse
on article 16 (1) (a) and (b), the ceDaW committee comments that a woman’s right to choose a spouse and enter 
freely into marriage is central to her life and to her dignity and equality as a human being. Paragraph 36 of the gen-
eral recommendation refers to the Vienna Declaration and Programme of action (VDPa),234 where states are urged 
to repeal existing laws and regulations and to remove customs and practices that discriminate against and cause 
harm to the female child. article 16 (2) of the ceDaW and the provisions of the crc oblige states parties to deny 
validity to a marriage between persons who have not attained their majority. states parties’ reports show that forced 
marriages or remarriages are permitted in some countries on the basis of custom, religious beliefs or ethnic origins. 
in some parts of the world, particularly in Pakistan and afghanistan (but also in parts of africa), forced marriage may 
be practiced in connection with dispute resolution processes between tribes and clans. in some cases, ijs may thus 
be closely involved with the practice in these countries. in africa, the custom or practice of levirate is widespread in 
some regions, according to which a woman may be forced to marry the brother of her deceased husband.
the ceDaW committee recommends235 the abolition of different marriage ages for men and women. moreover, it 
underscores that the betrothal of girls or family members’ undertakings concerning girls’ future marriage contra-
vene the convention and should not be allowed.
another aspect is the freedom to enter into a marriage of one’s own choosing. customary law in matrilineal cul-
tures in malawi traditionally did not permit a marriage without the consent of marriage guardians (chinkhoswe). 
interestingly, the malawian courts seem to have rejected this requirement as a bar to the validity of marriage, 
applying constitutional provisions securing the right of all persons to marry and the recognition of de facto mar-
riages after a set period of cohabitation.236, the court’s decision runs against traditional practices requiring agree-
ments and exchanges between the spouses’ families. the following chapter discusses the issue of child marriage, 
which may be seen by some as forced marriage by definition.
doWry and bride price
the payment of dowry and bride price is widely practiced and may be necessary for the validity of customary mar-
riages in many countries. in islamic law, dower (paid by the husband) may be a part of marriage consideration. in 
some countries, a dowry payment from the husband becomes the woman’s property upon eventual divorce.237 the 
practice of dowry payments from the wife’s family has been legally abolished in some countries, including india and 
Bangladesh, but dowry disputes are reportedly still matters that frequently arise in ijs in these and other countries. 
in south asia, such disputes have been connected to extreme forms of violence against women, such as acid throw-
ing. in much of africa, the payment of bride price is legal and nearly universal.238 reports from several countries 
indicate that high bride price may trap women in undesirable marriages, as repayment of the bride price may be a 
prerequisite to dissolution of the marriage under customary law.239 likewise, bride price (particularly if it is high) may 
233 south africa, recognition of customary marriages act, 1998.
234 adopted by the World conference on human rights, held at Vienna on 14-25 june 1993.
235 general recommendation no. 21, paragraph 38.
236 see mwambene, 2005, cited fully in malawi study.
237 Women Living Under Muslim Laws (Wluml), 2006, op. cit.
238 a challenge to the legal recognition of bride price brought by a ugandan ngo failed in uganda’s constitutional court in march 
2010. see : http://allafrica.com/stories/201003290749.html
239 the field visits were told that this could be the case (with some differences among various ethnicities) in malawi, uganda 
and Zambia. a study in tanzania linked bride price to violence against women. see http://www.irinnews.org/report.
aspx?reportid=59032 
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limit the freedom of young people to choose whom they wish to marry, as the approval of parents and relatives 
may depend on obtaining a certain price. in Zambia and much of southern africa (particularly in patrilineal cultures), 
bride price, known as lobola or lobolo, is generally one of the legal conditions of a valid customary marriage. While 
bride price may be less widespread in matrilineal cultures, there are variations from one place to another.
programming considerations regarding bride price
an early un convention, the supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery, the slave trade and institu-
tions and Practices similar to slavery,240 deals with issues that include forced marriages, wife inheritance and any 
form of ’wife trading‘ for value. it commits states parties to bring about the abolition and abandonment of such 
practices as soon as possible. in relation to bride price, the key issue in this instrument is the voluntariness of the 
practice, or right of the woman to refuse consent. some countries where bride price and dowry are practiced 
either succeeded to obligations under this convention or ratified it independently. as early as the 1960s, countries 
such as mali attempted to regulate bride price by setting limits on the amount permitted.241 as noted above and in 
the Bangladesh country study, that country adopted legislation prohibiting dowry payments by the wife’s family in 
1980, in part because of a link between such payments and violent acts against wives.242 although subsequent leg-
islation combating repression of women and children provides for imprisonment or a fine for taking or demanding 
a dowry, data in the Bangladesh country study casts doubt on the effectiveness of the law.243
a legal argument can be made that having bride price payment as a condition for the validity of a customary mar-
riage is a violation of individuals’ right to marry, so litigation based on constitutional or human rights law could 
be an element of a strategy to combat the practice. nevertheless, the limited probable impact this would have 
in the absence of popular agreement with any such decision would have to be considered. the ugandan ngo 
mifumi244 has made bride price a campaign issue, having worked on the question for a decade or more and using 
advocacy and strategic litigation. a legal petition to have the custom declared unconstitutional on grounds that 
it led to violence against women and treatment of women as chattels was defeated in the constitutional court in 
march 2010. the court criticized the lack of a factual foundation for the petitioners’ assertions, possibly indicating 
that their case may have stood a better chance if the assertions had been clearer. the case has been appealed to 
uganda’s supreme court.
Well-designed campaigns to limit the amount paid as bride price would be helpful. mifumi organized a referen-
dum in tororo, uganda, on the issue in 2001, obtaining a vote in favour of bride price being considered a non-
refundable gift rather than a necessary payment that is refundable on any eventual dissolution of marriage. this 
was followed in 2008 by the passing of a local ordinance to the same effect, a step preceded by the organiza-
tion’s lobbying over a number of years and using uganda’s decentralization structure to make change at the local 
level. among a range of interventions related to the issue, the organization has assisted and facilitated research in 
uganda in cooperation with international partners.245 the research produced recommendations on how to reform 
bride price, which include: pursuing legislative reform at the national government level; encouraging policy reform 
through government initiatives and civil society; instituting legislative and policy reform at the local level, e.g., 
through the tororo District Bridal gifts ordinance; introducing educational initiatives in the education system; and 
raising community awareness and promoting sensitization.
240 united nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 266, p. 3. geneva, 7 september 1956. 123 countries are parties, including all of those included as 
country studies for the present report, with the exception of Papua new guinea. http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/mtDsg/
Volume ii/chapter XViii/XViii-4.en.pdf
241 loi no. 62-17, 5 juris-classeur d'outre-mer, 3 fevrier 1962; code sur le menage et la tutelle.
242 the Wluml guide Knowing Our Rights (available on the Wluml website) gives a good overview of law and practice concerning 
dowry payments and similar practices and attempting to eliminate negative effects of dower and dowry customs in 
predominantly muslim countries.
243 see Bangladesh country study.
244 http://www.mifumi.org/
245 for example, the university of Warwick in the uK. see http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/shss/swell/bride_price_report_-_
executive_summary_-_final_fin.pdf
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custody of chiLdren
the ceDaW committee recommends recognition of the custody rights of women in de facto marriages. this fol-
lows from the clear wording of article 16 (d), whereby women in such marriages should share equal rights and 
responsibilities with men for the care and raising of dependent children or family members. the crc principle of 
the best interests of the child is also an issue here. many states with predominantly muslim populations or that 
have adopted islam as the state religion have made reservations to article 16 (f ), which deals with the guardian-
ship, wardship, trusteeship and adoption of children. the niger country study reveals that, according to islamic law 
in that country, women should generally have custody of children younger than 7, whereas those older than 7 
should go to the father. interestingly, a similar practice prevails in the customs of Papua new guinea. the following 
chapter on the rights of children and ijs discusses this in greater detail.
dissoLution of marriage generaLLy
Both customary and islamic law as applied in many countries are unlikely to live up to the ceDaW requirement of 
equality in dissolution of marriage. customary law in many countries and among many peoples, particularly those 
with patrilineal cultures, allows a man the right to divorce for a greater number of reasons, and with greater ease, 
than a woman, as the malawi, niger and uganda country studies show. the substantive grounds for divorce are 
likely to be different for women who initiate dissolution, as is the possible requirement to repay the bride price in 
order to be freed from a marriage she no longer wants. the niger country study illustrates the issue of repudiation, 
which is available only to men according to islamic law. reservations to the ceDaW by some predominantly muslim 
countries confirm this position. thus, the uae reservation provides that “Shari’ah makes a woman’s right to divorce 
conditional on a judicial decision, in a case in which she has been harmed.” Shari’ah therefore restricts the wife’s 
rights to divorce by making it contingent on a judge’s ruling, whereas no such restriction is laid down in the case of 
the husband. thus, men are permitted under Shari’ah to divorce their wives by talaq, i.e., by thrice repudiating her. 
if cultural or religious barriers to women going to either religious or state court compound this inequality,246 then 
women are even more vulnerable to mistreatment and abuse. as the section in this chapter on social barriers and 
the niger country study point out, the threat of repudiation may be a powerful barrier to women seeking redress 
in any justice forum. it is important to carefully analyse the concrete application of precepts of islamic law in each 
context, as interpretation and practice may differ widely and may be mixed with elements from national statutory 
law or custom. in some contexts, women may have limited ability to seek a divorce in a religious court and her 
husband’s permission may be required. in other contexts, she may be obliged to pay compensation and lose rights 
to maintenance that she might otherwise have had if the husband had initiated the divorce.247 aspects of islamic 
law that are more favourable to women include the rules that the woman retains rights to her own property and 
her rights to inherit land and real property (which is often not possible under customary law), and that the man 
must economically support female relatives.
mwambene (2006) cites a number of authors on the issue of the comparative possibilities for women to initiate 
divorce proceedings and the ease with which divorce can be obtained in matrilineal and patrilineal cultures in 
malawi. her conclusion, and that of other researchers, is that it is easier for women to divorce their husbands in 
matrilineal cultures and that these cultures allow women more initiative in seeking dissolution of marriage. these 
cultures may allow ‘no-fault’ divorce based on incompatibility of the parties. as stated earlier, patrilineal cultures are 
more likely to view the marriage as based on the lobola (bride price) contract, concluded between the husband 
and the wife’s father or male relatives. in this system, the husband, as a party to the agreement, is relatively free 
to terminate the contract for a wide variety of reasons. Differences between these systems are also apparent in 
dissolution of marriage due to the death of one of the spouses. mwambene cites some authorities’ view that the 
death of a husband does not terminate a marriage for a wife, who remains a wife at the husband’s family home. the 
246 see reference to saudi arabia above.
247 the ‘Khul’ form of divorce may be available to a muslim woman, generally upon compensation of the husband. interpretations, 
laws and practices differ regarding the husband and/or the court’s role and agency and whether this is an irrevocable divorce.
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tradition of wife inheritance, widely practiced in many patrilineal cultures in africa248 and traditionally a guarantee 
of support for widows and orphans, is linked to this idea. in some cases, rituals and harmful practices such as so-
called ‘sexual cleansing’ may be associated with this tradition.
Women’s rights to property
article 17 of the uDhr recognizes every person’s right to own property alone as well as in association with others. 
article 25 of the uDhr confirms the right to an adequate standard of living, including with respect to housing. 
apart from these provisions of the uDhr, the principal global human rights instruments are rather silent on the 
question of the right to property as such.249 nevertheless, several provisions of international human rights law 
touch on the question, particularly in relation to equality.250
Women’s right to housing
article 11 of the icescr recognizes the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his 
family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. 
the right to adequate housing is considered to be one of the main elements of the human right to an adequate 
standard of living.251 the un committee on economic, social and cultural rights explains that the right to ade-
quate housing consists of: 1) legal security of tenure; 2) availability of services, materials, facilities and infrastructure; 
3) affordability; 4) habitability; 5) accessibility; 6) location; and 7) cultural adequacy. article 14 (h), coupled with 
article 11 of the icescr, obligates states to ensure not only that women do not face discrimination in relation to 
housing and living conditions, but also that they enjoy a certain minimum standard.
the hrc252 emphasizes that states must ensure that the matrimonial regime contain equal rights and obligations 
for both spouses, including with regard to the ownership or administration of property, “whether common prop-
erty or property in the sole ownership of either spouse.” upon the dissolution of marriage, the decisions about 
property distribution should be the same for men and women, and “women should also have equal inheritance 
rights to those of men when the dissolution of marriage is caused by the death of one of the spouses.”
the right of everyone to be recognized everywhere as a person before the law253 implies “that the capacity of 
women to own property, to enter into a contract or to exercise other civil rights may not be restricted on the basis 
of marital status or any other discriminatory ground. it also implies that women may not be treated as objects to 
be given together with the property of the deceased husband to his family.”254
it is important that the hrc found this to be an obligation under the iccPr, particularly as many states have reser-
vations to the ceDaW in this regard. it is also significant that the hrc bases the equal rights of women in this regard 
on the right to recognition as a person before the law. thus, with regard to married women, the reservations that 
some states have made in relation to equality in marriage (iccPr art. 23.4) are irrelevant in this regard, if they are 
also parties to the iccPr.
islamic law protects women’s right to own property as such. in respect of customary law, it is difficult to generalize 
across so many different countries and contexts. While custom may not favour practices such as property-grabbing 
(often committed against widows), its structures seem to be poorly adapted to protect vulnerable women, who 
248 see, for example, human rights Watch, ‘Double standards: Women’s Property rights Violations in Kenya’. 
249 in contrast to, for example, the european convention system, where the right is protected in the first protocol to the convention.
250 it is beyond the scope of this study to consider the literature and specialist field related to land. ijs and land issues in rural areas 
are often interconnected and profound reform of ijs will have key impact on land.
251 see the 1991 general comment no. 4 of the committee on economic, social and cultural rights on the right to adequate housing.
252 the general comment (28) of the human rights committee.
253 uDhr article 6; iccPr, article 16.
254 hrc, gc 28.
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may be far from their own families and who would often be dependent on a male in-law for protection. numerous 
reports confirm that, especially in patrilineal societies, the biggest threat to widows and orphans comes from rela-
tives of the deceased male.255 the country studies in africa, as well as other work among ngos in southern africa, 
report this as a widespread problem, particularly in the context of hiV/aiDs-related death. Property-grabbing may 
include housing, and law and custom differ as to whether a dwelling will be considered real or personal property.
Women’s right to oWn property
the ceDaW general recommendation on ‘equality in marriage and family relations’256 deals with the risks for 
women’s economic survival if women are prevented from entering into contract, from having access to financial 
credit, or can do so only with the concurrence or guarantee of their husbands or a male relative. this denial of 
autonomy prevents her from holding property as the sole owner. article 13 (b) of the ceDaW requires states par-
ties to “take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in areas of economic and social 
life to ensure women’s equal right to bank loans, mortgages and other forms of financial credit.” this would include 
ownership provisions that are discriminatory, including any recognition of customary title that recognizes men’s 
rights to the exclusion of women. article 14 of the ceDaW recognizes the obligation of states to promote the right 
of rural women to participate in community activities, have access to credit, and benefit from development.
in property law, well-entrenched norms make it difficult to litigate significant legal issues in many countries, par-
ticularly in africa. according to traditional ways of allocating collectively owned land in much of africa, a chief will 
allocate land rights to sub-chiefs, who re-allocate it to others along a tribal or clan hierarchy that is generally exclu-
sively male (in patrilineal cultures). this power remains perhaps the most important plank on which the power of 
chiefs and headmen rests.257 Women’s access to land – often the most important economic resource – is through 
marriage or their father.
in some countries, including malawi, matriliny (matrilineality) is still relatively widespread. this may mean that 
land is understood to belong to a female member of the family and will revert to female relatives on the death 
of persons in possession.258 this does not necessarily mean that women exercise power over land in traditional 
communities, as the senior member of the family (often male) and the headman or chief may also play a role. it 
may, however, make it more difficult for a husband to alienate land without the consent of his wife or at least of a 
member of her family. men may continue to exercise authority over the land that nominally belongs to their sisters, 
while farming and deriving an income from land belonging to the family into which they have married. males may 
be seen as ‘borrowing’ the land. Women have some security in matrilineal cultures in malawi, where they may also 
be considered the owners of the matrimonial dwelling, which the husband is obliged to build for her.259
the Papua new guinea study also shows that, in matrilineal cultures, women are less vulnerable to risks such as 
expulsion from the matrimonial dwelling when a husband dies. generally, the male relatives of the woman whom 
a man marries exercise authority.260 Because of these systems, women may simply have few customary or legal 
rights that can be the subject of litigation.261 While even patrilineal custom would generally have given some 
255 among a number of sources, see, for example, (1) Kaori izumi, ‘gender-based Violence and Property-grabbing in africa: a 
Denial of Women’s liberty and security’ in Gender & Development, Vol. 15, no. 1, march 2007. issn 1355-2074 print/1364-9221 
online/07/010011_ 13 – oxfam gB 2007 and (2) human rights Watch, Suffering In Silence: The Links between Human Rights Abuses 
and HIV Transmission to Girls in Zambia, new york, 2002
256 ceDaW, general recommendation no. 21, 13th session, 1994, available at: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recomm.htm
257 see, for example, oomen, 2000.
258 Final Report Of The Presidential Commission Of Inquiry On Land Policy Reform, Malawi Government Volume I Main Report, 31 march 1999.
259 op. cit., mwambene, 2006, cited in the malawi country study. see also Kaarhus, r., 2010, 37: 2; 171-192, and Peters, P. e. and 
Kambewa, D., 2007. 
260 authority and responsibility for the welfare of the family is likely to be with a male nkhoswe. see mwambene, cited in malawi 
country study.
261 for a brief description of customary law and practice in this area, see adams and turner, Legal Dualism and Land Policy in Eastern & 
Southern Africa, unDP.
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protection of usufructuary rights to widows (imposing a responsibility on the male heir) prior to death or remar-
riage, enforcement is reportedly increasingly uncertain in many places.262
there can be little doubt that customary law and structures, as well as state ones, are failing to protect women 
from discrimination in regard to property rights in many contexts. this is especially the case when custom meets 
modern, individualistic forms of ownership and the advent of a cash economy. today, the problem is often that 
those traditionally charged with upholding and enforcing customary law are precisely those who may benefit from 
breaking it, and neither the statutory nor the customary courts are well placed to stop them. While tradition did 
not typically mean that men or the chiefs owned the land personally, the de facto power of chiefs and modernized 
customary law may mean that traditional ownership is interpreted as doing precisely this. as some african ngos 
have pointed out, the worst inequalities may be the result of the failure of state law to fill the gap left when custom-
ary law can no longer be applied, rather than the result of customary law as such.263 the country study on uganda 
deals rather extensively with ijs involvement with real property issues and the extensive legal and academic work 
carried out in this domain there. also in south africa, social scientists and jurists have done a great deal of work on 
the question of land rights. the work of many ngos dealing with the protection of women’s rights in africa seeks 
to address the question of property-grabbing,264 especially as the mechanisms of customary justice may be unable 
to provide practical protection against this. the problem is also known in other parts of the world, including Papua 
new guinea, as the country study shows. some aspects of the unicef programme in the eastern highlands of 
Papua new guinea as well as programmes dealing with assistance to aiDs orphans that address these issues are 
mentioned below and in the Papua new guinea country study.
programming considerations in reLation to reaL property
it is thus important to remember the limitations of ijs and customary law in relation to achieving change in some 
legal domains. Because of the very complex nature of the land and real property issue in africa and the difficulty of 
achieving satisfactory reform in this area, state law may be of little help. for example, malawi developed a national 
land policy in 2002, the result of a process commenced in 1996, yet the policy has still not been transformed into 
national law.265 Despite real improvements in the legislative framework in uganda, confusion about the interpreta-
tion and application of the law causes difficulty for various reasons explored in the uganda country study. reform 
of land law may well involve head-on political battles with entrenched interests, including among chiefs and head-
men. in many contexts, enforcement of law will depend on the good will of these actors.
the 1998 ugandan land reform is a good example of legislation that attempted to remove many of the legal handi-
caps often placed upon women; many aspects of the process of adopting the legislation, as well as of the act itself, 
are relevant to programming for ijs. the land act gives full legal status to all land held under customary tenure, 
including customary rules and institutions. customary ownership of land is recognized as private property. the 
legislation introduced many positive provisions, including legal protection of all persons having proprietary rights 
in customary land, requiring their consent before it could be legally disposed of. Various groups can form commu-
nal land associations, and the founding documents of these bodies can include women’s rights. While most com-
mentators in uganda recognize the positive intentions and provisions of the legislation, it has been impossible to 
fully implement them due to problems with capacity and prioritization. organizations such as lemu266 criticize the 
government for not devoting more resources to customary title and preferring to promote individual freehold.
262 . see generally http://www.law.utoronto.ca/students_content.asp?itempath=2/8/5/4/1&contentid=1199&ctype=webpages, 
especially mcPherson, Property-grabbing and Africa’s Orphaned Generation: A Legal Analysis of the Implications of the HIV/AIDS 
Pandemic for Inheritance by Orphaned Children in Uganda, Kenya, Zambia and Malawi. for another useful source, see aili mari tripp, 
‘Women's movements, customary law, and land rights in africa: the case of uganda’, African Studies Quarterly, spring, 2004. 
263 see especially the study on uganda.
264 a woman’s husband dies and her household property is seized by the relatives of her husband, in whose community she lives. see 
mcPherson, op. cit.
265 see chiweza, a. l., 2008.
266 land and equity movement in uganda. see: http://www.land-in-uganda.org/
117
c
H
a
PT
er
  v
ii
a stuDy of informal justice systems: access to justice anD human rights
the 1998 ugandan legislation was the subject of intense work and lobbying by ngos that attempted to introduce 
progressive provisions on women’s ownership. one paper dealing with this subject noted that the general sympa-
thy of african legislators to patriarchal values and powerful lobbies of customary leaders makes it very difficult to 
pass statutory reforms to protect the property of widows and (especially female) children, pointing to the efforts 
– and ultimate failure – of ngos to ensure recognition of spousal co-ownership of land in the legislation. “these 
activists succeeded in eliciting a promise from the government to include the clause, only to see it removed in 
last-minute parliamentary debate.” the article goes on to observe that “development organizations from the World 
Bank to oxfam have concluded that the best way to encourage property rights reform in sub-saharan africa, 
including tenure security for women, is to ‘build on’ customary property systems, not to try and overrule them with 
statutory regimes.” however, the paper also cites some authors who “underscore that african feminist lawyers gen-
erally remain sceptical of the ability for customary or habitual local norms rooted in patriarchy to offer meaningful 
change, without serious pressure from a progressive statutory regime.”267
the author concludes that the best approach is for legislation not to try to sideline customary structures, but to 
oblige them to provide protection for widows and orphans, and for campaigns to make them into partners in 
combating land and property-grabbing against widows and orphans. the article cites positive examples of chiefs 
and headmen making a real difference once they are prepared to act on this issue and recommends further that 
religious organizations be mobilized to spread a message of the obligation to protect the vulnerable, including 
widows and orphans.
studies of matrilineal marriage and land ownership patterns in malawi show that some efforts to modernize and 
formalize title rights may have disempowered women. it is vital to ensure full understanding of existing patterns 
of rights, ownership and use prior to embarking on reforms.268
the unicef programme in Papua new guinea’s eastern highlands, whereby village court magistrates have received 
training, has seemingly moved these magistrates to consider other issues besides the amount of bride price paid 
when making property settlements, including the number of years that the marriage has lasted, the number of 
children, and the woman’s economic position. unsurprisingly, the fairly recent appointment of a woman magis-
trate has helped women there to speak out in hearings on such issues. the example shows that good training 
programmes that are well anchored in the needs of the community involved and in the practical application of 
rights and access to justice principles can have a positive impact.
Women’s property rights on dissoLution of marriage
the question of women’s real property rights is often most important when marriage ends, either through dis-
solution or death. a ceDaW committee general recommendation269 describes many of the disadvantages facing 
women upon the dissolution of marriage. it recognizes the widespread phenomenon of single mothers, noting 
that this belies the premise that men have sole responsibility for the women and children of his family and that 
unequal division of property based on this premise is unrealistic and incorrect.270 regarding judicial assessments 
of contributions to marital assets and income, the committee states that financial and non-financial contributions 
should be accorded equal weight. likewise, property laws and customs that discriminate in this way against mar-
ried or unmarried women with or without children should be revoked and discouraged.
267 see mcPherson, op. cit., and the references cited in that paper.
268 Kaarhuus, r., 2010, op. cit.
269 no. 21.
270 ceDaW general recommendation no. 21 on equality in marriage and family relations, paragraph 31. “even when these legal 
rights are vested in women, and the courts enforce them, property owned by a woman during marriage or on divorce may be 
managed by a man. in many states, including those where there is a community-property regime, there is no legal requirement 
that a woman be consulted when property owned by the parties during marriage or de facto relationship is sold or otherwise 
disposed of. this limits the woman's ability to control disposition of the property or the income derived from it.”
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inheritance
the general recommendation mentioned above provides that states shall ensure that men and women in the 
same degree of relationship to a deceased person are entitled to equal shares in the estate and to equal rank in the 
order of succession.271 that provision has not been generally implemented. Women may receive a smaller share of 
the husband’s or father’s property upon his death than would widowers and sons. in some instances, women are 
granted limited and controlled rights and receive income only from the deceased’s property. often, inheritance 
rights for widows do not reflect the principles of equal ownership of property acquired during marriage. such 
provisions contravene the convention and should be abolished.
the problems noted above were generally borne out in the country studies. in some states, there have been nota-
ble improvements in legislation concerning women’s inheritance rights. nevertheless, women may have difficulty 
in enforcing the legal rights that they have according to national law. rwanda’s 1999 inheritance and marital Prop-
erty law won the praise of national and international activists for women’s rights, but reports say that, in practice, 
“social and cultural obstacles prevent women from inheriting.”272 moreover, in common with legislation in other 
african countries,273 the law does not apply to real property.
Property-grabbing is most apparent in situations of intestate succession. asiyati lorraine chiweza describes how 
women’s inheritance rights to personal property in malawi depend in practice on district assemblies and, in turn, on 
traditional authorities for the payment of inheritance sums payable to widows.274 state obligations to ensure that 
local officials and traditional chiefs act in accordance with national legislative and human rights guarantees are clear, 
but the system may be incapable of guarding itself against contrary notions, local prejudices and corruption. these 
problems illustrate the well-known principle that justice systems are only as strong as their weakest link. Polygamy 
and the coexistence of various marital regimes complicate women’s right to inherit from their husbands; the fact 
that even customary law sometimes does not recognize some informal unions as marriage – which may require the 
payment of dowry or bride price – only complicates this even further. While matrilineal traditions may provide better 
protection to women in some respects, the picture is convoluted. one study in malawi observed that:
“Under a matrilineal system, chieftaincy is handed down through the female line. Under this 
system, women’s rights to customary land tend to be primary. However, this is not always the case. 
Under matriliny the inheritance of customary land does not appear to be very problematic, the 
same cannot be said of leasehold estates, especially where the leaseholder dies intestate. Under 
the matrilineal system of marriage, a man’s rightful heirs are his sister’s children. Hence, it is often 
the case that on the death of the leaseholder, his sister’s children claim the farm as their property at 
the expense of their cousins, the children of the deceased. The Presidential Commission in Malawi 
identified the rule that a man’s rightful heirs are his sister’s children and not his own as a major 
cause of conflict over property (including leases), between cousins. The Commission also noted 
public preference for a rule that would permit direct inheritance to all categories of property by 
surviving spouses and children.”275
thus, widowers and their children in matrilineal cultures may suffer obstacles similar to those that widows suffer 
in patrilineal ones. While informal justice forums could present some advantages for poor and vulnerable persons, 
like eliminating formalities such as the requirement to show a death certificate in order to inherit customary land, 
insufficient knowledge or a failure to accept statutory requirements often far outweighs these.
271 the general recommendation refers to the un economic and social council resolution 884 D (XXXiV) to this effect.
272 see the oecD Development centre’s social institutions and gender index reports. http://genderindex.org/country/rwanda
273 including malawi and Zambia. see strickland, r. s., 2004.
274 2005, op. cit.
275 see mbaya, 2002.
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again, a distinction must be made between islamic law and the law prevailing in countries with muslim popula-
tions. the Qur’an lays down specific rules about inheritance. While sunnism and shi’ism, for example, have differing 
interpretations of these, the precept that male and female shares are unequal is rather clear. the niger country 
study explores this in more detail and points out that islamic authorities – particularly those in the country’s urban 
areas – tend to recognize women’s right to inherit real property, albeit in a smaller portion than would go to male 
relatives. in rural areas, people generally disregard this principle in favour of more discriminatory custom concern-
ing real property, because they are either ignorant of it or unwilling to apply it.
programming to combat property-grabbing
Programming to combat property-grabbing needs to situate the problem within the context of combating pov-
erty. links between ijs and other primary justice providers, including the police, are vital. While large-scale criminal 
proceedings against almost equally impoverished relatives may not be the best way forward, law enforcement 
agencies nevertheless need to show that the issue is taken seriously in order to push chiefs, headmen, clan and 
family leaders to take action against it.
other issues
While not addressed within the framework of the ceDaW committee general comment, gender roles and respon-
sibilities in marriage may figure differently in ijs. the focus is less likely to be on equality than on the obligations 
assigned to the spouses in marital relations, thus demanding consideration of public versus private and even per-
sonal spheres. there are cases being dealt with in ijs where spouses bring matters such as a husband’s obligation 
to provide maintenance of a certain standard, a wife’s obligation to obey her husband, fulfilment of sexual needs, 
relations with in-laws, and relations between different wives and their respective children in polygamous mar-
riages. the gap between international standards and the standards prevailing in local communities may be very 
wide. Women may demand remedies that seem entirely appropriate in their specific context and culture, but that 
have no clear counterpart in international human rights law, which assumes gender neutrality.
rights to personaL integrity and physicaL security276
LegaL frameWorK
a number of international instruments now address the problem of gender-based violence. Where these treaties 
have not been ratified or domesticated, this can be a programming aim. the ceDaW committee recalls articles 2 
and 5 of the convention and the obligation on states to act to protect women against discrimination and violence 
in the private sphere “by any person, organization or enterprise”. states may also be responsible for private acts if 
they fail to act with due diligence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of violence; they 
may also be responsible for providing compensation.277 thus, ijs that endorse or tolerate any form of violence 
against women incur a state obligation to act in protection of women, using all necessary measures, even if the 
state does not recognize those ijs. if the state recognizes ijs in some manner, its liability is even clearer.
in the maputo Protocol, the african human rights system defines ‘harmful practices’ as “all behaviour, attitudes 
and/or practices that negatively affect the fundamental rights of women and girls, such as their right to life, health, 
dignity, education and physical integrity.”278 the Protocol279 obliges states parties to prohibit and condemn such 
practices. the measures they should take to eliminate them include the fostering of public awareness in all sec-
tors of society through information, formal and informal education and outreach programmes; furthermore, 
276 this discussion draws largely on the relevant general recommendation of the ceDaW committee on Violence against Women, 
general recommendation no. 19, 11th session, 1992.
277 mention should also be made here of one specific international instrument concerning ending violence against women: the inter-
american convention on the Prevention, Punishment and eradication of Violence against Women. 
278 article 1, definitions
279 article 5
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they commit themselves to “prohibition, through legislative measures backed by sanctions, of all forms of female 
genital mutilation, scarification, medicalisation and para-medicalisation of female genital mutilation and all other 
practices in order to eradicate them.”280 moreover, states are obliged to ensure provision of “necessary support to 
victims of harmful practices through basic services such as health services, legal and judicial support, emotional 
and psychological counselling as well as vocational training to make them self-supporting.” finally, the Protocol 
obliges states to provide “protection of women who are at risk of being subjected to harmful practices or all other 
forms of violence, abuse and intolerance.”281
in the americas, the Belem do Para convention concerns the prevention, punishment and eradication of violence 
against women. according to the convention, violence against women shall be understood as any act or conduct, 
based on gender, which causes death or physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, whether 
in the public or private sphere.282 moreover, it includes physical, sexual and psychological violence that occurs in 
the family or domestic unit, in the community, workplace or educational institution and even that the state or its 
agents perpetrate or condone, regardless of where it occurs.283 the convention thus broadly defines violence and 
distinguishes between the private and public spheres, taking into consideration violence in the community and 
‘any other place’. the role of the states parties is also well defined and includes refraining from violence against 
women, applying due diligence and addressing it through legislative measures, procedures and mechanisms to 
create effective access to restitution, reparations or other just and effective remedies.284
at the level of national law, several of the countries examined for this study had adopted legislation dealing with 
violence against women; these include Bangladesh (1983) and malawi (2006).
human rights issues and probLems in practice
the terms of interaction between law enforcement agencies (primarily the police) and ijs are very important. 
the country studies systematically reviewed the attitudes of the police and ijs providers toward violence against 
women. in niger, law enforcement officials who were interviewed285 agreed that the focus now placed on this 
issue makes it more difficult for justice providers to ignore it. nevertheless, they agreed that still only a small minor-
ity of cases – the most serious ones and those in which the victim had access to some form of assistance – make it 
to state justice institutions. in Papua new guinea, a minority of women who are aware of and within geographical 
reach of towns where there is a sympathetic ngo may seek legal and practical assistance. this is simply unavail-
able to other women. community-based efforts to sensitize men through suitable role models seemed to be a 
promising way of tackling the root of the problem. efforts such as this could target ijs members relatively easily. 
the country study emphasizes the importance of support from the police and state justice system for this kind of 
initiative, both to prosecute serious offenders and to protect complainants.
many issues can complicate how ijs handle gender-based violence. national law may not recognize a criminal 
offence of rape within marriage, for example, as seen from the 2009 controversies surrounding afghanistan.286 While 
national legislation is somewhat amenable to international influence, different attitudes may predominate under the 
280 article 5
281 article 5
282 article 1
283 article 2
284 articles 7 and 8 
285 one should note, though, that the interviews were carried out in parts of the country that had been exposed to relatively high 
levels of programming and donor involvement and that thus may not be representative of the country as a whole.
286 see cnn report ‘afghanistan 'rape' law puts women's rights front and center’ http://www.cnn.com/2009/WorlD/asiapcf/04/06/
afghanistan.law/ following international objections, including by us President obama, who called the provisions “abhorrent”, 
changes were made to the text. recent reports (july 2009) state that problematic clauses still remain. see ‘afghanistan revises 
marriage law but women still required to submit to sexual “intercourse”’ http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/
afghanistan/5790702/afghanistan-revises-marriage-law-but-women-still-required-to-submit-to-sexual-intercourse.html
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surface and be reflected in customary law and the implementation of statutory law. reference has been made above 
to customs of payment to families or the arrangement of a marriage as compensation for rape, for example.
proceduraL issues LinKed to seXuaL vioLence and maritaL cases
given the strength of taboos around sexuality and women’s vulnerability to gender-based violence, issues of social 
pressure and access, as discussed above, are likely to surface very strongly. the participation of women as judges 
can be a major factor in assisting women to overcome their reluctance to present stories of rape, sexual violence 
or sexual harassment. the participation of women as Gacaca judges in rwanda has been an important measure in 
assisting women to come forward with stories of this kind; confidential hearings and investigation procedures are 
also important. this study has already noted the strong presence of women as village mediators in malawi and the 
confidentiality of the mediation process; the malawi country study presents this in greater detail. Both factors have 
helped the mediators to attract cases on behalf of female disputants.
the general parameters concerning access – including direct financial cost, opportunity cost in terms of time, 
distance, language, and social, cultural, educational, procedural and institutional barriers – may take on a particular 
significance in relation to violence against women or gender-based violence. from the (little) available literature, it 
is not possible to write or conclude much on links between ijs and the formal justice system in relation to violence 
against women. While rape and sexual violence should not be dealt with in ijs, but referred to the ordinary courts, 
ijs must know and accept this principle in order for it to be enforced. sensitization and the participation of women 
in the ijs can be vital here; state systems’ capacity to deal with these cases is also a major concern. the country 
study on ecuador indicates that ijs users are aware that rape cases should be taken to formal justice systems, yet 
it also indicates that this type of violence is ‘new’. the country studies contain some discussion of this. it neverthe-
less remains the case that women’s own attitudes and preferences are vital. except in cases of serious (and often 
repeated) violence, women often remain reluctant to bring family matters before formal justice institutions, usually 
because they calculate that they and their children will be the losers if they do so.
Women as agents of change
the country studies and the literature analysed clearly reveal that women’s organizations and other ngos can 
affect the substantive, procedural and structural aspects of ijs. although ijs do not fully respect and protect wom-
en’s rights in many contexts, the study finds that women creatively seek a just resolution and the protection of their 
rights. While women may fare better in formal or parajudicial systems, they are often acutely aware of the necessity 
of maintaining collective structures that benefit communities as a whole. they also face social pressure and logisti-
cal and economic difficulties preventing them from accessing the formal justice system. thus, they often seek to 
change ijs structures from the inside rather than to discard them outright. engagement with ijs should therefore 
also be tied to raising awareness within ijs of women’s rights and of the range of choices and access available to 
them to seek justice, remedy and protection.
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chiLdren’s rights and informaL  
Justice systems
introduction
this chapter addresses children’s specific position in relation to ijs in normative frameworks, particularly of custom-
ary law and the procedural operation of ijs. it examines how perceptions of childhood and the role of children 
can affect how ijs treat them and how this treatment can collide with the implementation of standards on the 
children’s rights.
important issues regarding children’s legal and rights protection arise in relation to ijs. children should be able to 
enjoy the same basic rights as any other ijs users; these rights include compliance with normative frameworks, 
fair procedures, impartiality of decision makers, meaningful representation in proceedings, and protection from 
unlawful punishments. at the same time, the rights of children and women are more likely to be violated, as they 
are both often ‘structurally’ vulnerable parties before ijs, especially in more traditional systems, which are frequently 
dominated by middle-aged and elderly men. in addition, children, and particularly very young children, are unable 
to speak for themselves, and, in the proceedings, their interests will either go unrepresented or be represented by 
another person, perhaps a relative of the child, who may have an interest in the case. Vulnerability increases where 
the best interest of the child does not coincide with that of his parents or guardians or his or her close family.
there has been surprisingly little research on the legal situation of children in ijs. the research that does exist 
addresses mostly the co-opting of ijs – traditional or ngo-sponsored – in juvenile justice diversion programmes.287
But children’s interests are involved in many other matters dealt with within the framework of ijs: social conflict, 
inheritance, land, family disputes, underage or forced marriages, and accusations of witchcraft. even in disputes 
that do not, on the face of it, involve children at all, the outcome of the case may have direct and serious implica-
tions for a child or for children in the community. this is most obvious where, for example, ijs impose a punishment 
on a family in the community on the basis of the actions of one of the family members.288
Key human rights of chiLdren of particuLar reLevance to informaL 
Justice systems
the committee on the rights of the child has encouraged states parties to “take all appropriate measures to 
ensure that the concept of the child as rights holder with freedom to express views and the right to be consulted in 
matters that affect him or her is implemented from the earliest stage in ways appropriate to the child’s capacities, 
best interests, and rights to protection from harmful experiences.’’289 it goes on to state “all law and policy develop-
ment, administrative and judicial decision-making and service provision that affect children must take account of 
the best interests principle.” 290 this would indicate that it applies to ijs.
there are four general guiding principles in the convention on the rights of the child (crc): 1) the protection of 
the best interests of the child; 2) the prohibition of discrimination; 3) the safeguarding of the survival and optimal 
development of the child; and 4) the child’s right to be heard. these four principles should guide the interpretation 
of the other articles and are relevant to all aspects of implementation of the convention. this study addresses the 
287 see, for example, Banks, 2009, writing on southern sudan and east timor.
288 see also, for example, the description of young girls being offered by a jirga (village council) for marriage as compensation in 
family disputes in afghanistan. 
289 committee on the rights of the child: general comment no. 7, Implementing child rights in early childhood, 2005, crc/c/gc/7/
rev.1, 2006, paragraph 14.
290 committee on the rights of the child: general comment no. 7, Implementing child rights in early childhood, 2005, crc/c/gc/7/
rev.1, 2006, paragraph 13.
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four guiding principles from the convention in the context of ijs. in addition to these principles, there are inter-
national guidelines addressing children’s participation in the justice system,291 including their participation in ijs, 
which are outlined in this chapter.
1. protection of the best interests of the chiLd
the protection of the best interests of the child is the universal principle guiding the protection of the child in all 
matters concerning his or her rights and welfare. it is linked to perceptions of the particular nature of childhood 
and children as well as attitudes toward children that can vary notably from one part of the world to the other.292 
article 3.1 of the crc reads:
“In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare 
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the 
child shall be a primary consideration.”
the principle of the best interests of the child should be a primary consideration in any ijs’ proceedings in which 
the decision will have consequences for the welfare of a child or children; such proceedings might concern per-
sonal status, custody, foster placement, property and inheritance maters, disciplinary sanctions and so forth. it is 
possible to consider the best interest principle at two levels: for each child individually and for children as a group 
in the community.
in ijs, the level of protection of the best interests of the child may to some extent be linked to the degree of 
formalization of the justice system and the kind of ijs concerned. as the uganda country study notes, the local 
councils, including their judicial arms, have a responsibility to protect children under the children’s act. the local 
council courts are obliged by the act to “have due regard” to some procedural protection measures.293 in most tra-
ditional systems, it is the group (i.e., the extended family or the village community) rather than the nuclear family 
that protects the child. While this has obvious strengths, the problem is then that ‘the group’ will frequently have 
multiple, competing interests: not only is it the ‘protector of the child’, but it may also be a ‘party to the dispute’ and/
or a ‘decision maker’ in the proceedings.
in the committee’s opinion,294 there may be a distinction between the best interest of the individual child and the 
best interests of children as a group. in decisions regarding individual children, including decisions made by ijs, the 
best interests of the individual child are the primary concern. however, considering the collective cultural rights of 
the child is part of determining the child’s best interests.
the content of the principle of the best interests of the child has not been precisely defined; rather, the principle 
requires states to systematically apply the principle by considering the implication of their decisions and actions 
for children’s rights and interests.295 nevertheless, guidance on the substantial and objective elements of the prin-
ciple can be found in the contents of the crc itself, including: the right of the child to enjoy the highest attainable 
standard of health, provision for and protection of the child’s physical integrity, the right of the child to education, 
and the right of the child to an adequate standard of living sufficient for the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral 
and social development. the generality of the concept requires that administrators and adjudicators, including 
those in ijs, be understanding and flexible in their approach.
291 UN Guidelines on Justice in Matters involving Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime, 2005; UN Guidelines for Action on Children in the 
Criminal Justice System, 1997.
292 alston, P. and gilmour-Walsh, B., 1996: 17-23; Breen, c., 2002.
293 see articles 92 and 16 of the act.
294 committee on the rights of the child, general comment no. 11: Indigenous children and their rights under the Convention, 2009, 
crc/c/gc/11, paragraph 32.
295 committee on the rights of the child, general comment no. 5: General Measures of Implementation, 2003, paragraph 12.
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the committee has frequently296 called on states parties to take all appropriate measures to ensure that the gen-
eral principle of the best interests of the child is appropriately integrated into all legislation, judicial and adminis-
trative decisions, and policies, programmes and services affecting children. the committee297 has also expressed 
concern on occasions that respect for the views of the child remains limited within the family, in schools, in the 
courts and before administrative authorities, and in society at large, owing to traditional attitudes.
in its consideration of the periodic report of niger, the committee recommended that the state party develop 
a systematic approach to increasing public awareness of the participatory rights of children in the best interests 
of the child, particularly at local levels and in traditional communities, with the involvement of community and 
religious leaders, and ensure that the views of children are heard and taken into consideration in accordance with 
their age and maturity in families, communities, schools, care institutions and the judicial and administrative sys-
tems. as the niger country study notes, unicef has worked to sensitize chiefs in an attempt to combat the practice 
of child marriage.
the best interests of the chiLd, informaL Justice systems and the issue 
of customary or informaL aLternative care measures
on several occasions, the committee has considered informal alternative care (also including informal adoptions) 
and voiced concern that such practices are in conflict with articles 8, 9 and/or 21 of the crc and are generally not 
predicated upon or monitored with respect to the best interests of the child. 298 With respect to Papua new guinea, 
the committee warned that informal adoption may lead, inter alia, to the use of young informally adopted girls as 
domestic servants. 299
south africa is an example of a state that has systematically addressed the issue of children in customary law. the 
south african law reform commission (salrc) addressed the issue of customary law and children in its Discus-
sion Paper number 103 of 2001300 and in its subsequent report301 on the review of the child care act. in general, 
salrc sought a future child law system in which core children’s rights and concerns would be equally respected 
and protected, independent of the system of personal law in which a child has been raised, while also ensuring 
that the state respected to the maximum extent the cultural and religious rights of children and families. as is clear 
below, the salrc recommended that some customary practices involving adoption be accepted, but also that 
authority and procedures on adoption be anchored solely in state organs.
With respect to adoption, the salrc proposed extending joint adoption beyond married couples. this meas-
ure would allow extended family structures recognized in customary law – including, for example, a polyga-
mous husband and all of his wives – to adopt a child jointly. thus, the approach here is to draw informal and 
customary practices that protect the child into the arms of the state system. the proposal was reflected in the 
legislation adopted.302
the salrc held workshops and received submissions on types of adoption and fosterage traditionally practiced in 
customary law, noting that there were variations in rules and practices among different groups. these models were 
of interest to the slrc in examining options for the regulation of adoption. there was no proposal to authorize 
296 see, for example, lebanon, crc, crc/c/114, 2002, 11, paragraph 56; malawi, crc, crc/c/114, 2002, 104, paragraph 405.
297 malawi, crc, crc/c/114, 2002, 104, paragraphs 404 and 405; Bangladesh, crc, crc/c/133, 2003, 93, paragraphs 463 and 464; 
niger, crc, crc/c/118, 2002, 37, paragraphs 157 and 158.
298 Papua new guinea, crc, crc/c/15 add.229, 2004, paragraphs 41 and 42; rwanda, crc, crc/c/15/add.234, 36, paragraphs 40 and 41.
299 Papua new guinea, crc, crc/c/15 add.229, 2004, paragraphs 41 and 42.
300 see Discussion Paper no. 103, 2001. isBn: 0-621-31810-8.
301 Project 110 review of the child care act report, December 2002. http://www.doj.gov.za/salrc/reports.htm, http://www.doj.gov.za/
salrc/dpapers/dp103.pdf
302 see the children’s act of 2005, section 231.
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customary leaders to carry out adoption. Provision of adoption services is restricted to a limited number of legally 
authorized persons.303 it is worthwhile remembering that this may nevertheless occur in practice and informally.
the best interests of the chiLd, informaL Justice systems and chiLd marriage
international actors may see marriages of children as forced marriages by definition, in that informed consent 
is impossible where a child is concerned. in niger, rural ijs providers cited opposition to arranged marriages as 
one kind of dispute that was frequently brought before them. custom in some parts of africa may permit much 
older men to marry very young girls against the girls’ will. While there may be an age of consent to marriage, this 
may apply only to civil marriage, which only a small portion of the population chooses. state courts may be over-
burdened with so-called ‘defilement’ cases, frequently involving two teenagers of proximate age who have had 
consensual sexual relations.304 this illustrates a double standard: young teenagers (or, occasionally, even younger 
children) may marry or be married against their will, but even consensual sexual relations with peers outside of 
marriage can render teenage males liable to severe punishment. in some countries, particularly where civil mar-
riage is widespread, child marriages may be consummated, but in order to avoid the risk of legal sanctions, not be 
registered until the age of majority is reached. ijs may endorse such unions. representatives of customary ijs are 
likely to hold positions of authority in communities, influencing such practices. unicef is working to combat child 
marriage,305 and one effort involves raising the awareness of traditional chiefs in niger to combat child marriages.
2. the prohibition of discrimination
the entitlement of everyone to the rights and freedoms laid down in the uDhr, without any form of discrimina-
tion, is repeated and further elaborated in respect of children in article 2 of the crc. states must respect and 
ensure the rights of children irrespective of the child’s or his or her parents’ race, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth, or other status (article 2.1). furthermore, 
states must ensure that the child is protected against all forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis of the 
status, activities, expressed opinions, or beliefs of his or her parents or family members (article 2.2).
the significance of the prohibition against discrimination in article 2 is that it extends beyond discriminatory 
conduct on the basis of the child’s own characteristic(s). it also encompasses prohibition against all forms of dis-
crimination or punishment on the basis of activities, opinions or beliefs of the child’s parents or family members.
custody of chiLdren and informaL Justice systems,  
incLuding programming aspects
another area where the committee has called for a more systematic application of the principles of non-discrim-
ination and the best interests of the child has been child custody disputes, where customary and/or religious 
practices are sometimes applied to determine custody solely on the basis of the child’s age or gender, without 
consideration of the views of the child and the child’s best interests. in its consideration of the periodic report of 
niger,306 the committee recommended ‘that the state party take all necessary measures to stop these practices 
and reinforce its efforts to sensitize the population on the obvious negative impact and the contradiction of these 
practices with the best interests of the child and other relevant provisions of the convention.’ During the niger 
country study mission, members of the judiciary appeared to be aware of the requirements of human rights law, 
but most custody matters are apparently resolved outside the formal courts, so the practice largely persists. sev-
eral interviewees mentioned an age limit of seven years as being determinant, where women retained custody of 
children under the age of seven and men were entitled to custody after this age.
303 children’s act, section 250.
304 this problem is well known in uganda, among other countries in africa.
305 see, for example, unicef, 2008, Handbook on Legislative Reform. 
306 niger, crc, crc/c/118, 2002, 37, paragraph 163; see also Pakistan, crc, crc/c/133, 2003, 37, paragraphs 198, 199, 210 and 211.
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further research could also usefully distinguish between issues of custody and guardianship, where the latter refers 
more to the right to exert parental authority and hence to decide on many issues relating to the upbringing of a 
child. (this could be an important factor in decisions relating to arranged marriages, particularly when girls reach 
the age of puberty.) Where marriage is seen as a contract between families, or between a man and the father or 
other senior male person in the wife’s family (as in many patrilineal cultures), the children of a marriage are gen-
erally regarded as belonging to the husband’s family or clan. in matrilineal cultures (where the husband usually 
moves to the wife’s family’s village, a custom known as ‘uxorilocality’), the children are considered to belong to 
the wife’s family or clan. as this implies that responsibility for the child resides with the family to whom the child 
’belongs’, the child’s best interests may often (but not necessarily) be best served if the child remains with the 
family that recognizes a responsibility toward that child.307
chiLdren’s inheritance and property rights
in many countries, land disputes are often dealt with at the local level and according to traditional practices. chil-
dren born outside marriage (‘illegitimate children‘), orphans, or children whose father has died may not have any 
right to inherit land or other property; in many traditional settings, female children and women cannot inherit their 
husband’s or father’s land.
for example, nigerian religious authorities’ interpretation of islamic law does not recognize succession rights for 
children born outside of marriage. the principle of the best interests of the child does not prevail over this long-
standing custom or legal rule in nigerian courts. While religious officials may exhort parents to marry or to rec-
ognize a child born in this way, the rules on succession quite clearly state that such children have no rights of 
inheritance. this is an accepted fact of life, according to the provider interviewees, and such cases do not normally 
even come to court.308 While numerical data on the practice of the different legal instances were not available on 
this question, this would seem to be true for chiefs’ courts, religious authorities and for the application of custom 
by the courts.
guardians of children who have lost their parents may mistreat them and deny them their inheritance and prop-
erty rights.309 these problems have become more acute as hiV/aiDs has directly or indirectly affected more and 
more children and has changed society and the role of the family and the traditional family structure.310 it is there-
fore important to identify how decisions concerning the guardianship of orphans are made at the local level and 
what role traditional chieftaincy plays in this. there are presently few, if any, studies that deal directly with the 
specific problems linked to land and property and the custody of orphans.
in this respect, the committee has very clearly defined the obligations of the state in relation to orphans: on the 
one hand, states must “support and strengthen the capacity of families and communities of children orphaned 
[…] to provide them with a standard of living adequate for their physical, mental, spiritual, moral, economic and 
social development, including access to psychosocial care.” on the other hand, states must ensure that “both law 
and practice support the inheritance and property rights of orphans, with particular attention to the underlying 
gender-based discrimination which may interfere with the fulfilment of these rights.”311
With respect to providing an adequate standard of living for orphans, it is difficult for customary justice to protect 
against property-grabbing. although custom generally offers widows some protection of usufructuary rights, the 
307 see mwambene, 2006, and authors cited in her study of these issues in malawi and south africa, discussed in the malawi study.
308 similarly, unmarried ‘partners’ or ‘concubines’ have no succession rights.
309 unaiDs: 2004 Report on the global AIDS epidemic, 2004, p. 63.
310 committee on the rights of the child, general comment no. 7: Implementing child rights in early childhood, 2005, crc/c/gc/7/rev. 
1, 2006, paragraph 19.
311 committee on the rights of the child: general comment no. 3: HIV/AIDS and the rights of the child, 2003, crc/gc/2003/3, 2003, 
paragraph 33.
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enforcement of such rights is uncertain in patrilineal and matrilineal systems alike. Property-grabbing is thus likely 
to affect orphans and children with a widow or widower parent. law enforcement agencies and ijs should there-
fore seriously consider how to counter property-grabbing in a context of combating poverty.
3. survivaL and deveLopment of the chiLd
children have the right to protection against arbitrary loss of or damage to life and to benefit from economic and 
social policies that will allow them to survive into adulthood and to develop in the broadest sense. the committee 
has stated312 that it expects states to interpret development in its broadest senses as a holistic concept, embrac-
ing the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral, psychological, and social development. implementation measures 
should be aimed at achieving the optimal development for all children. the committee has highlighted the sup-
port of traditional practices of some ijs, such as marriage of female children,313 as a contravention of state party 
obligations under article 6 of the convention to ensure the development of the child.
harmfuL practices affecting chiLdren and informaL Justice systems, 
incLuding programming aspects
the committee has also drawn attention314 to the practice of honour killings in some traditional societies and 
urged states parties to develop and implement awareness-raising campaigns, education programmes and legisla-
tion to change prevailing attitudes and address gender roles and stereotypes that contribute to harmful traditional 
practices. further, states parties should facilitate the establishment of multidisciplinary information and advice 
centres to inform people about the harmful aspects of some traditional practices, including child marriage and 
female genital mutilation.
some states have addressed harmful traditional practices through legislation on equality and non-discrimination. 
in south africa, equality legislation includes “any practice, including traditional customary or religious practice, 
which impairs the dignity of women and undermines equality between women and men, including the dignity 
and well-being of the girl child” as discrimination for the purposes of the legislation.315 By outlawing the practice 
of forced virginity testing, the children’s act of 2005 incorporated the south african law reform commission’s 
recommendation to remove the possibility of invoking customary law as a defence to charges of having engaged 
in this practice.
the imposition of beatings, lashings or any other forms of extra-judicial punishment by Shalish (traditional media-
tion) forums is illegal under Bangladeshi constitutional and criminal law. there is a high level of knowledge amongst 
Shalishkars (traditional mediators), local communities and government officials of this prohibition, and they appar-
ently generally comply with it, at least in the union Parishads in which the country study was conducted. from 
time to time, though, there are reports of physical punishments having been ordered and carried out, also against 
juveniles. Where such cases arise, law enforcement officials appear reluctant to ‘interfere in’ decisions made by local 
religious elders or village elders. Bangladeshi legal aid organizations and ngos have drawn attention to this prob-
lem and have occasionally taken successful legal action316 to compel the government to investigate such cases 
and to provide justice and redress to any victims.
312 committee on the rights of the child, general comment no. 5: General Measures of Implementation, 2003, paragraph 12.
313 committee on the rights of the child, general comment no. 3: HIV/AIDS and the Rights of the Child, 2003, paragraph 11.
314 committee on the rights of the child, general comment no. 4: Adolescent Health and Development in the Context of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, 
315 Promotion of equality and Prevention of unfair Discrimination act 4 of 2000, section 8.
316 see, for example, joint Press release of 22 august 2009 of Bangladesh legal aid and services trust, Bangladesh mahila Parishad, 
ain o salish Kendra, Brac and nijera Kori, ‘extra-judicial penalties in Shalish: high court Directs lgrD, law enforcing agencies and 
union Parishads and Paurashavas to take immediate measures.’
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in the Papua new guinea highlands, many young children, especially girls, find themselves directly or indirectly 
caught up in sorcery accusations. young girls or women accused of carrying out sanguma are sent away by their 
family to relatives, to another province or to Port moresby to avoid being tortured or killed. there is no way of prov-
ing or disproving the allegations. the violence is often carried out by mobs of young men who are beyond the 
control of village elders or community leaders. those who speak out in defence of a person accused of sorcery risk 
being accused or attacked themselves. for this reason, traditional leader courts (village elders) and village courts 
(a statutory body comprised of laypersons applying traditional custom) are reluctant to deal with such cases, as 
are local police. the ongoing social impact of such a climate of violence and fear on affected children and families 
is devastating. children risk being ostracized as the offspring of the sorcerers and are considered to be devilish.
the issue of defiLement and informaL Justice systems
Defilement cases, being serious criminal offences, officially fall outside the mandate of ijs in all countries that this 
study examined. nevertheless, the study has found that it is most common for such cases to be dealt with at the 
family or community level by family elders and village leaders rather than through the criminal justice system. in 
uganda, ijs typically treat defilement cases as civil customary matters, and legal procedures317 for referral to the 
formal system, to police and to child welfare officers. nevertheless, this practice needs to be seen in the context 
of the ugandan criminal law provisions that criminalize consensual sexual relationships between teenagers under 
the age of 18. in the highlands of Papua new guinea, tradition recognized that a family member, such as an uncle, 
has a responsibility to protect children if the parents fail to do so (in cases of child sexual abuse) and the author-
ity to step in and take custody of a child. as in uganda, defilement cases are reportedly rarely referred to criminal 
justice agencies.
4. the right of the chiLd to be heard
scope of the obLigation
the crc provides for the right of children to be heard and their views to be taken seriously in all matters and all 
decision-making processes affecting them (article 12.1). article 12 obligates governments to ensure that the views 
of children be sought and considered in all matters affecting their lives. it goes without saying that children are 
also fully entitled to recognition as persons before the law, including by ijs. it is nevertheless important to start 
with an understanding of the ambit of this obligation. it does not mean that states are obligated to allow minors 
to exercise full legal capacity (i.e., to sue and be sued) in formal or ijs. in many – or even most – jurisdictions of the 
world today, the legal capacity of children in civil matters is very restricted for the child’s protection, so that, for 
example, they cannot be held accountable in contract law. likewise, tort law is more likely to impose responsibility 
on parents for the intentional and negligent damage caused by the actions of minors than to impose liability on 
the children themselves. there is a trend in many countries toward greater independent representation of children 
in civil cases. in criminal law matters, the age of criminal responsibility is set by law, varying considerably from one 
state to another, and is often subject to tests and restrictions.
the convention does not imply that ijs or formal justice systems should give full legal capacity to children. article 
12 of the crc should thus rather be seen as requiring that decision makers and adjudicators allow a child’s views 
to be heard in a manner appropriate to the child’s maturity and development. this varies with age and from 
one child to another. as holders of rights, even the youngest children are entitled to express their views, which 
should be “given due weight in accordance with the age and the maturity of the child” (article 12.1) 318 thus, in its 
317 as contained in the children’s act, 2004.
318 committee on the rights of the child: general comment no. 7: Implementing Child Rights in Early Childhood, 2005, crc/c/gc/7/
rev. 1, 2006, paragraph 14.
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consideration of the periodic report of malawi, the committee recommended that “the state Party launch cam-
paigns to change the traditional attitude and values which do not allow children to express their views.” 319
ensuring genuine and meaningful participation by children in ijs is very difficult to achieve and requires careful 
consideration in any advocacy, training, support or monitoring programme. the committee has developed an 
extensive checklist of basic requirements for the implementation of article 12 of the crc.320 ensuring that children 
have the right to be heard in ijs and that this right is afforded meaningfully and effectively requires that states 
inform and provide appropriate training to ijs decision makers and the members of the local communities in 
which they operate. it is important to note that children’s participation must be inclusive, avoid existing patterns 
of discrimination, and encourage opportunities for marginalized children – girls and boys alike – to be involved. 
although not directly discussing ijs, the committee has stated in broad terms that:
“Achieving meaningful opportunities for the implementation of article 12 will necessitate 
dismantling the legal, political, economic, social and cultural barriers that currently impede 
children’s opportunity to be heard and their access to participation in all matters affecting them. 
It requires a preparedness to challenge assumptions about children’s capacities, and to encourage 
the development of environments in which children can build and demonstrate capacities. It also 
requires a commitment to resources and training.”321
the country studies in this study underline fundamental challenges to securing meaningful participation by 
children in ijs.322 children are rarely, if ever, heard in cases affecting their interests; they rarely participate in the 
proceedings, even as observers. again and again, interviews with stakeholders and focus groups in the country 
studies confirmed that children are not considered to be an independent actor in dispute resolution processes. if 
a child’s interests are affected by a dispute, a parent (almost always the father) or another relative will speak on the 
child’s behalf or the child’s interests will be treated as an extension of the parent’s. existing programmatic efforts 
addressing ijs have often understandably focussed on improving women’s participation and protection of wom-
en’s financial and physical security. Deeply held cultural perceptions of the role of children in traditional societies 
present a major challenge for informal justice sector programming. ijs tend to incorporate these societal views by 
favouring the position of adults over children by giving adults a stronger voice in the dispute resolution process.
in traditional Papua new guinean society, men reportedly widely regard children (and women) as personal prop-
erty and there are few, if any, opportunities for children to express their views on issues of community or family life. 
in addition to this understanding of children’s place in the society, melanesian societies value the maintenance and 
restoration of community peace and good order over claims of the individual to obtain compensation or some 
other form of redress for a wrong done to him or her.323 the same is true in many of the other countries studied. at 
the same time, the extended family and close community structure can also be a source of protection for the child, 
although within a framework of traditional norms and roles.
as in matters involving children’s inheritance rights, ijs providers are generally unaware of the principle of the best 
interests of the child and the other guiding principles of the convention – particularly the right of the child to be 
heard – and ijs forums’ procedures or practice in child custody matters rarely reflect them. this situation underlines 
the challenge to implementing the crc at the national level. nevertheless, ijs will often contain blocks on which 
dialogue and programmes can be built. the Papua new guinea country study illustrates how an adult relative may 
be appointed to speak on behalf of a child’s interests when the child’s parents are in dispute. the ecuador country 
319 malawi, crc, crc/c/114, 2002, 104, paragraphs 408-409.
320 committee on the rights of the child, general comment no. 12: The Right of the Child to be Heard, 2009, crc/c/gc/12, paragraphs 132-135.
321 committee on the rights of the child, general comment no. 12, paragraph 135.
322 see, for example, the section on children in the Bangladesh country study.
323 focus group discussions, interviews conducted in Png in august and october 2009.
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study revealed that, in cases within the family, someone – generally another family member – represents the child’s 
interests. thus, there is recognition of the principle that the ijs should hear the child’s interest.
programming on chiLdren’s right to be heard
any attempt to influence ijs practice in regard to children’s best interests and right to be heard must consider the 
ijs typology and procedures used. Written substantive and procedural law, as well as rules on appointment, struc-
ture, reporting and linkages to the formal justice system are much more likely to govern parajudicial ijs. in these 
instances, the formal procedural rights of children and adults are likely to generally reflect those of the legal system 
(though they may not be up to date in terms of requirements for the protection of children). Programming efforts 
may thus focus on attempting to improve procedural rules, taking into account the necessary capacity building 
that might be required to implement the new rules.
in all kinds of ijs in the country studies, the most difficult and enduring barriers to children’s access are likely to 
be social, rather than formal, requiring a change in mentalities rather than rules. these barriers may be particularly 
high in the case of custom-based ijs. it is not simply a question of addressing mentalities among adjudicators, as 
those of users and the surrounding community may be equally or even more determinant. there must also be 
consideration of how cases are brought and heard. When there is no formal filing procedure, cases may proceed 
to some form of adjudication only if the dispute involves two persons of some standing in the community. the 
adjudication process may in many ways be more akin to a negotiation. in these circumstances, the quality of the 
person assisting or representing the child is fundamental, but the challenge begins with recognition by parties and 
adjudicators that there is a legal interest of a child at stake and thus a need to appoint a representative. through 
support, training and interaction programmes, communities and adjudicators might grow to accept the principle 
of the representation of children’s legal interests. further steps might involve consultation with and training of 
adjudicators on the role of such representatives and to train the representatives in the performance of their role.
informaL Justice systems and chiLd protection systems, incLuding 
programming aspects
the term ‘child protection’ refers to measures to prevent and respond to violence, exploitation and abuse against 
children. Violations of a child’s right to protection take place in all countries, but are more likely to continue with 
impunity in poor and/or socially vulnerable communities. in its programmes worldwide, unicef and its partners 
work to build protective environments for children that can help to prevent and respond to violence where it 
occurs.324 in view of the governance and justice functions that ijs have in traditional communities, it is important 
that they be included in child protection plans and programmes, perhaps initially through an advocacy programme 
to promote child-protective attitudes and practices, but also in training and capacity-building programmes and, 
wherever possible, as part of a community-based child protection mechanism or system.
in Papua new guinea, unicef has been working together with the Village courts secretariat within the ministry of 
justice to establish national training, documentation, referral, monitoring and evaluation programmes, systems for 
village court judges and officers, encompassing children’s, women’s and other constitutionally guaranteed rights, 
and juvenile justice instruments, together with hiV/aiDs, governance and active citizenship education. this pro-
gramme is a positive example of how ijs providers can be successfully incorporated into a child protection system, 
where they become familiar with the international and constitutional standards of child rights and child protec-
tion and, at the same time, find themselves in a network where they can seek external assistance or refer particular 
cases for specialized assistance or treatment. ongoing collegial interaction between ijs providers, children’s ngos 
and support groups, the formal justice agencies and community liaison officers can be a dynamic and sustainable 
platform for change.
324 for a summary of recent developments in understanding and designing child protection systems, see, for example, ‘adapting a 
systems approach to child Protection: Key concepts and considerations’, unicef, Working Paper, fred Wulczyn, Deborah Daro, 
john fluke, sara feldman, christin glodek, Kate lifanda, january 2010.
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informaL Justice systems, chiLd victims and Witnesses of crime
Where children’s interests are engaged in ijs, it is most likely to be as victims or potential victims of crime, or as the 
vulnerable party to a family, inheritance or property dispute. the un guidelines on justice matters involving child 
Victims and Witnesses of crime (2005) set out good practices on children’s involvement in justice processes based 
on relevant international and regional norms, standards and practices.325 these were designed mainly for applica-
tion in formal legal systems, but much of the guidance they contain is also relevant to ijs. even though traditional 
justice forums often operate more from the perspective of restoration of communal harmony than with issues of 
the rights of victims and responsibilities of perpetrators (and thus may not operate with a clear separation of the 
notions of civil and criminal, or individual and collective liability), the guidelines are nevertheless applicable to ijs 
and governments have a responsibility to ensure their implementation. the challenge for governments and for 
development partners is to do this so that the rights of child victims and witnesses in domestic justice systems 
– including in ijs – are firmly on the agenda, yet so that ijs (or other justice) providers are neither overwhelmed 
nor alienated.
the following text box summarizes the ten fundamental rights of child victims and child witnesses, as these rights 
apply to ijs providers.326 implementing these rights in ijs raises many challenges. some aspects of the guidelines 
assume a level of juridical and administrative sophistication that simply does not presently exist in either the formal 
or informal justice sector in many countries. the guidelines accord children a status in law and in society that they 
do not enjoy in practice in most traditional communities today and engagement with ijs could focus on building 
understanding around these aspects.
325 ecosoc resolution 2005.20, guideline 6.
326 this summary is taken from unoDc’s forthcoming Special Training Module on Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime for Informal 
Justice Providers, (first draft, february 2010).
fundamentaL rights of chiLd victims and Witnesses  
in informaL Justice processes 
(derived from the UN Guidelines on Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime)
The Right to be Treated with Dignity and Compassion (see GL 5)
recognizing that child witnesses and victims are particularly vulnerable; treating child victims and child 
witnesses in a sensitive manner.
The Right to be Protected from Discrimination (see GL 6)
child victims and witnesses should not be discriminated against on the basis of their ethnic or national 
origin, age, disability, sex, religious beliefs, political beliefs, sexual orientation or any other consideration.
The Right to be Informed (see GL 7)
child victims and child witnesses should be provided with sufficient information to give their informed 
consent to their participation in informal justice processes.
The Right to be Heard and to Express Views and Concerns (see GL 8)
every child victim and child witness should be treated as capable of expressing his/her views and concerns; 
the child’s informed consent should be obtained.
the child’s informed consent should be obtained for all actions and decisions related to informal justice 
processes that affect her/him.
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The Right to Effective Assistance (see GL 9)
child victims and witnesses should have the necessary emotional, psychological and legal support while 
participating in informal justice processes.
The Right to Privacy (see GL 10)
the justice process should limit interference in the child’s private life to the minimum needed. information 
that could reveal the identity of child victims and witnesses should be kept confidential.
The Right to be Protected from Hardship during the Justice Process (see G 11):
child victims and child witnesses should be carefully prepared for the face-to-face encounter with  
the perpetrator. 
Power imbalances between child victims and child witnesses on the one hand and the perpetrator – and 
his/her family – on the other hand should be taken care of.
The right to safety (see GL12)
Where appropriate, there should be implementation or support requests for measures for child victims and 
child witnesses to protect them from intimidation, threats and harm.
The Right to Reparation (see GL 13)
the needs of child victims who participate in informal justice processes should be taken into account and 
given due weight. 
child victims – and their parents or legal guardian – should be informed about the possibility of seeking 
restitution and compensation in court if informal justice processes fail to achieve an agreement between 
the child victim and the perpetrator.
The Right to Special Preventative Measures (see GL 14)
child victims should not be victimized, re-victimized or otherwise additionally harmed. 
the establishment of special preventive measures should be guaranteed for particularly vulnerable child 
victims and child witnesses. 
Programmes to raise awareness, spread information and encourage education about primary victimization 
of children and risk of re-victimization should be promoted and receive contributions.
the guidelines emphasize the importance of making adequate training, education and information available to 
relevant professional groups in order to improve and sustain specialized methods and approaches and attitudes 
for the protection and effective, sensitive handling of child victims and witnesses. training should include, among 
other things, relevant human rights norms; information on the impact, consequences and trauma of crimes against 
children; appropriate child-communication skills; interviewing and assessment techniques; and skills to deal with 
child victims and witnesses sensitively and constructively. child justice professionals should make every effort to 
adopt an interdisciplinary approach in aiding children by familiarizing themselves with the wide array of available 
services, such as victim support, advocacy, economic assistance, counselling, education, health, legal and social 
services.327 as described above, such an interdisciplinary approach can be fostered through the establishment of 
child protection networks, which bring together informal and formal justice providers, community advocates, and 
health and social services personnel.
327 see guidelines 40-43, UN Guidelines on Justice in Matters Involving Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime, 2005.
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in cooperation with unicef, unoDc has developed a model law and accompanying commentary328 to assist 
states in adapting their national legislation to the provisions contained in the guidelines. the model law has been 
drafted to allow informal and customary justice systems to use and implement its principles and provisions.
informaL Justice systems and chiLdren in the criminaL Justice system – 
appLicabLe standards
the term ‘juvenile justice’ encompasses a very broad range of juvenile misconduct, from minor breaches of rules 
of behaviour applying within a local community, which account for the large majority of instances of juvenile 
wrongdoing, to cases of serious criminality, up to and including cases of child soldiers who have perpetrated war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.
the crc provides the same basic rights for all children; it does not differentiate between children who are in 
conflict with the law and those who are not. article 40 of the crc provides a set of fundamental principles for the 
treatment of children in conflict with the law, and several other provisions of the crc are also relevant to juvenile 
justice.329 a number of instruments have been adopted that provide guidance on how these fundamental inter-
national standards about children and justice should be implemented. these instruments were designed mainly 
for application in formal legal systems, but much of the guidance they contain is also relevant to ijs. the most 
relevant are the guidelines on justice in matters involving child Victims and Witnesses of crime outlined above 
and the standard minimum rules for the administration of juvenile justice (Beijing rules) and the guidelines for 
the Prevention of juvenile Delinquency (riyadh guidelines). these texts deal with the core elements of juvenile 
justice, such as prevention, diversion, the minimum age of criminal responsibility, punishment, and the guarantee 
of a fair trial. two further un instruments, the guidelines for action on children in the criminal justice system and 
the Basic Principles on the use of restorative justice Programmes in criminal matters, are also important references 
for guidance on assessment of and programming in children and criminal justice and should be considered in 
relation to any ijs which considers matters involving child misconduct, whether de novo or in a case that has been 
diverted from the formal justice system.
ijs are bound by these rules and guidelines; they must, for example, provide children who are alleged to have 
committed offences with some means to defend themselves (e.g., representation, counselling, the possibility to 
contest the veracity of the allegations against them).330 the confidentiality of the hearings, including protection of 
the child’s identity, must also be respected even within the community, especially when dealing with child victims 
of sexual violence, given the stigmatization that may follow from such acts. the legal frameworks of the countries 
visited for this study did not fully live up to these standards. as the uganda country study shows, the ugandan chil-
dren’s act, although often considered to be a very progressive piece of legislation in africa, does not allow for legal 
representation. though, even if the legal framework regarding this were changed, there would be too few lawyers 
to take on this role. thus, if the requirement of some form of representation is to be taken seriously, consideration 
should be given to using sufficiently trained non-lawyers, such as paralegals with appropriate qualifications.
the international legal framework for juvenile justice is well established and has been abundantly commented 
on.331 By comparison, documentation on the levels of implementation of the rules and guidelines for juvenile 
justice in ijs is very scarce, particularly concerning ijs that have had little or no interaction with the formal justice 
system or with ngo-sponsored initiatives. there has been some penetration of international standards where 
there are initiatives to use ijs to divert cases from the formal criminal justice system, as the malawi and uganda 
country studies show.
328 unoDc/unicef, Justice in Matters involving Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime – Model Law and Related Commentary, un, new york, 2009.
329 committee on the rights of the child, general comment no. 10, children’s rights in juvenile justice, 2007, crc/c/gc/10, 2007.
330 see fair trial guarantees in, for example, iccPr, article 14; echr, article 6; crc, article 40; american convention, article 8; african 
charter, paragraph 7.
331 see, for example, unoDc’s Manual for the Measurement of Juvenile Justice Indicators, soerensen and jepsen, (eds.), 2005.
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ijs are often seen as a positive tool to divert juveniles from the more retributive aspects of formal criminal justice 
systems. concentration is on the limited or non-existent access to formal juvenile justice mechanisms, the restora-
tive qualities of ijs, and the search for harmony in the local community and thereby the social reintegration of the 
young offenders. in fact, state or ngo-sponsored juvenile justice programmes may often attempt to build on pre-
existing traditional conflict resolution systems. in dealing with child offenders, informal justice mechanisms have 
certain advantages over the formal justice system, in that they often “concentrate on rehabilitation, reintegration 
and fostering respect for the rights of others, which are also important juvenile justice principles. as traditional 
justice measures tend to take place at the community level, they are likely to facilitate reintegration of the child 
into that community.”332
traditional practices – and possibly custom-based ijs in the form of traditional chieftaincy – can also be used to 
facilitate reconciliation and reintegration of child soldiers into their communities. in sierra leone, traditional ceremo-
nies have been used to facilitate the reconciliation and reintegration of child ex-combatants into the community:
“Child protection agencies, with the support of UNICEF and the Government of Sierra Leone, have 
turned to traditional ceremonies to help facilitate this reconciliation and reunification of children 
with their communities. These exercises, while varying from village to village, are a symbolic gesture 
that the child is forgiven and accepted back into the community. For example, in northern Sierra 
Leone, village members wash the soles of children’s feet and their mothers or female guardians 
then drink the water. In the south and east, the parents of the children dress in rags and take to 
the streets as community members follow, singing. In addition, village elders sometimes consider it 
appropriate to impose monetary fines”333
Whatever the nature of the legal system in which juvenile justice is being administered, key human rights norms 
and procedural guarantees will always be applicable. Basic procedural guarantees should be respected334 even 
if the justice forum is non-judicial. the ‘Beijing rules’ set out a detailed list of principles for the administration of 
juvenile justice335 and include, among other matters, the promotion of the best interests, well-being and safety of 
the juvenile, and, in this regard, consideration, wherever appropriate, of dealing with juvenile offenders without 
resorting to formal proceedings. the trying of juveniles below internationally accepted minimum age standards or 
the use of caning and whipping as a sentence for juvenile offenders constitute violations of the crc,336 irrespective 
of whether ijs or a formal court enforces the punishment.
infLiction of corporaL punishment and informaL Justice systems
article 19 of the crc makes clear that juvenile offenders must never be subject to any form of physical or mental vio-
lence. states have a responsibility to protect juveniles from any such punishments that ijs may apply and to monitor 
the activities of ijs to ensure that any disciplinary measures are consistent with the child’s human dignity and all 
provisions of the convention. the committee has stated337 that eliminating violent and humiliating punishment 
of children is an immediate and unqualified obligation of states parties. corporal punishment of children directly 
conflicts with the equal and inalienable rights of children to respect for their human dignity and physical integrity.
332 unicef innocenti research centre, 2002, pp. 131-136.
333 ibid. 
334 see, for example, Principle 7, un standard minimum rules for the administration of juvenile justice (‘the Beijing rules’).
335 un general assembly resolution 40/33 of 29 november 1985.
336 see also Bangladesh, crc, crc/c/133, 2003, 93, paragraph 510; Kyrgyzstan, crc, crc/c/143, 2004, 50, paragraphs 278, 279  
and 306-308.
337 committee on the rights of the child, general comment no. 8, The Right of the Child to Protection from Corporal Punishment and 
Other Cruel or Degrading Forms of Punishment, article 19; article 28, paragraph 2; and article 37, inter alia, paragraphs 18-22.
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the country studies in this study did not encounter evidence of widespread corporal punishment against juve-
niles following adjudication by ijs. this does not mean that such punishments are not being routinely imposed, 
although it may indicate that it is more likely to occur without any form of adjudication, administered by informal 
security providers or family members, as seen in the example from Papua new guinea. in some instances, infliction 
of corporal punishment may be more severe where some of the customary ijs examined in this study have weak-
ened and been replaced by more ad hoc measures. the quantitative studies conducted for this study show that, in 
some countries (e.g., Bangladesh), both users and providers in some districts appeared to be relatively tolerant of 
beatings; this included beatings of juvenile offenders by traditional leaders, which had slightly more approval than 
beatings by police. local users may see solutions such as this as more humane to the offender than detention and 
subjection to a dysfunctional penal system.
in partnership with the ministry of justice in Papua new guinea, unicef has sponsored the establishment of 
pilot juvenile justice Working groups. these Working groups promote child juvenile justice principles and seek 
to ensure that juvenile offenders are not treated as adults or subjected to extra-judicial sanctions at the commu-
nity level, but are instead referred to juvenile justice services. Village courts receiving or becoming aware of cases 
involving juveniles are required to refer them to juvenile justice services. in simbu Province, the provincial admin-
istration employs a juvenile justice liaison officer to inform people about juvenile justice and to maintain regular 
contracts with village courts and local community groups.
unicef’s juvenile justice and child rights protection programmes in Papua new guinea had the support of stakehold-
ers at all levels of government and of relevant actors in local communities. they ensured the referral of cases involving 
children as defendants to the formal justice system or their handling through mediation within the community.
there is a need to couple this type of engagement with efforts to ensure that the formal system is indeed capable 
of handling the cases according to recognized standards. Broadening advocacy efforts by government agencies, 
actors such as the church, and civil society organizations for the protection of children in contact with the law is 
also key because there is widespread perception, also among traditional mediators, that physical abuse at the 
hands of family members is justifiable punishment and a matter for the family or the local community to resolve, 
rather than a crime against which the victim or victims deserves protection, support and redress.
perceptions of chiLdhood and perceptions of Justice
all international human right standards concerning children are based on the development of attitudes and per-
ceptions of childhood and children.338 academic research on societal perceptions of childhood and of the role 
of the child is relevant for ijs to comprehend and possibly influence how ijs handle children. it is important to 
understand how, in most traditional societies, children are seen as valuable to the family and the community as a 
whole. there are many studies on childhood in traditional societies, but it is also important to study the underlying 
social, cultural, economic and political factors that may shape how society perceives children and the position of 
children in ijs.
there is a link between the societal perceptions of the role of the child and the compliance of ijs with the rights 
of the child. certain basic elements have to be in place in order for a child to receive the basic protection to which 
he or she is entitled; one such element involves understanding the age at which an individual is still considered to 
be a child in the community. if a child is not considered to be a child, it is also crucial to understand whether the 
child is then considered to be an adult or a ’non-person‘. as the committee states, “[i]n many countries and regions 
traditional beliefs have emphasized young children’s need for training and socialization. they have been regarded 
as undeveloped, lacking even basic capacities for understanding, communicating and making choices. they have 
338 Veerman, P. e., 1992. 
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been powerless within their families, and often voiceless and invisible within society.”339 in many societies, such as 
Papua new guinea, a man is not deemed mature enough to occupy positions of responsibility in the community 
until he has reached middle age.
likewise, the attitudes of young people to ijs are important. a study conducted in recent years documents the 
perspectives that a selection of young people have on traditional justice structures in somalia.340 in the first place, 
youth acknowledge the role of the traditional elders in creating peace and stability and positive inter-clan relations 
through the rendering of traditional justice. they are also well aware that the real power resides with the traditional 
leaders. nevertheless, they also have some objections. they see the elders as having ability and capacities that are 
often limited, as not adapting to social change, and as having a limited horizon, which can lead to clashes with 
younger people in the village. in addition, young people contest their own exclusion from active roles in tradi-
tional decision-making. Where punishment appears to be enforced collectively, a stronger individualism among 
the younger generation makes them react to the collective responsibility of the clans for the actions of its indi-
vidual members; for them, it does not make sense to deter an entire clan collectively when rogue individuals need 
to be deterred from committing crimes. finally, young people generally criticize traditional elders for sometimes 
misleading people and for being corrupted and manipulated by politicians, warlords and business people, which, 
according to these young people, causes such traditional leaders to follow their private and particular interests 
rather than the wider interests of the community. the consequences of alienation from tradition by groups of 
young men are also seen in some of the communities of Papua new guinea. youth gangs there commit some of 
the worst violence perpetrated against people accused of sorcery, none of which is sanctioned by the traditional 
leaders or ijs.
engaging with ijs on issues of child rights requires greater efforts to fulfil their obligations under the convention 
with respect to primary justice mechanisms. the state’s responsibility to protect, ensure and fulfil children’s rights 
does not stop at the lowest level of the formal justice system, but extends to ijs. national strategies and action plans 
for implementation of the convention should include a specific component for increasing respect for the rights of 
children whose rights and interests are or stand to be affected by primary justice mechanisms, including ijs.
339 committee on the rights of the child, general comment no. 7: Implementing Child Rights in Early Childhood, 2005, crc/c/gc/7/
rev. 1, 2006, paragraph 14.
340 gundel, j., 2006: 42-43.
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programming With informaL Justice systems
introduction
until recently, ijs often remained relatively invisible in donor-supported interventions in justice systems.
this chapter examines possibilities and practices in programming with and for ijs. it begins at the policy level and 
considers whether to use government and development organisation funds to support ijs. it then looks at support 
to ijs in the context of justice sector support, from the point of view of sector-wide approaches, and then from a 
project and component approach. While programmatic interventions are discussed separately, it is important to 
combine interventions that harmonize with one another and with other justice and development interventions. 
thus, the holistic thinking behind sector approaches to justice, involving complementary interventions with vari-
ous institutions, needs to be adapted and applied to ijs as players in the provision of primary justice. Program-
ming for ijs needs to take its outset in the systems as they operate in their context, including their relations with 
the formal system. rigorous analysis of official and unofficial linkages, and explicit policy and operational choices 
based on these realities, are thus a prerequisite to programming.
the analysis of programmatic interventions works through the programme cycle, moving from preliminary analy-
sis and stakeholder consultation to identification, appraisal, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of a series 
of typical programmatic interventions. the typology of ijs employed in this study applies to these generic inter-
ventions; each kind of programmatic intervention is examined in terms of the broad categories of ijs though 
not exhaustively. it is important to remember that, despite some overall similarities, a chief characteristic of ijs is 
their degree of adaptation to their socio-economic, political and cultural contexts. the particularity of ijs makes a 
generic approach to them unreliable.
principLes of programming
Whether to engage With informaL Justice systems
human rights activists and development practitioners must contend with the fact that the state sometimes has 
little or no reach and lacks the resources to extend it – at least in the short term. in favourable circumstances, the 
different mind-sets of these activists and practitioners can complement each other in a critical dialogue. Whereas 
the human rights system emphasizes the immediate responsibilities of individual states as duty bearers, develop-
ment practitioners can sometimes understand their work more in terms of obligations and goals that are common 
to partnered donors and recipients. at the level of written policy, development organizations have little difficulty in 
agreeing that they should not engage with ijs that are likely to violate human rights or that all interventions should 
promote compliance with human rights.341 strictly applying the first criterion excludes many ijs from potential 
support, and applying the same criteria to formal systems would produce similar difficulties. in particular, the 
choice of whether to engage with ijs that discriminate against women is an unavoidable dilemma for develop-
ment organisations wishing to engage with ijs. While day-to-day failure to measure up to international standards 
– in structure, process and outcomes – may be the inescapable reality, the demand to respect them is a legal 
requirement and a cherished aspiration. the 2009 ichrP report is critical of what amounts to a ‘progressive realiza-
tion’ approach to human rights in ijs342 that fails to demand compliance with human rights. to development pro-
341 see DfiD, 2004. “this Briefing note suggests ways of working with nsjs systems that have positive aspects upon which to build, 
and that have the potential to improve poor people’s safety and access to justice. it is not applicable to situations where nsjs 
systems violate basic human rights such that donor engagement is both inappropriate and unlikely to achieve reform.” likewise, 
the 2009 DaniDa strategy paper ‘Democratisation and human rights for the Benefit of the People’ proclaims that, “Denmark will 
only support informal systems of justice that respect human rights, or that are willing and able to change norms and practices that 
infringe on human rights.”
342 ichrP, 2009: 124.
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grammers used to the pragmatic demands of limited resources, limited power and everyday compromise, there 
will be nothing surprising in such an approach. they will likely note that practical enjoyment of human rights even 
in the formal justice system in many poor countries is precisely a matter of ‘progressive realization’, regardless of the 
prescriptions of law and of the human rights system. in other contexts and at the level of principle, an acceptance 
of a ‘progressive realization’ approach will be clearly retrogressive.
as Bruce Baker recommends in a recent work on security provision, the question should rather be one of willing-
ness to reform.343 While pragmatism is unavoidable in engagement on the ground, there can be no concessions in 
principle regarding the international minimum norms against which justice provision is measured or in the goal 
of partnership efforts. Programming should begin with an analysis of the current situation and practices, including 
strengths and weaknesses in protecting human rights. While the ichrP cites criticism of reformers’ low ambition 
for india’s Lok Adalat system,344 the operational context inevitably influences definitions of ‘sufficiently ambitious’ in 
terms of human rights and expectations for the speed of progress. the question of what minimum conditions to 
include, while seemingly simple on paper, depends on context and can be difficult in practice. the ichrP report 
does not discuss the details of human rights standards as they relate to issues of structure, process and outcome 
in ijs. minimum criteria for engagement would often include that the ijs provider subscribe in principle to (human 
rights-compliant) national law and broadly refrain from illegally asserting jurisdiction.
in extreme contexts, programmers may face a choice between supporting informal justice mechanisms that occa-
sionally allow plainly abusive outcomes or countenancing trends that are even worse. an example is seen in war-
torn regions of afghanistan, where counterinsurgency and political considerations have influenced the choice of 
ijs partners in government and internationally sponsored programmes.345 one paper on the subject describes 
how “the competition for justice service delivery in the districts is between the elders and the taliban”. the govern-
ment-sanctioned elders may occasionally resolve murder cases through compensation or even employ “the use 
of women or girls as part of a compensation deal” (a practice known as baadh). support to a government justice 
liaison committee can include human rights and basic legal education and other measures that may in time lead 
to a reduction of practices that violate human rights.
another rather extreme example is rwanda’s Gacaca system, in which the extreme circumstances of post-geno-
cide justice have led elected courts of ordinary community members to try large numbers of people for the most 
serious crimes without legal representation. measures such as generous penalty reductions, community service 
and the openness of the forum in which adjudication takes place have somewhat mitigated these worrying com-
promises on due process standards. international development partners have supported Gacaca in various ways, 
including through financing for the training of judges.346
thus, context is important, and what some may consider the best or only choice available in one context might be 
unacceptable in another. Partnerships should be premised on mutual acceptance of core human rights principles, 
including gender equality, and on a willingness to work to achieve various goals that are themselves compatible 
with human rights. the outline of the programming interventions below describes how programmers can choose 
among a number of partners and among a variety of interventions. there will often be a chain of partnerships 
reaching between international funding and the justice providers themselves. as described earlier, there is a pro-
cess of ‘translation’ along this chain. some partnerships and interventions will carry greater potential for change 
– and greater risks – than others, and success requires a willingness to run those risks.
343 Baker, B., 2010, op. cit. see also scheye, 2009.
344 ichrP, 2009, op. cit.
345 see fearon, K., 2009.
346 see, inter alia, uvin, ‘the Gacaca tribunals in rwanda’ in Reconciliation after Violent Conflict’, international idea, stockholm, 2003, 
isBn: 91-89098-91-9. the extent to which Gacaca can be considered an informal justice system within the definition used in 
the beginning of this study is questionable, as state legislation, administration and finance have entirely established, created, 
maintained and control the system, which is used for the genocide trials.
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many standards on structure and procedure are ‘soft-law’ and the extent of the obligation to respect them may 
be contested or not fully understood. normally, programming would not want to encourage ijs handling serious 
criminal cases, but cooperation with ijs may be precisely what is needed to ensure that these cases are transferred 
to the formal system, and such referral could quite easily be a ‘goal’ achievable through an intervention rather than 
a prerequisite to engagement.347
consideration of aLternatives to support for informaL Justice systems
support for ijs should only proceed after careful consideration of the alternatives. it is important to repeat that ijs 
are not a substitute for a national justice or legal system. While the national system’s legitimacy may have suffered 
due to colonialism, corruption and neglect, the effort to build such a system remains a vital goal. Building a cred-
ible and legitimate legal and justice system may require at least two generations. if that estimate is accurate, then 
the 10 to 20 years of international assistance that have been undertaken in this field in many countries is short. 
alternative measures to ijs’ engagement may include: improving community policing; increasing community 
involvement in the formal court system through the employment of lay assessors; hearing community representa-
tives in bail hearings; increasing use of restorative and non-custodial punishment in criminal cases; reducing the 
formality and adversarial nature of proceedings in the formal system;348 improving the availability and accessibility 
of first instance and small claims courts and increasing the availability of appropriate legal services for poor and 
vulnerable peoples. thus, baseline studies should include an analysis of user and community preferences when 
trying to understand why people do not choose the formal system.
doing no harm
equally important, interventions targeting or affecting ijs must evidently be premised on realistic prospects of 
sustainable improvement. it is important to avoid short-term interventions that serve only to create dependency 
or that risk damaging functioning systems without ensuring that something better replaces them. Difficult and 
rather fundamental questions must be asked about what is economically sustainable in a particular country and 
context. schärf (2003) frankly warns: “Western models of justice have resource assumptions that no african country 
can afford. consequently the western system in an african setting fails abysmally to do justice, and particularly for 
the poor.” thus, programmers, both in national governments and their international development partners, need a 
measure of self-criticism and humility.
second, because ijs may operate in very fragile social environments, the clear priority of local people will often be 
survival, and it is critical that ijs-related interventions be considered in terms of an overall assessment of sequenc-
ing and priorities that is respectful of culture. thus, one lesson is that development programming that is participa-
tory and sensitive to local wishes might well be unwelcome if it tries to influence ijs before helping with more 
immediate priorities.
the poLicy LeveL: cLarifying the aims of support  
to informaL Justice systems
decLared aims and overaLL vaLues underLying recognition and support
links should naturally be made between programming for ijs and sector-wide approaches to justice (‘justice 
sWaPs’) aligned with poverty reduction strategy papers (‘PrsPs’) and with strategies for public sector manage-
ment, governance, and anti-corruption interventions. there is general agreement that justice sector interventions 
should proceed from an agreed set of values that emphasize the rule of law and access to justice for all, especially 
for the poor and marginalized, as well as in a charter of human rights based on constitutional and international 
347 Wojkowska cites a reduction in forced marriage of widows as the successful outcome of a project in somalia.
348 We are indebted to Pri 2000 for some of these proposals. see pp. 94–95.
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standards. Democratic participation, equality, good governance and international cooperation will usually also 
figure prominently among those values. recipient governments and development partners should ensure that 
these declared values fully account for women’s and children’s human rights.
Beyond statements of basic values, it is important to know why a state or ‘polity’ and/or a government tolerates or 
encourages support for ijs as part of justice provision in the country, or conversely why the state may be attempt-
ing to move away from a pluralistic to a unitary system. chapter V notes reasons why users choose ijs. state leaders 
may have the same reasons – or different ones – than users for favouring ijs or legal pluralism. they may favour 
one model over another to achieve political goals. clarity about national goals and development partners’ explicit 
consideration of these goals are important for programming. Development partners and governments should 
guard against simply finding a cheap solution to the problem of satisfying the obligation to provide justice (‘poor 
justice for the poor’). While pragmatic, economical solutions may be necessary in the medium term, they should 
be consistent with a value-based long-term vision. in general, development partners can remain on more neutral 
political ground when there is a wide political consensus.
national governments may include ijs349 in order to accommodate regional, religious, political or cultural differ-
ences or to respect the rights of minorities. in this case, national commitment to including ijs may be long-term 
and strategic, particularly if backed by a wide political consensus. it is important to note that recognition or inclu-
sion may be a manifestation of underlying conflicts about authority or even sovereignty. Where there has been a 
history of unequal power relations and discrimination against (often large) indigenous communities, as in latin 
america, recognition of ijs is often seen as a way to bolster local democracy and autonomy and is part of an 
explicitly political debate based on identity, backed by international instruments such as ilo convention number 
169. in latin america, the resource base (i.e., literacy, access to materials, communication, etc.) is also often better 
than that in some other parts of the world where ijs play a prominent role (although latin american indigenous 
communities may still have relatively little such access in comparison with other groups in those societies). oppor-
tunities to comply with demands for increased transparency and accountability may be correspondingly higher 
than in some other parts of the world. indigenous peoples may be positively disposed towards a re-examination 
of discriminatory aspects of traditional normative frameworks.
in other cases, recognition of ijs may be based on an acknowledgement that the formal or state justice system 
has insufficient capacity or outreach and ijs have existed in the community for a long time. in such circumstances, 
recognition of ijs might be merely ‘tactical’, pending a (re)assertion of the strength of the state justice system. the 
malawi country study illustrates that national policy may tend against ijs, as was the case with the effective aboli-
tion of traditional courts (at first instance and appellate level) in malawi in 1994.
the necessity of a poWer and environmentaL anaLysis: the roLe of poLitics
the six country studies and references to other situations present various perspectives on the role of policy and 
politics in state involvement with ijs. these studies show that politics – understood as strategies to gain and main-
tain political power or economic advantage – may be equally apparent at the local level as at the national level, if 
not even more so.350 adjudication of important questions of resource allocation may be a vital – and contested – 
component of the maintenance of power, particularly where it is combined with other forms of power.351
there are underlying and rather fundamental tensions between the republican and democratic principles on 
which post-colonial states are nominally built and the neo-patrimonial, family and clan-based, often-patriarchal 
349 see DfiD, 2004, ‘non-state justice and security systems’.
350 see again DfiD, 2004.
351 see, for example, uganda, huriPec Working Paper no. 12. schärf (2003) is brutally succinct on the situation in southern africa: “the 
utility of the chiefs to the democratic polities now seems to be to deliver the electorate to the ruling party.”
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structures in which custom is embedded. it is important that external actors appreciate this political context and 
that there are ways to combat politicization of justice. there needs to be a power analysis in the context of ijs inter-
ventions. the guiding Principles that the international council on human rights Policy proposed in its 2009 report 
on legal pluralism and human rights can support analysis of the background for use of ijs.352 the need for such an 
analysis may be controversial. it may be equally necessary when dealing with religious organizations.
the impact of support for ijs on the position of the judiciary is particularly important. a point of special considera-
tion is that an assessment of the impact on the independence of the judiciary and the impartiality of ijs adjudicators’ 
needs to be made at the structural and procedural levels. the procedural aspect can be approached operationally 
through programmatic interventions. the structural or strategic aspect, on the other hand, involves more political 
and legal analysis and discussion. the uganda country study illustrates some of the tensions that arise when adju-
dicative and other governmental functions are combined in one organ and the resulting uncertainty as to whether 
ultimate authority rests with the judiciary or the executive. on the other hand, judiciaries are as vulnerable as other 
members of the state elite to accusations of being removed from the realities of the poor, and judges in all countries 
are occasionally suspected of using judicial independence as a means to block necessary reforms. reference to an 
objective set of principles is therefore necessary. the existing international standards on human rights and justice, 
including the independence of the judiciary, can provide a useful framework for this purpose.
a human rights-based approach can provide an appropriate analytical guideline in determining whether and how 
to support ijs. interventions in support of ijs can be considered, assessed, designed and evaluated according to 
whether they enhance participation, accountability, and empowerment, whether they are grounded in human 
rights standards, and whether they increase protection of the most vulnerable groups.353 in the programming 
approaches and interventions presented in this study some are clearly more participatory than others. ‘self-state-
ment’ processes in relation to customary norms and standards, carried out appropriately, are apparently participa-
tory and would seem to favour the development of relationships of accountability between traditional leaders and 
the communities they serve in ways that top-down codification processes do not.
as the most important questions for ordinary people not involved in policy-making often concern livelihood and 
access to basic resources and services (including security), an examination of the interaction of justice provision 
(including ijs) with these issues is very important. thus, questions of whether ijs are capable of making decisions 
on access to water, land, food production, housing or other physical necessities more participatory, accountable 
and empowering as well as preserving human dignity in the process, should be central to programming choices.
support for studies on informaL Justice systems and state  
LegaL systems
sector-level interventions should support the inclusion of ijs into broader policy debates and discussions, ensur-
ing that the debates and studies are qualified by being:
1. Based on facts, the result of professional, inclusive studies (which takes time);
2. open and inclusive with respect to debates on policy choices; and
3. conducted where respect for human rights, equality, participation, access to justice and the separation of 
powers are the cornerstones of the choices
352 ichrP, 2009, op. cit.
353 see Wojkowska, unDP, 2006. “all informal justice systems should meet the following criteria and that any interventions or initiatives 
undertaken should work toward gradually enhancing the quality of dispute resolution and getting the informal justice systems to 
adhere to the following human rights based principles […].”
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While there may not be much experience with ijs in sWaPs, some countries and organizations have worked seri-
ously with the issue of how statutory and customary justice systems can and should cooperate. the south african 
experience stands out because it has involved many studies and debates and particularly deep academic analysis 
of legal and social issues. the traditional courts Bill, still pending at the time of writing of this study after a decade 
of research and debate, has been the focus of extensive debate for politicians, academics and justice system stake-
holders and the focus of two analytical studies by state organs.354 the Bill tends toward recognition and regulation 
of traditional courts rather than incorporation of them into the ordinary judiciary, from which they remain distinct.
the 2000 study by Penal reform international on sub-saharan africa clearly recommends that existing traditional 
and customary systems should not be incorporated into the state system:
“Linking the two systems tends to undermine the positive attributes of the informal system. The 
voluntary nature of the process is undermined by the presence of state coercion. As a result, the court 
need no longer rely on social sanctions and public participation loses its primary importance. At the 
same time, decisions which do not conform to procedural requirements, or which deviate from the 
strict law in the interests of reconciliation, may be reviewed and overturned on appeal to the higher 
courts. Procedural requirements invariably become greater and public participation is curtailed.”355
the Pri study pointed to the colonial experience whereby traditional mechanisms that ensured participation and 
community accountability were rendered useless when traditional leaders were given the coercive powers of the 
state and no longer had to rely on community legitimacy for their force. according to this view, incorporation 
would risk repeating this phenomenon. this raises the question of making recognition conditional on participation 
and accountability, as seen in the south african legislation concerning traditional leaders.356
although the south african experience has its own particularities from combating the legacy of apartheid, includ-
ing its misuse of traditional structures, it also offers extremely valuable lessons and insights of more general validity. 
this study cannot do justice to the depth and breadth of this work.357 in some other countries, including malawi 
and Zambia, law reform commissions have seriously studied informal or non-state systems and their relationship to 
the formal or statutory courts, although these studies have apparently not yet been matched by wide consultations 
with the public and stakeholders. it is noteworthy that forms of links or integration between informal and formal 
systems are likely to vary significantly from one legal domain to another; national policy and institutional structures 
relating to land are likely to differ from those relating to marriage and the family, for example. in south africa, legisla-
tion on the recognition of customary marriages preceded the debates about and analyses of traditional courts, and 
a court decision excludes interstate succession from the material jurisdiction of traditional courts.358
it is impossible to propose a single, universally applicable model for interaction between systems, and national 
representative organs need to make the political choices. in a study of legal pluralism in Vanuatu, miranda forsyth 
thoroughly and usefully compares models for the relationship of systems and assesses some of their advantages 
and disadvantages.359 the study also proposes a methodology for policy development toward a model that is 
suited to the context in question and contains mechanisms of mutual recognition, adaptation and regulation.
354 there has been criticism, though, that there has been insufficient popular consultation. see a selection of media articles on the 
subject on the university of cape town’s website at: http://www.lrg.uct.ac.za/
355 Penal reform international 2000: 129
356 traditional leadership and governance framework amendment act, 2003.
357 for further reading on the traditional courts Bill, see for example, himonga, c. and manjoo, r., 2009.
358 idem.
359 forsyth, 2007.
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incLusion of informaL Justice systems in Justice programming at 
the sector LeveL
once there is agreement in principle on the inclusion of ijs in justice sector strategies and programmes, the central 
questions become how this should be done and what combination and sequencing of various kinds of interven-
tions to use. the tendency to include ijs in justice sector strategies is growing and there are some recent examples. 
support for ijs is especially apparent in the case of parajudicial ‘hybrid’ systems that exist in many countries. for 
example, the uganda jlos strategic investment plan (2007–2011), which is donor-supported, includes the local 
council courts, as the uganda country study discusses. the Kenya gjlos programme’s360 medium-term strategy 
includes state and non-state justice systems to provide “improved access to justice that is affordable, speedy, rel-
evant and effective”. in timor leste, an independent needs assessment report from 2009 found low capacity and 
outreach in the formal system (despite important recent improvements in this regard) and familiarity with, trust in, 
and access to informal systems.361 the report first proposed that any law recognizing customary law processes at 
the community level should ensure that those processes comply with basic human rights and coordinate with the 
formal justice system and, second, that any initiative giving recognition should harmonize with the formal system 
and not operate as a parallel or separate system of justice. the recently adopted strategic plan for the justice sector 
in timor leste appears to follow this recommendation and posits one overall goal in relation to ijs: that the cus-
tomary law and community justice mechanisms be regulated and the systematic monitoring of their conformity 
with human rights be implemented. the overall approach appears to be a top-down one, aiming at circumscrib-
ing ijs through a suitable legal framework (supported by preliminary studies and research) and the training of ijs 
providers.362 similar developments are apparent in many countries around the world, where, even if not explicitly 
mentioned at the strategic level, programmes contain components of support for ijs.
inclusion of programming for ijs at the sector level is still relatively new, and there are few high-level evaluations 
and reviews that assess progress and pitfalls. While uganda’s decentralization programme is often considered to 
be a success, the lc court system has been criticized for insufficient attention to human rights in the legal and 
policy frameworks surrounding it.363 other weaknesses, seen in the country study, are a gap between the tasks 
given to the lc court system and the intellectual and material resources available to these courts. Programming to 
integrate formal and informal systems better will depend on the national justice policy context, the jurisdictional 
division between formal and ijs, and an analysis of the desired and factual links between the two. Planning requires 
that these issues be thought out systematically and with an eye toward policy. this is a complex task, involving in-
depth studies and qualified political debates, and should involve work by law reform commissions, public consul-
tations, and consideration of consequences at various levels. Policy development should take account of human 
rights issues, including those of access, structure (including participation), procedure and substantive norms.
While this study looks primarily at how ijs can be harnessed to improve access to justice, occasionally the policy 
will go in the opposite direction: toward the abolition of ijs and the creation of a more integrated formal court 
system. the malawi country study notes that, after the move to multiparty democracy and the adoption of a new 
constitution in 1994/95, malawi quickly discarded the traditional courts that had operated in the country for dec-
ades. these courts were especially discredited because the executive (which controlled them) had abused them 
to persecute political opponents. nevertheless, some studies364 have pointed out that the traditional courts also 
fulfilled important functions for poor people through their jurisdiction over title to land, their power to dissolve 
marriage (especially customary marriage), and their authority to decide custody of children. initially, the traditional 
360 Key result 4, concerned with improved access to justice for the poor, marginalized and vulnerable.
361 ‘the justice system of timor leste – an independent comprehensive needs assessment’, Dili, october 2009.
362 judicial actors will also be trained in customary law, but within the objective of regulating and implementing community mechanisms.
363 see oloka-onyango, 2007, ichrP, 2009: 123.
364 see especially schärf, W., et al., 2002.
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courts were abolished without the adoption of legislation transferring their jurisdiction over these matters to mag-
istrates courts. for a while, the only court that had jurisdiction was thus the remote and expensive high court. 
according to studies,365 some magistrates courts continued handling such cases without jurisdiction to do so. 
eventually, the malawi parliament adopted legislation extending the jurisdiction of the magistrates courts, but 
knowledge of the new legislation was not found to be widespread among magistrates at the time of studies in 
2002, so confusion over jurisdiction in these matters was still hindering access to justice. this process clearly illus-
trates the need for preliminary research and careful planning.
pLanning and baseLine studies prior to incLusion of informaL  
Justice systems in sector programmes
as when planning for sector interventions generally, a thorough analysis is a necessary start when addressing ijs. 
the scale of the analysis should match the scale of the intervention (local or national). While planning for support 
of justice sector institutions requires information on caseloads, resources and linkages as well as needs, program-
ming for informal justice demands greater information about people’s legal preferences needs and choices, as well 
as the cultural, social and economic realities that condition these needs, and a knowledge of the paths through 
the systems that people choose. the ichrP report366 documents the lack of empirical research on non-state legal 
orders and states that, in most cases, baseline studies do not exist.
to map justice needs and the choices of ordinary people, the World Bank’s justice for the Poor programme (jsDP) 
in sierra leone used combinations of the following:367
  household survey data, using previous surveys of this kind and, as necessary, drawing on other data sources 
such as relatively recent government census data and biannual public expenditure tracking surveys
  analysis of court records, comprising data from customary and common law courts, across different levels of 
courts and different areas of countries, as well as country study methods, combining and cross-referencing 
data to develop informative stories that are notable either for their frequency or their uniqueness
  focus group interviews with a wide range of stakeholders at the district, chiefdom, and community levels 
(including chiefdom and local government authorities, customary and general law courts officials, police, ngo 
representatives, women and youth leaders, and ‘ordinary’ men, women, and youth, with an emphasis on the 
poor and marginalized in each community) and individual interviews with subsets of the population to provide 
in-depth information on individual experiences with justice systems
in relation to informal justice, the jsDP in sierra leone focused in its initial two years on conducting studies to 
inform future programming and policy-making, without having made prior prescriptive choices. the jsDP decided 
that understanding the role, importance and, where relevant, the strengthening of the ijs would be a key focus in 
the initial phase of the programme. it is important to recognize that understanding the context may require time 
and study.
the governance secretariat under the ministry of justice in Zambia is currently368 undertaking an extensive access 
to justice situation analysis. the study involves both desk and field analyses and includes an explicit human 
rights framework.369
365 ibid.
366 ichrP, 2009: 118.
367 Dale, P., 2008.
368 january 2010. the Danish institute for human rights is leading the study.
369 these are merely a few of many relevant studies. there are similar studies, or plans for them, in liberia, (us institute of Peace and 
george Washington university), indonesia (the World Bank’s justice for the Poor programme), nepal, and malawi (reportedly 
planned by DfiD). What is perhaps still lacking is a more or less standard methodological ‘toolbox’ for the conduct of such studies. 
the extent of the study’s need to be comprehensive depends, of course, on the extent of existing documentation on justice issues. 
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While the World Bank study in sierra leone did not appear to incorporate human rights analysis, a later jsDP study 
did examine some aspects of human rights.370 as human rights are a state obligation, it would be appropriate to 
consider them at every stage, including at the identification and planning phases. it would be relatively simple 
to include representatives of national human rights institutions and gender equality bodies in such work where 
they can contribute substantially. in other cases, expertise in human rights and gender equality can be found 
elsewhere. the assessment can help to answer questions about which issues, wrongs or offences ijs are capable 
of addressing, as well as the consequences of intervention or non-intervention. ijs providers and user representa-
tives should also be represented at the planning stage, as they are too often treated as the ‘poor relative’ during 
the planning and programming of justice interventions. the human rights analysis should be broad, not limited 
to critically examining the compliance or non-compliance of ijs with international or constitutional standards, but 
examining comparative strengths and weaknesses in structure, process and substantive outcomes vis-à-vis the 
formal system.
recommendations on conduct of baseLine studies
Baselines should not only assess the capacities, resources, strengths and weaknesses of the formal justice system, 
but also explicitly begin by identifying social realities, including the barriers to access to the justice system and its 
responsiveness to the justice needs of ordinary people, and by disaggregating according to social and economic 
status. they should address the reasons why people choose ijs and do not choose the formal system. just as ijs 
are dynamic, people may have had recent experiences of conflict or authoritarian or corrupt governance that has 
left them mistrustful of the formal justice system. mistrust of the system does not necessarily have to be perpetual, 
though. as emphasized above, baseline studies need to have a critical perspective that includes an analysis of the 
political and economic interests that transform justice mechanisms into instruments of local power.
it is also important to recognize and address the many official and unofficial linkages between the formal justice 
system and ijs. in so doing, it is essential to consider, among other issues, the roles of power and individual inter-
ests as they affect the extent to which the primary justice provider finds collaboration worthwhile. Power, authority 
and the boundaries between jurisdictions are also at issue.
the human rights compliance of ijs should be an explicit part of the framework for examination of ijs. such an 
analysis of this kind should incorporate human rights standards pertaining to substantive norms (contextualized 
to deal with the most prevalent kinds of disputes, whether they be land, property, family or criminal type issues), 
procedures and access criteria, and structural issues of participation and accountability.371
understanding the social barriers that prevent women from taking any steps at all to resolve legal problems or 
prevent them from using particular avenues or remedies may be vital in determining the best programming 
approach. if social custom or pressure are discouraging women from availing themselves of otherwise available 
formal systems, support for ijs may have to balance carefully between the palliative of attempting to improve 
procedures and remedies and the danger of reinforcing the social norms that make it ‘unacceptable’ for women 
to seek justice.
in relation to procedures, it would be appropriate to attempt to understand women’s preferences through testing 
and pilot schemes. relevant questions include: Do women prefer more confidential proceedings that permit them 
to discuss difficult issues in a secure atmosphere, or do they favour public proceedings where social pressure may 
increase the chances of enforcement? Do they prefer one avenue for particular kinds of cases?
370 silenced injustices in moyamba District, paragraphs 33 et seq. documenting the failures of the ijs.
371 this is in line with the approach adopted by national human rights institutions in paragraph 33 (c) of the 2008 nairobi 
Declaration, cited above.
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similar considerations apply to children’s access to ijs. Baseline research should investigate whether the access of 
children – as parties, victims, perpetrators or witnesses – can be most improved through programmatic coopera-
tion with ijs or through making statutory mechanisms more available, accessible, acceptable and adaptable.
Preliminary assessments of human rights compliance must critically examine the willingness and ability of ijs to 
change. they must consider the complexity of change, particularly where ijs are applying norms that are broadly 
held within their communities. While some kinds of change – particularly process-related ones – might be rela-
tively easy to change by focussing on providers or sets of rules, others will typically be deeply embedded in com-
munity norms. although ijs providers, like other groups, are likely to defend their own interests, it may be a mistake 
to regard them as barriers to reforms that their user constituencies would wholeheartedly welcome. for example, 
rural women may be among the strongest upholders of patrilineal succession practices, expecting that their eldest 
sons, whom they have supported and nurtured, will remember them in their old age.
Baseline studies such as these should, of course, set up indicators and benchmarks for future achievement; these 
should be used in later phases of the programming cycle.
indicator frameWorKs for assessing informaL Justice systems
indicators can measure compliance with established standards (including those related to human rights and gov-
ernance) or the performance of outputs and progress toward agreed goals and objectives. this section starts with 
a framework that is oriented toward measuring compliance with human rights standards in the substantive out-
comes, processes and structures of ijs. the assumption is that the performance indicators for programming will 
often set objectives of greater human rights compliance.
analysis of rule of law indicators generally maintains372 that indicators should provide reliable information not only 
on whether there is progress toward an agreed objective, but also provide warnings when there are emergent 
problems. a high-level indicator system should permit the inclusion of project-level indicators to feed into it.
Previous work on this subject, such as the 2004 DfiD study and the 2006 unDP report, has suggested various 
indicators for ijs.373 the DfiD briefing paper emphasizes three categories: transparency, protection of rights, and 
cooperation between state and non-state institutions. in this proposal, transparency was mostly concerned with 
the recording of decisions. in regard to protection of rights, the proposal suggests including users’ – and especially 
women’s – knowledge, understanding and confidence and their perceptions of being treated equally and with 
dignity, as well as the proportion of cases solved through mediation (as opposed to more binding approaches, 
such as arbitration). the cooperation category looks at referrals going in both directions as well as at users’ avenues 
of appeal (it would presumably also look at the formal availability of such avenues).
the 2006 unDP paper, while at times less specific than the DfiD brief when discussing the precise measures to 
be taken and the sources of data, adopts the category of transparency, accepting the proposed DfiD indicators. 
the unDP paper added indicators for the adoption of codes and guidelines on ethics, and included two indicators 
related to participation: 1) the existence of rules and procedures for the selection of ijs adjudicators and 2) whether 
there is a public forum to review and discuss the performance of ijs and, if so, whether it allows equal participa-
tion. under the category of protection of rights, it goes a step further than the DfiD briefing paper, proposing 
indicators of three important human rights themes: 1) measurements of ijs’ use of physical punishment and force, 
2) measurements of ijs’ provider attitudes on gender issues, and 3) measurements on issues such as dowry/bride 
price payments and the age of marriage. further, it looks at structural and procedural rights, proposing to examine 
levels of participation of women as adjudicators and awareness of the principle of equality before the law. under 
372 see, for example, Vera institute of justice, 2003.
373 see unDP/Wojkowska, 2006: 45; DfiD, 2004: 16.
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the category of safety and security, the unDP study includes the question of the effectiveness of ijs by looking for 
increases in the number of ijs decisions that are actually carried out.
Discussion of indicators for ijs should refer to justice indicators more generally and their efforts to include ijs. the 
World justice Project uses four categories or bands, divided into 16 factors and 68 sub-factors. one factor, under 
the access to justice band, relates specifically to the fairness and efficiency of traditional justice. the sub-factors 
include independence and impartiality, respect of fundamental rights (without going into further detail, though) 
and the voluntariness of outcomes. Within the access to justice band that the World justice Project proposed, a 
Vera institute report374 proposed an overall category or ‘basket’ of indicators comprising “transparency, fairness, and 
accountability to high standards of professional and ethical conduct” and added some additional sub-factors for 
the purpose of its study. these are similar to those proposed by DfiD and unDP and look at consistency in out-
comes, public perceptions of fairness and corruption, the presence of a set of known standards that are available 
for review and consistently applied, the proportion of male and female users, and ngo reports on abuses.
tabLe: proposed frameWorK for compLiance indicators for informaL 
Justice systems375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383
for programming purposes, the following proposal would, like the efforts just described, be an indicator frame-
work that takes its outset in access to justice across the three main parameters already mentioned: the substantive 
standards used and applied in ijs, the structure of ijs, and the fairness and effectiveness of procedures, including 
the remedies available. the indicators below are merely samples and may not be the best or most appropriate ones 
in all contexts. the inclusion of a column on indicators related to legislation is not a tacit assumption that legisla-
tive solutions will be the most effective. effectiveness and appropriateness will vary from one context to another. 
374 Vera institute/altus global alliance, 2008.
375 see the discussion of this issue in chapter Vii on women’s rights. Procedural incentives could include making the option of civil 
marriage (and dissolution of civil marriage) more geographically, financially and procedurally accessible.
376 
377 
378 
379 
380 
381 
382
383 
CaTegorieS Sub- 
CaTegorieS
exampleS  
of iSSueS
Sample indiCaTor – 
legal
Sample indiCaTor – 
praC TiCe
meanS of  
VerifiCaTion
Norms and 
substantive 
outcomes
Personal status and 
family law issues 
Child marriages Clear age limit, applicable to 
customary marriages 
IJS refusal to endorse  
child marriages 
1.  Legislation
2.  Reporting, studies, 
monitoring
Forced marriages 
(including ‘wife 
inheritance’)
Legal prohibition IJS practice of verifying real consent 
to marriage
1.  Legislation
2.  Reporting, studies, 
monitoring
Bride price/dowry Repayment not a legal requirement 
for dissolution; recognition that 
payment does not reflect ‘ownership’
IJS practical application of (changed) 
legal standard; reduced amounts
1.  Legislation
2.  Reporting, studies, 
monitoring
Dissolution of marriage Legal recognition of equality in 
grounds for dissolution
IJS practical application of (changed) 
legal standard
1.  Legislation
2.  Reporting, studies, 
monitoring
Maintenance and 
paternity
Clear rules on jurisdiction and proof 
in paternity suits
IJS practical application of (changed) 
legal standard
1.  Legislation
2.  Reporting, studies, 
monitoring
Custody of children Best interests of child principle 
applicable to IJS
IJS practical application of (changed) 
legal standard
1.  Legislation
2.  Reporting, studies, 
monitoring
Polygyny Legal and procedural incentives to 
monogamous375 marriages
Reduction in polygyny 1.  Legislation
2.  Reporting, studies, 
monitoring
Abandonment/
desertion
Law provides protection that is 
applicable to IJS
IJS practical application of (changed) 
legal standard
1.  Legislation
2.  Reporting, studies, 
monitoring
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CaTegorieS Sub- 
CaTegorieS
exampleS  
of iSSueS
Sample indiCaTor – 
legal
Sample indiCaTor – 
praC TiCe
meanS of  
VerifiCaTion
Real property  
law issues 
Individual title protected 
in customary law 
framework
Law provides an application frame-
work that is applicable by IJS; 
development of customary norms to 
reflect changing forms of ownership
1.  Indicators should reflect account-
ability of providers 
2.  Knowledge among the public of 
statutory law.
1.  Legislation
2.  Reporting, studies, 
monitoring
Customary forms of 
collective ownership 
protected in legislation
Statutory law recognizes these forms 
of ownership
1.  Indicators should reflect account-
ability of providers 
2.  Knowledge among the public and 
justice providers of statutory law.
1.  Legislation
2.  Reporting, studies, 
monitoring
Gender equality in real 
property ownership
Legislation on title and intestate 
succession are gender-equal and 
apply to customary land;376
development of gender-equal 
customary norms
IJS practical application of changed 
legal standard
1.  Legislation
2.  Reporting, studies, 
monitoring
Succession (applies to 
personal property also)
Law provides an application frame-
work that is applicable by IJS and 
poor users
Knowledge and use of testate 
succession
1.  Legislation
2.  Reporting, studies, 
monitoring
Personal property 
issues
Protection for widows 
and orphans against 
property-grabbing 
(may apply to real 
property also)
Legislative clarity on ownership and 
succession as to ‘family property’
Indicators of cooperation among 
primary justice providers, including 
referrals.
1.  Legislation
2.  Reporting, studies, 
monitoring
Reporting by state 
primary justice agencies
Issues of personal 
security, crime and 
social order
Jurisdiction of IJS in 
relation to petty crime
Clarity and realistic provisions 
governing subject matter and 
personal jurisdiction as well as the 
coercive powers of providers.
Clarity and realistic provisions as to 
relations with state law enforcement.
Indicators of cooperation among 
primary justice providers, including 
referrals.
Use of restorative measures.
Resources of primary state agencies 
to cooperate effectively.
1.  Legislation
2.  Reporting, studies, 
monitoring
Reporting by state 
primary justice agencies
Illegal coercion and 
illegal punishments 
by IJS
Legislative prohibition and appropri-
ate sanctions377
1.  Quantitative indicators of use 
and attitudes
2.  Quantitative indicators of use of 
dialogue, warnings and coercive 
sanctions by law enforcement 
officers
1.  Legislation
2.  Reporting, studies, 
monitoring
Reporting by state 
primary justice agencies
Juvenile justice Legal frameworks for cooperation 
and use of restorative measures 
involving a role for IJS
Use of restorative measures. Linked 
to performance indicators of carry-
ing out of capacity assessments, 
provision of training, resources and 
monitoring structures
1.  Legislation
2.  Reporting, studies, 
monitoring
Reporting by state 
primary justice agencies
Gender-based violence Legislative prohibition and appropri-
ate sanctions378
1.  Quantitative indicators sanctions 
by IJS and attitudes (surveys), 
qualitative surveys on attitudes
2.  Quantitative and qualitative 
indicators of referrals to law 
enforcement officers
1.  Legislation
2.  Reporting, studies, 
monitoring
Reporting by state 
primary justice agencies
Witchcraft accusations Legislative frameworks that protect 
appropriately against intimidation 
through use and against accusations
1.  Quantitative indicators of 
sanctions by IJS and attitudes 
(surveys), qualitative surveys  
on attitudes
2.  Quantitative and qualitative 
indicators of referrals to law 
enforcement officers
1.  Legislation
2.  Reporting, studies, 
monitoring
Reporting by state 
primary justice agencies
376 any legislative reforms proposed in this area are likely to provoke highly political debate and the opposition of traditional leaders. 
including them as an indicator here is not intended as advocating a simplistic approach to this issue that does not take account of 
the likely difficulties.
377 the issue of what is appropriate is highly dependent on the gravity of the offence and various other contextual considerations. 
the issue of sanctioning excess here is closely linked to the previous indicators concerned with realistic legislative provisions and 
powers that are capable of protecting people’s right to security of person and property.
 378 see discussion on gBV in the main study and the country studies.
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CaTegorieS Sub- 
CaTegorieS
exampleS  
of iSSueS
Sample indiCaTor – 
legal
Sample indiCaTor – 
praC TiCe
meanS of  
VerifiCaTion
Structure: accessi-
bility, participation 
and accountability 
of providers379
Structural issues 
- participation
Gender equity in repre-
sentation in IJS
Legislative and policy frameworks 
encouraging or mandating equi-
table representation380
Quantitative indicators of representa-
tion of women and men.
Qualitative indicators of attitudes 
in communities and among bodies 
exercising authority
Surveys and qualitative 
studies, reporting by 
state- regulated IJS
Forms of democratic 
appointment proce-
dures, standard setting, 
performance review 
and application
Legislative and policy frameworks 
encouraging or mandating demo-
cratic forums
Quantitative indicators of 
operation of democratic forums and 
mechanisms. 
Qualitative indicators on attitudes 
in communities and among bodies 
exercising authority.
Surveys and qualitative 
studies, reporting by 
state- regulated IJS
Structural issues: 
accountability, 
independence and 
impartiality
Forms of democratic 
accountability, including 
performance review 
of IJS
Legislative and policy frameworks 
encouraging or mandating demo-
cratic forums
Quantitative indicators of operation 
of democratic forums. 
Qualitative indicators of attitudes 
in communities and among bodies 
exercising authority.
Surveys and qualitative 
studies, reporting by 
state- regulated IJS
Qualification require-
ments for adjudicators
Legislative and policy frameworks 
encouraging or mandating qualifica-
tion requirements
Quantitative indicators of operation 
of qualification requirements. 
Qualitative indicators of attitudes 
in communities and among bodies 
exercising authority.
Surveys and qualitative 
studies, reporting by 
state- regulated IJS
Disciplinary and 
removal procedures
Legislative and policy frameworks 
encouraging or mandating disciplin-
ary and removal procedures381
Quantitative indicators of opera-
tion of disciplinary and removal 
procedures. 
Qualitative indicators of attitudes 
in communities and among bodies 
exercising authority.
Surveys and qualitative 
studies, reporting by 
state- regulated IJS
Independence 
respected in appoint-
ment, hierarchy and 
remuneration rules  
and procedures
Links to state bodies are to judicial 
rather than executive organs
Quantitative indicators of operation 
of appointment, hierarchy and remu-
neration rules and procedures. 
Qualitative indicators of attitudes 
in communities and among bodies 
exercising authority.
Surveys and qualitative 
studies, reporting by 
state- regulated IJS
Rules mandat-
ing impartiality, in 
appointment and 
disqualification
Regulatory frameworks Data on practical operation Surveys and qualitative 
studies, reporting by 
state- regulated IJS
Rules mandating trans-
parency in appointment 
procedures
Regulatory frameworks Data on practical operation Surveys and qualitative 
studies, reporting by 
state- regulated IJS
Structural issues: 
accessibility
Distance Number and distribution of IJS loca-
tions by population density
Number and distribution of IJS 
operating by population density
Surveys and qualitative 
studies, reporting by 
state- regulated IJS
Costs Fees set Fees demanded in practice Surveys and  
qualitative studies
Complexity Written or unwritten Rules on 
form of complaints, pleadings, 
motions, etc.
Application of rules on form of 
complaints, pleadings, motions, etc.
Appropriateness of 
jurisdiction
Legislation provides jurisdiction to 
the most available primary justice 
forum (incl. IJS) in respect of the 
most immediate justice problems?
Data on people’s justice needs Surveys and  
qualitative studies
379 there is some overlap between structural and procedural factors.
380 see the discussion on programming interventions to ensure gender equity, as related to typology of ijs.
381 see the discussion of programming interventions as related to typology of ijs.
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CaTegorieS Sub- 
CaTegorieS
exampleS  
of iSSueS
Sample indiCaTor – 
legal
Sample indiCaTor – 
praC TiCe
meanS of  
VerifiCaTion
Time Time limits imposed on IJS  
for responses?382
Data on whether time targets are 
met in practice
Quantitative and  
qualitative surveys  
and studies
Effectiveness Existence of official  
enforcement mechanisms
Data on operation of  
enforcement mechanisms
Quantitative and quali-
tative surveys, reporting 
by state primary  
justice providers
Referral rules and procedures to 
more appropriate bodies and by 
those bodies to IJS
Data on operation of  
referral mechanisms
Process: fair-
ness (including 
independence 
and impartiality), 
equality and 
effectiveness
Procedural/opera-
tional impartiality
Disqualification rules 
and procedures
Adequacy of regulatory frameworks 
or voluntary codes
Data on operation of  
regulatory frameworks
Quantitative and quali-
tative surveys, reporting 
by state primary  
justice providersProcedural/
operational 
independence
No combination of 
adjudicative and execu-
tive functions383
Procedural equality All persons entitled and 
enabled to access IJS on 
same conditions
Rules and policies encouraging/
equality of access
Data on operation of regulatory 
frameworks (or voluntary codes, as 
the case may be)
Quantitative and quali-
tative surveys, reporting 
by state primary  
justice providers
Absence of prejudice 
and intimidation 
against categories  
of persons
Rules or voluntary codes allow-
ing women, poor and vulnerable 
to be heard without barriers or 
intimidation
Procedure based on 
hearing of all parties – 
mechanisms to ensure 
child right to be heard
Rules or codes mandating  
hearing of all
Oversight and 
monitoring
Appeal procedures Regulatory frameworks Data on operation Quantitative and quali-
tative surveys, reporting  
by state primary  
justice providers
Referral procedures
Monitoring
Operational 
transparency
Publicity of hearings
Protection of 
vulnerable persons
Confidential hearings 
when appropriate
Possibility of ‘legal’ 
assistance, measures to 
ensure understanding of 
proceedings, including 
for victims as well  
as defendants 
Representative  
for children
Predictability  
of outcomes –  
legal certainty
Publicized written or 
oral norms
Regulatory frameworks Data on operation Quantitative and quali-
tative surveys, reporting
by state primary  
justice providersBinding precedents and accessible recording  
of outcomes
382 this will be most appropriate to forms of ijs that are state-regulated or where the ijs themselves set targets to be met.
383 this may particularly be an issue for parajudicial ijs. 
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programming and the LinK to typoLogy of informaL Justice systems
Before discussing specific interventions in relation to ijs, it is necessary to briefly consider programming in relation 
to typology. the possible modes and means of intervention with ijs will differ significantly depending on the kind 
of system under consideration. there are similarly different programming challenges and advantages presented by 
different kinds of ijs. When considering approaches, this study has no general preference for one kind of informal 
justice system over another, but stresses the importance of recognizing the various roles of different mechanisms, 
all of which may be valuable; see the section below on fostering links between ijs and primary justice providers.
paraJudiciaL type mechanisms and administrative officiaLs With  
adJudicative functions
Broader and more centralized forms of intervention, involving planning on a national scale (whether for train-
ing, transparency and accountability measures or monitoring, research and documentation programmes), may be 
possible with parajudicial type mechanisms, such as the village courts in Papua new guinea, (some levels of ) the 
local council courts in uganda, the Tribunais Communitarios in mozambique or the local courts in sierra leone or 
Zambia. the same is true of mechanisms using administrative officials to adjudicate cases, as in the village courts 
in Bangladesh. chapter iV on typology notes that the links that both systems have to government structures and 
regulations provide some ‘leverage’ for influence and ready-made structures that may help in the management of 
funding and reporting. the possibility of larger interventions may make them attractive subjects for government 
and development partner programming, including at the sector level. un agencies have some experience work-
ing with such mechanisms, as the example of the unicef programme described in the Papua new guinea country 
study shows. the previous chapter briefly referred to the work of the Village courts secretariat in the ministry of 
justice in Papua new guinea, which encompasses many aspects of assistance to village courts, including training, 
referrals and monitoring. the Bangladesh country study discusses unDP’s support for the village courts in Bangla-
desh. the Bangladesh programme activating Village courts in Bangladesh, which unDP and the european union 
support, is an example of such a larger programme.384 a large programme also makes an integrated programmatic 
approach possible. the Bangladesh programme has four components:
1. a review of the existing legal framework, which will result in the submission of a proposal for reform of the 
existing Village courts act to the government of Bangladesh
2. capacity development of uP chairmen, village police and staff of village courts, focusing on knowledge-
sharing and best national and international practices
3. awareness-raising about the roles and functions of village courts for potential court users, community-based 
organizations, school teachers and religious leaders
4. technical assistance to the local government Department and the ministry of local government, rural 
Development and cooperatives to strengthen oversight, monitoring and evaluation of Vc activities
nevertheless, these systems also present certain challenges. in some contexts, they may face resistance because 
they are seen as being a government attempt to replace traditional systems. Programming on a large scale for 
mechanisms like these brings with it increased demands on programming itself, including requirements for moni-
toring, regulation and reporting. the reporting and other requirements that will be demanded may deprive these 
mechanisms of the informality that makes them easy for local people to deal with. increased workloads for pro-
vider officials may affect their willingness to work for little or no pay. it may likewise see rising costs, which are 
passed on to the public in the form of court fees, whether officially or unofficially. furthermore, the greater the 
investment in such systems, the greater the demand will be that they conform to constitutional and international 
standards on independence, impartiality and the guarantees of due process, as seen in uganda. the investments 
384 see Bangladesh country study.
152
c
H
a
PT
er
  i
X
a stuDy of informal justice systems: access to justice anD human rights
that these requirements demand in turn raise the question whether the same resources should not be used to 
make the formal system more fair, accessible and effective. the uganda country study looks critically at how the 
demands placed on lc courts are already outstripping what these volunteer-based organs are able to deliver. criti-
cal assessments of capacity are necessary. a further difficulty, seen in uganda, Bangladesh and other countries, is 
the uncertainty surrounding which state body is responsible for these courts. the affiliation to ministries respon-
sible for local government makes sense from some points of view, but may also engender a ‘hands off’ attitude in 
the ministry of justice and the judiciary. in the long term, a gradual process of integration into the judiciary seems 
the most desirable path, even if this process requires years or even decades.
a further point relates to the jurisdiction of such mechanisms and particularly to the distinction between civil and 
criminal matters. customary law often does not distinguish between civil and criminal matters. for minor offences, it 
is entirely correct not to unduly insist on such a distinction. People often want to be compensated for a wrong done 
to them rather than to see a fine going to the state. it makes very good sense to allow civil settlements and restora-
tive measures to mitigate or even negate criminal penalties, as long as this is done transparently and accountably.385
custom-based mechanisms
custom-based mechanisms apparently present the advantages of sustainability and legitimacy, having stood the 
test of time and being solidly anchored in communities. they may, however, have difficulties in extending their 
reach beyond tightly knit communities that may be small and local. changes in structures, procedures and the 
substantive standards applied by these bodies stand the chance of being adopted by the community and thus 
becoming sustainable. nevertheless, an influx of donor funds can lead to the criticism that that funding will create 
dependency. as discussed above, programming would need to be mindful of not reinforcing patriarchal patterns 
and structures lacking in transparency and accountability. customary or traditional mechanisms are at first sight 
more difficult to reach, as there may be few obvious structures through which programming can be carried out.
Based on the interventions considered in the country and desk studies, ngos providing legal services are the 
organizations most frequently involved in working together with traditional structures – mostly through educa-
tion programmes. Women’s organizations often appear to have comparatively good outreach networks at the pri-
mary level. the gender perspective that these organizations can bring may help in balancing the harmful aspects 
of patriarchal traditional structures. the interest that both of these parties have in perpetuating programmes, 
together with the general difficulty of documenting outcomes in this area, may make critical evaluations challeng-
ing. the malawi country study presents the largest single attempt to programmatically address custom-based ijs. 
there, a (faith-based) ngo coordinated an overall programme that a variety of delivery agencies, from local gov-
ernment to ngos and faith-based organizations, implemented at the local level. While there may be some chal-
lenges in achieving a uniform approach in this case, the choice of a local implementing partner (or, indeed, that of 
a national-level faith-based organization) did not seem to have any negative influence on the essential message 
of the programme. the malawi Primary justice programme focuses mainly on education and documentation of 
case outcomes, but also promotes interaction among primary justice providers and linkages to the formal system. 
the Bangladesh country study notes how direct engagement with traditional systems appears to have been rarely 
attempted as a programmatic response – traditional justice has been left alone. it notes some legal attempts by 
ngos to agitate for the government to protect people against extra-legal penalties.
there has already been made mention of the 2000 Pri study’s recommendation against incorporation of tradi-
tional systems into state justice frameworks. the argument maintains that, procedurally, incorporation could entail 
the imposition of requirements of written decisions, some form of stare decisis and respect of procedural rules that 
would compel the informal systems to abandon the flexibility and speed that are part of what makes them attrac-
tive to users.
385 see the discussion of malawi in schärf/DfiD, 2003, p. 46.
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the study cites schärf’s view that incorporation “(i) is likely to change, quite fundamentally, the basis on which 
these courts win their legitimacy and support the bureaucratisation and payment of some members of the com-
munity courts and not others is likely to cause division and jealousy (ii) the bureaucratisation is likely to lessen the 
degree to which the community courts are going to be responsive to community sentiments (iii) the low criminal 
jurisdiction might rob the court of its influence and power in civil matters (iv) the procedures may be beyond the 
reach of the local population (v) communities might continue to form and run courts that suit their needs as paral-
lel or in competition to the newly acknowledged state courts (vi) the bureaucratisation and formalized procedures 
will diminish the capacity to combine multiple problems in a holistic manner (vii) there is likely to be a focus on 
individual cases rather than inter-linking issues that constitute a problem (viii) [formalisation of ] these courts [will] 
reduce the ability of the community to tackle matters that are related to the cases that they hear, e.g. imposing a 
curfew on shebeens [and] (ix) the blend of policing decision-making and crime prevention performed by the com-
munity courts to date will in all likelihood be jettisoned for purposes of bureaucratic niceties and departmental 
homogeneity.”386 the recommendation is coupled with an equally strong recommendation to refrain from any 
moves to make the case resolutions of these ijs binding.387
in a 2003 study for DfiD, schärf warned that the seemingly inexorable decline in the authority of chiefs and head-
men in southern africa can have severely negative consequences and requires very careful handling:
“The point here is that the reduction of power and status of chiefs, if it is going to happen, has 
to be managed very delicately, and donors may well want to assist in reducing the negative 
consequences of governance vacuums created by their downgrading. In the rural areas chiefs are 
all there is for local residents. Transition strategies should be clear and the relegation of the chiefs 
to cultural leaders with no administrative power should be given sufficient time.”
the uganda country study also alludes to the gap in protection that arises when traditional systems decline and 
modern ones are unable to adequately replace them.
reLigious informaL Justice systems388
like custom-based mechanisms, these systems are likely to be relatively sustainable and legitimate among their 
user communities. at their best, their outcomes may enjoy respect because of strongly held values. as is clear from 
the niger country study, though, these values may accord not at all or only partly with principles of national and 
international human rights law, and religious doctrine may strongly resist influence or change. the question of 
how to reach religious ijs may also be relevant. in niger, the non-hierarchical structure of islam (with imams being 
selected locally by the followers of the faith) would make it difficult to impose a set of qualifications, procedural 
rules or a disciplinary mechanism from outside; indeed, even the large islamic association would find it difficult to 
do this.
in other predominantly muslim countries, faith-based structures may be very different. in some countries, par-
ticularly in the middle east, there may be either a high degree of state involvement in religious affairs or large and 
complex organizational structures – often with close links to the state – that would make some form of central-
ized initiative possible. in recent years, researchers and practitioners have paid more attention to development 
cooperation work with faith-based organizations.389 some may see their work as explicitly linked to an effort to 
strengthen religious faith, whereas, for others, religious values may be a foundation for more general and more 
secular charitable work.
386 Pri, 2000, p. 135.
387 ‘non-state justice systems in southern africa: how should governments respond?’, DfiD, march 2003.
388 marie juul Petersen of the university of copenhagen kindly assisted on this topic.
389 see, for example, holenstein, 2006.
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at present, there is little evidence or documentation of justice-related work in partnership with islamic organi-
zations. nevertheless, it is evidently possible to build constructive working relationships with many of these 
faith-based organizations, also on justice-related themes. marie juul Petersen describes how some of the islamic 
organizations in the jordan study mentioned above are trusted partners of international agencies, including in 
unicef-funded work focusing on children’s rights390 and how Western-based islamic organizations may be help-
ful in building bridges to understanding these themes. in its strategic plan for 2007–2010, uK-based muslim aid 
specifically commits to working for women’s rights. islamic aid cooperated with imams in the implementation of 
the unicef-funded facts for life programme.391
it cannot be concluded that engaging with religious ijs involves dealing with more sensitive issues than other 
ijs. While women’s right to own land may be a stumbling block with traditional leaders, it is relatively uncontro-
versial to islamic authorities (as documented in the niger study). it may be difficult to address religiously sensi-
tive themes, including women’s reproductive rights, women’s rights on dissolution of marriage and inheritance 
rights, particularly if the outset is seen as a ‘Western’ agenda, but issues of procedural equality, children’s rights or 
improved participation may be easier to approach. importantly, it must be remembered that religion is only one 
factor; religions are not monolithic and their application and interpretation differ according to social, economic 
and political factors.
some christian priests and pastors assist in resolving disputes, but they do this less on the basis of religious law and 
are not very involved in informal justice processes in the countries studied. the action of faith-based organizations 
to support or influence justice providers is separate from this. in some countries, faith-based organizations, such as 
the yWca and ccjP/caritas, have long worked with justice provision. in recent years, us-based or linked christian 
evangelical organizations have joined them392 and some of this work addresses ijs. one such organization trained 
many traditional leaders in uganda,393 and such interventions will probably become more common as program-
mers more widely understand the vital role of traditional leaders.
the influence of religious views is undoubtedly strong in matters of marriage and the family. the country studies 
do not examine how religion influences the legal services that christian religious organizations offer in this area, 
as most of the work that this study considered relates to legal services vis-à-vis the formal system rather than ijs. 
unfortunately, there are examples of christian churches that are close to ijs that promote the idea of child witches 
and the necessity to ‘save’ them through exorcisms.394 thus, a critical examination is necessary in relation to reli-
gious organizations on the same basis as it is with any other organization.
ngo-based viLLage or community mediation schemes
schemes where (usually) ngos are able to help communities devise new ways to solve disputes based on taught 
mediation techniques have the advantage that outcomes can be freer of social pressure and the interests of pow-
erful groups in the community. the schemes can either be completely ‘modern’, as the malawi country study 
shows, or they can be an attempt to improve or modify traditional mechanisms, as the Bangladesh country study 
discusses in relation to the mlaa. a trade-off appears between open, public mechanisms, such as the modi-
fied Shalish in madaripur, and the private and confidential mediation practiced in malawi. the former gives the 
390 id.
391 information provided in written comments by marie juul Petersen.
392 two prominent examples are international justice mission and advocates international. 
393 http://allafrica.com/stories/200910070047.html ‘uganda: lango leaders trained in land laws’. advocates international provided 
support for the training, in partnership with ugandan fBos.
394 a uK channel four documentary programme entitled ‘saving africa’s Witch children’ describes the phenomenon and the work  
of two partnered British and nigerian ngos (child rights and rehabilitation network and stepping stones nigeria) to protect  
the children.
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advantages of ‘justice as theatre’ in setting an example of what is fair in a community and apparently helps in 
enforcing decisions. the latter provides a confidential forum that is more intimate and accessible in delicate cases, 
especially for women and vulnerable persons. an ideal model might give room for both.
What these diverse mechanisms have in common is that they are, in principle, based on volunteerism and are free 
of charge. experience shows that much work is necessary before traditional and religious leaders, as well as police 
and district officials accept such schemes. Where this has been done sensitively and carefully, these leaders have 
usually been well-disposed to the initiatives, as the malawi and Bangladesh country studies show. evaluation at 
the project level and comparatively across projects and countries would be necessary to determine success rates 
in retaining mediators and effectively executing settlement outcomes and to gauge the necessity of continued 
monitoring and re-training.
specific interventions and outputs: aims
Programming is likely to fit into the broad direction set by government policy, which can have widely varying 
aims and effects. most interventions will broadly aspire to provide accessible forums to resolve disputes. under 
the framework of justice sector programming, the study identified specific interventions, which include inter alia:
  state law reform processes to enhance compliance with international human rights guarantees
  selection and mandate of adjudicators
  education of adjudicators
  education of users
  Procedural regulation and self-regulation
  Promotion of accountability through linkages, participation, monitoring and supervision
  Promotion of linkages between ijs and primary formal justice mechanisms
  linkages to paralegals and legal aid providers
  linkages to wider development programming
law and regulatory reform may also concern specific legal domains, particularly including those that ijs are most 
often concerned with, i.e., family law, property law and criminal or conduct issues.
the programming initiatives described below are in no way exhaustive. one important caveat of this study is that 
it focuses mainly on ijs rather than on formal justice systems, which frequently do not understand ijs and custom-
ary law and governance. the country studies reveal the striking fact that formal justice actors often know very 
little about the informal systems that most people use and law school curricula, for example, pay little attention to 
customary law. agents of the formal justice system often attempt to fill this gap by learning about customary law 
in ad hoc ways, such as by consulting court personnel or others in their immediate circle. supplementing formal 
justice providers’ knowledge about ijs is a necessary element of an overall strategy.
the following table outlines programmatic interventions for ijs.395
395 
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395 here, as elsewhere in relation to the subject of ijs, the impossibility of applying valid generalizations is obvious. traditional leaders, 
religious authorities and community mediation are usually, but not always, separate from the state. there are instances where any 
of these three are under the authority of the state.
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tio
na
l p
oli
ti-
ca
l p
roc
ess
 to
 en
ga
ge
 th
em
 m
ay
 in
 so
me
 ca
ses
 be
 an
 al
ter
na
tiv
e.
Pa
rti
cip
ato
ry 
pro
ce
sse
s m
ay
 be
 us
efu
l in
 en
su
rin
g m
om
en
tum
, 
tho
ug
h t
he
 fra
me
wo
rk 
sta
nd
ard
s w
ill 
typ
ica
lly
 be
 se
t c
en
tra
lly.
Ele
cte
d o
ffic
ial
s m
ay
 le
git
i- 
ma
tel
y d
em
an
d g
rea
ter
 sa
y i
n  
sta
nd
ard
 se
tti
ng
.
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S
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Su
m
pT
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n
S 
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 f
ea
Si
bi
li
Ty
 a
n
d 
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pa
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 b
y 
Ty
pe
S 
of
 in
fo
rm
al
 Ju
ST
iC
e 
Sy
ST
em
Ty
pi
Ca
ll
y 
ex
Tr
a-
ST
aT
e 
 
in
fo
rm
al
 S
yS
Te
m
S3
95
Ty
pi
Ca
ll
y 
ST
aT
e 
H
yb
ri
d 
or
  
pa
ra
Ju
di
Ci
al
 in
fo
rm
al
 S
yS
Te
m
S
Se
lec
tio
n a
nd
 m
an
da
te 
of 
ad
jud
ica
tor
s
Re
qu
ire
me
nts
 as
 to
 qu
ali
fic
ati
on
s a
nd
 
pro
ce
du
res
 fo
r s
ele
cti
on
, d
isc
ipl
ine
 an
d 
rem
ov
al 
of 
ad
jud
ica
tor
s.
Typ
ica
l a
im
s w
ou
ld 
be
 to
 se
cu
re 
ad
eq
ua
te 
qu
ali
fic
ati
on
s, g
en
de
r b
ala
nc
e a
nd
 op
en
, 
tra
ns
pa
ren
t a
nd
 ac
co
un
tab
le 
sel
ec
tio
n 
pro
ce
sse
s.
Sta
te 
lev
era
ge
 fo
r 
inc
rea
sed
 de
mo
cra
tic
 
co
ntr
ol 
is p
res
en
t 
wh
ere
 th
ere
 ar
e f
orm
s 
of 
sta
te 
rec
og
nit
ion
.
Of
ten
 di
ffic
ult
 an
d 
hig
hly
 po
liti
ca
l fo
r 
sta
te 
to 
int
erf
ere
 in
 
sel
ec
tio
n p
roc
ess
. 
Po
ssi
ble
 de
ve
lop
me
nt 
pa
rtn
er 
lev
era
ge
 
thr
ou
gh
 fu
nd
ing
 of
 
loc
al 
de
ve
lop
me
nt 
pro
jec
ts.
 
So
me
 le
ve
rag
e a
mo
ng
 
ce
ntr
al 
rel
igi
ou
s 
au
th
ori
tie
s. 
Sc
op
e f
or 
wo
rki
ng
 w
ith
 
rel
igi
ou
s b
od
ies
.
So
me
 st
ate
 le
ve
rag
e, 
de
pe
nd
ing
 on
 na
tur
e 
of 
sta
te.
Po
ten
tia
lly
 hi
gh
 de
ve
l-
op
me
nt 
pa
rtn
er 
lev
era
ge
 
in 
rel
ati
on
 to
, e
.g.
, e
ns
ur-
ing
 ge
nd
er 
ba
lan
ce
, 
tra
ns
pa
ren
t s
ele
cti
on
 
pro
ce
sse
s, e
tc.
Hig
h l
ev
el 
of 
sta
te 
lev
era
ge
 
av
ail
ab
le 
to 
fur
the
r a
 hu
ma
n 
rig
hts
 ag
en
da
.
Hig
h l
ev
el 
of 
sta
te 
lev
era
ge
 
av
ail
ab
le 
to 
fur
the
r a
 hu
ma
n 
rig
hts
 ag
en
da
.
So
me
 st
ate
 le
ve
rag
e.
So
me
 le
ve
rag
e o
n t
he
 pa
rt 
of 
CS
 
org
an
iza
tio
ns
 an
d p
oli
tic
al 
pa
rti
es:
 
CS
 or
ga
niz
ati
on
s c
an
 at
tem
pt 
to 
ma
ke
 po
liti
ca
l d
em
an
ds
 on
 pa
rti
es 
to 
sh
ow
 re
su
lts
 in
 ge
nd
er 
ba
lan
ce.
Ed
uc
ati
on
 of
 
ad
jud
ica
tor
s
Co
mp
uls
ory
 ed
uc
ati
on
 in
 na
tio
na
l la
w 
an
d/
or 
hu
ma
n r
igh
ts 
sta
nd
ard
st
Sta
te 
ma
y h
av
e l
im
ite
d 
lev
era
ge
 to
 im
po
se
 
thi
s r
eq
uir
em
en
t. M
os
t 
ch
ief
s/ 
he
ad
me
n k
ee
n 
to 
rec
eiv
e t
rai
nin
g  
an
d k
no
wl
ed
ge
. 
Tai
lor
ing
 of
 co
nte
nt 
to 
co
nte
xt 
an
d t
rus
tfu
l 
rel
ati
on
sh
ips
 ne
ce
ssa
ry 
for
 m
utu
al 
lea
rni
ng
. 
Sta
te 
ma
y h
av
e l
im
ite
d 
lev
era
ge
 to
 im
po
se 
thi
s 
req
uir
em
en
t. 
De
pe
nd
s o
n n
atu
re 
of 
sta
te 
an
d i
ts 
lin
ks 
to 
rel
igi
ou
s b
od
ies
.
Th
e s
po
ns
ors
 of
 th
e 
co
mm
un
ity
 m
ed
iat
ion
 
ini
tia
tiv
e m
ay
 ha
ve
 
sig
nifi
ca
nt 
lev
era
ge
.
Tai
lor
ing
 of
 co
nte
nt 
to 
co
nte
xt 
an
d t
arg
et 
gro
up
 
ve
ry 
ne
ce
ssa
ry.
Sta
te 
ha
s a
 hi
gh
 le
ve
l o
f le
ve
rag
e. 
Tai
lor
ing
 of
 co
nte
nt 
to 
co
nte
xt 
an
d t
arg
et 
gro
up
 is 
ne
ce
ssa
ry.
Th
ere
 m
ay
 be
 gr
ea
ter
 le
ve
rag
e w
ith
 
the
 lo
ca
l st
ate
 bo
dy
 th
at 
the
 offi
cia
ls 
be
lon
g t
o.
Tai
lor
ing
 of
 co
nte
nt 
to 
co
nte
xt 
an
d 
tar
ge
t g
rou
p i
s n
ec
ess
ary
.
Vo
lun
tar
y e
du
cat
ion
 in
 na
tio
na
l la
w 
an
d/
or 
hu
ma
n r
igh
ts 
sta
nd
ard
s
De
liv
ery
 m
ec
ha
nis
m 
for
 ou
tsi
de
 or
ga
niz
a-
tio
n m
ay
 ne
ed
 to
 be
 
ca
ref
ull
y n
eg
oti
ate
d 
Tai
lor
ing
 of
 co
nte
nt 
 
to 
co
nte
xt 
an
d  
tar
ge
t g
rou
p.
Re
lig
iou
s g
rou
ps
 w
ill 
oft
en
 w
an
t to
 m
an
ag
e 
de
liv
ery
 th
em
se
lve
s, 
if w
illi
ng
Ta
ilo
rin
g o
f c
on
ten
t 
to 
co
nte
xt 
an
d t
arg
et 
gro
up
 is 
ne
ce
ssa
ry.
De
liv
ery
 re
qu
ire
s a
 sp
on
-
so
r w
ith
 le
git
im
ac
y a
nd
 
ou
tre
ac
h.
Me
dia
tio
n i
mp
lie
s a
n 
ind
ire
ct 
ap
pli
cat
ion
 of
 HR
.
Tai
lor
ing
 of
 co
nte
nt 
to 
co
nte
xt 
an
d t
arg
et 
gro
up
 
is n
ec
ess
ary
.
De
liv
ery
 us
ua
lly
 po
ssi
ble
 th
rou
gh
 or
ga
ns
 of
 th
e j
ud
icia
ry.
 NH
RIs
, 
NG
Os
 an
d a
ca
de
mi
a m
ay
 be
 pa
rtn
ers
.
Tai
lor
ing
 of
 co
nte
nt 
to 
co
nte
xt 
an
d t
arg
et 
gro
up
 is 
ne
ce
ssa
ry.
Na
tio
na
l o
r lo
ca
l p
rog
ram
me
? Is
 
the
re 
a n
ati
on
al 
bo
dy
 of
 lo
ca
l  
ele
cte
d o
ffic
ial
s?
Tai
lor
ing
 of
 co
nte
nt 
to 
co
nte
xt 
an
d 
tar
ge
t g
rou
p i
s n
ec
ess
ary
.
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 f
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 b
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pe
S 
of
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fo
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al
 Ju
ST
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e 
Sy
ST
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ST
aT
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 S
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Ty
pi
Ca
ll
y 
ST
aT
e 
H
yb
ri
d 
or
  
pa
ra
Ju
di
Ci
al
 in
fo
rm
al
 S
yS
Te
m
S
Pro
vis
ion
 of
 le
ga
l m
ate
ria
ls  
an
d g
uid
eli
ne
s
Lit
era
cy
 le
ve
ls m
ay
 
be
 an
 iss
ue
 re
qu
irin
g 
pre
cis
e t
ail
ori
ng
 of
  
the
 m
ate
ria
ls.
Re
ce
pti
ve
ne
ss 
to 
ma
te-
ria
ls d
ev
elo
pe
d o
uts
ide
 
the
 re
lig
ion
 m
ay
 be
 an
 
iss
ue
 re
qu
irin
g c
om
pro
-
mi
se 
on
 so
me
 iss
ue
s.
In 
so
me
 co
nte
xts
, 
lite
rac
y l
ev
els
 m
ay
 be
 
an
 iss
ue
.
Lit
era
cy
 le
ve
ls m
ay
 be
 an
 
iss
ue
 re
qu
irin
g p
rec
ise
 
tai
lor
ing
 of
 th
e m
ate
ria
ls.
Me
dia
tio
n i
mp
lie
s a
n 
ind
ire
ct 
ap
pli
cat
ion
 of
 
HR
. M
ate
ria
ls s
ho
uld
 
refl
ec
t th
is.
Lit
era
cy
 le
ve
ls m
ay
 be
 an
 iss
ue
 re
qu
irin
g p
rec
ise
 ta
ilo
rin
g o
f th
e m
ate
ria
ls.
Tra
ini
ng
 in
 te
ch
niq
ue
s f
or 
do
cu
me
nta
tio
n 
of 
ca
se 
ou
tco
me
s
Lit
era
cy
 le
ve
ls, 
lin
gu
ist
ic v
ari
ati
on
s a
nd
 co
ns
ide
rat
ion
 of
 ho
w 
do
cu
me
nta
tio
n w
ill 
be
 st
ore
d, 
ret
rie
ve
d a
nd
 us
ed
 ar
e i
mp
ort
an
t is
su
es.
Tra
ini
ng
 in
 di
ffe
ren
t te
ch
niq
ue
s o
f  
dis
pu
te 
res
olu
tio
n
Tai
lor
ing
 of
 te
ch
niq
ue
s t
o t
he
 po
we
rs 
of 
the
 IJS
, lo
ca
l cu
ltu
ral
 no
rm
s a
nd
 th
e b
ind
ing
 or
 no
n-
bin
din
g n
atu
re 
of 
ca
se 
ou
tco
me
s is
 ne
ce
ssa
ry.
Ed
uc
ati
on
 of
 us
ers
: le
ga
l 
aw
are
ne
ss-
rai
sin
g
Ge
ne
ral
 civ
ic e
du
cat
ion
 / i
nfo
rm
ati
on
Lit
era
cy
 le
ve
ls m
ay
 be
 an
 iss
ue
 re
qu
irin
g p
rec
ise
 ta
ilo
rin
g o
f th
e m
ate
ria
ls.
De
liv
ery
 m
ec
ha
nis
ms
 sh
ou
ld 
be
 co
ns
ide
red
: ra
dio
 pr
og
ram
me
s, p
ort
ab
le T
Vs
, d
ram
a, 
etc
.
Ed
uc
ati
on
 in
 na
tio
na
l la
w
Lit
era
cy
 le
ve
ls m
ay
 re
qu
ire
 pr
ec
ise
 ta
ilo
rin
g o
f th
e m
ate
ria
ls. 
Co
nte
xt 
an
d n
atu
re 
of 
dis
pu
tes
 re
qu
ire
 pr
ec
ise
 ta
ilo
rin
g o
f th
e m
ate
ria
ls.
De
liv
ery
 m
ec
ha
nis
ms
 sh
ou
ld 
be
 co
ns
ide
red
: ra
dio
 pr
og
ram
me
s, p
ort
ab
le T
Vs
, d
ram
a, 
etc
.
Pro
vis
ion
 of
 le
ga
l m
ate
ria
ls 
 
an
d g
uid
eli
ne
s
Co
ns
ide
rat
ion
 of
 ta
rge
t g
rou
ps
 re
qu
ire
d. 
Ar
e t
he
 m
ate
ria
ls a
im
ed
 at
 co
mm
un
ity
 pa
ral
eg
als
 or
 m
em
be
rs 
of 
the
 pu
bli
c d
ire
ctl
y?
Lit
era
cy
 le
ve
ls m
ay
 re
qu
ire
 pr
ec
ise
 ta
ilo
rin
g o
f th
e m
ate
ria
ls. 
Co
nte
xt 
an
d n
atu
re 
of 
dis
pu
tes
 re
qu
ire
 pr
ec
ise
 ta
ilo
rin
g o
f th
e m
ate
ria
ls.
Tra
ini
ng
 in
 di
ffe
ren
t te
ch
niq
ue
s o
f  
dis
pu
te 
res
olu
tio
n
Tai
lor
ing
 of
 te
ch
niq
ue
s t
o t
he
 po
we
rs 
of 
the
 IJS
, lo
ca
l cu
ltu
ral
 no
rm
s a
nd
 th
e b
ind
ing
 or
 no
n-
bin
din
g n
atu
re 
of 
ca
se 
ou
tco
me
s is
 ne
ce
ssa
ry.
Pro
ce
du
ral
 Re
gu
lat
ion
 
an
d S
elf
 Re
gu
lat
ion
As
 to
 pr
oc
ed
ura
l n
orm
s in
cl.
 im
pa
rti
ali
ty,
 
fai
rne
ss,
 tra
ns
pa
ren
cy,
 pa
rti
cip
ati
on
Ma
y b
e e
xp
lic
it o
r 
im
pli
cit
 re
qu
ire
me
nts
 
of 
rec
og
nit
ion
 –
 se
e 
typ
olo
gy
.
Sim
ple
, n
on
-te
ch
nic
al 
ve
rsi
on
s o
f b
asi
c d
ue
 
pro
ce
ss 
rul
es 
ne
ed
 
to 
be
 el
ab
ora
ted
 an
d 
co
mm
un
ica
ted
 in
 an
 
un
de
rst
an
da
ble
 an
d 
us
ab
le 
for
m.
Ma
y b
e e
xp
lic
it o
r 
im
pli
cit
 re
qu
ire
me
nts
 
of 
rec
og
nit
ion
 –
 se
e 
typ
olo
gy
.
Sim
ple
, n
on
-te
ch
nic
al 
ve
rsi
on
s o
f b
asi
c d
ue
 
pro
ce
ss 
rul
es 
ne
ed
 
to 
be
 el
ab
ora
ted
 an
d 
co
mm
un
ica
ted
 in
 an
 
un
de
rst
an
da
ble
 an
d 
us
ab
le 
for
m.
Ma
y b
e e
xp
lic
it o
r im
pli
cit
 
req
uir
em
en
ts 
of 
rec
og
ni-
tio
n –
 se
e t
yp
olo
gy
.
Sim
ple
, n
on
-te
ch
nic
al 
ve
rsi
on
s o
f b
asi
c d
ue
 
pro
ce
ss 
rul
es 
ne
ed
 to
 be
 
ela
bo
rat
ed
 an
d c
om
mu
-
nic
ate
d i
n a
n u
nd
ers
tan
d-
ab
le 
an
d u
sab
le 
for
m.
Gr
ea
ter
 le
ve
rag
e f
or 
sta
te-
ce
ntr
ed
 sy
ste
ms
Sim
ple
, n
on
-te
ch
nic
al 
ve
rsi
on
s 
of 
ba
sic
 du
e p
roc
ess
 ru
les
 ne
ed
 
to 
be
 el
ab
ora
ted
 an
d c
om
mu
ni-
cat
ed
 in
 an
 un
de
rst
an
da
ble
 an
d 
us
ab
le 
for
m.
Gr
ea
ter
 le
ve
rag
e f
or 
sta
te-
ce
ntr
ed
 sy
ste
ms
Sim
ple
, n
on
-te
ch
nic
al 
ve
rsi
on
s o
f b
asi
c d
ue
 pr
oc
ess
 
rul
es 
ne
ed
 to
 be
 el
ab
ora
ted
 
an
d c
om
mu
nic
ate
d i
n a
n 
un
de
rst
an
da
ble
 an
d u
sab
le 
for
m.
Gr
ea
ter
 le
ve
rag
e f
or 
sta
te-
ce
ntr
ed
 
sys
tem
s
Sim
ple
, n
on
-te
ch
nic
al 
ve
rsi
on
s o
f 
ba
sic
 du
e p
roc
ess
 ru
les
 ne
ed
 to
 be
 
ela
bo
rat
ed
 an
d c
om
mu
nic
ate
d i
n a
n 
un
de
rst
an
da
ble
 an
d u
sab
le 
for
m.
Pro
ce
sse
s t
o d
ev
elo
p v
olu
nta
ry 
ch
art
ers
Mo
re 
ap
pro
pri
ate
 to
 no
n-
sta
te 
vo
lun
tar
y m
ec
ha
nis
ms
 w
he
re 
no
n-
bin
din
g d
ec
isio
ns
 ar
e r
ele
ase
d
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 b
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pe
S 
of
 in
fo
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al
 Ju
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iC
e 
Sy
ST
em
Ty
pi
Ca
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y 
ex
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ST
aT
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in
fo
rm
al
 S
yS
Te
m
S3
95
Ty
pi
Ca
ll
y 
ST
aT
e 
H
yb
ri
d 
or
  
pa
ra
Ju
di
Ci
al
 in
fo
rm
al
 S
yS
Te
m
S
As
 to
 de
ve
lop
me
nt 
an
d m
ain
ten
an
ce
 
of 
no
rm
s
Co
mm
un
ity
 in
vo
lve
me
nt 
in 
en
for
cin
g n
orm
s t
hro
ug
h p
art
icip
ati
on
 an
d s
en
sit
iza
tio
n c
an
 be
 fa
vo
ure
d.
Ac
co
un
tab
ilit
y  
me
ch
an
ism
s: t
ran
sp
ar-
en
cy,
 m
on
ito
rin
g  
an
d o
ve
rsi
gh
t
Pro
vis
ion
 of
 ad
vic
e s
erv
ice
s t
o a
dju
dic
a-
tor
s /
 pr
ov
ide
rs
Re
qu
ire
s p
re-
est
ab
lish
ed
 re
lat
ion
sh
ips
 of
 tru
st 
wi
th 
pro
vid
ers
 of
 le
ga
l se
rvi
ce
s 
(of
ten
 NG
Os
)
W
hil
e t
his
 ca
n b
e d
ec
ide
d i
n a
 to
p-
do
wn
 m
an
ne
r th
rou
gh
 re
gu
lat
ion
 w
ith
 st
ate
-sp
on
so
red
 m
ec
ha
nis
ms
, 
ac
ce
pta
nc
e w
ill 
sti
ll r
eq
uir
e r
ela
tio
ns
hip
s o
f tr
us
t.
Op
en
 at
ten
da
nc
e a
nd
  
civ
il s
oc
iet
y m
on
ito
rin
g
W
ill 
req
uir
e c
on
sen
t 
an
d t
rus
t o
f tr
ad
itio
na
l 
lea
de
rs.
Mo
nit
ori
ng
 by
 lik
e-
mi
nd
ed
 pe
rso
ns
 an
d 
org
an
iza
tio
ns
 m
ore
 
lik
ely
 to
 be
 ac
ce
pte
d
CS
 m
on
ito
rin
g i
s o
fte
n 
bu
ilt 
int
o t
he
se 
sch
em
es.
W
hil
e t
his
 ca
n b
e d
ec
ide
d i
n a
 to
p-
do
wn
 m
an
ne
r th
rou
gh
 re
gu
lat
ion
 w
ith
 st
ate
-sp
on
so
red
 m
ec
ha
nis
ms
, 
ac
ce
pta
nc
e w
ill 
sti
ll r
eq
uir
e r
ela
tio
ns
hip
s o
f tr
us
t.
Fo
rm
ali
zed
 m
ec
ha
nis
ms
 of
 in
sp
ec
tio
n 
Us
e o
f h
ier
arc
hy
 of
 
tra
dit
ion
al 
lea
de
rs 
co
uld
 us
efu
lly
 be
 
co
ns
ide
red
 fo
r m
on
i-
tor
ing
 an
d i
ns
pe
cti
on
, 
wi
th 
su
pp
ort
 of
 
ou
tsi
de
r e
xp
ert
ise
.
Mo
nit
ori
ng
 by
 lik
e-
mi
nd
ed
 pe
rso
ns
 an
d 
org
an
iza
tio
ns
 m
ore
 
lik
ely
 to
 be
 ac
ce
pte
d
CS
 m
on
ito
rin
g i
s o
fte
n 
bu
ilt 
int
o t
he
se 
sch
em
es.
Of
ten
 pr
ese
nt,
 bu
t n
ot 
en
tire
ly 
fun
cti
on
al 
in 
the
se 
sys
tem
s. 
Se
ns
itiv
e i
ns
pe
cti
on
 co
up
led
 
wi
th 
su
pp
ort
 lik
ely
 to
 ha
ve
 
gre
ate
st 
ch
an
ce
s o
f s
uc
ce
ss 
(lo
ca
l co
ur
t o
ffic
ers
 in
 Si
err
a 
Le
on
e o
r Z
am
bia
, fo
r e
xa
mp
le.
)
De
pe
nd
s o
n  
de
ce
ntr
ali
za
tio
n m
od
el.
De
pe
nd
s o
n d
ec
en
tra
liz
ati
on
 m
od
el.
Re
qu
ire
me
nts
 of
 en
do
rse
me
nt 
by
 co
ur
ts 
or 
oth
er 
ex
ter
na
l a
cto
rs
Diffi
cu
lt t
o i
ntr
od
uc
e 
wi
tho
ut 
co
ns
ult
ati
on
 
an
d a
cce
pta
nc
e. 
Re
qu
ire
s t
ha
t re
so
urc
es
 
are
 av
ail
ab
le 
to 
en
su
re 
sm
oo
th 
co
mm
un
ica
-
tio
n a
nd
 co
op
era
tio
n 
to 
av
oid
 bo
ttle
ne
ck
s.
Diffi
cu
lt t
o i
ntr
od
uc
e 
wi
tho
ut 
co
ns
ult
a-
tio
n a
nd
 ac
ce
pta
nc
e. 
Re
qu
ire
s t
ha
t re
so
urc
es
 
are
 av
ail
ab
le 
to 
en
su
re 
sm
oo
th 
co
mm
un
ica
tio
n 
an
d c
oo
pe
rat
ion
 to
 
av
oid
 bo
ttle
ne
ck
s.
Re
aso
na
ble
 re
qu
ire
me
nts
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tabLe of programmatic interventions in reLation to informaL  
Justice systems
harnessing internationaL mechanisms for reform of LegaL frameWorKs
ratification of international human rights instruments can create an effective platform to address issues that arise 
in relation to ijs. support for domestication of international standards will be a part of the law reform effort and will 
be particularly important in countries subscribing to the dualist doctrine of international law.
earlier chapters discuss the basis of the relationship between statutory law and the law or rules applied by informal 
providers. the so-called ‘repugnancy’ clauses and their more recent successors that require conformity with statu-
tory law, as well as exemptions to such rules, are a part of the relationship. law reform can aim to adjust the terms 
of this relationship relating to equal treatment.
Programmatic interventions may seek to bring ijs more clearly within the ambit of legislative and constitutional 
standards. such efforts may be linked to reporting and review processes in international treaty bodies or the like, 
which may in turn be linked to civil society engagement in advocacy and alternative reporting, often with external 
support. one important example concerns certain common law countries in africa where, as mentioned elsewhere in 
this study,396 customary law is exempted from certain constitutional guarantees, particularly related to discrimination.
support for legislative and constitutional change of this kind is thus an intervention that (a) is in line with the 
demands of international law, (b) enjoys backing from the uPr system, and (c) appears to have the backing of a 
number of african governments and civil society movements, and should thus be considered within the range of 
programming options open to un programmers. Where constitutional provisions tolerating discriminatory treat-
ment still exist, un agencies and other development partners should continue to support documentation and 
advocacy actions to ensure that these provisions are brought to the fore during the treaty body and uPr review 
mechanisms. in the african context, the constitutions of countries like malawi, uganda, south africa and mozam-
bique provide inspiration.
reservations to or non-ratification of the ceDaW should not hold women’s and human rights actors back from 
engaging with these issues in relation to the treaty bodies or the uPr, as other global instruments can also provide 
an adequate platform, as witnessed by relevant recommendations of the human rights committee, the commit-
tee on economic, social and cultural rights and the committee on the rights of the child.
reform of LaW, incLuding domestication of internationaL standards
Programming should include support for national partners for the repeal of the offending provisions and the 
adoption of legislation giving effect to the international recommendations and strategies for implementation. in 
countries that do not yet have constitutional guarantees of equal treatment, there can be support for advocacy for 
their adoption. the momentous consequences that a change at the constitutional level would produce should not 
be underestimated. as chapter Vii on women’s rights and ijs notes, full legal equality between men and women 
would demand changes in the law and customs relating to ownership of real and personal property and marital 
and family relations (including polygyny, dissolution of marriage and bride price). it would demand a legislative 
programme to regulate many of these and related issues as well as administrative measures and processes to carry 
them out, training for justices, law enforcement officials and customary leaders on the new norms and standards.
transitional measures would be required to regulate the situation and status of people who have organized their 
lives according to the current laws and rules. it is almost certain that some sections of the population, including 
some justice officials, would resist the implementation of the required new laws. as indicated in the niger coun-
try study, there are serious weaknesses inherent in a process that would introduce change on this scale at the 
396 chapter Vii on Women’s rights and ijs, section on discrimination in legal frameworks.
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constitutional level alone, without legislation to regulate the details for reform. a constitutional change that leaves 
the details to be sorted out through litigation and judicial review is likely to be unsatisfactory and to subject the 
higher judiciary to unwelcome pressure. in short, a far-reaching programmatic response would be necessary to 
successfully introduce change on this scale.
reform of law is, of course, a technically and politically complex process. Process in law reform in this area does 
not differ from that in other areas, except that it needs to take particular account of stakeholder groups that are 
often far from the policy-making process: the rural poor, indigenous communities and women. achieving effective 
consultation of such marginalized groups is a major challenge. the malawi country study illustrates some aspects 
related to law reform that are relevant to customary law and informal justice. in some ways, the 1994 constitution 
provided an unparalleled platform for making laws that respect human rights, and the work carried out by the 
malawi law commission took advantage of this platform in a wide range of areas, particularly on gender-related 
issues. at the same time, most of the proposals have remained as bills not considered by parliament or adopted 
into law. While this delay has thus far been due to political deadlock rather than opposition to the proposals as 
such, it shows the uncertainty that is inherent in political processes.
law reform is one – perhaps limited – way to influence structural, normative and procedural standards and prac-
tices surrounding ijs. the country studies reveal that ijs failure to comply with the formal law is extremely wide-
spread, so the impact of legislation should not be overestimated. success may be much more likely where ijs 
directly depend on the state, as with the parajudicial ijs mechanisms. even so, change depends on ijs adjudicators’ 
knowledge and understanding of the law, as the literature on ijs and the country studies in this study confirm. 
second, the question of any possibility of oversight will have a bearing on respect for the law.
strategic Litigation
linked to law reform is the tool of strategic litigation, which activist organizations can use to bring about change 
in legal standards. Where the legal environment is favourable, strategic litigation can be used as a tool to achieve 
both legal change and consciousness raising / coalition building. national and regional courts as well as the global 
un treaty bodies can be relevant in this regard.397 Depending on the context, strategic litigation may be a valuable 
strategy to advance the effective protection of rights.
however, in states where the rule of law remains relatively weak, there should not be unrealistic expectations for 
results. Previous chapters have mentioned the use of strategic litigation to tackle particular issues such as bride 
price in uganda and polygyny in niger. in the niger and uganda examples, the issue concerns the highest levels 
of the court system, but lower courts may in some contexts be competent to rule on the constitutionality of cus-
toms (and/or of statutory law). as discussed in those contexts, there are dangers inherent in a literal application 
of the law to populations that do not support it. in malawi, a 2002 study found varying approaches among lower 
court judges to the application of constitutional principles to customary law.398 the niger country study notes that 
some were cautious about the risks of a backlash against the formal justice system if they did so. others, applying 
a more ‘progressive’ approach, would try to interpret customs in the light of the constitution or, more radically, 
even strike down unconstitutional customs. the study observed a certain (unsurprising) correlation between the 
cultural background of the individual judge and the customs that they were prepared to uphold or strike down. 
some magistrates did not believe in the norms they were enforcing. although judges all over the world occasion-
ally face this situation, the context is different where a judge is the sole upholder of a system of values that the 
community sees as alien.
397 the inter-american and african human rights systems as well as the increasing human rights role of regional judicial organs (under 
the regional economic commissions) are relevant.
398 schärf et al., 2002.
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insufficient knowledge of the constitution, the lack of a reliable system for distributing knowledge of important 
precedents in the country, and the difficulty of ensuring uniformity in interpretation, make it more likely that 
judges’ rulings will be highly inconsistent if a very ‘progressive’ approach is adopted where judges are used to 
spearheading social change. the entire onus of change cannot realistically be placed on judges at the most local 
level of the court system.
one study in malawi examined the willingness of the judiciary in asserting social rights on the basis of what is, com-
paratively speaking, a progressive set of constitutional guarantees.399 the authors identify various factors, including 
the nature of the legal system and legal culture, the composition and social background of the judges, the degree 
to which they are sensitized to human rights concerns, and public discourses on social rights. another environ-
mental factor – the dynamism of the political system and particularly of the legislative process – is also important.
too often, the gap between constitutional guarantees of individual freedom or human rights conventions and 
outdated legislation (or custom untouched by the hand of legislation) is both wide and deep. Where constitu-
tional guarantees are not elaborated into more detailed legislative provisions as part of a democratic process 
involving widespread debate, political leadership and responsibility, it seems obvious that it may be untenable 
to make judges the vanguard of rather radical social change on the basis of rather vague and general constitu-
tional or treaty provisions. judges may be unwilling to play this role or, if they do, they may face severe political or 
social reactions.
strategic litigation may be most likely to succeed where society is accustomed to the leadership of all three 
branches of government on social questions more generally, and depends on the extent to which society is dis-
posed toward these governmental organs. While the specific relationship between legislation and constitutional 
adjudication is unique to each country, people may see judicial intervention as being a less radical step where 
there is greater consciousness of the rule of law and an active legislative process that tackles contentious societal 
issues through law. in the ugandan, malawian and nigerian examples, judicial intervention was sought when it 
had not been possible to pass legislation that reformers desired. the ugandan legislature is considerably more 
active in producing new law than the malawian or nigerian legislatures, as any perusal of the amount of legislation 
passed in these countries over the last decade will show.
the Bangladesh country study provides a different example, where ngos took legal action in the high court 
against government agencies to compel them to protect people against the imposition of extra-legal penalties. 
the high court ordered the government to take immediate measures of investigation, punishment and protection.
research on the basis and operation of informaL Justice systems
Better research on ijs can serve many purposes, including those related to law reform and debates on policy and 
programming. interventions in this area can include support for research by academics in developing countries 
and for bodies such as law reform commissions and think tanks, as well as human rights and equality bodies. 
academic research in developing countries on informal justice gives important support to the broad policy and 
law reform debate. While individual researchers do much valuable work in many countries, this study formed the 
general impression that more systematic research programmes in traditional or informal justice, security and gov-
ernance, as well as in primary justice more generally, remain all too rare. Despite the importance of these systems 
for the populations of developing countries, they are rarely strongly represented in the research and teaching 
activities of universities. the work of the university of cape town in south africa, the university of namibia, or 
makerere university in uganda (especially huriPec), or of law reform commissions, such as in malawi and Zambia, 
are good examples of what can be done in this field. the Papua new guinea country study mentions a research 
project carried out by the Village courts secretariat in cooperation with the manus Provincial government that 
399 gloppen, s., and Kanyongolo, f. e., 2007, 5 (2): 258-293.
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aims to document customs that promote gender equality and women’s participation. the malawi human rights 
commission’s work on cultural practices is one of the few studies of this nature and quality by an nhri.
research and reporting at the national level can inform the un treaty body system and special mechanisms. the 
research can be used as information provided in stakeholder reports to treaty bodies, such as reports by nhris 
in the universal Periodic review, or ngo stakeholders. the research can also be used by governments in their 
national reports to the un treaty body.
substantive content: efforts to adJust or cLarify the content  
of informaL LaW
law reform or other programming can also attempt to intervene directly in the rules, customs or law that ijs apply. 
this can happen in various ways, from the attempts at ‘codification’ of custom that took place in the colonial (and 
sometimes immediate post-colonial) era to efforts at clarification or recording and also laws that require ijs to 
apply statutory rather than customary law in some domains.
codification through LegisLation
efforts at codification in the colonial era were characterised by top-down processes or interference. codification in 
this sense entailed formalising customary laws in legislation and not processes of ascertainment discussed below 
where decisions and standards are documented. one of the well-known examples of codification of customary 
law is the codification of Zulu law in what was then the separate colony of natal in 19th century south africa. While 
this codification has perhaps been relatively successful in that it has survived, it was closely linked to issues of 
politics and identity and confused many indigenous forms and doctrines with those that the colonial government 
brought. there were numerous efforts toward codification in the immediate post-colonial period, including in 
tanzania and ethiopia. governments were quite explicit in their aims of not merely codifying or restating custom, 
but in modifying it to suit their values and purposes. this interference often contributed to non-acceptance of 
the new codes. there are few or no recent examples of successful codification of customary law, especially across 
ethnic or tribal groups. as one scholar has pointed out, customary law does not become ‘more’ law through mere 
codification.400 thus, the government of Zambia, which had initially intended to produce such a codification in 
response to the challenges of the country’s dual legal system,401 has reportedly abandoned the idea following a 
report by the country’s law reform commission, settling for the option to plan legislation governing customary 
marriages.402 in relation to religious law, the south african law reform commission likewise rejected the option 
of codification. choosing one school of islamic law over another would inevitably have provoked controversies 
between adherents of different schools.403 it thus seems correct to say that legislation aiming at codification across 
the board has lost its appeal as a policy option in most contexts.
efforts at ascertainment of customary LaW
attempts by academics and administrators to define or clarify customary law through the recording of decisions 
and precedents and academic enquiry have been a feature of the formal legal systems’ attempts to deal with cus-
tomary law in various countries. the ‘restatement’ approach of allott and the school of oriental and african studies 
led the way in this regard for a long time. this approach will generally be most relevant for the more ‘locally owned’ 
forms of ijs, where norms and structural and procedural standards are not set by legislation. as with codification 
efforts, these processes took place on a relatively large scale in some countries in africa during and immediately 
following the colonial era, with varying degrees of fidelity to custom as actually practiced. studies of this kind, 
400 hinz, m. o., 2009.
401 see State Report to the Human Rights Committee, 25 april 2006: ccPr/c/ZmB/3, 25 april 2006, paragraph 66.
402 ccPr/c/ZmB/co/3/add.1, supplemented by discussion with a representative of the law reform commission. also in namibia, an 
initial intention to attempt codification was dropped; see hinz, 2007.
403 salrc ‘Working Paper 103’, 2001.
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often referred to as ‘restatement’ processes,404 continue to be carried out and advocated for. the niger country 
study refers to a very recent effort carried out by academic experts. in processes of this kind, it is important to con-
sider who is doing the asking and answering and by whom and for what purpose the restated ‘custom’ will be used.
in his book on customary law in south africa,405 t. W. Bennett cites research by other scholars showing that the 
normative outputs of processes like these are far from neutral, but rather depend on whether questions are put 
only to chiefs and headmen or to members of the communities themselves. this and other research shows that, far 
from being the subject of full consensus in a (mythical) harmonious society, custom may be highly contested, and 
that case outcomes are the result of a process of negotiation, as the country studies in this study confirm. scholar-
ship on other parts of the world, including latin america, seems to fully support this observation.406 restatement 
processes that are blind to the power inherent in writing something down risk committing errors of various kinds, 
including cementing unequal relationships that may have more to do with political and economic power than 
with custom.
a further issue in ‘restatement’ processes concerns their intended purpose. if the resulting, clarified norms are for 
application by the same community-based structures that apply them and if there is real community input in 
drawing them up, there may be less risk of distortion. if they are intended for re-application by other bodies, such 
as state customary or local courts, there is a danger that restatement of only the substantive norms, divorced from 
the procedurally flexible and open community context in which they have developed, will result in unsatisfactory 
and unduly formalistic outcomes, and the dynamism and flexibility of custom will be lost. thus, it is important 
to recall that customary law often relies less on fixed norms than on the negotiation of a durable, and hopefully 
fair, solution.
more recent efforts at ascertainment of customary law have used the method of self-statement,407 whereby tradi-
tional communities produce their own version of customary law in writing. When analysing such efforts or inten-
tions, it is important to go beyond the name given to them, as aims to change or influence the norms may be 
hiding behind a neutral-sounding word. in namibia, the process of self-statement apparently contains no element 
of outside parties inserting their views of what the law ought to be. it involves a process within the community 
itself, where the end result is a product created in the community and binding upon it. the community may later 
employ a similar (or different) process to change the law afterwards.
the model used in namibia408 consists of a ten-step process:
1. identify the target community or communities
2. Do legal background research with respect to the community or communities
3. Draft policy on ascertainment of customary law
4. Develop a comprehensive enquiry guide
5. agree with the community on the ascertainment process and structure
6. recruit and train ascertainment assistants
404 Kane, j. oloka-onyango, makerere university and abdul tejan-cole, sierra leone.
405 Bennett, t. W., 2004. the reference (footnote 152) is to roberts, Botswana notes & records, Vol. 3, pp. 12-14, 1971. see also 
‘customary law and Zones of chiefly sovereignty: the impact of government Policy on Whose Voices Prevail in the making and 
changing of customary law’ in land, Power and custom: controversies generated by south africa's communal land rights act, 
claassens, a. and cousins, B., 2008.
406 see Van cott, D.l., 2000, op. cit. citing several sources, including sieder, Customary Law and Democratic Transition in Guatemala, pp. 
17 & 19.
407 this description owes a debt to the above paper by Professor hinz and his references to the restatement project of the school of 
oriental and african studies (soas) of the university of london under anthony allott.
408 ibid.
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7. conduct/supervise the ascertainment project
8. conduct complementary research in identified community or communities
9. Promote the compilation of the ascertainment texts
10. Prepare publications in at least, two languages, the vernacular language and english
While such a process might not be immune to the power of local elites to control outcomes and processes, it can 
potentially contain important participatory mechanisms capable of further empowering community members. 
Depending on the cultural and social context, this can obviously involve interference with local power relations 
and hierarchies. there is thus a certain formalization of the local ‘legislative’ process and outcome inherent in this 
method. this study does not have information about how often the use of this process leads to institutionaliza-
tion of this way of ‘legislating’ at the community level or about the compliance with the ‘restated’ standards. the 
method has the virtue of firmly anchoring ownership in the community, though. it does not attempt to chal-
lenge the power structures in the community and does not attempt to inject higher norms. Pitfalls of this process, 
though, may include the practical difficulties of securing the participation of women and traditionally excluded 
groups and of scaling such an exercise up to cover large areas. 409
the country study on uganda notes a slightly contrasting approach in acholiland. there, a working group con-
sisting of elders from the community, but also including district political representatives and civil society groups, 
developed a draft set of ‘Principles and Practices of customary tenure in acholiland’. the acholi governmental 
structure then approved a version of these. some groups contested the principles and they were not being 
actually applied.
it was not clear whether the failure to secure full acceptance in the acholi example was due to an overly pre-
scriptive approach on the part of elders or outsiders or whether it is more due to internal disagreements in a 
post-conflict setting marked by long-term displacement and recent return, especially given the limited scope of 
the country study that was possible. nevertheless, it seems that prescriptive approaches will run the risk of lack of 
acceptance. in some cases, it might be possible to convince the community that the ‘new’ or modified principles 
are worthwhile, though this attempt will obviously require a sensitive and inclusive process of engagement with 
the community. the ugandan organization lemu appears to have enjoyed success in this regard, building on its 
research efforts and in-depth engagement with this question.
recommendations on processes to cLarify norms and standards
for the reasons of democratic principles and the human rights-based principle of participation, processes to ascer-
tain custom should use methods that engage communities as a whole. Where community-based structures are 
to apply the resulting norms and standards, the self-statement method is a good starting point.410 Documenta-
tion of principles and standards should include documentation of the process whereby norms can be changed 
and of the process for adjudicating disputes, and not be limited simply to substantive norms. the ascertainment 
process should be open to facilitating eventual debates about whether more open, participatory and accountable 
processes should be adopted. Where the purpose of the exercise is to assist ‘parajudicial’-type courts (i.e., local or 
similar courts) in ascertaining and applying custom, the human rights-based approach would still require consul-
tation not only with tribal elders and local chiefs, but all members of the community, or at least a representative 
sample of them.
this recommendation does not exclude less ambitious attempts to either ascertain the law or to exert some influ-
ence on it through more everyday engagement with adjudicators. ijs providers can be included or represented in 
409 see Local Justice in Southern Sudan, usiP, 2010, for a discussion.
410 this study, though, was not able to evaluate the process. a study on comparative programming work would be a useful follow-up.
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justice sector coordination groups, particularly at the local level, or providers can receive written material, advice 
and information; it is also possible to bring groups of providers together to exchange views and precedents in 
formal or informal settings.
the example from acholiland, involving the mobilization of the acholi governmental structure, highlights another 
potential avenue for programming. in many countries, there are national organizations or a state organ where 
traditional leaders are represented. these structures could play constructive roles in setting standards for struc-
ture, substantive norms and procedure relating to ijs. this could be in the form of voluntary codes or charters or 
through advising and debating the legislature. encouraging the elaboration and adoption of an easily understand-
able and widely owned informal but quasi ‘constitutional’ text for ijs, with fundamental substantive and procedural 
standards, to which ijs could declare their adherence, could be an initiative capable of reaching many actors. 
naturally, any such text should not contradict international standards.
seLection and mandate of adJudicators
all research and study confirms that measures to encourage gender equality in the selection of adjudicators are 
crucially important and strongly influence women’s preferences and access to justice. the Papua new guinea coun-
try study shows that such measures can have a relatively quick impact and communities and users are inclined to 
welcome them. the niger country study refers to the existence, but effective non-use, of disciplinary procedures, 
as well as the prospects for the nomination of women as customary assessors. Despite the conservative traditions 
of the country, ngos have succeeded in making women focal points acceptable at the village level. chapter Vii on 
women’s rights and ijs describes how the Zambian judicial service commission has made the selection processes 
more transparent and gender-sensitive, so that vacancies are publicized and candidacies publicly canvassed. the 
Bangladesh country study, looking at the Shalish courts, illustrates how the work of ngos has enhanced the role 
and status of women in these village courts over the years. the uganda country study describes the election 
procedures for adjudicators with gender quotas that exist there. from its beginning, the ngo-sponsored village 
mediation programme, as documented in the malawi country study, has achieved practically equal gender repre-
sentation among mediators – apparently without alienating village headmen or male litigants and parties.
these examples, among many others, demonstrate that work to increase transparency and equality in the selec-
tion of adjudicators can be a productive area for programming in relation to ijs. they show that approaches will 
necessarily differ according to the types of ijs concerned. a first step can be to ensure that the body responsible 
for making or processing nominations itself contain an adequate representation of women. a state body such 
as a judicial service commission that plays a role in the selection of ijs adjudicators for parajudicial mechanisms 
may be free to rewrite qualification rules and modernize selection procedures, making them more transparent 
and gender-equal. similarly, it may be able to improve the enforcement of rules on disqualification and discipline 
(including removal) of adjudicators. a judicial body such as this may also be more amenable to legal arguments 
such as those based on international human rights law as a reason to enforce change.
Village or community mediation schemes that are initiated by ngos, such as the Village mediation Project in 
malawi, may be able to significantly influence the qualifications and profiles of community mediators, including 
with respect to gender balance. in the malawian example, gender-balanced selection occurred in consultation 
with village headmen and chiefs.
Qualification requirements could include educational ones mandating general education and the completion 
of specific courses and requirements pertinent to the position of adjudicator. specialized courses could typically 
include elements and examinations on issues of national law, judicial organization and ethics as well as human rights 
standards. Depending on resources, there could be training in a range of skills and competencies, from record keep-
ing, court and case management to mediation and conflict resolution skills. language skills may also be necessary.
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Where local elders choose traditional leaders and adjudicators, it is not possible for outsiders to determine selec-
tion rules and procedures. nevertheless, these bodies generally do need to be legitimate in the eyes of the com-
munities they serve. Village headmen may also be upwardly accountable to a chief or a hierarchy of chiefs. the 
malawi country study points out that women often play a key role in choosing traditional leaders. Programmatic 
interventions could attempt to develop, influence or clarify the criteria that women use in choosing a leader. it 
may be possible to build on these structures to enhance accountability through voluntary codes. this will be pos-
sible only on the basis of relationships of trust with the communities or hierarchies concerned. some ngos that 
work with the provision of legal services or rural development enjoy good relationships with these structures.411
these relationships could provide a basis on which to construct or expand accountability mechanisms, whether 
upward, downward or horizontal (i.e., to a community of peers among providers). the country studies note no 
explicit examples of attempts to build on accountability mechanisms in this way, and more work is necessary to 
investigate such possibilities.
in some cases, government authorities ultimately appoint or approve traditional leaders, providing state lever-
age. in south africa, legislation412 demands that 40 percent of the membership of traditional councils must be 
democratically elected and 33.3 percent be female. unfortunately, threats to the security of female chiefs in south 
africa413 may require additional protective measures for them. in niger and malawi, the government has varying 
degrees of influence in the process. Prescriptive approaches that leverage this power to achieve change are pos-
sible in principle; these might comprise steps such as linking appointment as a traditional leader to declarations 
of commitment to codes of conduct, including the elimination of harmful practices. Depending on the resources 
available – and undoubtedly on politics – there could be an examination of the process of installation or induc-
tion as a chief to see how that process could include obligations and/or the raising of awareness about the chief’s 
responsibility to uphold national law and the constitution.
this study does not provide examples of programmatic attempts to influence the selection, professional discipline 
or the qualifications of religious ijs adjudicators. Depending on the context and the extent of the involvement 
of religious organizations with adjudication of disputes, it might be possible to work with these organizations on 
these issues. While the catholic commission for justice and Peace (ccjP) in malawi has perhaps the largest project 
working with informal justice in the country, the targeted ijs providers are not religious officials, but traditional 
leaders, and this church-affiliated organization does not exert authority over their selection. the niger country 
study documents how leaders of the two islamic organizations that were interviewed for this study agreed that 
insufficient knowledge of islamic law, also among imams and cadis, could be a problem, but the selection of 
imams is a local matter in which they have neither the authority nor the resources to intervene. it would seem that, 
given the right context and partnership relationship, there could be room for religious structures to improve the 
qualifications of persons engaged in dispute resolution and affiliated with it. nevertheless, this would take place 
within a framework where the organization and religious doctrine set the terms.
education of providers
While the intervention above is concerned with selection and entrance qualifications, education interventions 
can also target current, practicing adjudicators. the content of training can encompass a range of subjects, from 
guidance on the law in relevant domains, to techniques of documentation, dispute resolution, legal procedure, 
professional ethics, human rights and judicial organization. training could be specific to build the awareness 
and capacity of adjudicators in relation to children’s and women’s rights. training could also be provided to 
411 some examples are the madaripur legal aid association in Bangladesh, timaP for justice in sierra leone, Women for change in 
Zambia, and the ccjP in malawi.
412 traditional governance and leadership framework act, 2003, p. 3.
413 see reference in the section on traditional or customary ijs in chapter iV on typology.
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other participants in the proceedings, such as those who represent and assist children, fulfilling the right to be 
heard. some differentiation in approach according to the types of ijs, as well as adjustments to specific contexts 
will be necessary.
it would be somewhat easier to plan for the education and training of parajudicial adjudicators who are recruited, 
regulated and paid in state structures and whose jurisdiction, functions and powers are uniform and regulated. 
sets of rules, practice guides and manuals already exist for adjudicators in many of the parajudicial systems encoun-
tered, and education and training can be matched to these functional tools. unDP’s project support to local 
council courts in the conflict-affected Districts of uganda included (in addition to the building of courthouses) 
training for local court justices. it is also possible to include ijs adjudicators in joint training with other primary 
justice providers, such as paralegals. joint training of this kind can foster cooperation and productive relationships 
between these two groups of primary justice actors.
experience from several contexts tends to show that adjudicators at the higher levels of traditional systems – such 
as in chiefs’ courts – often have more education than those in state-run local or customary courts. traditional 
leaders are often well aware of the need to ‘keep up’, nominating well-educated members of the community as 
adjudicators. it is also notable that, where women have become traditional leaders, they have often been chosen 
because they are among the most successful and well-educated members of their communities. education of 
women as mediators in Bangladesh had a ‘knock-on’ effect whereby women began to demand representation 
on traditional Shalish panels. the country studies confirm that traditional adjudicators are often eager to attend 
educational courses. When asked to describe their needs, adjudicators in all countries that were visited for this 
study prominently cited their wish for education and training. the niger country study encountered training in 
documentation of case outcomes and the powers and jurisdiction of headmen and chiefs. that study observes 
that only a relatively small number of traditional leaders were literate. the malawi country study looks more closely 
at the training that the ccjP, whose project intervention appears414 to have succeeded in forging good working 
relationships at the village level in numerous areas across the country, provides to traditional leaders.
this study’s evaluation of these efforts found that human rights training, which is often at the centre of educa-
tional efforts, needs to be contextualized to fit the circumstances and mandate of a given adjudication of disputes. 
materials need to fit the needs of clearly identified target group profiles. tendencies to focus overly on abstract 
and distant principles of constitutional and international law should be avoided, and instead attention should be 
paid to rights aspects in the kinds of cases that adjudicators are likely to encounter. here again, programming can 
benefit from baseline studies that illustrate these issues.
addressing cuLturaL practices
special consideration must be taken of efforts that have the goal of engaging with cultural practices. a wide vari-
ety of cultural practices are potentially problematic with respect to human rights (bride price and child marriage, 
for example). it is not easy to isolate ijs or the adjudication function of chiefs, for example, as the primary locus 
where such customs are upheld. Previous studies of ijs have made this point.415 the customs are woven into the 
fabric of cultural, social and economic life, surfacing in a variety of ways.
an attempt to modify cultural practices that are deeply culturally embedded may have significance not just for 
justice, but also for education and health. in some instances, they may be better tackled through interventions 
that adopt a multifaceted approach. relationships with local communities or traditional leaders that are working in 
health or education may present the best opportunity for addressing harmful practices and for benefiting informal 
justice. the malawi country study refers to the malawi human rights commission’s (mhrc) 2006 report on cultural 
414 it was not possible to obtain an evaluation report of the project itself.
415 see, for example, Pri 2000, p. 3.
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practices,416 which makes some useful recommendations on programming that addresses such practices, which is 
paraphrased in the following paragraphs. While they extend far beyond the field of justice, they may nevertheless 
be relevant to it.
changing harmful traditional practices is a complex process that must involve all stakeholders, including traditional 
leaders, community members, religious groups that may be reluctant to speak out about the practice, and the 
government. Promotion of awareness of rights and the harnessing of traditional and religious leaders are necessary 
in the effort to spread knowledge of rights. in interacting with traditional or religious leaders, respecting positive or 
‘neutral’ traditional practices and endorsing culture and diversity is important to demonstrating good faith.
understanding the power balance is also key; women may be especially vulnerable because of their lower social and 
economic status. outreach programmes on gender equality targeting all sectors of society need to create public 
awareness through information. Practices that directly or indirectly confer higher status on boys and men than on 
women and girls should be modified so that males and females enjoy equal status. Women, as one category of the 
main victims, must be given the opportunity to participate in the process of modifying the negative practices.
 it is important to understand the cultural underpinnings of a given practice. People are naturally hesitant to sac-
rifice what is important to them, even if they understand that it is harmful. offering substitute activities or a modi-
fied version of a practice is constructive since the abolition or modification of the practice could leave a vacuum.
People who perform harmful practices are often doing what they think is best for the children. the ‘unwritten 
curricula’ (used by malawian anankungwi) during initiation should be reviewed by regularly engaging them in 
dialogue or interactive discussions. information that is passed on to the initiates must be appropriate for them and 
must centre not on sexual performance but on good behaviour. therefore, the anankungwi should undergo train-
ing on sex and sexuality and how information about this subject can be best passed on to the initiates. regular 
interactive discussion between them and everyone interested in promoting the rights of children would help.
the ministry of health should take a leading role in promoting healthy cultural practices by giving all participants 
advice about cultural practices such as circumcision and discouraging unhygienic practices.
the education of women is vital to the realization of their rights. unless girls’ education is promoted so that girls 
can realize their full potential, the status of women in malawi will remain low and women’s rights are likely to con-
tinue to be violated.
many harmful practices have legal and/or administrative implications. the mhrc recommends that the law com-
mission thoroughly study the practices discussed in their study with a view to initiating a process of law reform 
pertaining to culture.
education of users: LegaL aWareness raising
the raising of legal awareness and public information outreach efforts targeting the general population can use-
fully be developed in conjunction with the training of adjudicators. strengthening legal awareness extends knowl-
edge of rights, provides an important foundation for the community to demand the protection of those rights, 
and offers remedies where those rights have been violated. a lack of awareness and understanding of their rights 
often disproportionately affects the most disadvantaged groups in society, including women, the poor, and geo-
graphically isolated communities. community empowerment through the heightening of legal awareness is vital 
to encouraging ijs to be responsive to the community and mitigates any risk that ijs could be captured by an elite.
416 ‘cultural Practices and their impact on the enjoyment of human rights, Particularly the rights of Women and children in malawi’. 
see reference in the country study.
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many programming initiatives include a legal awareness component, often focusing on educating the community 
on human rights and providing information about the institutions, mechanisms and procedures available to the 
community. Partnership with government or local authorities through the development of communication strate-
gies to promote legal awareness is a useful entry point. ngos also have considerable experience in undertaking 
initiatives to raise legal awareness. such strategies would respond to the needs of disadvantaged groups by, for 
example, adopting user-friendly formats in local languages and informing those who face substantial physical, cul-
tural or economic barriers to access. the efforts of different development partners can usefully complement each 
other, even outside the context of a sector programme. thus, the usaiD-financed spring uganda programme, 
aimed at promoting peace, stability and reconciliation in northern uganda, has produced accessible information 
brochures on the role and functions of the local courts while the unDP project, support to local council courts 
in the conflict-affected Districts of uganda, has financed the provision of simple-language guides on key pieces 
of legislation.
in some contexts, the use of media, radio and television campaigns are useful. among the other means of educat-
ing people are street theatre, information kits or flyers on how to initiate legal action or bring a dispute to ijs. legal 
information kiosks or mobile legal clinics also travel particularly to remote areas to conduct community educa-
tion initiatives on legal rights. trusted and familiar social networks, such as teachers, religious leaders, community 
groups or others with non-legal specialty skills, can substantially contribute to public awareness of the law and 
legal rights. in summary, a legally aware community translates into increased demand and higher expectation that 
ijs will deliver justice and be more accountable.
proceduraL reguLation and seLf-reguLation: deveLopment and provi-
sion of practice manuaLs and guideLines
Practice manuals for ijs providers exist in some ijs, particularly common among parajudicial ijs, although they are 
often out of date and not always available to all adjudicators. Parajudical ijs tend to have more procedural regula-
tion than other ijs and are generally obliged to follow a defined set of procedural, jurisdictional and substantive 
rules. thus, the production of such a guide was a development partner-financed activity for lc courts in uganda. 
it may be worthwhile for programming to improve, update and distribute such functional tools. these guides can 
be extremely useful, but literacy levels and language proficiency need to be taken into account. as with all such 
materials, a participatory approach, as well as pre-testing of draft materials and curricula, give results.
ngo-sponsored mediation schemes may also involve the provision of manuals and schematic guidelines, although 
they are less likely to be used in custom and religion-based ijs. any initiative to promote this kind of tool with 
custom or religion-based ijs will obviously require a participatory approach involving credible representatives of 
the providers themselves. regional, ethnic and other differences also need to be taken into account. With sufficient 
time and engagement in education at the community level, procedures and good practices in dispute resolution 
can be transmitted even without literacy or written guides, as illustrated by the work of the madaripur legal aid 
association with Shalish courts that is described in the Bangladesh country study.
as noted above, many countries have national organizations or a state organ where traditional leaders are repre-
sented. these structures could play constructive roles in setting standards, procedures, voluntary codes and char-
ters of ijs. Programming could assist these organizations to elaborate and adopt such texts to which ijs providers 
could declare their adherence. the participatory approaches adopted to detail such a text could ensure its support 
and the national organization could also ensure broad societal reach for these kinds of codes and regulations.
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accountabiLity mechanisms: transparency, monitoring and oversight
recording of case outcomes
requiring or promoting the recording of case outcomes promotes legal certainty and transparency and can 
enhance oversight. the niger case study mentions one recent project that attempts to improve documentation 
of case outcomes (which in theory is obligatory, but in practice is neglected) through training and the develop-
ment of a standard form. literacy in french, the language in which outcomes are supposed to be recorded, poses 
a serious challenge, though. the primary purpose of documenting outcomes will generally be to give the disput-
ing parties greater legal certainty about the outcome and to strengthen enforcement mechanisms. While docu-
menting outcomes may have this effect in some contexts, in others it may not. for example, anecdotal evidence 
indicates there are cases in which providers as well as the parties are illiterate and in which literate court clerks, 
possibly corrupt or biased, record a settlement that is different from what was agreed or adjudicated by the ijs. a 
further consideration in this regard is that legal certainty is a value of formal systems. informal systems will typically 
be more concerned with flexibility and the circumstances of the individual case. the intervention could in some 
circumstances therefore contribute to distorting the nature of the ijs, although this is not inevitable.
systems of referraL, appeaL and enforcement
Besides giving the parties a record of the outcome, recording can also facilitate registration or approval of the 
settlement by other instances (including a formal court) or appeal. coupled with avenues of appeal and the avail-
ability of legal services, recording can be effective. the outcomes of most parajudicial mechanisms are generally 
subject to appeal to the ordinary courts, although, cases sometimes have to recommence ab initio. in other con-
texts, decisions of ijs are subject to a magistrate’s confirmation before they can become executory.
interviewees in some country studies agreed that the recording of outcomes was useful in disputes concern-
ing the delineation of real property, as it can prevent cases from being reopened such as when a new chief is 
appointed. recording is generally useful if the parties obtain copies, combined with a record that is kept safely by 
the adjudicator that can be referred to later. here as elsewhere in justice, though, the various links in the chain have 
to be effective and coordinated with one another. Without an accessible enforcement system that acknowledges 
the binding nature of the written decision or agreement, a written document is of limited value.
systems of inspection, monitoring and support
recording can also facilitate monitoring by outside parties, whether these are members of the public, organi-
zations representing stakeholders, hierarchically superior adjudicators or official inspectors. the country studies 
observe that state-linked parajudicial ijs and ngo-sponsored mediation schemes are the ijs mostly likely to have 
established mechanisms of inspection or monitoring. tradition or religion-based systems, on the other hand, often 
have hierarchies of authority through which cases can be appealed. systems that are subject to a defined set of 
rules and procedures and are directly subject to state authorities can naturally be more readily inspected than ones 
that are anchored in community structures and operate according to tradition.
Parajudicial systems generally have a supervision framework and regulations providing for official inspection, but, 
in practice, few such systems operate effectively. in sierra leone, the ministry of justice and ministry of internal 
affairs are responsible for monitoring the local courts; customary law officers are under the ministry of justice, 
whereas some other aspects of the functioning of these courts are the responsibility of the ministry of internal 
affairs.417 in Zambia, district and provincial local court officers belong to the judiciary. in both countries, local court 
officers have far-reaching powers over local courts, including the power to inspect all records, attend hearings, and 
417 World Bank, Kane, 2005, op. cit. and local courts record analysis survey in sierra leone, World Bank, http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/intjusforPoor/resources/sl_local_courts_recorD_analysis_surVey.rtf
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even to overturn decisions (provided that the decision has not been appealed). in uganda, the local council courts 
are subject to general supervision by the chief magistrate. in most of these cases, though, supervision is reportedly 
ineffective because the supervisory organs have insufficient resources.418 justice agencies may question whether 
the establishment of elaborate (and expensive) monitoring frameworks for informal systems, instead of improving 
formal ones, is the best way to use resources. as seen in uganda and sierra leone, supervision of these systems in 
some countries is also difficult because overlapping supervision mandates and the occasional use of a variety of 
uncoordinated monitoring frameworks create confusion. supervision by executive agencies also raises issues con-
cerning the independence of the judiciary. monitoring should heed the respective obligations and requirements 
for support that ijs and (other) organs of the state possess. it should thus allow providers to voice their concerns. 
a monitoring system that is purely top-down and that the ijs providers see as an instrument that only criticizes 
them is unlikely to be successful.
When it comes to traditional mechanisms, outside monitoring may be an unwelcome intrusion. Providers and 
even communities may strongly resist it unless it is developed in careful dialogue with providers and users. Provid-
ers questioned for this study were often hostile to the idea of monitoring by persons unfamiliar with the local con-
ditions and culture. the question is rather one of presence and trust. the examples from Bangladesh and malawi, 
where ngos gained access to traditional mechanisms by providing support and obtaining the trust of the leaders 
and communities, probably illustrate a more viable approach.
While there is little doubt that improved monitoring could be a helpful measure, some caution is necessary before 
seeing this as the best solution, for several reasons. Persons staffing the monitoring mechanisms may come from 
urban areas and be unfamiliar with the needs and conditions in rural and impoverished areas where ijs are strong-
est. monitoring that does not make correct legal protection more available is of doubtful value. the utility of using 
resources to develop large-scale monitoring systems according to capacities, costs and benefits must be meas-
ured. monitoring requires record keeping (and thus literacy) among providers, a clear structure that takes account 
of and documents a set of standards (structural, normative and procedural) against which ijs are to be assessed. 
ijs providers may be working for no or very little compensation, and the imposition of additional work burdens 
may be unwelcome or unrealistic. Both adjudicators and monitors may need to be trained in the reporting and 
monitoring methodology. these interventions can be costly and must be weighed against the benefits of using 
similar resources for other institutions.
pubLicity of hearings and processes
requirements of public hearings in some cases and open admission to the court or adjudication forum, including 
for the general public and observers from civil society organizations and the media, can be useful transparency 
measures. Where literacy is low, publicity surrounding hearings, processes and outcomes might be more success-
ful than written records of hearings and decisions. the model of the Shalish courts in Bangladesh comes to mind, 
where the highly public nature of the forum and the case outcome promote enforcement – recording takes place 
in the minds of the members of the community, rather than on paper, and the collective conscience of the com-
munity is committed to enforcement. in other contexts however, chiefs will be more authoritative than communi-
ties, and this method of the Shalish courts may not be applicable.
importantly, public hearings are not appropriate for all types of cases and in all contexts. confidentiality is central 
to the successful resolution of some disputes. for women in some communities, public hearings could prevent 
them from bringing a case forward. further, sensitivities of having children as victims and witnesses in a case could 
dictate against public hearings.
418 sierra leone: record analysis survey, above. in uganda, interviewees mentioned this during the country study. in Zambia, some 
interviewees reported this.
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LinKages among primary Justice providers
this study has emphasized that ijs should not be seen as operating in isolation from other avenues of primary 
justice. Programming should look at all actors, preferences and patterns at the local level. jurisdictional limits, de 
facto divisions of workload, and patterns of interaction may promote useful synergies across different forms of ijs, 
law enforcement, administrative and political structures, statutory courts and legal service providers. the baseline 
studies recommended at the beginning of this chapter are likely to reveal the official and unofficial links that are in 
operation and the effects of support measures, and jurisdictional limits.
these studies and links may provide opportunities for exchange of information, referrals and mutual support. the 
Papua new guinea study describes one initiative designed to promote exchange and improve linkages among 
primary justice providers in places known as community justice centres. at the time of this study, this was a pilot 
activity. such initiatives seem to be extremely valuable in promoting mutual understanding of the different roles 
that different providers play and in providing a forum for learning and improvement. the Papua new guinea study 
observes that people may continue to see traditional dispute resolution as necessary to ensure community har-
mony and reconciliation between families and clans, even when the formal system has handled a matter and has 
approached a problem as a civil or criminal offence involving the liability or guilt of a single individual.419
as the Papua new guinea study emphasizes in relation to the centres, most programmes are in or close to provin-
cial capitals. there are good reasons that such programmes should begin close to political and institutional hubs: 
it is best to start a new programme where there is a reasonable likelihood that it will meet its goals and objectives. 
there are also economies of scale: it is easier to connect to and service programmes that are close to communica-
tion, infrastructure and transport links. nevertheless, well-functioning programmes must over time be extended 
so that they are also available to people in outlying communities. Development partners should be willing to take 
risks to introduce community justice programmes into some districts where government services are failing and 
also where communal violence is an ongoing problem. here, there should be an understanding already at the 
outset of the programme that it will be difficult to achieve results and that it will take longer to change harmful 
practices and lawlessness that have ‘been imported’ into the local community due to the breakdown of traditional 
cultural norms. likewise, police presence and support may be a vital element in enabling ijs to change and to lead 
the way in tackling harmful social phenomena. relationships between police and lcs in uganda often seemed 
positive and mutually appreciated, providing a platform for further efforts in this direction. also in uganda, courts’ 
use of advice from traditional leaders in land disputes is a positive development.
the ecuador study identifies some mechanisms of outreach by the formal justice system to indigenous commu-
nities and the informal systems. the malawi study illustrates some aspects of interaction between two kinds of 
ijs: tradition or custom-based mechanisms and the ngo-sponsored Village mediation Project (VmP). in the areas 
where both are present, the work of the ngo to ensure smooth relationships with traditional leaders has been 
helpful in avoiding conflict. there apparently is an understanding about the division of the case burden in some 
cases, whereby traditional leaders retain land cases, leaving many family disputes to the mediators. linkages to the 
police and the formal justice system are an inherent part of the VmP and Primary justice Programmes there and 
include efforts to secure recognition by the courts underway in respect of the VmP. in conclusion, linkages are vital 
and deserve monitoring.
419 other studies have also reveled numerous valuable approaches to this initiative. see, for example, hinz, m. o. and mapaure, c., 
2010, op. cit.
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the niger country study examines the use of customary assessors in state courts. While this mechanism is formal-
ized in countries such as niger, it is informally widespread in many countries, including malawi.
the Bangladesh country study illustrates interesting secondary effects that the representation and participation of 
women have on different types of ijs. Women who are educated and empowered in relation to one mechanism – 
ngo-sponsored Shalish – feel emboldened to work for their rights in others. likewise, the quota of elected female 
uP representatives has seemingly had knock-on effects in communities. the country study also notes how ‘healthy 
competition’ among ijs providers in some areas has led to improvements in the traditional Shalish.
LinKages to paraLegaLs and LegaL aid providers
the fostering of closer relations between ijs and local legal aid providers, such as paralegals, has had some posi-
tive results. not all ijs will allow legal aid providers to act as representatives in proceedings, but even where this 
is not possible, such providers can advise individuals involved in those proceedings. Paralegals can also assume 
observation roles where proceedings are public. government and non-government actors can be involved in 
making provision for legal aid and paralegal service.420 strategies can include institutionalization of community 
services to draw on law graduates and retired professionals in legal clinics. Paralegals can offer particular services 
such as advice and assistance about whether a matter needs to be taken before a justice system or can be settled 
in another way. Paralegals and legal aid lawyers can also coordinate referrals to non-legal expertise; for example, 
some matters might require health care intervention or financial assistance.
Programming in linking ijs to legal aid and paralegal mechanisms would require particular efforts to ensure sus-
tainability and cost-effectiveness. legal aid schemes are usually expensive and governments often do not accord 
them priority. this is where university clinics and the participation of bar associations, paralegals and other public 
advocates can play a key role and also be a lobby to ensure the continued provision of resources. in Zambia, a gtZ 
training programme of local court justices, with the assistance of ngos and community paralegals, helped break 
down barriers between the two groups. consequently, it became possible for paralegals to enter into and observe 
proceedings in local courts and monitor how the justices and court personnel treated women. the success indica-
tors measured the degree to which intimidating language was used against women and whether women were 
allowed to speak before the court without being accompanied by a male relative, as these were problems observ-
able in the baseline data.
420 carried out with the judiciary section responsible for local courts and two ngos that provide legal services to rural women. from 
an unpublished paper entitled ‘summary of reports on monitoring the impact of training local court justices and Paralegals in 
the southern and eastern Provinces of Zambia’, under a gtZ-supported project ‘improvement of the legal status of Women and 
girls in Zambia’, by tina hofstaetter, gtZ, lusaka, july 2006.
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Linkages to Wider development programming
it has been emphasized that phenomena that are visible in ijs, including discriminatory practices in relation to 
marital and family relations, property ownership and inheritance, or superstition-based practices and punishments, 
are expressions not simply of justice standards, but also of the structure of societies. the best ways to influence 
change in these areas may include broader development initiatives for education, livelihoods and public health. 
reducing dependency on land as the only source of subsistence may provide new opportunities to women, and 
improving education can change social power balances in the community. attention to the proper sequencing 
of development initiatives, as well as respect for the human rights-based approach principles of participation and 
empowerment of local communities and individuals, require that ijs not be treated in isolation from other aspects 
of life. the entry point for discussion of justice issues can be through vital health, education or livelihood issues, and 
justice in relation to these questions, rather than about ijs as an isolated arena. similarly, dialogue and participation 
aims at building an understanding of the local context in which people are attempting to live and survive. this can 
provide the basis for targeting an overall programme to that context.
Broader development initiatives are also key to creating an environment where human rights can be respected 
and fulfilled. consequently, it is important that ijs be included in child protection programmes that work to build 
protective environments for children. similarly, national strategies and action plans to implement crc or ceDaW 
should include a specific component on engaging with ijs for the implementation of these conventions.
ijs engagement therefore must be integrated as a component of broader development initiatives. this is an oft-
ignored area of justice programming, but the efficacy of working with ijs requires that it be complemented by 
engagement with the formal justice system and with development programming that engages the broader social, 
cultural, political and economic context of ijs.
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process 
this study was commissioned by unDP, unicef and unifem (now un Women) and commenced in january 2009. 
a comprehensive desk study and literature review was undertaken and complemented by country-specific case 
studies for a large number of countries. from february 2009 to january 2010, the qualitative and quantitative data 
collection was carried out in the six selected countries of Bangladesh, ecuador, malawi, niger, Papua new guinea 
and uganda. 
Literature revieW and desK study
this study is the fruit of a multidisciplinary approach to the question of ijs. the research team included human 
rights lawyers, academic researchers and practitioners, a specialist in conflict management, an anthropologist, 
and project managers in the field of human rights. the work of the core team was supplemented by (i) input in 
the form of an issues paper from a recognized expert in the field of programming for legal empowerment and 
(ii) comments on an early version of the desk study by a senior academic expert in the field of customary law and 
informal justice.
there are, broadly speaking, three sets of literature that have a bearing on this subject. the first, and by far the 
most extensive, is the anthropological literature that seeks to understand the phenomenon of legal pluralism and 
customary law, primarily in developing countries. this literature frequently provides an insight into the operation 
of systems in their social, cultural and economic context while also promoting an awareness of the political and 
methodoLogy
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historical factors that have created the current situation. second, there is a growing body of literature on justice 
reform, growing out of the extensive work and efforts in this field over the past 15 to 20 years, but also reach-
ing back to the ‘law and Development’ movement of the 1960s. much of this literature is technical and project-
oriented, reflecting a prescriptive and teleological perspective. only very recently has it begun to concern itself 
systematically with informal or non-state systems of justice. finally, there is the body of human rights standards, 
analysis and literature that is concerned with ijs. this takes its outset in state obligations, and, with a prescriptive 
approach, has often diagnosed state failures. 
combining the insights of these bodies of literature and practice was the major challenge of the desk study. With 
such a large field of inquiry – in both geographical and thematic terms – the ambition of the study is rather gen-
eral. the aim was thus to marry the anthropological and analytical literature to the international standards some-
what more systematically than what appears to have been done hitherto. 
given the relative lack of understanding and acknowledgement of the importance of the role of ijs, it is clear that 
a good deal of future programming work will have to focus on knowledge gathering. the study thus attempts to 
propose typologies, working categories and definitions, as well as analytical tools that can assist further analysis, 
particularly for the purpose of programming. the annexes on method at the end of the report are seen as a con-
tribution in this regard.
country desK studies
country desk studies were carried out on the countries identified by unDP, unicef and unifem (now un Women) 
as relevant in the tor, as well as on some countries identified by the study team as being particularly interesting. 
thirty country-specific desk studies were commenced, but, despite the time and effort dedicated to this, it proved 
impossible to gather sufficient quality information from all of the selected countries to conclude all of them satis-
factorily, mostly due to a lack of reliable and updated information. the information and documentation gathered 
for these studies was obtained through available literature from academia, un agencies, ngos, governments, 
websites and conferences. to the extent possible, they have been developed in consultation with national experts 
on the informal as well as the formal justice systems, including scholars and human rights experts. 
the desk studies assess the nature and characteristics of ijs (composition, decision-making, procedural aspects), 
linkages among the different justice providers and particularly in relation to the formal justice system, legal frame-
works, human rights aspects, efforts made to date in the area of programming by governments, national and 
international ngos, and un and other development partners, etc. the volume and quality of information available 
from each of the countries varies, as it was often found that adequate or sufficiently reliable information was not 
available from any accessible source, at least in any of the five working languages of the team. moreover, legal 
reform processes taking place in many countries affected the possibility of accessing updated normative docu-
mentation. to some extent, a similar challenge was faced in obtaining programmatic documentation, often only 
available through consultation with national experts or programmers. the desk studies reflect the varying levels of 
details and types of information provided. 
the desk studies were used by the team members at different stages and for different purposes in the report. 
Primarily, they contributed to an overview of the various aspects that characterize ijs. conducting the country 
desk studies proved to be of great value when selecting the countries studied through field visits. a comparative 
grid containing relevant and specific information extracted from the desk studies was made. on the basis of this 
analysis, a pre-selection of countries of interest for conducting field studies was agreed upon. the latter was then 
used for the selection of the final six country studies.
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country studies
the country studies were carried out in six countries, selected in consultation with the three un agencies. the 
countries studied are: Bangladesh, ecuador, malawi, niger, Papua new guinea and uganda. the methodology was 
developed through a pilot case study in malawi. Qualitative and quantitative aspects were studied in five of the six 
countries. in uganda, it was decided to focus on the qualitative part in order to include three very different areas 
(Karamoja, acholiland and the central region) of the country characterized by three distinct contexts as regards ijs. 
the fact that a number of in-depth research studies on transitional, traditional, informal and primary justice have 
been and are being undertaken in uganda also made the limited quantitative analysis that would have been pos-
sible for this study less relevant. in addition to these country studies, the study benefited from substantial involve-
ment of members of the research team in relevant research and programming work in mozambique and Zambia. 
the country studies were carried out according to a uniform methodology, and identical or very similar categories 
of analysis are used in all of the country study reports. at the same time, the countries were also selected precisely 
because of the dissimilarity of the issues that they could highlight. substantively, family and inheritance law issues, 
particularly as they concern women and children, and the role of religious norms and providers are particularly 
prominent in the niger study. the uganda study permits a greater exploration of land issues and issues affecting 
children, particularly defilement (statutory rape), and the right to a hearing. the malawi study allows some explora-
tion of matrilineal family and inheritance customs. malawi also presents an example of a progressive constitutional 
framework that has been taken very seriously in far-reaching proposals for law reform. Bangladesh and Papua new 
guinea present some innovative perspectives on programming, the former particularly by civil society, and the 
latter through the active engagement of unicef. the ecuador study presents a perspective that is so far absent 
from many other contexts: the dimension of identity, so central to discussions on legal pluralism, and perspectives 
on balancing of individual and collective cultural rights.
the country studies were carried out in partnership with national partner organizations in the respective countries 
to ensure contextual knowledge, assistance in the planning of the qualitative part, and the implementation of the 
quantitative part of the study. 
the QuaLitative part of the country studies 
interviews were conducted with a range of relevant stakeholders at the local and national levels and were both 
individual and group-based. to enable comparison across countries, an interview guide was developed for each of 
the target categories listed below, with a set of relevant themes and questions. the interview guides were open to 
adjustments to the specific context, ensuring the terminology used was relevant and understandable. Where nec-
essary, the national partner organization performed the role of interpreter in interviews with local users and infor-
mal justice providers. information was gathered on respondents’ knowledge of, attitudes toward, and opinions 
on primary justice provision, with a particular focus on informal justice and the position of women and children. 
interviews were carried out with the following respondents:
  representatives of donor and international organizations (involved in primary justice also in formal justice sector)
  representatives of ngos/cBos (headquarter, district and community levels)
  informal justice providers
  representatives of the police (general service and specialized, e.g., victim support unit)
  justice sector actors (national and district levels)
  community members/users
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 group interviews with mixed community members
  group interview with only women
 group interview with only children between 12 and 18 years old
Besides the separate groups of women and juveniles, group interviews aimed to cover a representative sample 
of different relevant categories of people living in the selected area. in practice, however, one of the biggest chal-
lenges when arranging user interviews was influence on the selection of the group. the task was given to the 
national partner organizations, but as they, too, had to go through contacts in the selected areas, the composition 
would often be decided by this contact point. in many cases, it was necessary to go through the local leader or ijs, 
who would then insist on sitting in on the interview, which had an impact on the interviews and discussions. the 
scope of the study did not permit stays of any real length in the areas where interviews were carried out that might 
have permitted an easing of such restrictions. this limitation, in particular, as compared to anthropological studies, 
is openly acknowledged and serves to underscore the importance of more detailed observation and consultation.
in addition to the interviews and the qualitative part of the study, existing data from secondary sources was col-
lected by the national partner organization. the data included documentation on legal frameworks, programmes 
addressing primary justice, documentation on the types of justice providers available and statistical information, as 
well as documentation of cases heard or disputes resolved by informal justice providers (including case records), 
if available.
the Quantitative part of the country studies 
the quantitative part of the country studies included surveys for (a) users of informal justice and (b) informal justice 
providers. the surveys followed a generic questionnaire format to make it comparable with data from other coun-
tries. Where necessary, written translations of the questionnaires were made from english into french or spanish and 
oral interpretation of them into other national languages. the surveys followed the qualitative part, and the national 
partner responsible for carrying out the survey was instructed by the Dihr researchers. it should be noted that it was 
not possible to carry out studies of specific cases and the preference was to gather more wide-ranging information.
interviews were carried out with different categories of respondents, according to different criteria (including 
age, gender, etc.) as established under the methodology of the study. only individual interviews were conducted 
during this part of the study.
individual interviews aimed to assess user knowledge on ijs providers, preferences and the use of ijs, notions of 
justice, organization and legitimacy of ijs, users’ knowledge of programmatic interventions, knowledge of the law 
and human rights. these interviews also looked at providers’ knowledge of the operation of ijs, including proce-
dures, preferences and use, organization, knowledge of programmatic efforts, notions of justice and knowledge of 
legislation and human rights. 
the various aspects raised by the questionnaires were contextualized, depending on the different places where 
the study took place. this required a high level of training for those carrying out the interviews to make sure that 
the right interpretation was given to questions in the different settings. the latter represented a bigger challenge 
in those places where translation from the original language to the local language was required. 
after the data collection, a data clean-up process was undertaken in order to eliminate data entry mistakes, techni-
cal issues or any other problems that could affect the results.
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seLection of geographicaL areas for  
country studies 
for the qualitative part, interviews were carried out in two or three selected districts, where programmes aimed at 
promoting primary justice and addressing primary justice providers have been carried out within the preceding 
three years. the districts chosen included areas representative of the type of ijs most widespread and most com-
monly used in the country, ijs with very specific characteristics, or new ways of addressing ijs, new ways of linking 
the informal to the formal justice systems, or the presence of an interesting combination of formal and informal 
justice providers/actors at the local level. in all countries chosen, there was a preference for rural as opposed to 
urban areas.
the minimal coverage of the quantitative surveys was equivalent to the areas covered in the qualitative part, while 
it was possible in some of the countries to cover additional areas with the quantitative survey. Within each district, 
smaller entities were selected that are either defined by administrative borders or traditional borders, depending 
on what is most relevant in a given area. Please see the country study methodology in the annex to the report for 
the criteria applied in the selection of respondents to ensure representation as well as coverage of marginalized 
and vulnerable groups. 
the qualitative data was collected by small survey teams bringing printed questionnaires with them to the survey 
areas, completing them and handing them over to a national coordinator, who ensured entry of the data in an 
electronic format. this was sent to Dihr in copenhagen to be read into the database and the subsequent analysis 
made using an internet-based data processing tool.
the total number of 1,675 respondents is distributed as follows :
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Limitations
the countries studied are all non-oecD states. this choice is based on the aim that the study be used primarily as 
a programming tool for justice programming in developing and transitional countries. it does mean that the valu-
able insights that can be had through examination of experience of countries such as australia, canada and the 
united states of america have not been examined in any detail for the purposes of the report. Practitioners and 
researchers in search of these insights should refer to existing literature on these countries. 
a similar limitation is acknowledged in relation to the question of collective rights of various kinds, including cul-
tural rights and land rights. the scope of the report did not permit a detailed discussion of these issues or a specific 
chapter devoted to them, though they are referred to in the human rights chapter of the report and in the ecuador 
study. While it is difficult to completely distinguish the discussions on informal justice from those on legal plural-
ism, the question is more central to the latter and is dealt with in greater detail in studies of this topic.
the overall focus of the study is on ijs in ‘normal’ situations, where development issues, rather than conflict, are 
the main concern. While questions of instability, internal conflict and transitional justice are present in relation to 
some of the country studies (in northern uganda and to some extent in Papua new guinea), the overall focus is 
on non-conflict situations. this distinction is necessary to make in studies of informal justice and the focus on non-
conflict situations allowed for a greater discussion of overall policy and direction. nevertheless, it also poses some 
limitations in relation to the applicability of its findings at national level. 
importantly, the present study explicitly examines ijs through the lens of positivist legal standards that have their 
origin in sources such as international human rights law and notions such as the rule of law. it can be (and has 
been) argued that any such attempt amounts to an imposition of standards, with individual biases on systems that 
are fundamentally different in character, valuing group harmony over individual rights. While a criticism such as 
this raises questions of a fundamental character, the approach is defended here as one that (a) provides an analyti-
cal framework that represents the widest consensus available throughout the world and (b) is most true to the 
declared values of the united nations system. moreover, on a practical and operational level, it is to be expected 
that these standards will represent those used as points of reference by programmers and other stakeholders.
reference is made above to the general choice of rural and peri-urban as opposed to urban areas and the conse-
quences of this choice for the operation of ijs and the issues in focus among users.
as with any survey, a number of limitations in the data collection and analysis need to be considered:
  the selection of respondents was carried out with the assistance of local organizations; this may have influ-
enced the responses of respondents.
  the selection of areas visited was influenced by practical and logistical concerns, including time available, 
transport facilities and security (especially in niger and Papua new guinea). in ecuador, it was influenced by the 
willingness of traditional authorities to facilitate or permit the study. 
  the diversity of populations, ijs and social settings means that meaningful comparisons between countries, 
and sometimes even within countries, are difficult to make.
  the sample sizes in the countries are relatively small, which means that, when more than one question is 
crossed with other variables, the number of respondents in some instances is so small that it is not possible to 
make interpretations based on the data. this limitation is also due to the complexity of some of the questions, 
such as those on types of cases and choice of providers.
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 there is a risk of a tendency to please the interviewer, where people can have a tendency to give the answers 
they think are those wished for by the interviewer. moreover, respondents may answer in a way that they think 
favours more interventions and external support, influencing answers given about knowledge and impact of 
both government and donor programming efforts.
  the questionnaire was designed to be easy to administer by the local survey teams, but is has become clear in the 
analysis stage that the use of a questionnaire based on yes/no answers, presents difficulties for statistical analysis. 
the above limitations mean that statements based on the quantitative data analysis are relative and not con-
clusive. tendencies can be identified from a combination of the qualitative and quantitative parts of the studies, 
which can be the basis for further analysis.
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methodoLogy
this case study draws on three sources of information: first, a review of the existing literature on ijs, on local gov-
ernance, human security and justice in Bangladesh; second, on qualitative interviews conducted in june and july 
2009; and third, on a quantitative survey of ijs users and providers carried out in jessore and madaripur districts in 
august 2009. 
the two key study objectives were to understand the characteristics of ijs and to ascertain the scope for improving 
respect for human rights principles through programming opportunities.
as regards the qualitative interviews conducted in june and july 2009, a series of focus group interviews were 
conducted in madaripur, jessore, rangpur, sylhet and rangamati districts with groups of:
a. traditional village-level shalishkars (mediators)
b. ngo and/or ngo-supported mediators (the so-called modified shalish)
c. Village court/arbitration council members
d. young people
e. Women
f. a mixed group comprised of 15 people of different gender, economic status, education and occupation 
interviews were also conducted with district police chiefs and with District court magistrates in each of the five 
districts visited. in addition, interviews were conducted in Dhaka with a range of interlocutors from the govern-
ment, the judiciary, the legal sector, academia, ngos, and international agencies.
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the quantitative research, which was carried out in madaripur and jessore districts under the direction of the ngo, 
Bangladesh legal aid and services trust (Blast), involved the administering of two survey instruments, one for 
informal justice providers (village shalishkars, union Parishad (uP) members who sit as panellists on the village 
court and/or the arbitration council, mediators from ngo-supported shalish forums, and any other), and the other 
for informal justice users. in each district, four uPs were selected, and within each of the uPs, three wards were 
selected (i.e., a total of 12 wards for each district). in each of the wards, a minimum of 15 user questionnaires and 
five provider questionnaires were completed. adding the two districts together, a total of 360 user and 120 pro-
vider questionnaires were administered.
bacKground
overvieW of administrative and JudiciaL structures in bangLadesh
in order to understand how ijs operate in Bangladesh, it is first necessary to understand something of the admin-
istrative, political and judicial structures in the country. Bangladesh is comprised of 64 zilas (districts), which can be 
further subdivided into 460 uapzilas (sub-districts), 4498 unions and about 87,000 villages. 
at the district level, a District commissioner has supervisory responsibility for scrutinizing union-level operations, 
although funds for union-level activities are allocated by administrative units at the uapzila level, from block grants 
received annually from the central government. the District commissioner can, however, exert considerable influ-
ence through his/her responsibility for recruiting union-level public officials and approving all union Parishad 
(uP) projects.
there are no elected representatives at district or uapzila levels, but at uP level there is an elected council com-
prised of 13 members (one directly elected chairman, nine general seats, and three seats reserved for women). the 
uP has responsibility for implementing a variety of development projects with funding distributed by the govern-
ment at the uapzila-level. although uP members may not formally seek election as the representative of one of the 
major political parties, in practice they normally have informal affiliations, as do other prominent community fig-
ures at union level and below: businessmen, leaders of village development and welfare associations, and so forth.
there have been several attempts in Bangladesh’s post-independent history to establish an elected gram sarkar 
(village government) system, none of which have enjoyed bipartisan political support. the most recent experi-
ment in village-level governance was discontinued in 2007.
as regards judicial institutions, the District courts are the principal means by which formal justice is administered in 
rural locations throughout the country. the District courts do not command the same respect as the Bangladeshi 
high court, but this is in large part due to factors beyond the control of the judges and court officials who work 
in them. the courts suffer from a lack of human and financial resources and crumbling infrastructure. there are 
long case backlogs1 and judges, in addition to their normal functions, are burdened with numerous administrative 
functions. case backlogs and poor salaries are said to be contributing factors to significant levels of corruption 
within the District courts. having said this, however, the perception of local people interviewed in this study was 
overwhelmingly that the District courts were fairer and more impartial than village courts or traditional village-
based shalish, which is perceived to be often subject to elite capture.
at uP level, there exist statutory village courts2 and arbitration councils, the members of which are primarily com-
prised of uP councillors. the village courts are mandated to hear a variety of civil and minor criminal law mat-
1 as of january 2010, there were 15 lakh (1.5 million) cases pending with the country’s subordinate courts. (source: report on a 
Parliamentary law and justice subcommittee report, The Daily Star, february 14, 2010)
2 the Village court act, 2006.
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ters and have authority to award compensation up to a ceiling of tK 25,000.3 the arbitration councils, originally 
established under the muslim family law ordinance,4 have a mandate to hear and resolve various family disputes: 
divorce, polygamy and maintenance. in terms of their mandate and operating procedures, these institutions are 
in many respects much closer to informal dispute resolution, or shalish, than to the formal courts. the operation of 
the Village and arbitration courts are discussed in greater detail in the next section below. 
Within the central government, responsibility for the uPs falls under the authority of the ministry for local gov-
ernment, rural Development and cooperatives (mlgrDc). this reflects the important role of the uPs as vehicles 
for decentralized governance and rural economic development. But with respect to the uP members’ roles as 
(occasional) members of the Village court and arbitration council, the mlgrDc is not so well placed to exercise 
guidance and provide support as would be, for example, the Bangladesh judiciary or the ministry of law, justice 
and constitutional affairs (moljPa).
it has been said that Bangladesh has one of the lowest ratios of police officers to heads of population anywhere in 
the world.5 Police stations are established in all uapzillas. Below this level, there is no permanent police presence. 
Police can stay abreast of developments at the union level and below through operational contacts with the uPs, 
with traditional village leaders and with various formal local associations and social groupings. in some parts of the 
country, community policing arrangements at the ward level have been established or are being trialled. commu-
nity policing citizens committees, under the supervision of the uP chairman or another person appointed by the 
uP, meet to settle small-scale disputes, to maintain a register of crimes, and to report regularly to the police about 
law and order developments.
the police have a very poor reputation in rural communities; they are perceived as being susceptible to corrup-
tion, as unlikely to provide assistance without payment of a bribe, and as unlikely to protect poor people in the 
community or women from violence or threats of violence. People interviewed for this study said consistently that 
they feared the police. many said that they would rather seek resolution of a crime through the village authorities 
or through the intervention of a uP member or ngo than by contacting the police. these findings are similar to 
those from several previous studies.
there is a great disparity between the level of training of police officers, who are selected from the very best per-
forming candidates for the public service entrance exam, and regular police, who are poorly trained, poorly paid 
and resistant to change. in their defence, police in rural districts may also face considerable external pressure from 
influential members of the community: local elites, rich landowners and representatives of political parties, to 
compromise complaints of the poor. 
as part of an ongoing police reform programme supported by unDP and DfiD, over 20,000 community police 
(laypersons) have already been appointed over the past three years with an ultimate goal of 40,000 community 
police countrywide. the programme is also addressing issues of gender mainstreaming, police responsiveness to 
vulnerable groups and protection for victims and witnesses. six pilot victim support units were established in early 
2009. there are plans to hire an additional 3,000 female police (at present, only 1.5 percent of the police force are 
women) so that there is at least one female police officer in every police station. strategies are being developed to 
improve police responsiveness and sensitivity towards women, children and representatives of vulnerable groups 
who seek police assistance.
3 equivalent to us $532.44 (exchange rate quoted on www.oanda.com, 1 september 2010)
4 the muslim family law ordinance, 1961.
5 lewis and hossain, 2008, p. 53.
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the operation of informaL Justice systems  
in bangLadesh 
there is a saying in Bangladesh that ‘if you wish to take a goat to court, you have to sell a cow.’ not only the courts, 
but the whole formal justice system is alien to many poor people’s lives. this is borne out by the surveys conducted 
for this study, which show that a large majority of people wish to resolve their disputes through mediation, either 
at the village level, or with the assistance of uP members or an ngo/community service organization. although 
many informants also acknowledge problems with traditional village-based mediation, which are discussed in 
detail below, there is a tendency to try to find the best solution amongst the informal justice possibilities that exist 
rather than approaching the police or the district court.
the traditionaL ShaliSh
for many hundreds or even thousands of years, disputes in local communities in Bengal and elsewhere on the sub-
continent have been decided through village-based dispute resolution or shalish, as it is most commonly known 
in Bangladesh. even today, the large majority of civil or minor criminal disputes are resolved through shalish of one 
form or another, rather than through the formal courts or the intervention of the local government or the police. 
procedures
the shalish is not governed by formal rules or procedures. some shalish may take the form of voluntary submis-
sion to arbitration, where the parties to the dispute submit to the judgment of the shalish panel; others take the 
form of a mediation, where the shalishkars assist the parties to find a mutually acceptable solution. even in this 
form of shalish, there may be considerable pressure on the parties, by virtue of the public nature of the forum or 
the seniority of the shalishkars, to accept a proffered solution. some respondents suggested that traditional shalish 
processes can occasionally be subjected to nefarious influences when middlemen ‘arrange’ shalish mediations on 
behalf of disputing parties.
the shalish normally takes place in public – under a tree or in a building owned by the local community. in addition 
to the shalishkars and the parties to the dispute and family members, there will also be onlookers, sometimes a 
sizeable group. Shalish sessions are not formal or static; on the contrary, they can be and often are lively and impas-
sioned, with the parties, their supporters and even onlookers seeking to impress on the panel their point of view, 
sometimes several persons at the same time.
in general terms, the role of the shalishkars is to guide the parties to the dispute toward a resolution, and, in an 
appropriate case, to reach a verdict as to payment or compensation or some other form of reparations or the pun-
ishment of the guilty party. 
as discussed in subsequent sections, ngos in Bangladesh have succeeded in fostering reforms and improvements 
of traditional shalish through engaging at the community level in consultative and participatory approaches, 
bringing the process closer to mediation than traditional arbitration.
subJect matter and outcomes
the subject of the dispute might be a disagreement between neighbours, a conflict between a husband and wife 
or between their two families, or a minor criminal matter (a case of theft or damage of property). By Bangladeshi 
law, shalish committees do not have authority in relation to criminal cases or marriage and dowry disputes, but 
there is some leeway in how the law is administered at the local level. there is consensus at least that serious 
criminal matters – cases of murder or rape, acid-throwing or kidnapping – must always be dealt with by the formal 
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justice system. Shalish committees may order the payment of compensation by the guilty party, but must not 
imprison a person or order or carry out any other form of punishment. extra-judicial punishment is unlawful in 
Bangladesh, but the practice of the imposition of punishments by shalish committees continues today in many 
rural communities. the guilty party may be forced to wear a necklace of shoes, may have his or her face ground 
in the dirt or be publically humiliated in some other way, or may be temporarily banished from the community. 
in some cases, shalish committees have issued orders for imprisonment, whipping or other cruel and extreme 
forms of physical punishment. the Daily star of 29 june 2009, for example, reported a case in comilla District where 
a widow of 40 and a younger man, aged 25, accused of engaging in anti-social activity, received 202 and 101 lashes 
respectively, following a fatwa (religious edict) made by a village shalish committee under the guidance of a local 
religious leader. in the case in question, the police responded to a complaint subsequently made by the widow 
and arrested six people, including the members of the committee and the religious leader in question. the case is 
an illustration of ‘cruel shalish’, as it is commonly known.
it is very difficult to assess the extent to which this type of shalish takes place today and the study did not reveal 
any assessments on this score. some commentators believe that the influence of Shariah islamic law over village 
shalish is much less now than it was in the past, with the increasing involvement of uP members in local justice 
processes and the emergence of other elites in local communities, e.g., representatives of political parties, private 
businessmen, community development and women’s empowerment organizations. 
in the uPs in which this study was conducted, there was a high level of awareness amongst all stakeholder groups 
of those categories of cases that cannot be dealt with by ijs and of the prohibition on corporal punishment or 
imprisonment. on the other hand, various degrading or humiliating forms of punishment (e.g., the necklace of 
shoes) seemed to be still quite commonly practiced – and accepted – by informants. this study took place in jes-
sore and madaripur, two of the provinces where there has been the most intensive ngo activity on reform of shal-
ish and provision of community legal services and it is possible that the responses received in the user and provider 
questionnaires do not reflect conditions in a ‘typical’ Bangladeshi rural community. 
composition
in the traditional shalish, the dispute is adjudicated/presided over by village leaders, who are mostly but not always 
exclusively men. as this study revealed, it is increasingly common for uP members to participate in village shalish, 
by virtue of their authority as elected community representatives. the traditional informal village leaders do not 
have the same level of authority in village life as they once had. even though uP members have in many cases 
received no formal training to equip them to carry out their duties as Village court judges, they are connected to 
the state administration at uapzilla and district levels by virtue of their positions, and it could be expected that this 
would be reflected in the way in which they adjudicate village-level disputes, particularly as regards respect for 
the criminal law.
it is important to emphasize that shalish is not only a feature of rural village life; informal dispute resolution com-
mittees of one form or another are also commonplace in urban communities, as well as in public and private insti-
tutions: schools, public sector workplaces, clothing factories, and so forth. the resolution of interpersonal disputes 
through mediation or arbitration is a part of the fabric of Bengali society. this has been recognised by successive 
governments in Bangladesh through the establishment of statutory Village courts. likewise, community develop-
ment advocates and legal empowerment organizations have made long-standing efforts to develop and support 
models for community-based mediation that draw on the strengths of the shalish tradition while incorporating 
norms of constitutional and human rights law as regards equal participation, fairness and impartiality in adjudica-
tion, sensitivity to the rights of women and children, and protection and redress for victims of crime. the Village 
courts, arbitration councils, and ngo-promoted ijs are addressed in the following sections of the report. 
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viLLage courts and arbitration counciLs
Both the Village courts and arbitration councils operate under the aegis of the uP. the uP chairman takes a lead-
ing role in relation to both institutions. 
arbitration counciLs
the arbitration councils (ac) operate pursuant to the muslim family law ordinance. they have jurisdiction to hear 
and determine various family law matters for muslim families, among them divorce, maintenance, the payment 
of dower, and polygamy. the tradition of dower, whereby a bride was paid or promised a sum of money and/or 
goods in kind by the bridegroom, is now less common in Bangladesh than previously. Polygamy is in fact banned 
by article 5 of the ordinance, although the ac retains discretion to approve the contracting of a polygamous 
union, on application of the would-be husband, if it is satisfied that the marriage is necessary. the ac does not 
have jurisdiction over disputes arising in non-muslim families. 
ac panels are comprised of three persons: the uP chairman together with two other panellists, one chosen by 
each party. as with the Vc, judgments are determined by a majority of the panel. there is no statutory financial 
limit specified for awards or compensation or maintenance made by the ac.
viLLage courts 
the Village courts (Vcs) were initially established under the Village courts ordinance of 1976 to handle minor civil 
and criminal matters at the union level, and, in so doing, to reduce the burden on the District courts. Vcs are cur-
rently regulated by the Village courts act of 2006, the main features of which are the following:
  jurisdiction: the Vcs’ jurisdiction is limited to those matters specified in schedules 1 and 2 of the act. as regards 
criminal offences, the Vc may hear cases concerning theft, theft in a dwelling house, criminal breach of trust, 
and dishonest misappropriation of property. concerning civil matters, the court may hear suits for recovery of 
money due under contact, recovery of movable and immovable property, and claims for compensation for 
wrongfully damaging movable property. subject to some exceptions, these matters cannot be dealt with by 
the District court as a court of first instance. 
  in criminal cases, the Vc has jurisdiction to issue a fine and/or the payment of compensation to victims up to an 
amount of tK 25,000. similarly, in civil cases, the Vc can consider cases dealing with matters of up to tK 25,000, 
which is also the maximum amount it can award to an aggrieved party. Vc decisions are taken by simple major-
ity, declared publically and given in writing.
  composition: Vc panels are comprised of five members: the chairman of the uP (unless he or she is incapable 
of chairing or his neutrality has been brought into question by one of the parties) and two members selected 
by each party to the dispute, one of whom must be a member of the uP. the panel for each case is therefore 
comprised of three uP members (one of them the chairman) and two community representatives. the quota 
of a minimum of three women representatives on uPs ensures the availability of some women who can serve 
as adjudicators on the Vcs.
  Procedure: Procedural and substantive laws and rules of evidence which apply to the District and high courts 
do not apply to the Vc. 
  lawyers do not have standing to appear in Vc cases. 
  applicants to the Vc pay a nominal fee of tK 5 or similar to file an application. 
While it is difficult to assess the extent to which Vcs are operational across Bangladesh, it is likely that many of them 
are either not functioning at all or are rarely utilized. the respondents in this study showed a very high level of 
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awareness of the Vc, and Vcs were said to be operational in each of the five districts in which qualitative interviews 
were undertaken. But since the study was focused primarily on madaripur and jessore, and the interviews were 
facilitated with the assistance of the legal services ngo, Blast, it is possible that the key informants and interviews 
contained a disproportionate number of people who had had contact with them.
By contrast, a survey of 10,000 people from 500 uPs, conducted in early 2009 as part of the unDP and european 
union-supported ‘activating Village courts’ project,6 found that only 24 percent of respondents were aware of the 
Vcs’ existence. furthermore, the study found that a majority of uP chairmen and members interviewed did not 
have a clear understanding of the Vcs’ jurisdiction. in this regard, cases of violence against women were said to 
constitute a significant proportion of the cases considered by Vcs in the uPs surveyed, even though this issue does 
not fall within the mandate of the Vc.
caseLoad and Jurisdiction of viLLage courts
these findings on Vc jurisdiction are broadly similar to those from this study. While there was a high level of under-
standing of the prohibition on hearing serious criminal matters (rape, acid-throwing, murder, trafficking and kid-
napping), a number of Vc magistrates said that they hear cases involving family disputes and domestic violence. 
the study also showed that, while relatively few cases are heard by the Vc each month (between five and 10, 
in most cases), uP members often participate in 20 or more informal mediation sessions, either in the uP office 
or in the village. local people approach uP members and ask them to facilitate a mediation process rather than 
applying to the Village court for an arbitrated resolution of the dispute. in the opinion of one uP chairman from 
rangpur, uP members also prefer to act as mediators than as judges, since, as politicians, it is more in their interests 
to facilitate a mutually acceptable solution for all parties to the dispute rather than to favour one over the other.
the existing tK 25,000 limit provided for in the Village courts act was probably intended to ensure that more seri-
ous matters were not dealt with by the Vc, but were instead filed in the District court, where the formal legal and 
procedural rules apply and where conflicts of interest are less likely to arise. But, in fact, cases ineligible for hearing 
by the Vc, either due to the financial limit or to the jurisdictional limitations, are more likely to be heard informally 
in the community than submitted to the District court for adjudication. here, there is also a paradox: while infor-
mants generally have a good opinion of the impartiality of the District court and perceive it as a better forum to 
obtain justice, they nevertheless prefer to have a dispute settled in the local community, despite the weaknesses 
and potential injustices of community-based ijs. 
there are good arguments for raising the tK 25,000 limit and for extending the jurisdiction of the court so that it 
can also hear some family and neighbour disputes or cases of domestic violence. as with those cases where the 
compensation sought is over tK 25,000, the tendency for cases of family violence is to ask village elders or uP 
members to conduct a shalish or to approach an ngo to mediate in the matter, rather than to go to the District 
court. the ac and Vc members have not received training in basic legal, constitutional or human rights principles 
that would assist them in dealing with matters involving the rights of women and children, but neither have the 
village elders. at least with the uP members, it is possible to hold them accountable for their actions in various 
ways, as discussed in the following section. the issue of training is also discussed below.
Legitimacy, accountabiLity, impartiaLity and independence
many anthropologists have documented the patron-client nature of rural power structures in Bangladesh and 
have argued that such structures are ‘anti-poor’ by nature, resistant to reforms that would improve access to justice 
for poor people or that would promote gender equality or women’s empowerment and participation in society, 
6 this programme is considered in greater detail in section 5 of this study.
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including in ijs. Public perceptions of the Vc are closely related to the profile and credibility of the uP chairman 
and the other uP members who sit as panellists. as discussed above, uP members have a high public profile in 
local communities and they have to a significant extent begun to share the role of local-level justice provision that 
has traditionally been the domain of village leaders. the dual roles of the uP chairman and uP members who sit as 
ac or Vc magistrates can bring into question the impartiality of the Vc. such a blending of political, executive and 
judicial roles would not be considered acceptable at the higher levels of the judicial system. 
it has been argued that, while the construction of the Vcs and their placement within the uP structure is not ideal, 
there are at least some procedural safeguards in place through the ability of disputants to choose a majority of 
the panellists and to object to the involvement of the uP chairman if they feel that he will be unable to hear the 
matter fairly and objectively. 
at the structural level, while the uPs are not the ideal ‘home’ for the Vcs or acs, they do have some indirect account-
ability features built into them: to the central government and to parliament, through their responsibility to account 
for use of finances; and public accountability, through administrative law principles (the Vcs and acs, as organs 
linked to the uPs currently fall within the mandate of the mlgrDc) and through local government elections. 
ideally, the Vc and ac could operate independently of local government representatives and structures. the only 
feasible alternative would be to place the Vcs and the acs under the administrative responsibility of the mojlPa, 
but this is not feasible given that the District courts are already severely overburdened and that none of the infra-
structure necessary to establish a physical presence of the moljPa at uP level is in place. for the foreseeable future, 
the Vcs and the acs will continue to be connected to the uPs, and the challenge for justice sector programming 
will be to develop and implement accountability measures that can guard against the potential for abuse.
support and training of vcs, incLuding programming considerations
it is this recognition of the potential of the Vc as a cheap and accessible alternative to the village shalish for ordi-
nary people, one which is not alien to poor people’s lives in the way the formal justice system can be, which lies 
behind several initiatives to activate the village courts and to improve their capacity and effectiveness. 
one of the major challenges for improving the quality of decision-making in the Vcs (and acs) is that neither 
of them receives budgetary or logistical support from the government. from interviews conducted in the five 
districts in which this study was undertaken, it seems that the uP chairman is often simultaneously the court’s 
registrar, secretary, documentalist and chairman. further, few, if any, uP chairmen/members have to date received 
any form of training to assist them in carrying out their duties in either tribunal. 
in this regard, there is a potential, but so far unexplored role for the mlgDrc and the moljPa (perhaps both minis-
tries working together in co-operation with the District courts) to provide training, support functions, monitoring 
and oversight of the operations of Vc and acs across the country. civil society organizations could also contribute. 
madaripur legal aid agency, a legal services organisation that has for many years been operating a community-
based dispute resolution model that draws on the strengths of the traditional shalish but that also emphasizes 
gender inclusion and respect for fundamental constitutional principles, has in recent years begun to provide train-
ing in mediation, basic legal skills and constitutional principles for Vc members in madaripur District. 
according to the Director and founder of mlaa, mr fazlul huq, the decision to support the Vcs is in part a means 
to ensure that the mediation model developed and championed by mlaa over the past 30 years continues to be 
used in madaripur in the future, ‘after the funding for mlaa has dried up’. the activities of mlaa and other ngos 
are to a large extent dependent on ongoing support from international cooperation partners. the Vc is an institu-
tion of the government, and the government has a responsibility to provide the means and resources for it to be 
able to function effectively, even if it does not do so at present. 
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in mr huq’s assessment, the Vc, despite its current limitations, can be an attractive alternative to village shalish for 
poor people, since there is no role for ‘middle-men’, people who try to earn money by ‘arranging’ the shalish on the 
part of the disputants. Villagers are already familiar with the uP and the uP members, and they have the possibil-
ity in a Vc case to nominate representatives whom they trust to sit on the adjudication panel. recognizing that 
much of the justice-related work being carried out by uP chairmen and members is informal mediation rather than 
Vc arbitration, the focus of mlaa’s support has been on teaching uP members the ‘madaripur mediation model’ 
(described in detail in the following section). as mr huq says:
“The VC and voluntary mediation can complement each other. The UP members can resolve some 
disputes by mediation, and some by adjudication. Maybe they don’t have a very good understanding 
of the law, but we can teach them a sense of the justice of the case.”
a four-year unDP and eu delegation-supported project, ‘activating Village courts in Bangladesh’, launched in 2009 
and worth almost $15 million, is seeking to strengthen the village court system in 500 selected uPs across Bangla-
desh. the project also seeks to develop capacity of village court members, uP representatives and support staff. 
the project has four components: (i) a review of the existing legal framework, which will result in the submission 
to the goB of a proposal for reform of the existing Village courts act; (ii) capacity development of uP chairmen, 
focusing on knowledge-sharing and best national and international practices, (iii) village police and staff of village 
courts; awareness-raising on the roles and functions of village courts amongst potential court users, community-
based organisations, school teachers and religious leaders; and (iv) technical assistance to the local government 
Department and the mlgrDc to strengthen oversight, monitoring and evaluation of Vc activities.
community-based Justice, mediation and peace-buiLding initiatives
the changing nature of traditional shalish, discussed above and commented upon by many researchers, is almost 
entirely due to the efforts of ngos, since very few if any resources have been allocated by the government to 
justice service delivery below the District court level. there are many ngos involved in justice or legal services 
deliveries at the community level in Bangladesh. they are engaged in provision of legal services in relation to the 
formal justice system as well as the aDr-type approaches discussed here. some ngos provide generalized services 
for all types of personal and community disputes; others, such as ain o Shalish Kendra (asK) and Banchte shekha 
(Bs), focus on family and women’s issues: dower, maintenance, guardianship, child custody and divorce. some of 
them, like mlaa, have developed their own distinctive dispute resolution models, sometimes known as moder-
ate or reformed shalish, which retain the informal and communitarian nature of traditional shalish, but which 
incorporate constitutional and human rights norms, in particular the principles of free and equal participation, 
non-discrimination and gender equity. 
structure, estabLishment and composition
the mlaa mediation model works in the following way:7
the ngo identifies local contact persons to disseminate information on mediation as an alternative to traditional 
mediation or to the formal court system. community-based mediation organizations (cBmos) are then estab-
lished with the help of the ngo, which trains cBmo members in human rights, gender equity, law and mediation. 
cBmo members are all volunteers and do not receive any remuneration. they could be retired teachers, nurses, 
public servants or others who have had some formal training or who enjoy respect in the community. the cBmos 
are comprised of both men and women, and women are represented on all mediation panels. 
7 this description draws heavily on the summary description in stapleton, 2010, pp. 63-64.
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the ngo then appoints a paid mediation worker to provide administrative and logistical support to each cBmo. 
his or her tasks are to receive applications for mediation, arrange and supervise mediation sessions, and follow up 
and monitor compliance with the solution reached by the parties. 
mediation workers at the village level report to a supervisor who is responsible for supporting the work of all medi-
ation workers in his or her area. an mlaa monitoring, evaluation and research cell maintains updated information 
on mediation procedures and data on all sessions conducted and outcomes. mlaa leaders maintain an ongoing 
dialogue with local religious and political leaders and police, so as to ensure ongoing support for the activities of 
the cBmos. 
procedures empLoyed
one common feature of ngo-sponsored or supported ijs is that they are based on mediation rather than arbitra-
tion. in ngo-sponsored shalish, the panelists seek to engage both parties in settling the dispute, with a view to 
reaching a mutually acceptable solution. the process is much more participatory than a traditional shalish and 
there is a high level of compliance with decisions reached. this is because (a) they have been accepted by both 
sides and (b) the presence of family members and neighbours, together with the involvement of local mediators 
under the aegis of a locally based and respected ngo, creates social pressure on the parties to keep the promises 
they have made. Procedures for the recording of agreements differ from organization to organization, as do moni-
toring and follow-up measures. in many cases, the ngos can also provide legal aid for parties wishing to apply to 
the District court, if mediation is not successful or the agreement does not hold. 
acceptance and effects
in general, traditional authorities welcome the activities of the cBmos, since it reduces their caseload and is seen 
as a positive contribution toward the maintenance of harmony in village life. it is also clear that, in those parts of 
the country where ngo-sponsored mediation programmes have been prominent, there has also been a flow-on 
effect to the village shalish. focus groups of traditional shalishkars in rangpur and in rangamati both confirmed 
that the presence of Bangladesh legal aid and services trust (Blast) and other ngos offering mediation services 
had raised community expectations. People were less likely to submit to an arbitrated process at the village level 
when they could choose a more participatory process instead. Women who had participated in training provided 
by ngos demanded that women be represented on the shalish panels. the involvement of female uP members in 
village mediations had become more common. there was now an expectation that, if one of the disputants was a 
woman, then there should be also at least one woman represented on the panel.
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preferences of users and profiLes  
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WHEN YOU HAVE A PROBLEM OR CASE, WHICH JUSTICE 
PROVIDER DO YOU PREFER TO GO TO FIRST?
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the figures in these graphs show that the various forms of ijs – community mediators, traditional leaders and local 
administrators (uP members) – are all ranked highly among the list of preferred justice providers. Police and Village 
courts do not currently rank highly among the respondents interviewed.
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WHAT CHARACTERIZES A GOOD JUSTICE PROVIDER?
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What Has Been Said
Treats Everyone Coming to Have a 
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and Interests
Keeps Peace in the Community
Allows the Parties in the Case to 
Discuss the Resolution
Knows the Law
Treats You with Respect 
and Politeness
18. Annex 2 – Page 16
WHICH JUSTICE PROVIDER WOULD YOU NOT APPROACH BECAUSE OF PRICE/COST?
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Village/Community Mediators (VM)
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provider profiLes
IF THERE IS A CONFLICT IN A FAMILY BETWEEN THE CHILD AND 
HIS/HER PARENTS, WOULD THE CHILD BE REPRESENTED BY 
SOMEONE DEFENDING HIS/HER INTERESTS?
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human rights issues arising out of the in-
formaL Justice systems
introduction
the preamble to the constitution of the People’s republic of Bangladesh proclaims that it “shall be a fundamental 
aim of the state to realise through the democratic process […] a society in which the rule of law, fundamental 
human rights and freedom, equality and justice, political, economic and social, will be secured for all citizens.”
article 11 of the constitution provides that “the republic shall be a democracy in which fundamental human rights 
and freedoms and respect for the dignity and worth of the human person shall be guaranteed, and in which effec-
tive participation by the people through their elected representatives in administration at all levels shall be ensured.”
article 27 provides further that “all citizens are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection of the law.”
the guiding principles and rights guarantees contained in the constitution provide a framework for measuring 
the effectiveness of governance and justice institutions in Bangladesh, first and foremost of official institutions, 
but also of informal bodies, since the state’s human rights protection obligations extend beyond its own acts and 
omissions and require it to take positive measures to protect, promote and ensure respect for human rights prin-
ciples in all areas of society, including in the domestic sphere. 
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75 percent of Bangladesh’s population of 150 million people live in rural areas.8 the majority of the rural population 
are poor and it is estimated that more than 50 percent of them earn less than tK 15 (1 us$) per day. Very few of 
these people will ever have any contact with the formal justice system.
the government’s principal response to the justice needs of local communities to date has been to establish acs 
and Vcs. to date, the potential of the Vcs has been largely unrealized, but, with the new ‘activating Village courts 
Programme’, the government is taking a significant first step toward providing the necessary resources and know-
how for Vcs to be a viable justice provider – and a source of inspiration and of good practices for other informal 
justice providers – at the community level. 
this is a welcome first step, but more needs to be done. in particular, the government should also take an active 
interest in the operations of village shalish and of the various ngo-supported mediation initiatives that are operating 
at the uP level and below, so as to realize the promises of the constitution and to fulfil its human rights obligations. 
Women and informaL Justice systems
the difficult situation faced by many Bangladeshi women in their daily lives has been well documented in numer-
ous reports and is also acknowledged by the government and in a significant number of laws, ordinances, govern-
ment programmes and advocacy campaigns. 
article 28 (2) of the constitution provides that women shall have equal rights with men in all spheres of the state 
and of public life, but this is at best an aspiration rather than a right that can be claimed or enforced in practice in 
Bangladesh at present.
the national maternal mortality rate in Bangladesh is one of the worst in asia; every year, about 11,000 women die 
giving birth, as most deliveries take place at home without a skilled professional.  it has been calculated that one 
in every seven maternal deaths is due to domestic violence.  Bangladesh is one of the few countries in the world 
where women have a lower life expectancy than men. Women, particularly poor women, have very restricted life 
choices. most of the decisions regarding their lives are made by others: by their families, by their husbands, by 
male village leaders. Domestic violence is commonplace, both in rural and urban communities. as in many other 
societies where domestic violence is commonplace, women are often trapped in dysfunctional marital and family 
relationships, unable to seek redress or to break free from a violent relationship due to poverty, lack of education, 
fear of reprisals, or of bringing shame upon themselves or upon their children.
it is in this context that Bangladeshi women’s participation and potential to obtain fair and equitable outcomes 
from ijs should be assessed. Promoting the participation of women as shalish panellists and encouraging the more 
active participation of female disputants – including ensuring the rights of women to freely present their point of 
view during the hearing – are important and worthwhile goals for reform of ijs in rural Bangladesh, but they are 
unlikely to be enough in themselves, since they do not address the underlying causes of women’s disempower-
ment and vulnerability in Bangladeshi society. 
in women’s focus groups conducted for this study, there was general agreement that traditional shalish favours 
men’s interests, and, furthermore, that unmarried women and widows are at a particular disadvantage. it was also 
clear that those women who have had contact with women’s ngos or participated in ngo-sponsored shalish 
were in a much better position to articulate the problems with the village shalish and had higher expectations 
of what types of ijs reforms should take place. in this regard, the quota of a minimum of three female uP mem-
bers has created a group of female community leaders who have a level of authority by virtue of their office that 
women have not had previously. the practice of inviting uP members to participate in village shalish has meant 
that some village shalish have now for the first time started including female panellists, at least in family matters or 
8 Van schendel, 2009, p. 232.
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matters involving female disputants. as the practice spreads, so does the expectation amongst (female) members 
of the community that female participation should be the norm. 
as mentioned above, the values of gender equity and of free and equal participation by the parties to the dispute 
championed by the ngo-coordinated mediation programmes have also had a positive influence on village shal-
ish in those areas where ngos have been active. Where the ngo-sponsored shalish is popular and well respected, 
this creates positive pressure on traditional village leaders to incorporate aspects of the ngo model into their 
own shalish forums. ngo activity has, without a doubt, been significant in positively challenging negative cultural 
norms at village level and in raising awareness of those categories of cases that by law cannot be dealt with by ijs 
and of the prohibition on physical punishments or imprisonment.
at the same time, however, it is also acknowledged by all stakeholders that, despite the legal prohibition on cultural 
practices which are damaging to women’s interests and security, such as dowry demands, ‘eve teasing’ (described 
below), acid-throwing and other forms of harassment or violence against women, these practices continue to 
be widespread. neither the informal nor the formal justice system seems able or willing to effectively address or 
combat these practices. Women’s ngos provide a valuable source of support or legal assistance for victims of 
these offences, but only a very small percentage of victims are able or willing to approach an ngo (or other pos-
sible provider of legal or social support) for assistance. 
the practice of dowry-giving (by the wife’s family) is said to be contrary to the principles of islam and has also, 
since the adoption of the Dowry Prohibition act in 1980, been prohibited in Bangladesh. since that time, several 
other laws have been adopted seeking to address acts of violence against women, among them the cruelty to 
Women ordinance in 1983 and the Women and children repression Prevention act in 2000, which provided for 
punishment of crimes against women and children including the death penalty, depending on the seriousness of 
the incident. By virtue of the Women and children repression Prevention act, the taking or demanding of a dowry 
can result in imprisonment, a fine or both.
Despite the adoption of these laws and the islamic prohibition on the receiving of dowry,9 dowry demands con-
tinue to be commonplace and are perhaps even increasing in Bangladesh, amongst both rich and poor families. 
on the other hand, based upon the payment of dower, which is required by islamic law and which is also formally 
recognized in the Bangladeshi legal and judicial system (disputes about the payment of dower are one of the mat-
ters that can be dealt with by the arbitration council under the muslim family law ordinance), a survey carried 
out in Dhaka10 found that 88 percent of recently married muslim wives did not receive dower, but were forced to 
give a dowry. Dowries are seen by many men as a get-rich-quick instrument, a perfect means by which to achieve 
upward material mobility. 
Dowry demands are believed to be one of the major factors behind violence against women in Bangladesh today. 
the problem has been recognized by both the government and ngos, but the scale of the problem and the fact 
that dowry negotiations (and the violence that is associated with late or no payment of the dowry) take place 
within families and are kept secret makes it difficult to tackle it effectively. the government has responded by 
passing the Women and children’s act, which also creates a special family court to hear matters addressed in the 
act. more recently (as described in section 1), victims’ support units have been established as a pilot initiative at 
some police stations. But for the reasons described above, few women are willing to approach the justice system 
or the police for assistance. fear of reprisals, financial insecurity, fear of consequences for children to the marriage, 
and the risk of ostracism from family and community all conspire to keep women silent about the abuse they face.
9 according to the Qur’an, receiving dowry from the bride’s family is haram, forbidden by the islamic law; it is the husband’s family 
that should provide mohorana (otherwise known as dower), money for the bride’s family.
10 Described in monsoor, 2003.
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effectively combating dowry-related (and other) forms of violence against women requires concerted action by 
the government at all levels. the weaknesses of the police force at the local government level have already been 
described, and there is no doubt that, if progress is to be made, the police must be willing to act decisively, also in 
matters in the domestic sphere where they have been traditionally reluctant to interfere. 
But other governance and justice-sector institutions at the local level, both formal and informal, can play decisive 
roles. if the government engages directly with traditional leaders and ijs mechanisms, encouraging them to pro-
vide effective and proactive justice for women, while at the same time raising public awareness, in collaboration 
with ngos, more women will be willing to seek justice rather than to suffer in silence. as village and community 
leaders and mediators begin to act, as community awareness is raised, and where police demonstrate that they 
will actively enforce the law where violations are taking place or people are at risk, women will also receive more 
support from family members and from the community at large. 
chiLdren and informaL Justice systems
Very little has been written about the situation of children in ijs in Bangladesh. like other traditional societies, 
children in local communities in Bangladesh generally do not participate in ijs. if the matter is one where their 
interests are affected, someone (a relative – either a parent, or in the case of a custody matter, an uncle) will speak 
on their behalf.
this was confirmed by children’s focus groups in the five districts in which the study was undertaken. children 
interviewed were more or less unanimous in the view that children do not play any part in traditional shalish. they 
are unlikely to be present at all, since shalish is considered a matter for adults; yet, even if they are present, they will 
not have a right to speak. 
there was also a consensus amongst the children interviewed that being a child (or a young adult) is a disadvan-
tage in village life. older people enjoy greater respect and an older person’s opinion will invariably be accepted 
over the point of view of a child. 
the focus of ngo work and of government awareness-raising programmes to date has been almost exclusively 
on improving the level and quality of participation of women in the justice system. little, if any, attention has been 
given to the participation of children in ijs.
While children do not have a role in traditional village shalish, the shalish concept is widely used in Bangladeshi 
schools as a means of resolving conflicts that arise between students. an example given by children in jessore was 
of a case of ‘eve-teasing’, or sexual harassment, of a girl student by a boy. according to the children, police in jessore 
town were also aware of the eve-teasing phenomenon, and they had been responsive to it when complaints had 
been made. children in rangamati town told of a similar incident that had occurred in a residential area:
‘In the colony (residential area) in which they live, a boy had teased a girl. Afterwards, the girl told 
her parents about what had happened and they informed an elite person, who arranged a shalish 
on the family’s behalf. In the shalish, the boy confessed his wrongdoing and asked the girl and her 
family to forgive him.’ 
cases of eve-teasing have gained increasing national prominence in recent years. according to figures released by 
the ngo, ain o Shalish Kendra (asK), in june 2010,11 14 girls had taken their own lives over the past few months 
in Bangladesh as a consequence of harassment they had faced. the problem is considered serious enough by the 
ministry of education that they have designated a special day, june 13, as ‘’eve-teasing Protection Day’. accord-
ing to the minister for education, nurul islam nahid, there were cases where female students had dropped out of 
school or had been encouraged by their parents to do so because they felt that their safety and honour were at 
11 as reported by BBc news south asia online on 11 june 2010, ’Bangladesh “eve teasing” craze takes a terrible toll.’
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risk. in some places, schools had been shut down and exams delayed because of problems of stalkers harassing 
female students and teachers. the problem has also been acknowledged by the police at the highest levels: the 
head of Police nur mohammed said that the harassment and the cases of suicide were ‘a cause for grave concern’.12
as with dowry-related violence, combating sexual harassment requires a concerted effort at all levels of gov-
ernment, by the police and by all justice providers, both formal and informal. there is potential here too for the 
government, with the support of or even active cooperation with ngos, to work together with ijs providers to 
sensitize them, and through them local communities, to the prohibition on sexual harassment and to the need 
to take positive measures to bring the problem to light and to ensure that girls and young women do not keep 
silent due to a sense of shame, but be willing to speak up and to make complaints when harassment has occurred.
improving compLiance With fundamentaL LegaL and constitution-
aL standards in traditionaL (viLLage-based) ShaliSh
the problems with traditional shalish from a constitutional, legal or human rights point of view are well known. 
one response to these problems has been to create alternate dispute resolution forums that offer a fairer justice 
process. the work of law and justice ngos in rural Bangladesh has created healthy competition amongst justice 
providers and has had a positive impact on traditional shalish in those areas where ngos have been most active.
the government’s response to local justice needs has been the creation of the Village courts, although the initial 
motivation for their creation was probably to reduce pressure on the Districts courts (and at the same time to 
bring the formal justice sector closer to ordinary people) than to provide an alternative to traditional shalish.
What has not been attempted to any significant degree, either by the government or by civil society, is to engage 
directly with village leaders and others providing ijs to try to incorporate fundamental legal and constitutional 
standards into shalish practices and procedures. it is quite common in pluralistic legal systems for ijs providers 
and representatives of the formal justice system to have little or no contact with each other. Distinctions in class, 
education and social outlook can lead to a tendency for representatives of the formal justice system to look down 
on ijs providers and to dismiss traditional ijs as primitive and unenlightened, a travesty of justice endured by the 
rural poor. the lack of organic links to the judiciary in the current setup of Village courts does not contribute to 
breaking down these barriers.
a better approach would be if government at the central level were active in promoting positive engagement 
with ijs by all relevant ministries and agencies and those who work in them. the large majority of disputes are 
resolved through ijs and the government clearly does not have the resources to provide a viable alternative – or 
alternatives – to ijs that would ensure that key constitutional and legal principles were respected. 
there is a tendency on the part of the government at all levels to ‘leave traditional ijs alone’ rather than to seek to 
positively influence existing practices through engagement with ijs providers, awareness-raising, training and so 
on. a passive approach to ijs is not sufficient if Bangladesh is to meet its international obligations. Positive mea-
sures are also required if ordinary people, not least women and vulnerable groups in local communities, are to 
have effective access to justice.
Positive measures to promote and to facilitate enjoyment of rights by participants in ijs are transformative and 
will take time to realize. But the government’s protection obligations, specifically to ensure that people involved 
in traditional ijs are not subjected to unlawful, cruel or degrading punishments, could be engaged immediately if 
there were sufficient will to do so. in the face of government inaction against the practice of issuing extra-judicial 
penalties in shalish, a number of Bangladeshi ngos have taken legal action to seek to force local government and 
law enforcement agencies to protect people at risk and to punish those responsible. 
12 BBc news south asia online, 11 june 2010.
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for example, in a high court judgment of 22 august 2009,13 the court, responding to a public interest writ peti-
tion14 filed by five human rights, women’s rights and development organizations, issued a rule nisi on government 
and the inspector-general of Police as follows:
“To show cause why their failure to act in a timely manner and to comply with their legal and 
constitutional duties to take effective measures to prevent the imposition and execution of extra-
legal penalties, including by way of framing and adopting appropriate guidelines, directions or 
orders to all concerned authorities […] should not be declared to be without lawful authority […] 
and violative of fundamental rights as guaranteed in […] the Constitution, and as to why [they] 
should not be directed to frame and adopt such guidelines, directions or orders as appropriate and 
to disseminate them through Bangladesh Television and Bangladesh Betar.”
further, the court issued an interim order to government and law enforcement agencies and all uPs to “take imme-
diate measures to investigate promptly any report received of the issuance and imposition of an extra-judicial 
penalty such as beating or lashing by any person or body […] and to take appropriate measures against any found 
responsible, also to provide security and protection to any victim.”
in a subsequent high court judgment,15 handed down on 8 july 2010, the high court went further and declared 
illegal all kinds of extrajudicial punishment including those made following the issuance of a fatwa by local reli-
gious leaders as part of a shalish. the court directed relevant authorities to take punitive action against people 
involved in enforcing fatwa against women.
Putting to one side the most heinous forms of extra-judicial punishment ordered by a minority of village shalish, 
there are also other forms of punishment regularly practiced that also contravene Bangladeshi law and rights 
standards: beating a guilty person with a stick or a shoe, various shaming rituals such as the necklace of shoes or 
blackening the guilty party’s face, or temporary banishment of a person from the village. these practices are gener-
ally tolerated by local government and law enforcement officers. this may be because these practices also enjoy 
some support within local communities or because there is a general reluctance (or apathy) on the part of the 
government to interfere in village decision-making. nevertheless, these forms of punishment are also unlawful and 
are an area where the government has an obligation to take positive measures to educate shalishkars, religious and 
community leaders on the requirements of national law. as has been seen in the case of other practices that have 
been legislated against, such as dowry and various forms of gender-related violence, it is not enough to legislate 
against practices that violate citizen’s rights; there is also a need for concentrated awareness-raising and for prompt 
action by the police and local administration when norms are violated.
moving beyond passive compLiance With constitutionaL and human 
rights standards: toWard a needs-driven LocaL Justice system 
Despite the persistence of cruel practices in some traditional shalish and despite the ongoing exclusion of women 
– and children – from free, equal or meaningful participation, a large majority of people surveyed continue to 
prefer to have their disputes resolved within the local community. this can be explained in various ways, e.g., cost 
13 joint Press release by mohila Porishod, asK, Brac and nijera Kori; ‘extra-judicial penalties in shalish: high court directs lgrD, 
law-enforcing agencies and Union Parishads and Paurashavas to take immediate measures’, 22 august 2009.
14 the petition described an incident that had taken place in june 2009 where a women and man had been lashed 101 times on 
the order of village elders in nobigonj, habignaj, in a shalish held in the presence of a uP chairman; a woman in srimongol being 
lashed 101 times for speaking to a man from a different community; a woman in sirajgonj being caned 100 times for daring to file a 
complaint of rape with the court; and a woman being whipped in public in august 2009 after refusing a relative’s sexual advances.
15 ’fatwa illegal’, newspaper report in The Daily Star, 9 july 2010. the verdict was in response to three separate public interest writ 
petitions filed by Blast, asK, Bangladesh mahila Parishad, Brac human rights and legal services, and nijera Kori. 
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and opportunity factors, fear of the police, lack of knowledge of the formal justice system, or a fear of the conse-
quences that may arise if the status quo is challenged.
given that traditional shalish is the forum in which the large majority of disputes arising in the country are resolved 
and that it will be likely to continue to be so for generations to come, it needs to be included in justice-sector 
policy development and service delivery programmes. this is not to say that ijs should be formally recognized in 
Bangladesh, but that the rights, interests and needs of those who, for the reasons described above, choose to seek 
resolution of disputes through ijs should be taken into account by the government in justice sector programming. 
 a first step is to identify and undertake measures that can improve the functioning of traditional ijs in their exist-
ing form. Where the operations of ijs, ingrained traditions and perceptions of justice are in conflict with fundamen-
tal legal and constitutional principles, the state should intervene in appropriate ways to protect people at risk and 
provide guidance and support to improve community awareness and the ability of shalishkars to resolve disputes 
in compliance with law. 
a second step, however, is to go further than remedying obvious ‘malfunctions’ in the operation of traditional shal-
ish and to promote and support efforts to reform community justice mechanisms so that they address the real 
justice needs of local people. 
to take one example: the research undertaken on dowry-related domestic violence shows that very few women 
are willing to seek remedies; for the reasons discussed above, most choose to suffer in silence. for these women, 
neither the formal courts nor the police are realistic justice options. Domestic violence cases fall outside the juris-
diction of the village courts. if they live close to a district capital, they may be able to take their complaint to a 
women’s ngo, which can mediate on their behalf or assist them in obtaining formal legal redress. they could in 
theory seek justice through traditional shalish, which is also the most accessible forum and the one that is closest 
to their everyday life, but only if they can have confidence that their complaint will be taken seriously and they will 
not suffer reprisals. at present, however, no such confidence exists.
since neither the ngos nor the formal justice mechanisms have the capacity to absorb the need for justice of 
women at risk of violence, the traditional shalish, which exists in every village in Bangladesh, together with the 
village courts with an expanded jurisdiction, could, in time and with appropriate support, do something to fill the 
gap. this would require a major investment over a number of years by local government, justice sector and law 
enforcement agencies in partnership with legal services ngos. it would draw attention to the plight of women at 
risk, emphasize that the law prohibiting violence against women must be enforced without exceptions and that 
village leaders have a responsibility, together with other justice sector actors at local level, to ensure that women 
and children at risk be protected, and that their right to obtain justice and a remedy be supported. 
Put simply, dowry violence can never be solved by the formal justice sector alone. What is needed is to co-opt 
community leaders involved in ijs (and where necessary to first challenge discriminatory attitudes of these leaders 
towards women) so that they will adjudicate shalish cases in a different way, with a sense of justice for the position 
of women as well as for children and other vulnerable groups in the community. this process can be facilitated 
through the establishment of justice provider networks at the village and uP levels, bringing together traditional 
leaders, uP members, religious leaders, ngo representatives, the police and a representative from the District 
court. these types of networks have been established with success in other countries where ijs are prominent. 
Despite the challenging structural dynamics, embedded power structures and political fault lines that exist in local 
communities, justice provider networks could be successfully established in Bangladesh as well. 
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assessment of eXisting programming  
and government initiatives on  
informaL Justice systems 
the ‘activating Village courts’ programme is the first major attempt by the government or by international coop-
eration partners to support state-side justice initiatives at the local level. the Village courts have been in existence 
in their current form since 1976, but this is the first time that significant funds have been allocated by the govern-
ment to equip Vcs and those who work in them to carry out their function effectively. the programme will only 
reach 500 uPs, about 10 percent of the total number in the country, but, given that most Vcs are currently not 
operating or operating only intermittently, the programme is a significant and important one.
if the programme is successful in activating village courts in the 500 uPs selected and in establishing effective and 
sustainable training, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, then it can provide a catalyst for the activation of Vcs 
across the whole country. 
the research undertaken in this project demonstrates that, even where the Vcs are functional, people prefer to 
have their disputes resolved through mediation rather than adjudication. there is a tendency to approach uP 
chairmen and members and to ask them to facilitate a shalish rather than to lodge an application with the Vc. 
given that this is the case, the programme should explore whether it would be desirable to amend the act so as to 
formalize the ability of the Vc to mediate cases as an alternative or as a precursor to adjudication.
if there is a shortcoming in the design of the programme, it is the lack of involvement of ngo informal justice 
expertise in the programme design and implementation. the experiences of mlaa in recent years in training and 
supporting Vcs in madaripur District illustrate the potential that exists for qualified ngos and state justice institu-
tions to enter into public-private partnerships.
as stated in the asia foundation’s 2007 report on community legal service Delivery in Bangladesh:16
“The potential for interaction between informal and formal justice systems is not fully developed. 
While NGOs and public agencies enjoy collaborative working relations in education, public 
health and other development sectors, there are fewer examples in the justice sector. A number 
of innovations can strengthen public-private synergies. Examples include more efficient legal aid 
referral of cases for formal litigation that build on BLAST capacity and existing linkages, as well as 
community legal service technical support for enhanced village court capacity and community-
oriented policing.”
ngos such as mlaa, Blast, asK, sB and others have been providing or supporting justice solutions for people 
at local level for many years; they have considerable experience and enjoy both popular support and respect 
amongst local elites. they can provide training and other capacity-building services to Vc members that could 
subsequently be incorporated into training curricula for Vc magistrates to be developed by the mlgrDc, the 
judiciary and/or the moljPa. they also have the advantage that they are well established at the local level and can 
continue to provide training and support to the Vc and to newly elected uP members, without any prior experi-
ence of mediation or adjudication of disputes, in the future.
16 the asia foundation, ‘Promoting improved access to justice – community legal service Delivery in Bangladesh’, p. 47 ff. 
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recommendations for future programming for informaL  
Justice systems 
as part of the review of the existing Village courts act being carried out in connection with the ‘activating Village 
courts’ programme, consideration should be given to amending the act so that Village court magistrates are 
required to comply with certain key constitutional and legal standards. a checklist of minimum legal norms to be 
observed should be distributed to all Vcs, ideally in connection with basic training on law and human rights. the 
requirement for the court to comply with fundamental constitutional and human rights norms is necessary if the 
jurisdiction of the court is to be extended to include other civil and criminal matters, or if the existing financial limit 
of tK 25,000 is to be increased. 
consideration should also be given to extending the mandate of the Vcs so that they can offer mediated dispute 
resolution as an alternative to or as a first step prior to adjudication. this would reflect what is already taking place 
on the ground.
future government support for the operation of Vcs must also include administrative and support functions 
within the uPs. responsibility for providing training, logistical support and ongoing monitoring and oversight 
will require combined efforts from several agencies: the mlgrDc, the mojlPa and the judiciary. if the Vcs are to 
be activated and to operate effectively in all 5,000 uPs, this will also require a significant ongoing annual financial 
commitment from the government.
the current composition of the Vc panels is not really satisfactory and it would be much better if the Vc mag-
istrates were not also currently serving politicians and local government officials. in the longer term, it would 
be better if independent magistrates were appointed to the Vcs – retired school teachers, doctors or nurses, 
and other people in the community who are respected and who could take on the role of village court magis-
trate – with training and support from the government, for a renewable period of, for example, five years. the uP 
chairmen and members who sit as magistrates do so only for so long as they remain in the local government. By 
appointing judges from members of the local community, there is a better chance that capacity-building activities 
carried out by the government or by ngos will remain within the institutional memory of the court; turnover of 
court personnel will be less frequent.
as regards the ac, consideration should be given to extending its jurisdiction so that it is also accessible to people 
from non-muslim communities. alternatively, a separate state-led rural justice body should be set up to provide 
remedies in family affairs for hindus and other religious minorities.
Programmes of research into the normative, procedural and structural bases of traditional Shalish and the oper-
ation of primary justice more generally that take their outset in standards of constitutional and human rights 
(including the rights of children) and gender equality should be supported as part of a general engagement with 
justice for the poor.
at the central level, the police force has identified the need to be more actively engaged with local communities, 
through the introduction of community policing programmes, the creation of some pilot victim support units, and 
other initiatives. it will take some time before these new policies and programmes begin to have an impact on the 
ground. law enforcement officers have a vital role to play in the oversight of traditional ijs and in providing effec-
tive protection and support for people at risk. 
as discussed above, there are compelling arguments from rights, poverty reduction and access to justice perspec-
tives for a more active and targeted government interest and involvement in ijs at the community level. justice-
sector policy and programming at all levels should take into account the existence of ijs and the government 
should engage with ijs providers and users to try to improve the quality of dispute resolution taking place at 
present and, in so doing, to provide better access to justice for the rural poor. 
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in this regard, the government together with cooperation partners should also consider how to actively harness 
the experience of legal services ngos. cooperation with ngos would reduce the risk of duplication and of ‘re-
inventing the wheel’ in designing training and rights awareness programmes for village shalish providers. 
justice providers’ cooperation forums, which have been established successfully in other countries, could be 
encouraged at the uP level and below, so as to improve linkages and flow of good practices between all of the 
justice and informal justice sector actors: village shalishkars, religious leaders, ngos, uP members, judges, police 
and prosecutors.
one of the tasks of justice provider cooperation forums would be to educate, promote and maintain a collegial 
oversight over justice service provision by the various bodies represented in the forum. While there could be 
expected to be some initial resistance on the part of the judiciary or other formal agencies to sit in the forum, in 
the longer term it could be pivotal for transforming ijs procedures and practices at the village level for the benefit 
of all people living in rural communities.
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the study
this study mainly focuses on indigenous justice. as indigenous justice is becoming increasingly formalized 
through law in ecuador, the working title of the present study was Legal Pluralism and Intercultural Justice, which 
would perhaps have been a more accurate title. use of the phrase ’informal justice‘ in the final title was, however, 
finally maintained in order to give a certain uniformity among the six country studies. the continuum of formality 
to informality that is presented in the main report retains its analytical validity in relation to the systems studied in 
the present country study. no value judgment is intended by the use of the term ‘informal’.
bacKground 
the relation between indigenous law and formal systems of law in latin america has been debated for centu-
ries. central to this debate is the thinking of Bartolomé de las casas (1484-1566), Bishop of chiapas and attorney 
general and universal Protector of the indians. counter to the prevailing belief of the Conquistadores, he was of 
the opinion that indians, as human beings capable of reason, had their own laws and government that should be 
respected by the crown of spain.1 according to yrigoyen fajardo, the struggle for the recognition of indigenous 
law and legal systems has its roots both in the 16th century ideology of the natural inferiority of the indigenous 
1 in 1552, las casas published A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies that was dedicated to then-prince Philip ii of spain and 
depicted the genocide committed against native americans.
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people and the notion of the nation-state and state-law identity of the 19th century. in her view, recent constitu-
tional reforms show a tendency toward the construction of multi-cultural states in the andean countries.2
the andean region 
the republic of ecuador is part of the andean region, a region that is characterized by the presence of large indig-
enous populations that have generally been excluded from political life and public service. 
throughout the andean region, new institutions of government – the constitutional assemblies – have been cre-
ated. Bolivia and ecuador have both witnessed large ethnic political mobilizations that have recently gained power 
and have helped define a new paradigm for state-society relations. Both countries have recently introduced new 
constitutions that reflect a human rights vision, inclusive perceptions of justice and the multifaceted composition 
of the countries. in ecuador, constitutional reform goes beyond the concept of multiculturalism towards plurina-
tionalism and intercultural approaches. 
moreover, there is a constitutional recognition of indigenous justice systems in Bolivia, colombia, and ecuador, 
among other countries in latin america. 
as concerns informal justice, the state’s historical weakness in rural areas and the communal justice systems based 
in parallel community structures and indigenous cultures, some of which predate the national state, remain strong. 
although some of the practices do not conform to human rights norms, they do form an accessible alternative 
to the formal justice sector, which is often complex and inaccessible in terms of hierarchy, formalities and indirect 
cultural discrimination.3 according to Van cott, “large segments of latin american society have existed outside the 
reach of the law for centuries, and there ha[ve] only been efforts to address this problem with adequate resources 
since the last decade. informal systems are perhaps among the most necessary and constructive informal institu-
tions in the region, given the extreme weakness of the formal institutions they replace or complement.”4
in Bolivia and ecuador, initiatives to reform the justice sector have recently been launched, one of the main issues 
being the constitutional recognition of indigenous justice and the moulding of institutions and administration of 
justice along the lines of both formal and informal justice. it should be added that reforms of the (formal) justice 
sector have been undertaken in the past 20 years. the 2009 constitution of Bolivia, moreover, has specific provi-
sions on indigenous native/aboriginal rural jurisdictions.5 other countries in the region, including colombia and 
Peru, have developed models of constitutional and practical accommodation of local and indigenous justice provi-
sion that may exert some influence on developments in their neighbouring countries, despite political differences.6
the impLications of recent reforms 
the republic of ecuador has a population of approximately 12,150,000,7 of whom approximately 830,000 have 
declared that they are indigenous and approximately 604,000 are afro-ecuadorian.8 12 percent of the population 
2 yrigoyen f., p. 32.
3 Defensoria del Pueblo de Perú, 2006.
4 Van cott, 2003, p. 3. 
5 the Political constitution of Bolivia of 2009, chapter 4 on indigenous native/aboriginal rural jurisdiction. 
6 for a recent analysis of the relations between the justice systems in the andean countries, see cóndor c., eddie, ed. (2009), Estado 
de la relación entre justicia indígena y justicia estatal en los países andinos: estudio de casos en Colombia, Perú, Ecuador y Bolivia. 
comisión andina de juristas.
7 a census was carried out in 2010, the final results of which are not available yet. estimates are that the population numbers 
approximately 13,500,000 in 2011. 
8 Plan nacional para eliminar la Discriminación racial y la exclusión étnica-cultural, p. 125. Vi censo de Población y Vivienda. 
resultados Definitivos. Población que se declaró indígena, inec, noviembre 2001. 
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are indigenous according to the un special rapporteur. 50.5 percent of the population are women and 3 of 10 
ecuadorians are youth, of whom 41.65 percent are between 19 and 24 years old. 9 
the estimated number of indigenous communities, peoples and nationalities varies considerably.10 however, 
according to the council of nationalities and Peoples of ecuador (el Consejo de Nacionalidades y Pueblos del Ecua-
dor, coDenPe), there are 14 indigenous nationalities in ecuador. moreover, the Kichwa nationality consists of 18 
peoples that maintain their identity in accordance with their customs, dialect, geographical placement and eco-
nomic activities.11 the Kichwa de la Amazonia live in the amazon lowlands, whereas the other Kichwa nationalities 
mainly live in the provinces of the highlands. 
in the past 10 to 15 years, the questions of legal pluralism, ‘plurinationality’ or ‘democracy in diversity’12 have 
emerged as central political issues. moreover, the indigenous movement of ecuador has gained more voice, not 
least because its organizations have brought indigenous peoples more firmly into politics and civil society13 at a 
time when the consciousness of a specifically latin american identity and set of aspirations has been high on the 
political agenda.14 iturralde claimed in 1995 that the management of social transformations cannot ignore, as it has 
in the past, the presence of actors who are organizing to recover and strengthen their ethnic and cultural identities, 
nor can it disclaim the legitimacy of their demands or disregard the dynamism of their organizational structures.15
one of his points was the need for constructive inter-ethnic and intercultural dialogue in connection with judicial 
system reform, governance and representation, etc. 
the LaW and Justice frameWorK
as concerns justice, the constitution of ecuador of 1998 sought to ensure the basic guarantees of due process.16
moreover, article 191 recognized that 
“The authorities of indigenous peoples exercise justice functions, applying their own norms and 
procedures for the solution of internal conflicts in conformity with their customs and customary 
law, in as much as they are not contrary to the Constitution or the laws”.17
although foreseen in the 1998 constitution, legislation on the compatibility of the justice systems was not created,18
despite ideas such as the proposed Bill on the justice functions of the indigenous authorities of ecuador.19 how-
ever, a law on arbitration and mediation was passed on the establishment of mediation centres in indigenous and 
afro-ecuadorian communities and local associations.20 
reform processes in ecuador led to changes to the constitution, to the institutional framework of government, 
and the relationship between the indigenous movement and the government of ecuador. thus, the national 
congress (parliament) was suspended and a constitutional assembly was elected on 15 april 2007, with reform of 
9 ceDaW 
10 garciá, 2000, p. 94. 
11 the national Plan for the elimination of racial Discrimination and the ethno-cultural exclusion, p. 22. 
12 acosta and martinez, 2009. 
13 there is also the organizational act for Public institutions of indigenous Peoples defining themselves as ancestral nationalities, 
which entered into force in september 2007.
14 maybury-lewis, macdonald and maybury-lewis, 2009, p. 17. 
15 itturalde, 1995, p. 12.
16 as recognized in international instruments, laws or jurisprudence. 1998 constitution, article 24. 
17 unofficial translation of article 191, 4) of 1998 constitution. 
18 ecuarunari, 2008, p. 16.
19 justicia indígena – aportes para un debate, judith salgado compilador, p. 157. 
20 ley de arbitraje y mediación, titulo iii de la mediación comunitaria.
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the constitution as one of its main objectives. on 14 july 2009, an organic law was passed, thus formally creating 
a new law-making organ, the national assembly.21
the fundamental change brought by the 2008 constitution is the adoption of the neo-socialist doctrine (‘21st 
century socialism’) that will lead national norms, plans and policies. according to this doctrine, the role of the 
state has changed, as have the rights and obligations of citizens.22 the recognition of international human rights 
instruments ratified by ecuador has been maintained23 and these can be directly applied in any national court. 
moreover, ecuador recognizes and obliges itself to protect and guarantee the full exercise of human rights to every 
person within its jurisdiction. in addition, article 11. 2. of the constitution of ecuador establishes that “all persons 
are equal and enjoy the same rights, duties and opportunities”24 and article 275 outlines that “the state shall plan 
the development of the country in order to guarantee the exercise of rights, the attainment of the objectives of 
the development regime and the principles dedicated in the constitution”.25 
the right of indigenous communities to exercise their own justice system and the outcome of justice provision, 
within their own territory, has been recognized by the constitution of 2008. the implications of this provision are 
discussed in subsequent sections below. 
in march 2009, a new organic law on the judicial function entered into effect. at the planning level, the national 
Plan for Development 2007-2010 and the national Plan on the elimination of racial Discrimination and ethnic-
cultural exclusion 2009-2012 are central to justice – both formal and informal – and to this study. all three are 
mentioned below in the section referencing the justice system.
methodoLogy 
in ecuador, formal justice is referred to as ‘ordinary justice’, whereas ‘indigenous justice’ is justice that covers a broad 
spectrum of ancestral justice, customs and other types of community-based justice among indigenous peoples. 
there are also other forms of ‘informal justice’ measures such as mediation and arbitration, which are not to be 
compared with indigenous or communal justice, etc. the ecuador study mainly addressed indigenous justice and 
its relation with formal justice. it should be stressed that there is not one singular form of indigenous justice or 
indigenous justice provision. each nationality, people and even community has its particular justice system, which 
makes it very difficult to look at them from a ‘generalized perspective’. the present study thus looks at a few peo-
ples and communities of Kichwa nationality and it therefore does not address all forms of ijs or indigenous justice 
systems in ecuador. 
in the communities visited, the religious leaders did not appear to be involved in the provision of justice. neverthe-
less, community members are often very religious26 and will go to the priest for assistance with issues. the political 
deputy (el teniente politico) used to have an adjudicative function as an investigating judge as well as being the 
government executive on the parish council. this function disappeared with the 1998 constitution. the political 
deputy is a civil servant and as such represents government administration at the local level. it is in this capacity 
21 organic laws regulate the organization and activities of the main bodies of the government and the exercise of fundamental 
human rights and freedoms. all laws that are not covered by the above definition can be considered as ordinary. organic law 
prevails over ordinary law and must be approved, reformed or abolished by absolute majority of the national congress/assembly.
22 globalex, updated version of ’the Basic structure of the ecuadorian legal system and legal research’ by maria Dolores miño. the 
main principles are that ecuador is a constitutional state that functions under the principles of the fundamental rights and social 
justice. ecuador is self-defined as a sovereign, unitary, intercultural, plurinational state. spanish is the official language. Kichwa 
and shuar are official tongues to be used in intercultural exchange. the state's duties are to foster and protect human rights, 
strengthen national sovereignty and unity, eradicate poverty, foster development and a culture of peace.
23 this was also the case in the 1998 constitution.
24 unofficial translation. 
25 unofficial translation of article 275 of the 2008 constitution. 
26 catholicism and Protestantism are the most common religions. 
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that the deputy is recognized by the indigenous leadership. Presently, community members might seek to solve 
a problem with the help of the political deputy; however, during the mission it was not possible to determine the 
kind of problem or the way in which the deputy could be of help. thus, the study concentrated on the indigenous 
justice system as such. 
the study in ecuador entailed a desk study, the collection of quantitative and qualitative data and information, the 
analysis of data and information accumulated and, finally, the drafting of the report.
the collection of data and information was carried out under the supervision of fernando garcía-serrano, anthro-
pologist, flacso – Quito, who has extensive research experience in the field of indigenous issues and legal 
pluralism in latin america. the initial plan was to study two provinces of ecuador, Pastaza in the lowlands and tun-
gurahua in the highlands. however, as the indigenous leaders in Pastaza required that any study carried out should 
be of direct use to them and that this might not be case with this study, it was decided to study the highlands only. 
approximately 96.4 percent of the indigenous people in ecuador are highland Kichwas. 
the provinces of chimborazo and tungurahua were thus identified for the study. the tungurahua province is 
divided into 9 cantones that are divided into parishes (urban, rural) and the parishes are divided into neighbour-
hoods, ciudadelas, etc. the 2001 census established that there are 441,389 inhabitants, of whom 40 percent are 
indigenous, 40 percent are white and 20 percent are mixed. 60 percent of the population live in rural areas.27 the 
chimborazo Province consists of 10 cantones and 61 parishes.28 the 2001 census established that there are 427,517 
inhabitants, of whom 58 percent are indigenous and approximately 60 percent of whom live in rural areas. Both 
provinces host development projects, mainly in the areas of infrastructure (water, schools, etc.), health and pri-
mary education. governance and human rights projects are relatively few. Due to the concentration of indigenous 
people and culture, the populations in both provinces have been the subject of anthropological and sociological 
study and research.
the collection of data and information was carried out from june to september 2009 as follows:
  interviews were conducted by nuria Vehils and annali Kristiansen (Dihr) with state institutions, ministries, un 
agencies and civil society associations mainly in Quito in june 2009. 
  Quantitative data was collected by Veronica lligalo of ambato, Province of tungurahua and by maria Béatriz 
guzman of riobamba, Province of chimborazo in august 2009. 
  individual interviews and focus groups were conducted at the community level with leaders and the popula-
tion and with authorities and institutions at the provincial level in tungurahua and chimborazo. the interviews 
were carried out by annali Kristiansen (Dihr) with the assistance of Veronica lligalo and maria Béatriz guaman.
  Written sources by and for the community (such as community rules) were not consulted in the present study. 
this was followed by processing of the quantitative and qualitative data and subsequently the drafting of the 
report in 2010.
27 according to the Plan nacional para eliminar la Discriminación racial y la exclusión Étnica-cultural/ national Plan on the 
elimination of racial Discrimination and ethnic-cultural exclusion 2009-2010 64, 708 (14.08 per cent of the province) of the 
population declared themselves indigenous in the 2001 census, p. 125. 
28 according to the Plan nacional para eliminar la Discriminación racial y la exclusión Étnica-cultural/ national Plan on the 
elimination of racial Discrimination and ethnic-cultural exclusion 2009-2010 153,365 people (38 percent of the province) declared 
themselves indigenous in the 2001 census, p. 125. 
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the formaL Justice system and its reLation 
With indigenous informaL Justice systems
the Justice system, reform and poLicy 
the formal justice system of ecuador has undergone various reforms in the past two decades. in order to meet 
international standards, the 1998 constitution introduced two major reforms of the judiciary,29 namely, that the 
criminal procedures were to follow the accusatory system rather than the inquisitorial system and that all national 
tribunals would be part of the judiciary. therefore, the abolition of separate police and military tribunals, and the 
integration of these, as well as minors’ tribunals, into the judicial branch had been foreseen at the adoption of the 
1998 constitution. By 2008, only the minors’ tribunals had been integrated however. the 2008 constitution abol-
ished the military and police tribunals. thus, these reforms established a unitary judicial system where only the 
bodies of the judicial branch can exercise jurisdiction. 
a new organic code on judicial functions was published on 9 march 2009, the preamble of which underscores 
that, “the current organic law on the judicial function promulgated in the official registry 636 of 11 septem-
ber 1974 is absolutely incompatible with the constitutional norms and international human rights standards and 
administration of justice, and does not meet the social reality of ecuador in the 21st century.”30 
on 22 october 2009, an organic law on jurisdictional guarantees and constitutional control was published that 
develops the principles and procedures needed to make the constitutional actions to defend rights and also 
established the competencies of the constitutional court to guarantee constitutional supremacy. since april 2010, 
a bill on guarantees in penal justice has been debated. the overall idea is to address penal norms in relation to the 
constitution and international human rights law, to create coherence between penal norms and to make penal 
law and procedure more contemporary. 
ecuador has thus embarked on a thorough reform of the formal justice system. in addition to the formal recogni-
tion of the rule of law by the constitution,31 the purpose of the reform is to enhance the quality and reach of 
the justice system. current endeavours entail a reorganization of the system that provide for change in the long 
term. one example is the creation of a ‘judicial school’ for the training of professionals of the judiciary, in order to 
enhance the quality of the justice system.32 this is in line with policy 9.3. of the national Development Plan (please 
see the section on programming). 
the national Development Plan (2007-2010) includes the Promotion of access to justice and objective 9 consists 
of five policies that address issues such as legal training for citizenship, legal pluralism that respects human rights, 
the judicial function and the national system of social rehabilitation, and gender violence and abuse of children. 
several strategies have been developed to implement these policies. of particular interest is policy 9.2, which 
provides that, “a multicultural state shall respect the values and principles of the different communities that live in 
29 http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/ecuador.htm#V, accessed april 2010.
30 unofficial translation.
31 2008 constitution, article 1.  
el ecuador es un estado constitucional de derechos y justicia, social, democrático, soberano, independiente, unitario, intercultural 
plurinacional y laico. se organiza de forma de república y se gobierna de manera descentralizada.  
la soberania radica en el pueblo, cuya voluntad es el fundamento de la autoridad, y se ejerce a través de los organos del poder 
público y de las formas de participación directa previstas en la constitución. 
los recursos naturales no renovables del territorio del estado pertenecen a su patrimonio inalienable, ireunciable e impresciptible.
32 the details are outlined in the 2009 organic law on the judicial function. 
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society, without altering the principles that protect and promote human rights. Dialogue shall be supported and 
conflicts shall be overcome through the free will of the parties.”33 the above could indicate that there is political will 
to reconcile the various forms of justice. 34
it should be added that other policies are also important in creating access to justice in ecuador, not least the 
national policies concerning gender equality, violence against women, abuse of children, etc. most of these poli-
cies address the formal justice system. 
since the 1980s, women’s rights have been on the agenda in ecuador. the main efforts have addressed women in 
general and not indigenous women in particular. examples of recent legislation that concern women are the law 
on elections, which, in article 58, provides special measures to include women on the electoral list, and the law on 
Violence against Women and the family.35
the rights of the child have in recent years been given more attention by ecuadorian government and state 
bodies. the childhood and adolescence code (2003) provides that a child, of either sex, is a person who has not 
yet achieved the age of 12. an adolescent, of either sex, is a person between the ages of 12 and 18. this legislation 
also means that any national endeavour in this regard addresses the age-groups (a) children under 6, (b) children 
between ages 6 and 11, and (c) adolescents between ages 12 and 17.36 this definition is thus somewhat different 
from the definition in the convention on the rights of the child (crc), which defines a child as every human being 
below the age of 18 years unless majority is attained earlier according to applicable law.37 article 7 of the code 
guarantees the rights of indigenous and afro-ecuadorian children and adolescents to develop in accordance with 
their culture and within a framework of inter-culturality, in conformity with the constitution and as long as the 
cultural practices do not violate their rights. the principle of the best interest of the child is outlined in the code 
along with an indication that this principle is superior to that of ethnic and cultural diversity (article 11). article 34 
concerns the right to cultural identity.
as concerns the reach of the formal justice system, the national Plan on the elimination of racial Discrimination 
and ethnic-cultural exclusion 2009-2012 observes that, although the law implies the principles of non-discrimi-
nation and equality in access to justice, experience shows that certain groups of persons, in particular victims of 
racial discrimination, do not have access to justice or do not have access on an equal footing with the rest of the 
population.38 moreover, the most probable hypothesis is that justice users are not counted among the population 
of little income, limited education, or who live in marginalized and remote areas of ecuador. in other words, some 
social groups cannot access justice or make their human rights effective (both in the administration of and access 
to justice). 
33 they include: 
•	 the promulgation of the law on the strengthening of the national system of the Public Defender 
•	 the promulgation of a law on the articulation of the justices that, safeguarding the ancestral customs and the exercise of the 
jurisdiction on behalf of the authorities of the nationalities and peoples, permits the reconciliation of this justice with the 
common jurisdiction in fulfilling the international obligations of ecuador in regard to the ilo convention no. 169. 
•	 the promotion of the use of alternative mechanisms of resolution
•	 the promotion, discussion and passing of the law on Peace jurisdiction. 
34 unofficial translation of the Plan nacional de Desarrollo, pp. 229-236 and p. 338.
35 unifem-unicef-oacnuDh, 2008, p. 55.
36 crc/c/ecu/4 of 10 july 2009, article 4 of the code on childhood and adolescence. 
37 crc article 1. 
38 unofficial translation, Plan Nacional para Eliminar la Discriminación Racial y la Exclusión Étnica-cultural /National Plan on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination and Ethnic-Cultural Exclusion, 2009-2010, p. 26. 
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LegisLation and state poLicies defining reLations betWeen  
LegaL orders
recent legislation seeks to define inter-linkages between the legal orders. the formal recognition of the rule of 
law(s) by the constitution39 means that several types of justice have come into play and with greater legitimacy 
than before. a study financed by ohchr, unicef and unifem indicates that, “according to the indigenous orga-
nizations, the national judicial system functions as an official state system, whereas indigenous law – understood 
as the ‘juridical protection’ by the indigenous peoples (pueblos originarios) and administration hereof – in general 
works in a clandestine way. although there is a constitutional norm that declares rights, there is no regulation of 
their application, jurisdiction and competency to administrate justice.”40
the 2008 constitution enshrines norms relating to indigenous peoples and afro-ecuadorian communities, in 
which self-determination, self-government, participation and indigenous justice are recognized and protected. 
With the fundamental rights come the correlative obligations that are also guaranteed to all citizens. one remark-
able responsibility is the standard set by indigenous peoples: “ama killa, ama llulla, ama shwa” (one must not be 
lazy, one must not lie, and one must not steal).
article 171 of the 2008 constitution provides that indigenous justice is administered within the territory of indig-
enous communities, peoples and nationalities, and the state guarantees that indigenous justice decisions are 
respected by the public authorities and institutions as follows:
“The authorities of the indigenous communities, peoples and nationalities will exercise 
jurisdictional functions, based upon their ancestral traditions and law, within their territorial area, 
with the guaranteed participation of and decision by women. The authorities will apply their own 
norms and procedures for the solution of their internal conflicts, and which are not contrary to the 
Constitution and the human rights recognized in international instruments.  
The State guarantees that the decisions of indigenous jurisdiction will be respected by the public 
institutions and authorities. The said decisions will be subject to constitutional control. The Law will 
establish mechanisms of co-ordination and co-operation between the indigenous jurisdiction and 
the ordinary jurisdiction.”41         
thus, decisions of these judicial organs are binding. they should respect the constitution and international human 
rights standards.42 moreover, enforcement shall be respected by public and state institutions. in addition, decisions 
are subject to constitutional control. 
reportedly, this constitutional control will be carried out by an appeal tribunal composed of both indigenous 
authorities and state judges. at the time of the field study, it was not possible to ascertain whether the constitu-
tional control mechanism was in fact in place and whether it had been used. the organic law on judicial guar-
antees and constitutional control introduces a slightly different mechanism of “extraordinary Protective action 
against Decisions of indigenous justice” regarding any decision that might violate rights that are constitutionally 
guaranteed or discriminatory against women (articles 65-66, see below). 
39 art. 1 el ecuador es un estado constitucional de derechos y justicia. 
40 unifem-unicef-oacnuDh, 2008, p. 77. it should be noted that the report is likely to have been written before the 2008 constitution. 
41 unofficial translation. 
42 this is repeated in the article 343 of the organic code of the judicial function, which also states that it cannot be argued that 
customary law can justify the avoidance of any sanction of violation of women’s human rights. 
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in this regard, this provision of the constitution does not appear to lay down any jurisdictional limits based on 
subject matter. at first sight, it would thus appear that the indigenous jurisdiction may include responsibility for 
serious criminal offences, as is the case in some other countries in the region. While other constitutional provisions 
might possibly have the effect of placing limitations in this regard, questions of this kind remain largely unan-
swered at the time the study visit and writing took place.
interviews carried out with formal justice providers and representatives as well as the un indicated that an issue 
to be clarified is whether the different forms of justice are on par/considered equal, form part of a continuum of 
justice or are separate and/or complementary. 
the constitutional provision would appear to impose limits on the territorial jurisdiction of the indigenous ijs 
(“within their territorial area”). issues of boundaries could arise in this regard. at the time of writing, it was unclear 
to what extent the personal jurisdiction of the ijs could extend to non-indigenous persons, whether state agents 
could be excluded from the scope of personal jurisdiction, etc. as discussed later in this study, there are indica-
tions that, in practice, non-indigenous persons do resort to the ijs for resolution of disputes. Whether they can be 
obliged to do so by indigenous ijs is as yet unclear.
the requirement that the norms and procedures of indigenous jurisdiction conform to the constitution and to 
international standards of human rights is noteworthy. in addition, the fact that the rights of women are specifi-
cally mentioned is remarkable. it is reported that the importance of considering the rights of the child is debated, 
although the absence of the rights of the child in the text may be noted. the organic law on judicial guarantees 
and constitutional control,43 however, allows for any person who is not in agreement with the decision reached by 
the indigenous authority in the exercise of its judicial functions, to go to the constitutional court in order to con-
test any violation of the rights guaranteed constitutionally or the discrimination of a woman for being a woman.44
it remains to be seen, however, how the judiciary and legislature will interpret the relationship between individual 
and collective cultural rights. chapter Vi on human rights in the main report briefly discusses relevant jurisprudence 
in colombia, where the constitutional court, in one case, found that only a limited number of the most serious 
human rights violations, as well as other compelling national interests, could override the collective cultural rights 
and constitutional autonomy regime. the view of the court in that country was that cultural rights and indeed 
cultural survival were a national interest that, perhaps in the light of the many threats that indigenous peoples and 
communities are facing, overrode some other human rights, especially those of a procedural character relating to 
fair trial. it remains to be seen whether developments in ecuador will take the same direction. 
the requirement of legislation to clarify relationships and coordination between the two systems is made clear by 
the constitutional article, but, as noted, the similar requirement in the 1998 constitution went unfulfilled for almost 
a decade, as did a similar requirement in the 1991 constitution of neighbouring colombia, as discussed in the main 
report. if legislation is not forthcoming on the issue, it will be left to the higher judiciary to fill the gap based on 
particular cases rather than political decision-making. a bill on the relation between the ‘systems’ was foreseen for 
2009. the bill on coordination and co-operation between indigenous justice and ordinary justice (formal justice) 
is being prepared as part of the policies of the undersecretary of regulatory Development and the ministry of jus-
tice, human rights and Worship to create intercultural dialogue. the preparations include prior consultation and 
debate with indigenous organizations as a means of reaching consensus on the bill. 45 this bill has been delayed 
and it has not been possible to ascertain whether the bill has been presented yet (june 2010). 
43 2009 organic law on jurisdictional guarantees and constitutional control.
44 chapter iX on extraordinary Protective action against Decisions of indigenous justice, articles 65 - 66. 
45 consolidated un comments to final draft of report (unifem andean office). 
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the organic law on the judicial function of 2009 does outline some aspects of the relations between the systems. 
the initial implementation of this law takes place in the period 2009-2011. it addresses the relations between the 
functions of indigenous and ordinary justice to a certain extent46 as follows: 
  the exercise of indigenous justice should guarantee the participation and decision of women. to solve internal 
conflicts, the (indigenous) authorities apply norms that are not contrary to the constitution and human rights, 
and customary law may not be resorted to as a justification for violating the rights of women.47
  the principles of inter cultural justice are: diversity, equality, non bis ne idem, pro indigenous jurisdiction and 
intercultural interpretation.48 they are defined as follows:
  the actions and decisions of judges, prosecutors, defenders and other agents of the judiciary, police and other 
public officials will observe the following principles in the processes of justice:
a. Diversity – the law, customs and traditional practices of indigenous communities and peoples must be 
taken into account, with the aim of guaranteeing the maximum recognition and the full realization of 
cultural diversity.
b. equality – the authority concerned will take the necessary measures to guarantee the understanding of 
the norms, procedures and legal consequences of the decision in proceedings involving indigenous per-
sons and collectivities. they will therefore make use of, among other means, the procedural intervention 
of interpreters, experienced anthropologists and specialists in indigenous law.
c. Non bis in idem – the acts of the authorities of indigenous justice may not be tried or reviewed by judges 
and judges of the judiciary or by any administrative authority at any stage of the proceedings brought to 
their knowledge, without prejudice to constitutional review.
d. Pro indigenous jurisdiction – in case of doubt between the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts and that of 
the indigenous instances, the latter is preferred in order to ensure the maximum autonomy and the least 
possible intervention.
e. intercultural interpretation – Where persons or indigenous communities are present, the legal rights in 
dispute will, at the time of judicial action and decision, be interpreted cross-culturally.  consequently, 
efforts will be made to take cultural factors related to the customs, traditional practices, norms and 
procedures of peoples’, nations’, communities’ and indigenous communities’ own laws, in order to imple-
ment the rights enshrined in the constitution and international instruments.49
  in addition, it is possible for judges to decline the exercise of jurisdiction whenever there is a petition from the 
indigenous authority regarding a case that has been submitted to the indigenous authority. Within three days, 
the indigenous authorities must prove the pertinence of such a petition. should the statement be accepted by 
the judge, then the case should be referred to indigenous justice.50 
  as concerns the promotion of intercultural justice, the judicial council will determine which resources are 
necessary for the coordination and co-operation between indigenous justice and formal justice. this includes 
training of civil servants who work in areas where indigenous persons predominate. the judicial council does 
not exercise authority, government or administration in respect to indigenous justice. 
this actual application and effect of the law cannot be assessed at this early stage, as concrete application and 
thus jurisprudence can only be developed over time. the interviews carried out with formal justice providers and 
46 title Viii of the law, excerpt in annex i
47 article 343, organic law on the judicial function, excerpt in annex i 
48 article 346, organic law on the judicial function, excerpt in annex i
49 unofficial translation of article 344 may be found in the excerpt in annex i. 
50 article 345 of organic law on the judicial function.
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representatives as well as the un indicated that an issue to be clarified is whether the different forms of justice are 
considered equal, form part of a continuum of justice or are separate and/or complementary. 
as described later in this country study, practice would seem to indicate that it is rare for ijs to handle more serious 
criminal cases, though there are exceptions. given this background, it is perhaps surprising that the constitutional 
provisions do not explicitly provide for this limitation, which would accord with the recommendations of the un 
human rights committee (see the main report).
LinKages in practice
the opinion often encountered among indigenous communities is that the formal system does not provide jus-
tice, is expensive, tedious and time-consuming, and does not serve the indigenous communities. in the case of 
the present study, there is a high level of co-existence of systems. interviews revealed that community leadership 
is focused on keeping justice and justice-related issues within the community. 
as seen in the analysis in subsequent sections of this study, informal practices exist whereby users, providers and 
leaders more generally recognize the occasional limitations of ijs in certain areas (serious criminal cases, recidivism, 
non-respect of ijs’ decisions, inter-communal land disputes, fatal car accidents and, sometimes, marital break-up) 
and therefore resort to the formal system.51 the communities are mainly in touch with the police that carry out 
investigations. some interviewees mentioned contacting the police if relevant and particularly the traffic police 
were mentioned. the police related that they will act when they are contacted, although they are aware of a lack of 
confidence in the formal system, due to the bureaucracy and the language. the police work on the basis that one 
law applies to all. it appears that they have only general knowledge of indigenous justice and that the most usual 
contact is through exchange of information.
Present-day community leadership shows little evidence of functional linkages, which may be connected with 
historical facts, such as the introduction of the 1937 law and traditions. it may also be part of an effort of the 
indigenous communities and peoples to ensure that their culture and identity are maintained. one study shows a 
perception that indigenous justice functions clandestinely, which may also be an issue.52
it is as yet unclear whether the wording of the 2008 constitution could be used as a basis for rules adopted in the 
framework of the indigenous legal order that would attempt to prevent and punish women or other members 
of the community for resorting to the formal justice system. the tenor of the constitutional provision and the 
principles cited earlier in the present study would not seem to preclude such attempts, though the provisions 
on women’s rights – including the control mechanism of any decision that might violate rights that are consti-
tutionally guaranteed or discriminatory against women (see above) – would seem to demand that there be no 
discrimination based on gender in relation to the rights and remedies available to persons. this, like many other 
issues related to ijs, remains uncertain.
outreach initiatives of the formaL Justice system
indigenous promoters of the ombudsman 
the ombudsman, or ‘Defensoría del Pueblo’,53 can receive complaints, which that office then refers to the compe-
tent bodies with a request for sanction.54 it can express opinions regarding mainly administration and legislation; 
it can observe cases and ensure that they are correctly handled and that due process is respected, although it is 
51 Donna lee Van cott, 2003, p. 7.
52 unifem-unicef-oacnuDh, 2008, p. 77. 
53 2008 constitution, articles 214-216
54 crc/c/oPsc/ecu/Q/1/addendum 1, paragraph 16.
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not an alternative to the formal justice system and is not used as such. the office of the ombudsman has created 
an indigenous justice unit and there are 40 promoters selected by their communities who have been trained and 
work voluntarily in the provinces. the promoters have credentials and work according to a set of rules. 
there are also other promoters, such as the afro-ecuadorian promoters, who specifically work with their communities. 
indigenous public prosecutors Fiscales indígenas 
indigenous Public Prosecutors, or ‘Fiscales Indígenas’, and similar justice operators have in recent years been intro-
duced in some central american countries. in ecuador, articles 194-197 of the 2008 constitution establish the Fis-
calía General del Estado (Public Prosecutor). through an inter-institutional agreement, the Public Prosecutor’s office 
with support from coDenPe (Consejo de Desarrollo de las Nacionalidades y Pueblos del Ecuador, established in 1998) 
has since 2007 established 11 indigenous Prosecutor units in some provinces of ecuador. according to the office 
of the Public Prosecutor, one of the objectives is to integrate various forms of justice and to diminish the incidence 
of types of so-called indigenous justice that have appeared due to the limitations of the formal justice system.55
the offices of the Fiscales Indigenas (fis) are supposed to form a nexus between the formal and the informal sys-
tems.56 they act as a diversion office referring relevant cases to the formal system. also, they verify whether deci-
sions made by the indigenous justice forums are in compliance with the national legislation and human rights 
standards. the fi were created in accordance with agreement no. 064-mfg-2007 and before the current reform of 
the justice sector.
this leads to the question of the role and responsibilities of the Fiscal Indígena. the fi is a graduate of law, who, due 
to his ethnicity, has an understanding of indigenous justice, speaks the local language, etc. the fi can provide a 
link between indigenous persons and communities and the formal system, but is apparently not employed on the 
same terms as other civil servants.57 the result is a challenging professional position that requires knowledge of at 
least administrative, civil, criminal and tax law and covers an area (a province) where the majority of inhabitants are 
indigenous communities in rural areas. 
interviews with fis showed that they are aware of human rights and they use community relations to solve prob-
lems that they might encounter. fis are also called upon to help solve problems, acting to a higher degree as 
mediators and arbitrators than as public prosecutors. interviews revealed that the role of the fi is unclear. 
it is understood that the fi are a type of ‘mediator’ between formal and indigenous justice. fi are meeting the chal-
lenges of their position, although the role and responsibility of this unit – in particular in relation to the organic 
law on the judicial function – require further consideration. the question is also whether they are correctly placed 
to face the challenges that they in fact handle (mediation and arbitration, as opposed to prosecution only). 
mediation and Justices of peace 
the other mechanisms of conflict resolution are justices of the peace58 and mediation.59 60 
inspired by the Peruvian experience, justices of the peace are a recent innovation in ecuador and, although they 
are mentioned in the constitution, interviews confirmed that “there are no peace judges” or that “peace judges do 
not work”. 
55 see http://www.fiscalia.gov.ec
56 the function of fiscales indigena has also been created in guatemala and costa rica in recent years. 
57 not a civil servant as such, but employed on a short-term contract. 
58 2008 constitution, article 189.
59 2008 constitution, article 190.
60 globalex, updated version of ’the Basic structure of the ecuadorian legal system and legal research’ by maria Dolores miño.
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as concerns mediation, interviews with formal justice providers stressed that there are mediation centres and that 
they are used. since 1998, the Projusticia Programme of the ministry of justice and human rights has supported 
the creation of mediation centres in some cities of ecuador with support from multilateral and bilateral develop-
ment partners. the centres function according to a set of rules and mediation guidelines and according to the Pro-
justicia Programme and provide a useful alternative to formal justice. the mediation centres were not mentioned 
in the community interviews, although this may be due to the fact that the study was mainly conducted in rural 
areas, whereas the mediation centres are situated in towns. 
traditionaL Leaders and indigenous Justice 
bacKground 
in the communities surveyed (Kichwa), the population has inhabited the area since prior to spanish colonial rule. 
in the communities, it is the ayllus (a network of families in a given area and a form of government), the parentesco 
(the kinship groups), and productive units that are the social nucleus of organization and reference.61 inspired by 
laura nader’s analysis, fernando garcía-serrano underscores that the social system of the Kichwa not only serves 
to maintain social order and control, but also serves as a power system that resolves or exacerbates issues concern-
ing interests, individual and social rights and obligations and produces conflicts.62
colonial rule had an impact on indigenous justice. in some cases, indigenous law was destroyed and, in others, 
“colonial administrators tolerated the normative, administrative and jurisdictional activities of indigenous authori-
ties to manage minor, internal matters confined to spheres that did not impinge on ‘divine and human law’. indig-
enous authorities served as useful intermediaries between colonial authorities and the native population and 
an efficient means of social control.”63 in addition, the cargo system was introduced under colonial rule, whereby 
members, usually men, hold a series of cargos of increasing responsibility in the community.64
in the 19th century, there were a few ‘free indigenous communities’ and communities that were subjugated to the 
local landowner. in the second case, the local landowner (el patron de la hacienda) was the daily and permanent 
representative of power, who exercised power within the hacienda, regulated social relations and acted as an 
intermediary between state authorities and workers at the hacienda.65 moreover, the local landowners created 
a leadership system, the representatives of which were elected by government officials and business owners, as 
a means of ensuring an indigenous workforce for the use of the haciendas, for example. the system included a 
varayuk (baston de mando – the authority), a captain, a lieutenant, a henchman and a mayor (un alcalde, formerly 
both mayor and judge). 
in 1937, the Ley de Comunas Indígenas y Campesinas de 1937 replaced the above system and came to constitute one 
of the main sources behind the current leadership structure of the indigenous communities. it includes the chair-
man, the deputy chairman, the treasurer, the secretary and the member(s).66 the highest authority is the general 
assembly of the community that elects the leaders every year. the structure of the system may vary even from 
community to community and the description below should thus be seen as a very broad outline of some of the 
main characteristics of these systems. it is very likely that there are variations from one place to another. 
61 condor, 2009, p. 110. 
62 ibid., p. 128.
63 Van cott, 2003, p. 3.
64 ibid., p. 4.
65 Brandt and Valdivira, 2003, p. 21. 
66 Presidente, Vice Presidente, Tesorero, Secretario y Vocales. 
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indigenous Justice providers: composition and appointment 
according to literature67 and to the information provided by the interviewees, the justice providers are the commu-
nity leaders who are elected by the community through an annual ‘popular vote’ at the general assembly. as men-
tioned above, the highest authority is the general assembly of the community, which elects the leaders every year. 
this is in line with the organic code on the judicial function, whereby the authorities of the indigenous communi-
ties, peoples and nationalities authorities exercise the judicial functions as recognized by the constitution and the 
law (article 7). 
the interviews conducted with Kichwa communities revealed some characteristics of the organization. commu-
nity leaders and traditional authorities together make up the leadership. it is noteworthy that, in the communities, 
there is community leadership as well as traditional authority/council of elders, who are either former community 
leaders or elders. according to Van cott, juridical authorities are fused with religious and political authorities and 
are chosen through community customs. there is little or no differentiation of responsibilities, and decisions usu-
ally reflect the consensus of the elder authorities. although there might be variations, and different views, some 
very general characteristics may be outlined: 
a. the number of persons that make up community leadership (in some cases named el Cabildo or el Directorio, 
with a Directivo that meets less frequently) may vary. the interviews revealed that there could be between 7 
and 20 persons whose roles and responsibilities correspond to community needs and development.
b. the leadership includes:
  the chairman/the leader 
  the deputy-chairman/the substitute of the leader
  the treasurer
  the secretary, who takes notes and drafts documents 
  the trustee (el sindico) 
  the first member (el vocal), second member, etc.
c. leadership is related to the social and economic organization of the community. this includes authority in 
relation to issues of the use and community ownership of land, the production of agricultural produce and 
the use of the workforce, both for compulsory collective communal work (mingas) and work in nearby towns. 
among the leadership, each person has a specific role, and interviews revealed that a member (vocal) could 
be responsible for the area of education, another for health, etc. leaders are also responsible for community 
justice or indigenous justice as outlined below. leaders are usually married persons; persons who are not 
married can generally thus not access leadership functions or informal justice provision. 
in the administration of justice, all leaders are judges; however, each has a specific role to play. the chairman/leader 
runs the process and executes the sentence. the deputy-chairman has a mediator’s role, and the secretary of 
discipline notes everything down in writing and carries out certain procedures. the traditional authority is respon-
sible for providing legal advice to the leadership and the general assembly as well as providing advice to the 
punished person.68
67 Brandt and Valdiviria, 2007, p. 29.
68 condor, 2009, p. 140.
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profiLes, incLuding gender and age of Justice providers 
the community leaders must possess certain qualities and qualifications. interviewees mentioned that younger 
men with secondary or tertiary education are perceived as possible future leaders. Due to their schooling, young 
men might be appointed as secretaries. however, this should be weighed against the tendency of younger men 
with higher levels of education to leave the community, making it less evident for them to take on the responsibil-
ity as community leaders in practice. 
in the communities, the norm is that men, usually married, are elected as leaders. however, there are a few women 
community leaders, as some communities elect women directly. the qualitative study was able to ascertain that, 
in some communities, women have been elected as leaders; this was mentioned in users’ and providers’ interviews 
in chibuleo san francisco and chibuleo san Pedro, Pilahuin and Quisapincha (Province of tungurahua) and Bal-
lagan (Province of chimborazo). the relatively high proportion of women (in relation to men) who are included in 
leadership – and thus in justice provision – is also indicated in the quantitative survey (see main report, chapter 
iV on user preferences, provider profiles and their implications for policy on authority with respect to gender and 
age of justice providers). 
interviews in other communities related that the leadership is composed only of men. nevertheless, users and 
providers in some of these communities considered that the wife of a community leader is a kind of leader too. 
some (male) interviewees considered that women are as qualified as men, but that they do not want to be lead-
ers. according to some, women’s participation in leadership will increase with the education of younger women.69
research conducted in communities in chimborazo Province indicates that, until three or four years ago, women 
were not allowed to attend any meeting and that women are far from decision-making powers. 70 along the same 
lines (and as indicated in the main report in chapter Vi on women’s rights in the administration of informal justice 
concerning the right to participation), there is a male bias (from men to men) whereby the administration of justice 
has a tendency to go against women.71
one of the communities visited consisted almost entirely of women and children, which, in the long run, could 
have an implication on the election of community leaders. at the time of the field study, interviewees related that 
the leaders ’were away’ and effectively lived and worked in the cities of ecuador. thus, it should be added that 
migration has had an effect on the gender balance in communities at large and it is possible that this may have an 
impact on the composition of leadership and the administration of justice over time.
as bearers of culture and keepers of identity, women have a role in the application of physical punishments. elderly 
female family members thus carry out ‘ortigazo’ (whipping with nettles) and other purifying or cleansing rituals that 
are perceived as measures of correction and thus help to maintain community order.72 
the qualitative and quantitative surveys indicate that informal justice providers are mainly younger to middle-
aged males. in ecuador, the quantitative survey indicates that more than 50 percent of providers are between 36 
and 49 years old (see chapter iV on user preferences, provider profiles and their implications for policy concerning 
authority with respect to gender and age of justice providers). Qualitative interviews revealed that justice providers 
aged 25 to 30 years are not uncommon. one informal justice provider declared that, in his community, 80 percent 
are young and 20 percent are old community members. needless to say, this should be related to the average age 
of the population of ecuador, which is young (see section 1 on background in the present study). 
69 illiteracy is higher among women than men. 
70 unifem y la universidad andina simon Bolivar, 2008, p. 74. 
71 ibid., p. 74. 
72 ibid., p. 74.
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typicaL normative frameWorKs empLoyed and Jurisdiction 
customs and customary law provide the main normative framework for the administration of indigenous justice. 
however, one should keep in mind that customs change over time and the nature of culture is dynamic.
the Ley de Comunas y Campesinas de 1937 recognized community justice and provided outlines for the organiza-
tion of such justice. this was brought into the 1998 constitution, which recognized the right of indigenous authori-
ties to exercise justice functions for the solution of internal conflict. chapter four of the constitution of 2008 
elaborates on the rights of communities, peoples and nationalities, where it is stated that, “the indigenous com-
munities, peoples and nationalities, the afro-ecuadorian people, the montubio people and the communes form 
part of the ecuadorian state, united and indivisible”. collective rights73 of the communes, the indigenous commu-
nities, peoples and nationalities are recognized and guaranteed, e.g., “to freely maintain, develop and strengthen 
their identity, sense of belonging, ancestral traditions and forms of social organization”. 
as discussed above, the right of indigenous and peasant communities to exercise their own justice system and 
the outcome of justice provision, within their own territory, has been recognized by the constitution of 2008. 
Decisions are binding and should respect the constitution and international human rights standards; moreover, 
enforcement shall be respected by public and state institutions. in addition, decisions are subject to constitutional 
control; in concrete terms, this means an annual revision. at the time of the field study, it was not possible to 
ascertain whether the constitutional control mechanism was in fact in place and whether it had been used. this 
indicated a lack of familiarity with the functioning of any such mechanism by stakeholders. 
typicaL processes empLoyed and force of outcomes 
the principles 
the providers and users of indigenous justice interviewed perceive indigenous justice provision as:
  accessible – it is oral and in the local language 
  swift – in some cases overnight
  transparent – all community members know the rules, the procedure, the sanction
  free or low cost, perhaps to pay for paper used (documents)
  equitable – equality – all are equal 
  community-oriented – seeks to create ‘harmony’ in the community
the process
the interviews revealed that, once the existence of a problem has been recognized, the problem is usually brought 
to the attention of community leadership, which seeks to address it. 
Depending on the severity of the problem, it may be decided that one leader settles the matter by mediation or talk-
ing with the parties or it may be decided that the case be brought before the general assembly of the community. 
the matter is usually addressed in public. however, in the case of problems, such as intra-familial problems, it is 
seen that the matter is settled in a smaller group. interviews with leaders provided examples of couples ‘that do 
not live well’, where one leader seeks to advise the couple in order to solve the matter. another example is intra-
familial violence, where the accused husband is cautioned by the leader as a means of stopping the violence.
if the problem is severe, then the general assembly can be convoked at short notice by the community leadership. 
in a public meeting of the entire community, the case is presented and each party is heard, as well as any witnesses. 
73 in accordance with the constitution, and international pacts, covenants, declarations and human rights instruments. 
239
a
n
n
eX
 T
H
r
ee
a stuDy of informal justice systems: access to justice anD human rights
for the settlement of a case, the parties are required to sign a document of resolution. there is a book where com-
munity decisions are noted, including cases and their resolution. a description of the case, including dates and 
relevant information, is noted down. the book – el libro de actas – serves to check whether there is recidivism and 
as a basis to inform the police or the formal justice system, should the case be referred there.
reportedly, children can be heard as witnesses or give testimony, but they cannot be brought to trial if they are 
less than 18 years old. if a child is accused, the parent of the child is brought before the assembly and can be 
accused of an act that the child has in fact committed. the parent is perceived as the person responsible for the 
act. in the communities visited, it seemed that there had not been any conflicts caused by a child in relation to its 
parents and, in cases of conflict between parents and the child, the child remains with his or her mother, father, 
grandparents or relatives. 
in an interview with adults, the opinion was expressed that the young people do not want ijs, as they want to be 
free from punishment and the shame associated with it. 
substantive caseLoad – issues addressed and remedies and  
sanctions appLied
justice provision concerns mainly incidents that have happened in the community. there are community rules 
and, in many cases, the rules of justice provision are written down and these procedures are followed in practice 
(these procedures have possibly been introduced by the 1937 legislation). in some communities, the rules are 
updated regularly by the general assemblies in order to reflect changing relations with outside actors and within 
their communities, thus providing a dynamic and flexible system.74 all work is noted, including cases and their 
resolution in the case-book (el libro de actas).75
the interviews revealed that the typical issues that are dealt with include:
  Person: attacks, violence, or bodily harm inflicted against a person 
  family: relationships, separation, divorce, paternity issues, infidelity, intra-familial violence
  neighbour: neighbour disputes and sometimes violence, violence and health, e.g., mental health problems 
and subsequent violence 
  community: youth gangs or youth problems
  natural resources: Water and land disputes, theft of livestock and foodstuff
  goods and money: theft of goods and money
it should be added that a general impression was given that there were few grave problems in the communities 
visited. the problems mainly concern water distribution, land boundaries, marital issues or problems, and thefts, 
the majority of which have been solved in the community. according to the interviews, very few persons resolve 
their problems outside the community, such as with the help of the formal justice system, the political deputy, 
the police commissioner or the chairman of the parish board. it seems that solutions outside the community 
are mostly sought by individuals in cases where the community cannot provide a solution, such as separation 
or divorce.
if a community member is a recidivist, the sentence or punishment gradually becomes more severe. indigenous 
authorities may serve as first instance of adjudication for grave matters, which may subsequently be referred to 
74 one example is the validation by the leadership of formal documents such as contracts and land titles, although only in questions 
of mortgaging is it necessary for the state administration authorities to validate the documents. condor, 2009, p. 139. 
75 interviewees related that cases and their solutions are written down in order to be able check for recidivism in the future. 
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the state system.76 interviews revealed that, in serious cases, where a community decision is not respected several 
times, then some communities threaten to refer or actually refer the problem either to the formal justice system or 
even to the local political leader.
if a complaint is taken to the formal justice system, the indigenous authorities may show the case-book to the 
police or judge as the next step. the case-book provides the information necessary for the formal justice system to 
consider accepting a case, according to some interviewees. 
the following table presents an overview of the issues raised and remedies and sanctions applied that were men-
tioned in the qualitative interviews. the examples provided are only examples of specific issues and their solution 
and it is likely that there are local variations, which cannot be reflected entirely in the present study. 
iSSue remedieS, SanC TionS or SoluTionS 
Attacks on the life of a person Are almost always sent to the formal justice system, although exceptions are known
Problems between a young couple Conciliation: addressing the issue and providing advice
Marital problems Conciliation: addressing the issue and providing advice, formal justice
Intra-familiar violence or violence against women Conciliation, then a fine, then public punishment or confinement; final resort: formal justice 
Paternity issues Conciliation and recognition of responsibility 
Infidelity Public punishment 
Neighbour disputes Conciliation and recognition of responsibility
Neighbour or community violence Conciliation and recognition of responsibility, in some cases public punishment
Youth problems – youth gangs Relatively unknown phenomenon, but public punishment is seen as a means of preventing further developments
Water disputes Water is distributed according to a schedule; if the schedule is not respected between communities, then the 
community leaders meet to settle the dispute. 
Land disputes Land is owned by the community and boundary disputes are thus between communities. The community leaders 
meet to settle the dispute and they make use of the registers of land titles (state) as a means to clarify and settle 
the dispute. 
Theft of livestock and foodstuff Agreement to return the stolen goods or to repay the equivalent
Issues related to traffic Depends on the problem. It seems there is a distinction between the effect on the persons and the vehicles; some 
are taken care of by IJS and others are directly taken to formal justice systems. 
Corruption Corruption in leaders results in their being expelled or losing their position. 
typical remedies, sanctions and/or solutions
  conciliation: conversation and joint reflection, dialogue and apologies
  returning any stolen good or reimbursing the equivalent cost;
  fines
  Public punishment 
 – Whipping (‘latigez’)77 
 – cold baths (‘baños’)78
 – Whipping with stinging nettles79
76 Van cott, 2003, p. 7. 
77 in the case of physical attacks, stabbing, domestic violence.
78 cold baths are prepared with cold mountain water and usually take place after midnight. 
79 interviews revealed that there are three types of nettles with varying degrees of effect. 
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 Placing in confinement80 (in the community, in some cases subterranean) 
  exclusion from the community
as indicated above, the examples below are also of cases that were brought up in interviews and should therefore 
only be considered as illustrations of issues. as is apparent, retributive as well as more restorative measures are 
applied by the ijs.
vioLence 
one example was provided by a group of women who explained that there had been a problem of a knife fight 
in their community that was solved by the community by punishing the guilty person with whipping and baths. 
maritaL probLems/separation/divorce, and Women’s opportunities  
and preferences 
among the Kichwa, there are traditions or notions of what makes and unmakes a community. separation or divorce 
among Kichwa is similar to the destruction of the social fabric of the community; therefore, divorce or separation 
is thus not necessarily an option in indigenous justice. interviews with women users of justice revealed a variety of 
solutions to marital problems. some of the interviewees explained that they had not been able to solve a problem 
adequately and, as result, were obliged to remain with their spouse. 
in another community, there was ‘a problem at home’ due to a difference in ideas. in april 2009, the wife received 
the parents and the parents-in-law, followed by the leaders, as well as the pastor, who, through dialogue and 
advice, supported the resolution of the problem. in this way, the couple ended by apologizing to each other. in 
september 2009, the interviewees expressed that the solution was respected by the partners and it could be seen 
that they ‘live well’. in the same interview, it was commented that the couple decides if it wants to live well or live 
badly and that, in some cases, even discussion at the level of the general assembly can provide an opportunity to 
recognize errors. 
domestic vioLence and rape 
By national law, domestic violence has been banned since 1995, when the Violence against Women and the family 
act (law no. 103) was adopted. Domestic violence in indigenous communities has been addressed in research 
and, in the present study, it was mentioned in the interviews of women. research shows that violence against 
women is hardly ever tackled in the general assembly or by community leadership and, moreover, that violence 
against women has not been covered by the rules in all communities.81
in the present study, domestic violence and, in particular, violence against women were addressed in the inter-
views and the following provides some insight into the handling of these issues as perceived by women. a case 
of death threats and domestic violence was taken to the Cabildo three times in one community. Due to the fact 
that the decision was not respected several times and as it was considered very serious, the case was sent to the 
judge in ambato. 
in another case, it was decided that either a large fine should be paid or the couple should continue to live together. 
the couple continues to live together, but they reportedly ‘do not live well’. another example was of the confine-
ment of the husband in the community cell/dungeon (Calabazo), after which he stopped being violent and ‘they 
live well’. 
80 interviews revealed that, in the community, there is a room, a dungeon and in some cases a subterranean space. 
81 unifem y la universidad andina simon Bolivar, 2008, p. 74. . 
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rape is apparently a new issue. some interviewees responded that rape had not taken place in their community; 
some replied that is should be addressed by the state as medical professionals are involved; and others indicated 
that the community does not know how to handle this type of case.
iLL-treatment of chiLdren
ecuador’s state report to the iccPr submitted to the human rights committee in December 200782 mentions 
a high incidence of ill-treatment within the family in ecuador: 43.60 percent of children and young people have 
undergone some kind of ill-treatment.83 according to a survey,84 four of every 10 children said that their parents 
hit them when they were badly behaved or disobeyed. others had been subject to psychological ill-treatment; 
3 percent of children had been confined to a room or bathed in cold water by parents; 5 percent had suffered 
insults or jokes; and 2 percent had been expelled from their home or deprived of food. Blows were reportedly more 
frequently used by parents in rural areas than in cities, more in amazonia than in other regions, and more in poor 
and indigenous homes. 
as concerns ijs and ill-treatment of children, the question was briefly touched upon by one justice provider. he 
explained that children do leave home due to problems and that they either live in the community or go to the 
city to live. in addition, he mentioned that the problem is ill-treatment of children by parents. 
none of the interviews with children provided any indication of the frequency or level of ill-treatment of children. 
With the high incidence of ill-treatment in the country, it is likely that it also takes place in the rural communities. 
the limited duration of visits to communities, which is only possible in a study such as the present one, places 
limits on possibilities to discuss sensitive issues such as this.
Women’s rights concerning reaL property 
communities own land mostly on a communal basis, though, in some cases, there is individual ownership of plots 
of land. one example of a case solved by an informal justice system related to land use, ownership, and inheritance 
was described to the team:
in the community concerned, it is possible to rent from other community members plots of land situated next to 
the land of the person renting (lessee). a person thus rented a plot of land located in front of/across from her own 
land. the rented plot of land was sold and the lessee contested the sale. the seller was a woman who had rightfully 
inherited the land according to a ‘verbal inheritance’. the local informal justice system looked into the matter and 
decided that the sale was permitted and legal according to local norms. 
the reasoning of the informal justice system’s decision was that the plot of land had been sold to a neighbour who 
owned land – next to the plot of land. in the community, the first option to buy land is with the neighbour that is 
next to the plot of land. if that neighbour declines to buy the land, then it can be sold to anybody. as the person 
who rented the land lived in front of or across from the land, the first option was not available to her. 
the interviewee conceded that the solution was good. 
While several points could be raised in relation to the case, it is of interest that the plot of land had been inherited 
and sold by a woman, that the sale was also contested by a woman, and that this case was heard by the informal 
justice system. 
82 ccPr/c/ecu/5 of 26 may 2008, english version.
83 Draft of the fourth report to the cmrW.
84 ibid. 
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resources: Land and Water disputes, theft of LivestocK,  
inter-community disputes
Problems between communities are solved between community leaders; a typical example is a water conflict or 
determination of land boundaries. 
in Ballagán, a dispute between communities concerned land boundaries. these disputes occur due to the scar-
city of arable land; people therefore ‘move’ the boundaries. in the particular case, it was not possible to solve the 
dispute at the leadership level of the communities and it was thus decided to solve the dispute in riobamba (the 
main city of the Province of chimborazo), resorting to an expert to look at the official documents and land titles 
(escrituras públicas) in order to verify who owned exactly which land. 
in another cases, a dispute between the community of atapo el carmen and atapo Quillotoro concerned the 
cutting of water from the hill (mountain). in order to solve the dispute, the leaders of the communities talked and 
went to riobamba to verify ‘legal documents’ and to settle the matter. consequently, the community of atapo 
Quillotoro did not pursue the matter, as they did not have the right to do so. thus, the availability of the formal 
justice system was important in these cases.
in a case concerning theft of two head of livestock, the victim informed the leadership, which called the alleged 
thief and community member in order to look at the issue. the leadership decided that the thief should cover the 
costs of the two animals, awarding $800 in compensation, which was paid to the victim. 
traffic issues and car accidents 
other types of incidents – car accidents – are likely to be taken to the indigenous ijs. the last possibility was men-
tioned a few times in the interview. the interviews revealed that many situations occur due to car accidents. if an 
accident takes place and the police are at the scene, then it is taken to formal justice immediately. if an accident 
results in the death of a person, then the formal justice system will be involved. 
generally, it seems that agreements are reached in the ijs whereby the accused reimburses the victim for any costs 
that might occur, such as for the repair of the car. interviewees criticized the decision in one such case. the local 
leadership decided that $100 should be paid to cover repairs of the car, but the actual cost of repair amounted 
to $1,800, leaving the victim to pay the remaining cost. the actual cost was not acknowledged by the leadership, 
perhaps because the police had not been involved. 
sanctions, incLuding physicaL punishment
in analysing indigenous justice in ecuador, it is important first to establish the facts about the use of corporal pun-
ishment, including that which may amount to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. second, it is important to 
address these types of human rights violations in a manner that may prevent their use in the future. 
as may be seen from the table above on remedies and sanctions, there are punishments used that could be 
deemed to fall within the framework of uncat. at the same time, it is important to recognize that physical pun-
ishment such as public whipping, whipping with stinging nettles and cold ‘baths’ may often be seen as cleansing 
rituals. experts were of the view, however, that this is something that tends to be exaggerated in the media and 
may thus be less common than perceptions might sometimes indicate.85 
country study interviews confirmed the existence of these sanctions, although most interviewees added that 
these punishments are not applied very often and they have a preventive effect. leaders interviewed said that 
85 Vintimilla j., 2008, p. 71. 
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they are careful in the application of severe physical punishment, that this form of punishment is not the norm. 
Despite the fact that interviews confirm a sparing use of physical punishment, evidence of torture, inhuman or 
degrading treatment is available in the country. one example reported is of public hanging by arms and live burial 
where a Fiscal indígena (fi) intervened and managed to stop the punishment. 
as concerns violence and the dynamics of culture, it should be noted that the shuar federation in 1996 replaced 
the death sentence with community expulsion combined with the community’s confiscation of the accused’s 
possessions. the work of the shuar federation shows how it is possible for indigenous law – and justice – to 
develop sanctions, that to a higher degree, respect human rights as well as create spaces of intercultural under-
standing in the practice of legal pluralism.86 
at issue in ecuador is also the question of lynching, to which the media have given a lot of attention. lynching 
per definition is an extrajudicial punishment performed by a mob and, as such, it is not part of indigenous justice. 
great care should be taken to address lynching correctly and based on facts, just as indigenous justice deserves 
correct attention. interviews with formal justice providers and representatives revealed that lynching per se is not 
part of ijs. it is thus necessary to raise awareness about indigenous and informal justice. according to interviews 
in the communities, lynching is not part of indigenous justice and lynching in ecuador has taken place in urban or 
peri-urban settings by persons who may or may not be of indigenous descent. some interviewees stressed that, 
even though lynching may be carried out by indigenous persons, this does not mean that it is part of indigenous 
justice. in addition, the un special rapporteur on extrajudicial executions noted during his mission to ecuador in 
june 2010 that, “he had been presented with no evidence that indigenous justice had led to extrajudicial execu-
tions and stressed that it was entirely inappropriate to confuse mob lynching with indigenous justice”.87
users of indigenous Justice and their vieWs
the users of indigenous justice are to be found among community members, although it is possible that non-
indigenous persons who live in the area may seek indigenous justice as a means of solving an issue or an incident 
that has happened in the community. (see also above on the scope of personal jurisdiction of ijs.) one interviewee 
related that non-indigenous persons living in the area would rather address the parish or indigenous leadership 
than the formal justice system in order to solve specific problems.88 
Women’s access to Justice 
Women’s access to justice is generally acknowledged to be an issue in ecuador. indigenous justice takes its point 
of vantage in collective interests, which, to a certain extent, may be achieved at the cost of individual rights. the 
law is clear that, “the exercise of indigenous justice should guarantee the participation and decision of women. 
to solve internal conflicts, the (indigenous) authorities apply norms that are not contrary to the constitution and 
human rights, and the rights of women may not be violated by alleging that it is a question of customary law.”89 
nevertheless, the role of women and access to justice is complex and ensuring effective access requires more 
sustained effort. 
in ijs, women reportedly do voice their opinions; however, as long as the leadership is mainly composed of men, 
it may not always produce results in favour of women. although all interviews confirmed that women and men 
86 condor, 2009, p. 147. 
87 Press release by ohchr on 15 july 2010, full statement available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/executions/index.htm 
and full report to have been published in 2010. 
88 san Pedro
89 article 343, organic law on the judicial function.
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have equal opportunities to voice their opinions and be heard, research nevertheless provides a different picture. 
the idea that “men think that women do not talk well […] and therefore can neither help nor provide an opinion”90
effectively limits the participation of women. as concerns intra-familial violence, this question hardly ever reaches 
the leadership or the general assembly. (see page 15: substantive caseload above.) 
in one community, women thought that ‘problems of the home’ should not be managed by ijs. other interviews 
revealed that younger women prefer and also seek assistance from the state system rather than the indigenous 
justice system, despite the fact that this is ill-perceived in the community. in the case of separation or divorce, inter-
views with women revealed that indigenous justice is sometimes quietly ignored and that women go directly to 
the formal justice system or file cases of separation and divorce with the formal justice system as a last resort. this 
was also confirmed by formal justice system representatives. 
as concerns justice use, it seems that the women, although very loyal to the system, do not in fact access justice 
at the level of the individual. in cases concerning marital breakdown, some of the interviewees explained that they 
had not been able to solve a problem adequately and, as a result, were obliged to remain with their spouse. the 
question, of course, is what the adequate resolution of a problem according to the women is and whether either the 
formal or informal justice system is capable of providing it. as mentioned elsewhere in this study, younger women 
do seek assistance from the state system, despite the fact that this is either ill-perceived or against community rules. 
Women are becoming aware that solutions may be found in places outside the community system, such as from 
the formal justice system, which, on the one hand, may provide justice to the individual and, on the other, may 
instigate changes in the communities where the rules are revised annually. 
chiLdren’s vieWs of Justice
in general, only limited information was available regarding indigenous justice and children. children have some 
knowledge of the details of indigenous justice, although they are aware of the role of the community leadership 
in maintaining order. the interviews mentioned below revealed neither issues related to the rights of the child and 
ill-treatment of children, nor any information regarding the formal justice system or juvenile justice as such. 
an interview with boys and girls (12 to 14 years old) revealed that their knowledge mainly concerned justice in the 
community, whereas their knowledge of formal justice institutions – or institutions outside the community – was 
more limited. in the case of a problem with neighbours, the interviewed children would prefer to talk with their 
parents first to solve the issue. in the case of a small problem, some would leave it at that and others would also 
inform the community leaders. in more serious cases, the problem should be resolved at that level. the group indi-
cated that they knew of land and water disputes between communities, violence against women and abandoning 
of the home as well as questions of transport and repair of infrastructure. they did not report knowledge of cases 
such as rape or witchcraft. 
interviews with adolescents (17 to 18 years old) also showed that they had a good level of knowledge of ijs. they 
said that they would look at solving a problem so that it would not cause any disturbance. in addition, it was 
remarked that problems, including family issues, are solved by adults. another interview (group of people aged 17 
to 24 years) revealed that ijs can assist through conversation and guidance of young people. the example men-
tioned was problems of young couples. 
users vieWs of chiLdren’s issues
the quantitative survey showed that, in cases involving children, the qualitative restorative approaches are pre-
ferred, as the majority of the respondents think that beating or sending the child perpetrator to prison would be 
90 unifem y la universidad andina simon Bolivar, 2008, p. 74.
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a poor solution. however, one third of the respondents would approve of more retributive measures. it is only the 
solution ‘offender says “sorry” and you forgive‘ and the solution ’offender and you find a solution though mediation‘ 
that the majority of the respondents think would be appropriate. all other solutions are generally seen as poor. 
in ecuador, nearly all the respondents to the quantitative survey agreed that, if there is a case within the family 
between the child and his or her parents, the child would be represented by someone defending his or her inter-
est. moreover, the child would generally be represented by another family member. 
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users preferences 
perceptions of indigenous Justice and formaL Justice 
some qualitative interviews revealed that formal justice providers believe that indigenous justice works in an iso-
lated manner and it was indicated that the indigenous communities are not necessarily interested in relating to 
the formal justice system. moreover, there was limited knowledge of legislation or government policies in the field 
of indigenous justice, e.g., the organic law of march 2009 was hardly mentioned by formal justice providers in the 
provinces. 
some interviews confirmed that there is no relation between justice providers of the systems and there is no 
known policy to be followed. a few justice providers nevertheless seek to educate themselves on human rights, 
collective rights and indigenous justice; courses are provided by indigenous organizations. 
at the same time, it should be noted that indications are that women users of justice are aware that the formal 
justice system may be of better use to them in the case of divorce or domestic violence. 
preferred Justice provision
taking point of vantage in the quantitative survey, it is interesting to note that an overwhelming majority of the 
justice users at the community level first go to a local/village court (112) or the traditional leader (elder, former 
leader, 40). moreover, they are of the opinion that the best justice provider is either the local/village court (105), 
the traditional leaders (107) or the clan/family elders (11). it is also relevant to note that the church has a role to 
play, which is confirmed by the qualitative survey that revealed that the (evangelical) church is present in some 
communities. (see graphics below.)
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WHEN YOU HAVE A PROBLEM OR CASE, WHICH JUSTICE PROVIDER 
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programming
government programmes 
Plans and Policies 
In 1998, Ecuador adopted as a state policy Ecuador’s National Human Rights Plan, which has been imple-
mented since 2003 through Operational Action Plans under the leadership of the Standing Committee on 
the Monitoring of Ecuador’s Human Rights Plan, a joint body composed of representatives of the State 
and civil society, set up in November 1999. 
the national Development Plan (2007-2010) concerns the Promotion of access to justice and objective 9 consists 
of five policies as follows:
(9.1.) advance processes of legal training for citizenship
(9.2.) advance legal pluralism (alternative justice) that respects human rights
(9.3.) support institutional strengthening of the judicial function
(9.4.) restructure the national system of social rehabilitation and
(9.5.)  Diminish gender violence and abuse of children. several strategies have  
been developed to implement these policies. 
Policy 9.2 outlines that, “a multicultural state shall respect the values and principles of the different communities 
that live in society, without altering the principles that protect and promote human rights. Dialogue shall be sup-
ported and conflicts shall be overcome through the free will of the parties.”
other plans and policies are also important in creating access to justice in ecuador, least the national policies con-
cerning gender equality, violence against women, abuse of children, etc. most of these policies address the formal 
justice system. the national Plan of action of good living (2009-2013) refers directly to the ancestral andean 
(Kichwa) concept of good living known as sumak kawsay, which is maintained in many indigenous communities. 
Sumak kawsay may be understood as the fullness of life. 
as concerns the reach of the formal justice system, the national Plan on the elimination of racial Discrimination and 
ethnic-cultural exclusion 2009-2012 relates that, although the law implies the principles of non-discrimination and 
equality in access to justice, experience shows that certain groups of persons, in particular victims of racial discrimi-
nation, do not have access to justice or do not have access on an equal footing with the rest of the population.91 
as concerns planning and programming for children, ecuador has created organs under the constitution and 
the childhood and adolescence code that will become the Decentralized system of comprehensive Protection 
of children and adolescents (crc, paragraph 17). the childhood and adolescence code (2003) and the national 
Plan for the comprehensive Protection of children and adolescents (2004-2013) are key elements in this regard. 
law reforms have also been carried out, such as the reform of the criminal code (23 june 2005, official gazette no. 
45), which concerns sexual exploitation of children. in addition to law reform and plans, several executive Decrees 
have been issued, including executive Decree no. 179 on the comprehensive protection of the rights of children 
and adolescents and executive Decree no. 620 on the eradication of gender violence against children, adolescents 
and women. it should also be mentioned that measures have been taken to address poverty, the socio-economic 
situation, education, etc. in relation to children, the abolition of the $25 contribution per child towards education 
91 unofficial translation, Plan Nacional para Eliminar la Discriminación Racial y la Exclusión Étnica-cultural /the national Plan for the 
elimination of racial Discrimination and ethnic-cultural exclusion 2009-2010, p. 26. 
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and the introduction of the human Development Bono are relevant. the state-indigenous Peoples and nationali-
ties agreement for children and adolescents entitled Building sumak Kawsay (good living) from the Beginning of 
life, provides a minimum agenda for indigenous children in ecuador. 
the ministry of Justice, human rights and Worship
the creation of the then ministry of justice, and human rights (2008) has also been a relevant step, which has 
recently become the ministry of justice, human rights and Worship (‘cultos’ was added to the mandate in june 
2010). the ministry has been particularly active, including with:
1. surveys and legal analysis. in co-operation with unDP and unhcr, the ministry is collecting information 
about justice systems and, in particular, indigenous justice systems as a means of contributing towards the 
development of legislation. initiated in 2009, this three-year project is carried out in the provinces of sucum-
bíos, chimborazo and las esmeraldas.
2. conferences and publications. the book La transformación de la justicia is an example of co-operation with 
the universidad andina simon Bolivar that provides an analysis of justice and the organic law on the judicial 
function that came into effect in march 2009. 
3. mediation centres. the Projusticia Programme established mediation centres in various provinces and, more 
specifically, mediation centres for indigenous communities; the two most important are in cotacaxi and in 
otavalo. these centres have inverted the principles of confidentiality, whereby processes are closed to the com-
munity and the accused is subject to a verbal moral agreement. one such project is the opening of mediation 
centres in areas of Difficult access to justice (2004-2005, funded by the World Bank with japanese funds).
4. the bill on coordination and co-operation between indigenous justice and ordinary justice (formal justice) 
is being prepared as part of the policies of the undersecretary of regulatory Development and the ministry 
of justice, human rights and Worship to create intercultural dialogue. the preparations include prior consul-
tation and debate with indigenous organizations as a means of reaching consensus on the bill. 92 the bill has 
been delayed. 
united nations co-operation 
the united nations agencies are working together strategically with the government of ecuador. moreover, there 
is geographical focus on the provinces of chimborazo, las esmeraldas and sucumbíos.
the present unDaf 2010-2014 mentions access to justice as an issue.
the united nations office of the high commissioner for human rights (ohchr) and the united nations Devel-
opment Programme (unDP) work with the ministry of justice and human rights in collecting information about 
justice systems and, in particular, indigenous justice systems as a means of contributing towards the development 
of legislation. initiated in 2009, this co-operation is carried out in the provinces of sucumbíos, chimborazo and las 
esmeraldas. the ohchr and unDP are very aware of the challenges that the constitution of 2008 poses and that 
it is necessary to look into the lack of information about indigenous justice, not least about the fact that there are 
several forms of indigenous justice, because there are many indigenous peoples, communities and nations. the 
issues to be addressed are very real, e.g., the coordination between indigenous justice and formal justice.
unicef addresses juvenile justice in the formal justice system and in co-operation with the ministry of justice and 
human rights. When the field and desk research was done, unicef did not work directly with indigenous justice 
and the rights of the child. 
92 consolidated un comments to final draft of report (unifem andean office). 
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unifem works on Women’s access to justice and has published studies specifically on access to justice by indig-
enous women in the andean region. these studies provide a good panorama of the questions at issue in regard 
to the ceDaW and include good practices. 
foundations, ngos and biLateraL co-operation deveLopment agencies 
as concerns foundations and ngos:
1. ciDes – Centro sobre Derecho y Sociedad focuses on legal training and documentation, funded by the 
Deutscher entwicklungsdienst/german Development service
2. the confederation of the indigenous Peoples of Kichwa nationality (ecuarunari) organizes workshops 
on indigenous justice and as a result published ‘the legal structure and judicial systems of the indigenous 
peoples of Kichwa nationality of ecuador’ (2009)
3. gtZ has supported a series of seminars, where experts and academics from Bolivia, Brazil, colombia, ecuador, 
Peru and guatemala look into questions that relate to legal pluralism and the rule of law; one such seminar 
took place in lima, Peru, on 29-31 october 2009
4. iBis has principally worked on the rights of indigenous peoples
5. the Konrad adenauer foundation provides training of indigenous leaders in human rights and justice
6. the ngo-operated programme indigenous Women organised in ecuador to improve access to justice 
mentioned in the country-specific desk study could not be located, nor could the women’s coordinator of 
ecuarunari be contacted during the missions.
Very little mention was made of the un and of ngos that work on issues of justice in the communities. Plan inter-
national and the evangelical church were mentioned in the communities.
findings and recommendations 
as the purpose of the country study is to inform a larger, global study on ijs rather than to make programming 
recommendations specifically in relation to ecuador, the following findings and recommendations are tentative 
and generic.
the many changes introduced recently require concerted effort by development partners to work with govern-
ment in a way that builds upon a human rights approach and that seeks to develop an understanding of the sys-
tems in order to reach a useful and relevant placement of the systems in relation to each other. it is clear that much 
work lies ahead to reach an acceptable model of mutual accommodation or harmonization of the two systems. 
the relations between them are likely to change over time, especially if the formal justice system becomes more 
accessible to indigenous communities (in all parameters: cultural, financial, geographical, etc.). 
although the national Plan for Development 2007-2010 addresses justice, including forms other than formal jus-
tice, the perception frequently encountered in the provinces visited was that the government and state do not 
have any initiatives regarding ijs. it was confirmed in interviews during the mission that there are no resources to 
address ijs and that neither training nor information on ijs has been carried out among state institutions. under-
standing of the links and interest in ijs was sometimes encountered among respondents in the justice system, but 
this seemed to remain at a personal level. 
should the legislation on indigenous courts and tribunals still be in the making when future programming cycles 
commence, it would be useful to focus strategically on this endeavour and to ensure, for example, that human 
rights principles become part of the legislative text and that the text itself be clear and useful to users, providers 
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and practitioners of formal and informal justice systems. it is essential to clearly define the limits of subject matter 
and of personal and territorial jurisdiction and to emphasize human rights principles in this regard. in particular, if 
the constitutional provision results in the successful assertion of ijs’ jurisdiction over serious criminal offences, the 
operation of this jurisdiction warrants serious study of issues including legal certainty, due process and fair trial 
guarantees. Developments in neighbouring countries are highly relevant to this, and cross-border exchange and 
consultation could be improved, especially in regard to evaluation of the functioning and consequences of the 
constitutional and legislative changes of recent years.
studies of the implementation of the law could focus on various issues, including the implementation of the 
provisions concerning women’s decision-making and participation, the use of corporal punishment by ijs and the 
situation of children in indigenous justice. the latter requires an initial identification of key issues. 
the interviews revealed a lack of knowledge of indigenous justice and formal justice on the part of users and pro-
viders of justice, possibly because there have recently been so many legislative and institutional changes. this lack 
of knowledge can be remedied through study, surveys, good information and education. study should include 
aspects of structure, process and substance, as set out in the main report.
un agencies could focus on supporting the building of knowledge of the ijs within the formal justice system, on 
consultations between justice system stakeholders, and on ijs’ leadership and exchange of experience. the reach 
of the formal justice system and the ways in which it approaches indigenous communities are essential here. like-
wise, the present and future application of the principle of inter-culturality, as laid down in the 2009 legislation, is 
an area for study of best practices in relation to civil and criminal law.
indigenous organizations have debated and raised awareness about indigenous justice, mainly with civil society 
and coDenPe. nevertheless, given the widespread perception in ecuador of indigenous justice as a static system 
that has never been subject to changes, it might be relevant to enter into intercultural dialogue about justice sys-
tems as a means of providing input to the bill on jurisdictions and of creating ownership. 
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anneX i – eXcerpt of the organic LaW on the 
JudiciaL function 
registro oficiaL nº 544 – Lunes 9 de marZo deL 2009
………….
caPÍtulo ii 
PrinciPios rectores y DisPosiciones funDamentales
art. 4. – PrinciPio De suPremacÍa constitucional.- las juezas y jueces, las autoridades administrativas y servi-
doras y servidores de la función judicial aplicarán las disposiciones constitucionales, sin necesidad que se encuen-
tren desarrolladas en otras normas de menor jerarquía. en las decisiones no se podrá restringir, menoscabar o 
inobservar su contenido.
en consecuencia, cualquier jueza o juez, de oficio o a petición de parte, sólo si tiene duda razonable y motivada de 
que una norma jurídica es contraria a la constitución o a los instrumentos internacionales de derechos humanos 
que establezcan derechos más favorables que los reconocidos en la constitución, suspenderá la tramitación de la 
causa y remitirá en consulta el expediente a la corte constitucional, la que en un plazo no mayor a cuarenta y cinco 
días resolverá sobre la constitucionalidad de la norma.
si transcurrido el plazo previsto la corte no se pronuncia, el proceso seguirá sustanciándose. si la corte resolviere 
luego de dicho plazo, la resolución no tendrá efecto retroactivo, pero quedará a salvo la acción extraordinaria de 
protección por parte de quien hubiere sido perjudicado por recibir un fallo o resolución contraria a la resolución 
de la corte constitucional. no se suspenderá la tramitación de la causa, si la norma jurídica impugnada por la jueza 
o juez es resuelta en sentencia.
el tiempo de suspensión de la causa no se computará para efectos de la prescripción de la acción o del proceso.
art. 5. – PrinciPio De aPlicaBiliDaD Directa e inmeDiata De la norma constitucional.- las juezas y jueces, 
las autoridades administrativas y las servidoras y servidores de la función judicial, aplicarán directamente las 
normas constitucionales y las previstas en los instrumentos internacionales de derechos humanos cuando estas 
últimas sean más favorables a las establecidas en la constitución, aunque las partes no las invoquen expresamente.
los derechos consagrados en la constitución y los instrumentos internacionales de derechos humanos serán de 
inmediato cumplimiento y aplicación. no podrá alegarse falta de ley o desconocimiento de las normas para justifi-
car la vulneración de los derechos y garantías establecidos en la constitución, para desechar la acción interpuesta 
en su defensa, o para negar el reconocimiento de tales derechos.
art. 6. – interPretaciÓn integral De la norma constitucional. - las juezas y jueces aplicarán la norma con-
stitucional por el tenor que más se ajuste a la constitución en su integralidad. en caso de duda, se interpretarán en 
el sentido que más favorezca a la plena vigencia de los derechos garantizados por la norma, de acuerdo con los 
principios generales de la interpretación constitucional.
art. 7. – PrinciPios De legaliDaD, juris-Diccion y comPetencia. - la jurisdicción y la competencia nacen de la 
constitución y la ley. solo podrán ejercer la potestad jurisdiccional las juezas y jueces nombrados de conformidad 
con sus preceptos, con la intervención directa de fiscales y defensores públicos en el ámbito de sus funciones. las 
autoridades de las comunidades, pueblos y nacionalidades indígenas ejercerán las funciones jurisdiccionales que 
les están reconocidas por la constitución y la ley.
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las juezas y jueces de paz resolverán en equidad y tendrán competencia exclusiva y obligatoria para conocer 
aquellos conflictos individuales, comunitarios, vecinales y contravencionales, que sean sometidos a su jurisdicción, 
de conformidad con la ley.
los árbitros ejercerán funciones jurisdiccionales, de conformidad con la constitución y la ley. no ejercerán la potes-
tad jurisdiccional las juezas, jueces o tribunales de excepción ni las comisiones especiales creadas para el efecto.
art. 8. – PrinciPio De inDePenDencia.- las juezas y jueces solo están sometidos en el ejercicio de la potestad 
jurisdiccional a la constitución, a los instrumentos internacionales de derechos humanos y a la ley. al ejercerla, son 
independientes incluso frente a los demás órganos de la función judicial. ninguna función, órgano o autoridad 
del estado podrá interferir en el ejercicio de los deberes y atribuciones de la función judicial. toda violación a este 
principio conllevará responsabilidad administrativa, civil y/o penal, de acuerdo con la ley.
………….
tÍtulo Viii 
relaciones De la jurisDicciÓn inDÍgena con la jurisDicciÓn orDinaria
art. 343. – ÁmBito De la jurisDicciÓn inDÍgena
las autoridades de las comunidades, pueblos y nacionalidades indígenas ejercerán funciones jurisdiccionales, con 
base en sus tradiciones ancestrales y su derecho propio o consuetudinario, dentro de su ámbito territorial, con 
garantía de participación y decisión de las mujeres. las autoridades aplicarán normas y procedimientos propios 
para la solución de sus conflictos internos, y que no sean contrarios a la constitución y a los derechos humanos 
reconocidos en instrumentos internacionales. no se podrá alegar derecho propio o consuetudinario para justificar 
o dejar de sancionar la violación de derechos de las mujeres.
art. 344. – PrinciPios De la justicia intercultural
la actuación y decisiones de los jueces y juezas, fiscales, defensores y otros servidores judiciales, policías y demás 
funcionarias y funcionarios públicos, observarán en los procesos los siguientes principios:
a. Diversidad.- han de tener en cuenta el derecho propio, costumbres y prácticas ancestrales de las personas  
y pueblos indígenas, con el fin de garantizar el óptimo reconocimiento y realización plena de la  
diversidad cultural;
b.  igualdad.- la autoridad tomará las medidas necesarias para garantizar la comprensión de las normas, 
procedimientos, y consecuencias jurídicas de lo decidido en el proceso en el que intervengan personas y col-
ectividades indígenas. Por lo tanto, dispondrán, entre otras medidas, la intervención procesal de traductores, 
peritos antropólogos y especialistas en derecho indígena.
c. non bis in idem.- lo actuado por las autoridades de la justicia indígena no podrá ser juzgado ni revisado por 
los jueces y juezas de la función judicial ni por autoridad administrativa alguna, en ningún estado de las 
causas puestas a su conocimiento, sin perjuicio del control constitucional;
d. Pro jurisdicción indígena.- en caso de duda entre la jurisdicción ordinaria y la jurisdicción indígena, se prefer-
irá esta última, de tal manera que se asegure su mayor autonomía y la menor intervención posible; y,
e. interpretación intercultural.- en el caso de la comparecencia de personas o colectividades indígenas, al momento 
de su actuación y decisión judiciales, interpretarán interculturalmente los derechos controvertidos en el litigio. en 
consecuencia, se procurará tomar elementos culturales relacionados con las costumbres, prácticas ancestrales, 
normas, procedimientos del derecho propio de los pueblos, nacionalidades, comunas y comunidades indígenas, 
con el fin de aplicar los derechos establecidos en la constitución y los instrumentos internacionales.
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art. 345. – DeclinaciÓn De comPetencia
los jueces y juezas que conozcan de la existencia de un proceso sometido al conocimiento de las autoridades 
indígenas, declinarán su competencia, siempre que exista petición de la autoridad indígena en tal sentido. a tal 
efecto se abrirá un término probatorio de tres días en el que se demostrará sumariamente la pertinencia de tal 
invocación, bajo juramento de la autoridad indígena de ser tal. aceptada la alegación la jueza o el juez ordenará el 
archivo de la causa y remitirá el proceso a la jurisdicción indígena.
art. 346. – PromociÓn De la justicia intercultural.
 el consejo de la judicatura determinará los recursos humanos, económicos y de cualquier naturaleza que sean 
necesarios para establecer mecanismos eficientes de coordinación y cooperación entre la jurisdicción indígena y 
la jurisdicción ordinaria.
especialmente, capacitará a las servidoras y servidores de la función judicial que deban realizar actuaciones en 
el ámbito de su competencia en territorios donde existe predominio de personas indígenas, con la finalidad de 
que conozcan la cultura, el idioma y las costumbres, prácticas ancestrales, normas y procedimientos del derecho 
propio o consuetudinario de los pueblos indígenas.
el consejo de la judicatura no ejercerá ningún tipo de atribución, gobierno o administración respecto de la juris-
dicción indígena.
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methodoLogy
this study is based on three main elements. the first is a desk study of available materials concerning non-state or 
informal justice and customary law in niger.1 
the second element is a field study conducted during a two-week mission to niger in january 2010. the mission 
included visits to the town of gaya and the village of niakoye-tounga in the Dosso region (about 20 kilometres 
from the town of Dosso, on the main road)2 and to two settlements and hamlets in the area of makolandi in the 
tillaberi region, where providers and actual or potential users were met. constraints posed by budgetary, logistical 
and security considerations did not make it possible to visit the east of the country. this choice of districts reflects 
a preference for rural areas over urban ones.
it is important to note that gaya, in particular, is an area where there has been a lot of intervention by aid organiza-
tions and ngos. in the field of justice, governance and human rights, these have included radio broadcasts and 
public discussions where justice sector actors have participated, and ngo outreach programmes have provided 
legal education (including through drama) and other legal services, as well as training for chiefs on mediation. it 
is also a border town on the main route from niamey to important ports in the region. these factors mean that it 
probably represents a more open, progressive society compared to some parts of the country. the district (com-
prising 6 cantons and over 200 villages, as well as a number of urban quartiers) may thus give a good (though 
impressionistic, given the short duration) picture of an area where governance interventions of various kinds can 
be expected to have had an effect.
1 as is mentioned in the main study, the term justice informelle had negative, pejorative connotations for jurists in niger.
2 the nearest police (gendarmerie) post was 5 kilometres away, while the brigade was 20 kilometres away in gaya. the village, with 
an estimated area of 1 kilometre by 2 kilometres, has an estimated population of about 4,000, including 1,037 taxpayers.
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the mission also included meetings and discussions with a number of representatives of the justice system and 
legal experts having specific knowledge of customary law and informal justice mechanisms, as well as representa-
tives of un and other cooperation partners and ngos. 
the third element is a quantitative study during which a population survey of potential and actual users or ben-
eficiaries and providers of ijs were asked questions about their preferences and practices. the quantitative survey 
was conducted in the same districts and villages in the Dosso and tillabéri regions of southern and Western niger 
in february 2010. 
bacKground
like many post-colonial states, the republic of niger recognizes customary law that regulates many areas of life 
and social interaction, as well as the customary institutions that apply these rules. article 81 of the constitution 
provides that the law will set out a procedure whereby customs will be harmonized with the fundamental prin-
ciples of the constitution. the same article provides that the law will set out rules concerning the status of tradi-
tional chiefs.
legally, the situation in relation to the intersections between state and non-state provision of justice, and between 
statutory and customary law in niger, is thus characterized by formal recognition of traditional or customary law 
and justice. this is seen in measures that include the widespread application of customary law in civil matters in the 
ordinary courts of the state justice system, as well as formal recognition of the role of chiefs in resolving disputes.
on the other hand, there are significant elements of law and justice that are de facto, an accepted part of the 
system while remaining unregulated by state law. these elements are seen primarily in the role of islamic law as 
a part of customary law and of islamic religious officials and organizations in the settlement of disputes. in com-
parison with other countries, there is a high degree of linkage between these informal settlements and the courts, 
based on the high level of social support for islamic law and the informal instances that apply it.
niger is a party inter alia to the human rights covenants as well as to the convention on the rights of the child and 
the ceDaW, as well as to the convention against torture and the icerD. the constitution contains guarantees of 
basic human rights, including equality,3 but does not contain a clear prohibition of discrimination based on sex.
through assistance to the justice sector in the country and increased government focus, there are now courts in 
each department of the country, though for some people the nearest statutory court may still be at a distance of 
up to 150 kilometres. in this context, police and gendarmerie may function de facto as justices of the peace. future 
justice programming is expected to place greater emphasis on primary justice and non-state actors, including 
paralegals, with which unDP has worked to support paralegalism and primary justice in recent years. for its future 
programme, it aims to include cooperation with women’s organizations in its primary justice programming.
typoLogy
as is stressed in the main study, any typology of ijs is inevitably rough and ready, as national legislation, history 
and practice make for many variations. this annex examines three main forms of informal justice in niger: (1) the 
application of customary law by formal state courts, (2) the role of the chiefs in settling disputes, and (3) the settle-
ment of disputes by islamic religious authorities. of these, only the third can really be said to be a non-state system.
strictly speaking, the application of customary law by the formal courts may be said not to be an expression of 
informal justice at all. nevertheless, an interpretation such as this would exclude such a vitally important part of the 
3 see article 8.
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picture in niger. the application of customary law by special chambers of the formal courts bears a close resem-
blance in fact to the customary or local courts found in some anglophone and lusophone countries in africa. in 
this way, it fits more or less into the customary or local courts in the typology in chapter 3 of the main study.
as is discussed below, the institution of chiefs and headmen or traditional leaders also has its particularities in 
niger, particularly in relation to the unusually high level of integration of chiefs into the administrative and politi-
cal structure of the country. Despite this, chiefs are treated here as traditional leaders rather than as administrative 
structures with a dispute resolution function according to the working typology in the main study.
the religious authorities, including individual marabouts, imams and cadis, as well as associations such as the 
islamic association of niger (ain), can, in the context of niger, be considered on paper as purely non-state actors. 
the limitations of a simple dichotomy between formal and informal or state and non-state systems are never-
theless quickly seen when one considers the many ways in which dispute resolution by these actors is given an 
imprimatur by state agencies. 
as in most contexts, analysis of reality reveals a complex picture of interactions in which the different systems inter-
sect with one another. lower level chiefs may double as customary law assessors in formal courts, and assessors 
may advise and assist chiefs or may be recognized as marabouts in their communities. the precepts and doctrines 
of islamic law, as well as its actors, enter into the system in different ways at all levels.
the appLication of customary LaW by  
the courts
Pursuant to article 81 of the constitution, article 63 of the law on judicial organization and Powers4 lays down the 
basic framework for the application of customary law by the courts in the country. the article provides that, subject 
to conformity with provisions of duly ratified international conventions, legislative provisions or fundamental rules 
relating to public order (i.e., the civil law concept of ordre publique), the courts should apply the custom of the par-
ties in matters concerning:
1. the capacity of persons to enter into contracts and to take legal action, the status of persons, the family, mar-
riage, divorce, paternity, inheritance, gifts and wills; 
2. ownership or occupancy of real property and the rights arising therefrom, except where the legal action 
concerns a plot of land that is registered or concerning which documentation of the transfer is evidenced 
according to law.5
the courts routinely deal with cases in all of these areas. importantly, article 63 clearly gives primacy to interna-
tional conventions over conflicting customary rules. as we shall see below, this position creates some tension with 
some aspects of customary or islamic family law, including repudiation and the inheritance rights of children born 
outside of marriage.
4 loi organique n° 2004-50 du 22 juillet 2004 fixant l’organisation et la compétence des juridictions en république du niger. 
5 unofficial translation by Dihr. article 63 : sous réserve du respect des conventions internationales régulièrement ratifiées, des 
dispositions législatives ou des règles fondamentales concernant l’ordre public ou la liberté des personnes, les juridictions 
appliquent la coutume des parties :
1) dans les affaires concernant leur capacité à contracter et agir en justice, l’état des personnes, la famille, le mariage, le divorce, la 
filiation, les successions, donations et testaments;
2) dans celles concernant la propriété ou la possession immobilière et les droits qui en découlent, sauf lorsque le litige portera sur 
un terrain immatriculé ou dont l’acquisition ou le transfert aura été constaté par un mode de preuve établi par la loi.
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the roLe and functions of customary assessors
article 43 of the same law provides that, in such matters, the judge must associate two customary assessors (asses-
seurs coutumiers) who represent the customs of the parties. assessors are chosen from a list of nominees proposed 
by the chiefs of the different ethnicities and areas to the court of first instance. the candidates have often func-
tioned as advisers to the chiefs before being nominated for this position. the court can enter into a dialogue with 
the chiefs concerning the names put forward, based on the court’s knowledge of the qualities of the persons 
concerned. the court can reject certain candidacies as part of this process. the President of the court sends the 
agreed list of candidates to the ministry for justice, which makes the final selection. the list of candidates is not 
made public until after the approval. according to a judge interviewed, the assessors should be literate, often in 
arabic. asked whether it would be possible to make the candidacies public at an earlier stage, the justice of the 
court of gaya said that there would in principle be no difficulty with this. the problem is rather that there are not 
so many willing candidates, as the pay available to the assessors is so little that it is more or less a voluntary func-
tion, not attracting many candidates. the law does not appear to contain provisions relating to the deontology of 
assessors or for their disqualification for reasons of conflict of interest or partiality.
it is important that assessors have a solid knowledge of custom in fields such as inheritance, land and real property, 
marriage and paternity. although islamic law exerts a strong influence on the custom applied, there are important 
differences from place to place and from one ethnic group to another. thus, any attempt to develop a guide for 
courts on custom would either have to content itself with being generic and not completely accurate or have to 
be very detailed. 
While some judges insist that the assesseurs are mere advisers on custom, their role in practice may be rather dif-
ferent. judges rotate from one court to another in different parts of the country, whereas the same assessors may 
be in place even for decades. 
in practice, the assessors may be relied upon not simply for their knowledge of custom, but for proving evidence 
of the factual circumstances and context of the dispute, particularly in cases concerning land or the ethnicity and 
origin of a person. they may be closely associated with the chiefs and other elders who are familiar with the history 
of land allocations in a particular area, and would often conduct on-site visits together with the judge and cofo.6
their involvement with the court gives the judgements increased legitimacy among local communities. What is 
more, they are likely to speak the language of the locality and people involved, which the judge perhaps cannot. 
moreover, they may in fact play a role in assisting the judge to clarify the facts of the case and the nature of the 
claims involved, in advising the judge on the credibility of witnesses or otherwise on the merits of the case, and 
even in explaining and thereby indirectly enforcing the court’s decision. they may play a role in bringing the par-
ties to a dispute to a friendly settlement.7 if and when the assessors play this expanded role, there may be a danger 
that they will take the side of the chief and those close to him. to a large extent, it is up to the judge responsible for 
customary and civil matters whether the assessors will be confined to the strictly advisory role foreseen for them 
in the law or whether they will cover a range of rather diffuse and ill-defined functions.
in understanding the role played by the assessors, it may thus be more helpful to see the assessors as the vital link 
between the formal and informal systems that allows communication and understanding between the two and 
thus for them to work together. it should be remembered that the courts rarely have the resources to conduct on-
site visits, meaning that they must rely on other means to obtain information. they may contribute to the chances 
of an actual enforcement of decisions of the court by providing a channel of communication whereby chiefs, 
6 Commission Foncière, or local land commission. one member of the judiciary doubted whether the assessors possess an in-depth 
knowledge of land allocations, as they live mostly in town rather than in the rural areas.
7 interview with assessors, gaya, 18 january 2010. the most senior assessor in gaya had assisted in the process of filling the vacancy 
that arose when an assessor of another ethnicity retired. the assessors came from gaya town, rather than the surrounding areas, 
which is important for their availability.
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without whom a decision might have little chance of being enforced, can understand and accept the decisions of 
the courts. Without the benefit of further research, however, this remains a rather impressionistic view. given this 
variety of roles, any idea of gradually replacing the assessors with training and written guides on custom for judges 
seems less feasible.
LinKages betWeen the courts and the traditionaL chiefs
unofficial links exist between dispute resolution by the chiefs and litigation at the courts, and the assessors may 
play important roles in managing these. the assessors are often close to the chiefs, being nominated by them; they 
may live in the community where the dispute originates; and they will often take part in on-site visits and measure 
land, ascertaining the facts on behalf of the court. the assessors interviewed during the mission confirmed that 
they sometimes engage in advising chiefs on how to handle cases brought to them. in some cases, the assessors 
may themselves hold positions as traditional chiefs. among three assessors interviewed in gaya, one was a chef de 
quartier and an assessor. it was beyond the scope of the field study to attempt to assess whether judges attempted 
to secure against conflicts of interest and roles where functions overlapped in this way. an assessor may also be a 
marabout or expert in islam. 
an interview with the President of the court of gaya confirmed that the court normally insists that people have 
attempted to seek a resolution of the dispute from the chief in their village or quartier and canton before bringing 
a case to the court. it is not usually necessary to insist on this, as people would usually do so themselves. the judi-
ciary has interpreted this to be obligatory in cases concerning land,8 but courts extend it in practice into marriage 
dissolution and all areas as necessary to manage their case-load and because, among communities in niger, it is 
considered a violation of local peace to bring a person before a court. thus, preservation of peace and harmony 
demand that local avenues be utilized first, according to one judge. the conciliation avenue is seen as essential by 
the judiciary. 
representation of Women as assessors
the position (from the point of view of religious doctrine) of women in islam may be important when it comes to 
positions as assessors, to the extent that they are expected to have an understanding of islamic law. recognition 
for learning in islamic law (as well as approval by the chiefs in the area) may be considered important for nomina-
tion as a customary assessor at the courts. thus, religious doctrine and sentiment may influence the choice of cus-
tomary assessors in some areas also. nevertheless, there was one woman among the eight assessors at the court 
in gaya, and there are reportedly two at the high court (Tribunal de Grande Instance) in Dosso. 
a representative of the judiciary thought that the best way of promoting representation of women in positions of 
authority was by making positive examples known among the population, thereby promoting a change in views, 
rather than through top-down intervention.9 the ministry for justice acknowledged the poor representation of 
women in the justice system in general. 
the afjn felt that there should be a concerted effort to promote women as customary assessors, saying that 
this would be a visible and important signal that would affect women’s participation and access to justice. they 
expected that it would bear fruit in terms of case outcomes, as assessors promote their personal views, as well as 
custom, when intervening in cases. Women focal points said that customary assessors often fail to explain issues of 
women’s rights under customary law to the judge. they were in no doubt that gender biases are present. 
8 interview with the President of the court of first instance of gaya. 16 january 2010.
9 interview with adviser to the supreme court, m. mounkaila. niamey, 15 january 2010.
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customary or isLamic LaW?
in practice, there is a widespread and accepted conflation of customary law, which, as described above, is recog-
nized as a source of law in and by the legal system, with islamic law, which is not in itself recognized as a source 
of law by legislation or the constitution. at times and to varying degrees, the conflation amounts to a substitution 
of precepts of islamic law for custom. the general result is nevertheless that islamic law is widely applied by the 
courts, the chiefs and, of course, the islamic authorities. in the courts, the degree to which islam replaces custom 
will typically depend on a number of factors, including the views and preferences of the parties, the legal domain 
in question,10 the part of the country concerned and the knowledge and attitudes of the judges and assesseurs 
coutumiers who are working at a particular court.
in the areas of family law and succession, for which islam lays down very clear rules, islamic authorities will see 
any divergence from these rules as wrong. most observers agreed that islamic law has gradually taken over from 
divergent custom in many parts of the country as the accepted custom, so that one today finds that the courts are 
by and large applying islamic law in family matters where the parties have not chosen statutory law. 
in questions of real property law, where islam does not lay down substantive rules, non-religious custom will typi-
cally play a greater part. in practice, the customary law applied in particular areas and among particular groups will 
usually represent a mixture of ethno-linguistic or tribal custom and islamic law precepts. 
thus, the phrases ‘droit coutumier Haussa Islamis’ and ‘droit coutumier Djerma Islamisé’, meaning the islamified cus-
tomary law that is peculiar to haussa or Djerma groupings, are frequently heard and used among scholars, judges 
and the assesseurs coutumiers. 
there are differences of opinion among legal scholars and practitioners (the latter broadly including judges as well 
as lawyers) as to whether this conflation – and indeed islamic law as such – should be given legal recognition as a 
part of the customary law of the country. scholars and practitioners agree that this has in reality been done by the 
courts, including at the highest levels. unsurprisingly, the representatives of religious organizations interviewed 
considered islamic law to be part of the law of the land, partly because of what they saw as its moral authority, 
partly because its de facto acceptance.11 
the differences of opinion on this subject are largely, but not completely, aligned with views on the role of religion 
in public life (i.e., between holders of secularist and more religiously oriented points of view). legally recognizing 
the precepts of islamic law as a source of law would compromise the nominally secular and republican nature of 
the state. links between the political power of the state and mainstream islam in the country are well entrenched, 
though less explicit than the recognition given to the role of chiefs in settling disputes. in terms of legal domains, 
the issue of family law and the position of women herein has been an important unresolved issue in the country 
for close to 20 years. islamic religious authorities opposed the attempt to introduce a code of family law in the 
early 1990s. according to one representative of an islamic organization, the opposition was based on the content 
of what was being proposed rather than on the idea of a codified law as such.12
much scholarly attention in niger has been paid to the issue of family law and the difficulties surrounding the 
introduction of legislation in the area. While some constitutional provisions, including those on gender equality, for 
instance, would seem to mandate decisive judicial intervention (see below on the question of equality as it relates 
to repudiation in islamic marriage, for example), far-reaching judicial interpretations of these constitutional provi-
sions would run the risk of exposing the institution of the courts to political attack. 
10 i.e., one could expect a very high degree of penetration of islamic law in matters of marriage, divorce and succession.
11 interview with ain, niamey, 21 january 2010.
12 interview with anasi, niamey, 20 january 2010.
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reguLation of disputes by traditionaL or 
customary authorities
status of customary authorities
a 1993 regulation (Ordonnance)13 sets out the legal framework concerning the customary or traditional chiefs in 
the county. it provides that chiefs are organized according to the administrative structure of the country and are 
subject to the supervision of these bodies. this means that there are likely to be up to 15,000 chiefs in the country 
that are covered by the Ordonnance. While the chiefs and headmen are considered to be, and indeed act as, repre-
sentatives of the people, it is also true that the institution of chiefs and headmen in niger is an administrative insti-
tution, built up according to the administrative structure of the country (quarter/villages, tribe, canton, grouping 
and sultanate/province).14 these divisions may or may not correspond to ethnic and linguistic divisions. although 
the right to be a candidate for the office of headmen or chief is dependent on heredity, a great many headmen 
and chiefs are former civil servants15 and they are dependent for their office and income on the ministry of the 
interior. government authorities can modify or abolish the units and their structure. conviction of certain criminal 
offences results in ineligibility as a candidate for office as a traditional chief. the regulation provides for an election 
process among eligible persons and for ultimate approval by the minister responsible for local government or by 
a lower body in the governmental hierarchy, depending on the level of the chief concerned.16 once appointed, 
chiefs remain in office for life, barring removal for disciplinary reasons. the interviews conducted made it clear that 
village chiefs are very aware of the hierarchy within their own system and seem to respect the superior authority 
of the chef de canton. likewise, the chef de canton will generally not hear a case that has not been before the chef 
de village or quartier.
chiefs or headmen fulfil a number of governmental and administrative functions and are members of the local 
council. they assist in the collection of taxes and the conducting of censuses, maintain social harmony and cohe-
sion, ensure the respect of administrative and legal rules and defend the interests of citizens and communities 
vis-à-vis the authorities and third parties. they are associated with all development initiatives in the area they 
are responsible for and are considered administrative law magistrates, having the duty to maintain public order, 
and report on any circumstances likely to threaten it. they combine these functions with that of representing 
the people.
in addition to these functions, article 15 of the Ordonnance bestows on chiefs the function of resolution of dis-
putes. the article provides that traditional chiefs have the power to conciliate disputes in customary, civil and 
commercial matters. the chief uses custom to resolve issues concerning the use of land for cultivation or pasture 
on which the community possesses customary rights. 
Very prominent in the case-load of the chiefs are land and real property matters, as well as a number of disputes 
related to this, including disputes between cultivators and pastoralists concerning water, damage to crops, etc.
13 ordonnance n° 93-028 du 30 mars 1993 portant statut de la chefferie traditionnelle du niger.
14 « la chefferie au niger est donc une "chefferie administrative", d'origine coloniale, qui perdure depuis l'indépendance, et qu'il ne 
faut pas confondre avec ce qu'étaient les chefferies pré-coloniales .» 
jean-Pierre olivier de sardan, «chefs et Projets au Village (niger)», Le bulletin de l'APAD, n° 15, Les dimensions sociales et économiques 
du développement local et la décentralisation en Afrique au Sud du Sahara , [en ligne], mis en ligne le : 20 décembre 2006. url : 
http://apad.revues.org/document563.html. consulté le 14 avril 2010. 
15 this would seem to be the case especially in urban areas and among the higher ranks of the system. the chef du quartier met in 
gaya town was a former garde.
16 chapter 1 of the ordonnance.
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participation and gender 
the above-mentioned Ordonnance provides that any citizen of niger can participate in the process for nomination 
of chiefs, provided that the customary rules permit them to do so. on paper, there is nothing in the law to prevent 
women from participating in the process of selecting chiefs or, one would suppose, even in being nominated as a 
chief or as a customary assessor. there are reportedly areas of niger where there is representation of women in the 
chief’s council.17 nevertheless, there are several factors militating against such participation. social and customary 
norms weigh heavily against women playing such a role in most of the ethnic groups represented in the country. 
even in the state institutions, there are few women in positions of authority. 
second, the view of women in islam as interpreted in niger also plays a role. islamic officials questioned about this 
during the mission were sceptical about women occupying positions of authority.18 it seems fair to say that this 
view represents a particularly conservative view of islam, which, however, is dominant in niger today. 
proceduraL issues
according to many authors, the traditional chiefs very frequently exceed their powers by going beyond mediation 
or conciliation and actually imposing a decision.19 this view was frequently echoed by persons met during the 
mission, including by some chiefs themselves. it was nevertheless the view of many interviewees that the many 
efforts at training and sensitization of chiefs and populations, as well as the active ngo work conducted, had had a 
significant impact in lessening this tendency in the gaya district. nevertheless, there does not appear to be a clear 
or uniform understanding of what is meant by conciliation. ngo representatives interviewed explained that ‘nego-
tiation’ is perhaps a more accurate description of what takes place, where many influences and factors are present. 
on the positive side, hearings (when they are heard, which would usually only be the case for disputes being 
resolved at the level of the chef de canton) are held in public and everyone can attend them. interviews with village 
and ward (quartier) chiefs tended to confirm that formal hearings are held only in more serious cases and at the 
canton level. Based on the interviews and focus group discussions held, the resolution of disputes is frequently a 
function that the chief would share with the sages and notables of the area, often in a very informal way, where 
networks and relationships play an important role. minor disputes are usually handled by the chief consulting with 
the two families involved. (this would usually be the first step, even in marital disputes, rather than talking first to 
the parties themselves.) this would often be followed by consultations with the area notables (sages), and then, 
if necessary, by talking to the two spouses. generally, once a matter has been brought to the chief, it is already a 
public matter, so that confidentiality is less of an issue. nevertheless, matters can be handled with discretion where 
necessary. sometimes, disputants would arrive for a hearing, each accompanied by ‘their’ sages to assist and rep-
resent them. 
Problems involving two different quartiers would usually be dealt with by the two chefs de quartier meeting and 
consulting. if necessary, the chef de canton can get involved.
the absence of deontological rules concerning equality of the parties, independence and impartiality, as well as 
the impermissibility of coercion, coupled with other factors including the dependence of chiefs on the executive 
17 interview with mr. nouhou hamani mounkaila, counsellor at the supreme court of niger, 15 january 2010.
18 asked whether a woman could be a chief, the representative of an islamic organization interviewed referred to a Hadith as 
authority for the view of islam that women were unsuited to positions of authority. While the authors of the present report do not 
make claims to expertise in the field of islamic law, some brief reading on this Hadith shows that there is disagreement among 
islamic scholars both as to its authenticity and as to its correct interpretation. in some other predominantly muslim countries, no 
difficulty is seen with women occupying positions of authority.
19 see Bachir talfi, research Paper ‘Quel Droit applicable à la famille au niger ? le Pluralisme juridique en Question‘, Danish institute 
for human rights, research Partnership 4/2008. in footnote 95, the author cites a number of sources for this assertion. interviews 
conducted with some chiefs tended to confirm this. local populations expect to see matters decided and closed, they said.
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power, point to a weakness here. a chef de canton is a senior and powerful person whom ordinary people will be 
very reluctant to challenge. there are few or almost no safeguards against abuse in the procedure, and the nature 
of tightly knit communities means that it is unlikely that parties will not use connections and a variety of means to 
influence chiefs in their favour. ngo interviewees said that the important process regarding a dispute is what goes 
on before, rather than during, a hearing. Power relations very easily enter into the equation.
the LinK to the courts
article 15 provides further that the chief should draw up a procès verbale regarding the conciliated settlement. 
this should be kept in a register and copies provided to the competent administrative and judicial authorities. 
such a written record, duly signed by the parties, should, according to the article, in no case be contested again 
before the administrative or judicial authority. the same law does not require that parties attempt to resolve their 
disputes before the customary authorities before bringing them to court. it appears, however, that many judges 
and courts require this in practice.20 Where written settlements are drawn up, a difficulty that arises is that the law 
governing the judiciary21 does not make any reference to approval of the proces verbaux.22 in practice, the courts 
would reportedly hold that a settlement only becomes executory after approval by a court, although it becomes 
binding between the parties at the moment of signature. 
here, the courts must carry out a sensitive balancing act. it must do what it can to ensure due process at the level 
of the chiefs, including by refusing to approve documents that do not live up to basic requirements of procedural 
fairness and substantive guarantees. on the other hand, they must respect the requirements of the Ordonnance 
and the need to limit their case-load. the practice of the court of first instance in gaya is that the written record 
and the circumstances of its conclusion are examined to see if it really has the character of a conciliated settlement, 
before the court approves it. the court should not simply approve a written document on its own. sometimes, it is 
observable that one party has not even been present and that the document is the result of an ex parte application 
to the chief by one of the parties. the court’s practice is that claims of pressure from family members to accept a 
settlement will be insufficient to refuse approval, whereas coercion or threats from a chief will be sufficient. at a 
minimum, rules of justice would require that parties be informed of the principle of voluntariness and of this con-
sequence of signing a procès verbale. 
another difficulty encountered is that written records are rarely kept in most areas of niger. even in gaya, which as 
noted has seen many interventions, it is reportedly only done regularly by one or two out of a number of chefs de 
canton. many chiefs are illiterate and thus incapable of complying with the requirement to keep written records. 
a result of this is that parties sometimes reopen disputes when a chief dies and a new one is appointed (or even 
when a new judge is appointed to the court). 
access issues
there is no formal barrier to women bringing cases to the chiefs, although traditional mores may make this dif-
ficult. Women focal points said that women often feel frustrated by proceedings before the chiefs, as they are 
ordered by his counsellors to stay quiet when they try to speak and generally feel intimidated when surrounded 
by an all-male group of counsellors. the protocol required to access a chief’s court varies significantly from region 
to region. interviewees from ngos that provide legal services did not as a matter of common practice accompany 
‘clients’ during hearings. accompaniment of this kind would in practice require the consent of the chief. 
20 interviews with judge in gaya, january 2010. see above on application of custom by the courts. 
21 see footnote 1 above.
22 here, as elsewhere in this study, the authors are indebted to mr. talfi’s paper. see below.
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While some interviewees did mention that contributions (cash or in-kind) are made to chiefs for the adjudication 
services that they render, some thought that this was usually less an issue of corruption and bias than one of 
necessity. one interviewee thought that the amounts expected23 were generally small and known to the parties. 
however, in claims of a certain value, this might no longer hold true. other interviewees representing users said 
that corruption was a major problem both in the informal and formal justice systems. a more thorough study 
would be necessary on this issue before drawing conclusions.
supervision and monitoring mechanisms in reLation to the chiefs
there is no code of professional conduct in relation to resolution of disputes by chiefs. any attempt to develop 
one would have to take account of the different levels at which chiefs exercise their competence and of differing 
levels of formality (in terms of holding hearings) as well as levels of literacy, both of the chiefs themselves and of 
their communities. 
chapter V of the regulation/ordonnance concerning the chiefs sets out a disciplinary procedure in relation to the 
chiefs that provides for supervision by the appointing authority (the ministry responsible for local government). 
it provides for the establishment of disciplinary commissions and gives the ministry the power to determine their 
composition, functioning and operation. it appears, however, that this procedure has not always been used.24
there is no systematic monitoring in the absence of a complaint. While interviewees in the judiciary and among 
ngos considered that more systematic monitoring of the chiefs would be desirable, it would be an expensive 
and demanding undertaking that could rouse the antipathy of chiefs. the very presence of ngos and the work 
that they have done in sensitizing populations have created an environment where there are more checks on the 
power of chiefs. Where ngos can work among communities with the consent of chiefs, a cooperative relationship 
that promotes openness can arise gradually, in contrast to a top-down approach. 
Written records of case settlements should, as noted, be provided to the administrative and judicial authorities. 
this is reportedly rarely complied with in practice. Doing so would give both of these authorities the possibility to 
conduct a better informal dialogue with chiefs and contribute to supervision and monitoring, even in the absence 
of a systematized review by the courts, which exists in some other contexts.
one interviewee observed that it is possible to gauge the success of chiefs in resolving disputes amicably by 
examining the extent to which they are resorted to by the local population and comparing this to the numbers 
of cases brought to the courts in the area and the numbers of settlements contested and overturned. monitoring 
or analysis of this kind would provide indicators of acceptability and legitimacy.25 gender-disaggregated figures 
on litigants’ profiles would provide indications of levels of satisfaction with outcomes and processes at the level of 
conciliation by the chiefs.26 
reflecting on the dispute resolution tasks of a traditional chief, most found it difficult to give a precise estimate of 
how much time this task demanded on a monthly basis, but all agreed that availability was a key factor in accom-
plishing the task, as well as such qualities as being a good listener and communicator, being honest, fair-minded 
and of good reputation, but also being decisive and solution-oriented. a bad decision could pursue a chief for a 
long time, and people stop going to one who does not enjoy a good reputation.
23 often colloquially referred to as ‘Kola’.
24 some interviewees referred to the removal of a sultan in Zinder that occurred without invoking this procedure.
25 måître chaibou, interview in niamey, 22 january 2010.
26 
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penaL cases, pubLic order, and the LinK to the security forces
it is important for the gendarmerie to maintain good relationships with the chiefs, so that they call or contact the 
brigade when there is an incident. the gendarmerie has the authority to impose fines for minor assault and battery 
cases, and good links to the chiefs in the use of powers such as these can limit illegal action by chiefs. local chiefs 
interviewed seemed in general willing to contact the gendarmerie in cases of serious violence. the security forces 
might reportedly refer domestic dispute cases back to the traditional authorities, although increasing awareness 
of domestic and gender-based violence as something unacceptable means that the victim needs to be shown 
that this is taken seriously. usually, it would only be in extremely serious cases that a complaint would even be 
made to the security forces and then it would need to be pursued as a criminal matter.27 social pressure, and the 
impossibility of returning to her husband afterwards, would cause most women victims not to report the matter 
to the gendarmerie or police.
the chiefs’ knowledge of national legislation and human rights standards was generally estimated to be very 
limited, particularly at the lower levels of the hierarchical system. While chefs de quartier and chefs de village would 
often consult with a more senior chief (chef de canton, who is frequently a former state official with knowledge of 
the law and contacts in the administration) in serious cases and before arriving at a settlement, this mechanism 
was unlikely to be one that involved legal analysis. 
LinKs betWeen the chiefs and reLigious officiaLs
in practice, a local scholar of islamic law, or cadi, or a local imam may be consulted by the chief when he is asked 
to resolve a dispute. chiefs may also refer certain types of disputes to the cadi or imam, who will generally be one 
of the notables of the village or quarter and thus be likely to be close to the chief. as islam is the religion of the 
overwhelming majority of the people and lays down clear rules on a number of contentious issues, it very often 
cannot but be taken account of. thus, islam may play a significant role in the application of customary law by 
chiefs, though this will probably vary with local circumstances.
reguLation of disputes by reLigious  
organiZations and authorities
in practice, people often turn to religious authorities for settlement of their disputes, particularly those concerned 
with family, matrimonial and succession matters. in rural areas or simply outside niamey and other main towns, 
this means simply turning to the local imam, or a marabout or learned cadi.28 in contrast to customary or traditional 
chiefs, who seemingly have a large measure of pragmatism in how they approach and settle conflicts, religious 
officials are often likely to be guided by what they see as binding religious law. thus, these officials will judge, 
rather than conciliate, based on the Qur’an and Hadith. religious officials interviewed nevertheless emphasized 
that islam favours conciliation. cases that are clearly not regulated by islamic law might, though, be referred to the 
chef de canton. 
the islamic association of niger (Association Islamique du Niger, ain) occupies a particular position among these 
religious entities. this organization was allowed to be established during the period of military rule in the 1970s 
at a time when a state of exception was declared and freedom of association was not respected, meaning that 
it enjoyed a monopoly for a long period until the restoration of civil liberties in the early 1990s. While never 
having an official status, the position of the ain, as the de facto representative of the religion of the overwhelming 
27 interview with the commandant de Brigade of gaya gendarmerie, 18 january 2010
28 religious authorities mentioned that it is not unknown for two non-muslims to approach an imam or other religious official with 
a dispute. 
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majority of the people, and the clear signal given by the military government in permitting this organization to 
exist and develop while others were forbidden, gave it a status that resembled one of an official body in the eyes of 
many people.
the law does not provide for legal recognition of the dispute resolution function of these authorities. nevertheless, 
according to some authors and observers, they frequently hand down decisions that, for the parties involved, have 
a character that is considered binding.29 
semi-officiaL LinKages betWeen the courts  
and the reLigious authorities
When the institutional authority of an organization such as the ain is combined with the de facto assimilation 
of customary law to islamic law and the lack of guidance for judges on matters of islamic law, it is clear that it is 
the religious authorities that are recognized as having the greatest knowledge of religious law. Particularly in the 
capital, niamey,30 where there is a mixing of different ethnic groups and thus little trace of customary law that is 
distinct from islamic law, the latter holds sway. the decisions reached by religious authorities belonging to the ain 
enjoy great authority among the people and, very often, the judicial and administrative organs of the state. this is 
seen particularly in cases of dissolution of marriage. in practice, judges reportedly often defer to decisions such as 
divorces pronounced by the ain or by imams, and approve them as though they were taken by customary authori-
ties. this is reportedly done even by the supreme court. 
an interview with an imam in gaya confirmed that procès verbaux drawn up before the imam31 are sometimes 
approved by the court. at least in towns, imams may well be more highly educated than lower-level traditional 
chiefs. on other occasions, the judge might choose to modify the procès verbaux. from the interviews conducted 
(admittedly a small sample that is unrepresentative of the country as such), some judges tend to treat such written 
records from religious officials on more or less the same basis as those emanating from the chiefs. 
the courts will very often refer the parties to a dispute to the ain to swear a religious oath.32 more occasionally, a 
chef de canton might also request the swearing of such an oath. Because of the strong religious beliefs of people in 
niger, such an oath carries great weight. 
an illustration of how far this de facto recognition reaches in the eyes of the state authorities is the practice whereby 
the police even executed summonses (convocations) issued by the ain at the grand mosquée of niamey. accord-
ing to information given during an interview at ain, this practice has now stopped following a process of self-
evaluation at the ain, which considered that its authority should be based on voluntary submission to islamic law 
rather than to force. it nevertheless illustrates that the police of niamey clearly viewed the ain and the grande 
mosquée as having the authority of a state organ. it is also noteworthy that the critical evaluation of this practice 
came seemingly not from the state authorities, but from the religious ones.
29 gayakoye sabi a. Quelles autorités compétentes pour la mise en oeuvre du droit de la famille? Quelles compétences? Quelle 
hiérarchie ?, communication au colloque ‘Quel droit de la famille pour le niger?’, niamey du 21 au 23 novembre 2005, in actes du 
colloque, fsej/iDDh, p. 356. reference provided by Bachir talfi, footnote below.
30 the ain reportedly now has offices in the main provincial towns as well as in niamey.
31 usually in both french and arabic, in the case of this imam. 
32 Decisions of the supreme court of niger make frequent reference to such oaths sworn before religious officials of the ain. 
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preferences of users and profiLes  
of providers
in common with other places examined, people often find state providers too expensive, both because of fees 
actually demanded and because of transactional costs, including transport. the ain said that they would typically 
ask or encourage parties to a dispute to make a contribution toward the costs of the association. they would ask 
for contributions based on the size of the estate in a succession matter. some interviewees said that they were 
familiar with particular cases where imams had demanded exceedingly large amounts as fees or contributions 
for their work in solving succession disputes.33 Women focal points said that lower level chiefs would not usually 
demand a fee to hear a case.
most of the users interviewed in niger were illiterate or semi-literate, so the preference for someone who is familiar 
and able to explain things carefully is understandable. unsurprisingly, impartiality and effectiveness also rank highly.
several interlocutors reminded the team that it would be erroneous to see usage patterns as expressions of 
‘enlightened’ preference on the part of users. most observers repeated that people are unaware of their rights and 
are often or usually afraid to assert claims in relation to any form of authority, whether it is a local headman or chief, 
a religious learned person, a gendarme or other state official, or a judge.
Women’s preferences
interviews with the women focal points (femmes relais) in gaya tended to show a preference among women for 
the customary institutions because of the possibility of greater respect for privacy and confidentiality in sensitive 
marital matters. even if the process at the village level is not completely confidential, it remains within the village, 
where people know each other well. Bringing it to a formal court would involve exposure to strangers. the time 
factor, especially the delays that are present in the formal courts, coupled with the transport costs, are likewise an 
important reason why people avoid them. according to the President of the gaya court of first instance, up to 
90 percent of all matrimonial cases brought to the court are brought by women. this strikingly high figure would 
seem to indicate that women do not have full confidence in the conciliation mechanism by chiefs or are unhappy 
with outcomes from it. it is likely that many of them result from repudiation. interestingly, the islamic association 
of niger confirmed the same tendency in that most of the marital cases reaching them were brought by women. 
many cases are brought when a marriage has broken down and a woman is seeking one of a number of things 
from her husband or former husband. thus, in general, it is women who seek outside intervention to achieve 
justice and remedies in respect of marital breakdown. they will seek remedies according to the providers that are 
available and who they think is likely to be of the greatest assistance to them.
the african faith and justice network (afjn) provided (impressionistic) confirmation of this, saying that, once 
women learned to know and not fear the court system, they were more inclined to use it rather than the traditional 
resort to the cadi or local chief. they emphasized again that the presence of courts, even at the departmental 
level, is new in niger. as women discover this avenue, they make use of it. as a result, the afjn expressed a clear 
preference for providing resources to the courts and making them more accessible, rather than to the customary 
structures. they emphasized that the judiciary, and particularly its accessibility in the provinces, is still a very new 
phenomenon. the presence of courts in all department capitals is a huge improvement that has been realized, 
they said. 
in contrast, only 10 percent of land cases were (roughly and impressionistically) estimated to have been brought by 
women and only 5 percent of criminal complainants and defendants are estimated to be female. a small number 
33 author’s interview in niamey, 22 january 2010
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of women bring gBV or VaW cases to court. the President of the tribunal estimated that this was about one case 
per month at most. (it was not possible to obtain more systematically compiled data.)
Persons disagreeing with the decisions of imams or other religious officials may in some cases choose to bring 
them to a chef de canton rather than to a court, recognizing that the former is not a legal authority. a detailed 
survey would be necessary to draw conclusions on patterns in this regard. 
the poLitics of the poWer of chiefs and the authority of the Judiciary
an issue of major importance for the policy (and political) debate on the position of informal justice and custom-
ary law in the legal system of niger concerns the intrusion of national as well as local politics into the nomination 
and appointment of chiefs.34 in this regard, it should first be remembered that the nomination of chiefs, as well as 
responsibility for disciplinary matters concerning them, is with the executive rather than the judiciary. to the extent 
that chiefs are executing an adjudicative function, the scheme does not respect the separation of powers. 
some commentators point out that the power of chiefs was constrained and made subservient to the executive 
branch during the period of military government in niger. chiefs were removed if they displeased the government, 
and it became normal for the executive branch to intervene actively in the nomination and appointment of chiefs. 
Particularly at higher levels of the chefferie, the traditional constraints on the power of chiefs have been weakened. 
traditionally, a chief would have been surrounded by counsellors, whose assent would be necessary for decisions 
of importance. this constraint was weakened when chiefs were made more dependant on national politics. While 
the 1993 legislation on the status of chiefs, adopted after the return to multiparty politics, appeared to regularize 
matters, it did not change the political and sometimes dependent nature of the institution. the importance of 
patronage networks and the ability of headmen and chiefs to deliver political support of their communities, while 
perhaps weakened in recent years, cannot be underestimated in electoral politics.35 many interlocutors during the 
field visit confirmed the importance of this factor, with reports of senior national political actors intervening in the 
choice of chiefs even at the village level.36 
the privileges and allowances of the chiefs were augmented somewhat in new legislation supported by now 
ousted President tandja in june 2008. some commentators in niger make a connection between this move and 
the active support of chiefs when constitutional changes were made in an attempt to permit the president to 
remain in office. at a meeting of chiefs in the town of Dosso during the mission, the privileges accorded to chiefs 
were observable in the form of armed bodyguards and vehicles with state licence plates. representatives of the 
judiciary may look at examples like this and be reminded of their own lack of resources and vehicles and the non-
enforcement of their judgements. the importance of politics of this kind for issues of justice policy can be seen 
when it is remembered that the judiciary at the highest levels opposed the president’s attempt to seek a third 
term in office. in may 2009, the constitutional court twice found that a third term or any attempt to change the 
constitution to permit one would violate the constitution. the president ultimately responded by announcing the 
dissolution of the constitutional court. 
thus, the case of niger illustrates that, in certain contexts, any measures or programmes that tend to strengthen 
the adjudicative role of chiefs – especially if this is to the disadvantage of the authority of the courts – may not 
only be highly politicized, but also potentially detrimental to higher level goals of supporting the rule of law and 
democracy. attempts to work with informal justice through the system of chiefs will not remain modest efforts to 
improve access to justice, but will be seen through the lens of national politics. 
34 for an accessible article on this question, see abdoul azizou garza,  ‘le ”tazarcé” et la chefferie traditionnelle : la complicité 
invisible’ http://www.cetri.be/spip.php?article1460
35 ibid.
36 interview, niamey, january 2010.
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important human rights issues arising from 
informaL Justice systems
in the following, the issues that particularly affect women and children are mainstreamed, so that they are dealt 
with under family law, criminal law and property law.
confLicts betWeen custom and LegisLation
as article 63 of the organic law on judicial organization makes clear,37 the constitution, duly ratified international 
conventions, national legislation and ordre publique have primacy over custom. thus, the courts and traditional 
chiefs should refrain from giving effect to custom that is in violation of norms deriving from any of these sources. 
members of the judiciary were generally clear in responding that customs and religious precepts that contra-
vened these guarantees would have to give way to the primacy of hierarchically superior standards. linked to 
this is the question of whether custom is perceived as being dynamic and susceptible to change, including in the 
light of constitutional standards. the assessors interviewed were of the opinion that custom could not change,38 
although they observed that people were becoming more ignorant of their customs and less likely to follow them. 
they acknowledged that there were changes taking place in regard to the role of women. Programmatic mea-
sures, including those that would further a more informed discussion of the nature of custom and its relationship 
to national law, could help in increasing understanding and moving debate forward.
famiLy LaW matters, With a particuLar focus on the rights  
of Women
similarly to elsewhere in africa, marriage is customarily seen as the union of two families, rather than of two indi-
viduals. it is generally conducted by a religious official. it is preceded by payment of bride price agreed between 
representatives of the families. the amount of bride price varies from one ethnic group to another, and wealth and 
social status also play a role. marriage is thus not primarily based upon the independent choice of the individuals 
involved, though there are regional and ethnic variations in this regard. 
‘repudiation’ of femaLe spouses
the primacy of higher legal standards does not seem to be rigorously applied in all cases. Particularly difficult 
issues arise in relation to issues such as marital relations, including the question of repudiation of a female spouse 
by a male. asked whether the courts might ever find that the constitutional provision regarding equality (article 8, 
including equality of the sexes) could mean that availing this legal avenue to men and not to women was uncon-
stitutional, members of the judiciary were hesitant, referring to considerations of ordre publique. (interviewees 
were not aware of any cases where the question had been brought up.) similar issues might arise in relation to 
different succession rights based on gender, where islamic rules are very widely accepted in society. While islam 
decrees that a smaller portion of a deceased’s estate goes to a wife, this is seen as being justified by the difference 
in obligations that men and women have, whereby males in a family are obliged to provide for unmarried female 
relatives. married women’s rights to retain their own property are also stressed. an issue also arises in relation to 
children born outside of marriage and their (lack of ) succession rights in islamic law. as noted above, parliament in 
niger has failed to resolve the contentious issues of family law through legislation for almost 20 years. any attempt 
by the judiciary to step into the breach left by legislative inaction, on the basis of wide and general-sounding 
37 loi organique n° 2004-50 du 22 juillet 2004 fixant l’organisation et la compétence des juridictions en république du niger.  
see above.
38 it is to be emphasized that the tiny sample of assessors interviewed can in no way be considered to be representative of the 
opinions of assessors in the country in general.
271
a
n
n
eX
 f
o
U
r
a stuDy of informal justice systems: access to justice anD human rights
constitutional provisions, could prove very controversial and be a threat to the fragile position and legitimacy of 
the courts. 
the various actors expressed a number of different viewpoints on problems and solutions in this area. accord-
ing to representatives of the islamic associations ain and the association nigérienne pour l’appel et la solidarité 
islamiques (anasi), one problem is a lack of understanding of the rules of islamic law. these prescribe a lengthy 
process for repudiation that includes a considerable ’cooling off‘ period during which the repudiation (talaq) may 
be revoked and during which the spouses should seek mediation of their dispute. repudiation is abused in prac-
tice, according to many interviewees, including those from the religious associations. many men think that all they 
have to do to repudiate their wives according to islamic law is to say so three times in succession. a better under-
standing of islamic law among the public, as well as among chiefs, customary assessors and the judiciary, would 
lead to improvements and less hardship. anasi tries to encourage men to provide a document to repudiated 
wives to provide more certainty as to their status. 
some members of the judiciary interviewed were well aware of these rules and agreed that wives whose hus-
bands had expressed a wish to repudiate them should remain at home pending the whole (approximately 90-day) 
period39 foreseen by islamic law, during which a husband is obliged to continue to support his wife. 
the afjn representative agreed that erroneous interpretation of islamic law was a major barrier to access to jus-
tice for women, but also pointed to the lack of gender equality in some aspects of islamic law. the femmes relais/
women focal points interviewed in gaya pointed out that the very possibility of repudiation acts as a barrier to 
women bringing issues up in various justice forums. any complaint on their part could lead to repudiation, so they 
prefer to remain silent about all but the most grievous matters.
dissoLution of marriage
While repudiation is only open to males, men and women alike may seek dissolution of a marriage for a number of 
reasons. there seems to be a lack of clarity about who has the authority to dissolve a customary marriage. a chef de 
quartier said that the chef de canton or a judge had the authority to do this.40 the authority of religious officials to 
do this seems also to be accepted by the courts. nothing seems to be provided for in the law as to this authority 
and it seems that many dissolutions of marriage take place by agreement between families, with varying degrees 
of involvement by religious officials. as noted above, the courts, right up to the supreme court, reportedly accept 
divorces granted by religious officials as legal and binding. 
most interviewees said that repayment of bride price was necessary in order to obtain a divorce, especially if it is 
sought by the woman,41 though flexibility could be shown in relation to when repayment took place. some said 
that bride price would not have to be repaid if she had borne a child (especially a male one) to her husband. a new 
suitor or husband could assist the woman in repaying the former husband. in some cases (reportedly amongst the 
toubou), a husband can demand an additional sum from a suitor proposing marriage to his former wife. in one 
area, it was said that a woman would have to find a new spouse for her husband before she could be separated 
from him.
the afjn pointed out that women could be vulnerable to legal actions for bigamy where a couple separate and 
remarry, whereas men, because of the legality of polygamy, would not face any such threat.
39 according to the explanations received, the woman should complete three menstrual cycles before the repudiation enters into 
force. During this period, the husband must continue to provide for his wife. 
40 in many countries in africa, this can be done by agreement between the families and spouses.
41 interview with assessors in gaya. the interview with a village chief and his counselors in niakoye-tounga revealed the local 
practice that reimbursement would be necessary if the marriage was a voluntary one.
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chiLd marriages
information from unicef indicates that niger has the dubious distinction of having the highest percentage of 
child marriages of any country in the world. one study conducted by unicef showed that 44 percent of women 
between the age of 20 and 24 had been married before they reached the age of 15, which is the minimum age 
for girls established by statute for civil marriages. the study indicated that decisions concerning marriage are most 
often taken by men and that the reasons given for the consent to child marriages were the concern to prevent 
pregnancy outside of marriage, to follow tradition and to cement links and relations within the community.42 
unicef has conducted campaigns against child marriages in which traditional chiefs have been targeted. one 
ngo representative in gaya thought that the campaigns by unicef and other actors in this issue had had an 
impact in gaya and that this message had been understood. however, the interviews did not reveal evidence that 
arrangement of marriage of underage girls would be considered a matter for the police. 
interviews with the religious authorities (and some chiefs) did not reveal evidence of a clear standard based on 
age followed by them, but rather an assessment based on the maturity of the person in question on a case-by-
case basis. islamic law does not set a minimum age. the religious authorities and groupings met and interviewed 
did not express any opposition to the minimum age of 15 in the law. Women focal points said that the age of 15 
tended to be accepted as the age at which a girl could marry in urban areas, but, in rural areas, marriage at an 
earlier age was very frequent. Parents would often arrange marriage for girls who could no longer attend school, 
as they would be afraid of pregnancy.
an ngo representative said that the time factor was important in relation to child marriages and that such a mar-
riage could be annulled within the first year, but not afterwards.
forced marriages
Very often, forced marriages are also child marriages. in gaya, participants in an (urban) focus group discussion said 
that these were becoming rarer as young people expected greater freedom of choice. the question provoked a 
very lively discussion, with disagreement about whether it was women or men who were primarily instrumental in 
arranging marriages. in rural areas, answers indicate that the response of the chief might rather be to persuade a 
woman to accept the marriage.43 Village chiefs considered these cases difficult to deal with and cited cases where 
girls had to leave the village as a result of their refusal to enter into a marriage agreed to by their father.
criminaL LaW matters and the probLem of iLLegaL eXercise  
of authority, iLLegaL detention, etc.
as already mentioned, the material competence of the chiefs is limited to civil, commercial and customary matters. 
chiefs will often pragmatically resolve the civil aspect of petty criminal matters through imposing the payment of 
compensation to the victim, after which the matter will go no further. 
in former times, chiefs formally had the power to detain people. they had – and in many cases still have – hand-
cuffs and cells. in practice, however, many chiefs continue to exercise power in relation to violations of the penal 
law and other matters of social order where local norms are seen to have been violated.44 the judiciary is aware of 
many cases where chiefs impose ‘fines’ (the proceeds of which are often kept by the chiefs themselves) and may 
42 http://www.unicef.org/french/infobycountry/niger_39831.html 
43 interview in niakoye tounga, 18 january 2010
44 an interview in the village of niakoye-tounga confirmed that cases of witchcraft are occasionally dealt with by compelling the 
witch to release the soul of the victim. it was not possible to go into depth on the question.
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detain people. it is known for chiefs to detain persons to compel the appearance of a family member.45 even in 
civil cases, chiefs might detain people. Where crops are damaged by cattle, for example, people expect the chief 
to detain the ‘offender’ until payment is made. as pastoralists are still often nomadic or semi-nomadic and the 
amount may be disputed, detention will be seen as necessary until the matter is resolved.
local communities applying custom will often hold families or groups responsible for the acts of a member, several 
interviewees pointed out. communities will often not seek imprisonment to end a matter. if compensation is not 
paid, vengeance may still be sought. if the formal justice system does not take account of this aspect, there will 
often be a need for the informal system to deal with it.
occasionally, there are reports of chiefs imposing punishments that are cruel and may amount to torture, as well 
as being illegal.46 While such cases represent an extreme of unacceptable conduct by chiefs, the greater difficulty is 
that the state justice organs lack outreach to be able to deal with crime, meaning that it is, in practice, unavoidable 
that chiefs exercise some authority in regard to maintaining law and order in their communities, even without any 
formal authority to do so. a local chief might detain a person accused of wrongdoing and not be able to find a way 
of transporting the suspect to the gendarmerie until the next market day, for example. Witnesses might find it dif-
ficult and expensive to come to town, especially if they are not heard the first time, and then give up. as a result, the 
state justice organs are, however reluctantly, sometimes compelled to accept, in practice, that exercise of authority 
by the chief takes place. the result is that a gap opens up between what is legal and what is accepted practice. at 
other times, the police or gendarmerie might detain someone for a few days as punishment for a relatively minor 
offence, then release the person rather than take him or her to court.
an even more extreme situation is where the police are afraid to challenge the authority of the chief at a local 
level. chiefs and their Dogari (guards, often armed) may intimidate the gendarmes and prevent their intervention.47
often, according to one member of the judiciary, they simply do not find out about it at the time that it happens. 
accusations of witchcraft will often be dealt with entirely at the local level, and cases of infanticide, for example, 
may not be reported to the state authorities. it does well to remember that the balance of power (and numbers) 
in remote areas does not always favour the state organs.
formalizing some level of penal competence on the part of the chiefs has not been discussed in recent debates on 
justice. the representative of the supreme court of niger emphasized training and simultaneous capacity-building 
of chiefs and the judiciary as the best way to address the problems that arise. this could go a long way toward 
eliminating some of the worst human rights violations that arise through exceeding jurisdiction and imposing 
abusive and illegal punishments. nevertheless, unless the police and gendarmerie are given sufficient resources to 
successfully provide security in local communities, it would seem inevitable that local structures will fill the gap, 
with or without the legal authority to do so.
criminaL LaW issues affecting chiLdren, incLuding petty 
JuveniLe crime
in the town quartier of gaya, the practice described would attempt to find an informal, restorative solution for a first 
petty offence, whereby parents or guardians would be asked to exert discipline over a wayward child. for a more 
serious first offence, the chef de quartier would probably consult the chef de canton, who might decide that the 
matter should go to court. in rural areas, responses on this question indicated that any elder in the village might 
talk to an unruly child, though they felt that their words would often fall on deaf ears.
45 interview with mr. nouhou hamani mounkaila, adviser to the supreme court. a similar familiarity with such cases was mentioned 
by the President of the court of first instance of gaya.
46 for example, by keeping cells infested with ants or scorpions.
47 an instance of this was described in a meeting with ngos in gaya, where the Dogari prevented the gendarme from carrying out an 
arrest by threatening violence. the case involved a man who had killed a suspected adulterer. there was a lot of sympathy for the 
action in the village.
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vioLence against Women and harmfuL practices
levels of fgm/c are very low in niger, relative to some other countries in the region, and the practice is illegal.48 
the islamic authorities interviewed generally expressed strong disapproval of violence against women, saying 
that islamic law permitted only extremely mild forms of physical chastisement for disobedience to a husband. 
a representative of the gendarmerie interviewed noted the increased awareness of this issue in society, but said 
that traditional attitudes and the lack of real options for women outside the family are still a major barrier. most 
cases would simply not be reported to state authorities. his view was that women would go to a senior family 
member or, in some cases, to a local headman (chef du village or chef du quartier) if they thought there were some 
chance of a sympathetic reception and successful intervention. this view was echoed by representatives of the 
judiciary and would thus seem to speak in favour of trying to improve awareness and protection mechanisms at 
the most local level. the women focal points interviewed said that, even if gBV were raised, either with the formal 
or informal institutions, it was more likely that the complaint would come from a family member rather than the 
woman herself.
Land and reaL property LaW
it was generally agreed that property matters are among the most frequent conflicts and those most difficult for 
the courts, chiefs and religious officials to handle, as well as the most likely to cause conflict.49 ngo representatives 
found that property matters were not handled well either at the community level or by the courts. there was very 
little protection against abuse of power by the wealthy and powerful. ngos and members of the judiciary agreed 
that chiefs would often find it difficult not to take the side of those they were closest to in land disputes. as a result, 
people may be losing confidence in the customary systems. legislation was supposed to have created a special 
court or division of the court concerned with rural land questions, but it has not really operated in practice. 
some interviewees noted that women are beginning to make claims in relation to land and real property, which 
was not seen before, but, generally, the customs of those interviewed did not permit this. Women who came into 
possession of property due to the deaths of husbands would be vulnerable to having it taken from them.
LaW of succession
it was generally acknowledged that customary law does not permit women to own, or thus to inherit, land in their 
own right. islamic law demands that a fixed share of the estate go to the spouse of the deceased, including any 
portion of the estate that is real property. in this sense, the rules on succession in islamic law will usually be more 
favourable than those in customary law, and islamic religious authorities interviewed (who all had a high level 
of education) said that they would apply islamic rules rather than customary ones, whereas chiefs and assessors 
tended to answer more conservatively, sticking to customs that prevented women from inheriting real property. 
the association of women lawyers said that most cadis and ulemas would lack this level of knowledge and educa-
tion and would tend to find that women were not entitled to inherit land, saying that this represented islamic law. 
they cited several cases to demonstrate this point.
the ain said that it assisted in many succession disputes, but would usually only do so where all parties to the 
dispute sought its intervention and agreed to abide by the outcome. 
48 unicef, 2005, see http://www.unicef.org/publications/files/fgm-c_final_10_october.pdf. reports from niger indicate that the 
practice was most prevalent in western parts of the country where numbers of animists were relatively high, but that campaigns 
and programmatic initiatives have succeeded in reducing the numbers from close to 6 percent in 1998 to a little over 2 percent  
in 2006.
49 for example, the President of the tribunal de grande instance observed that there are deaths every year in Boboye because of 
land disputes.
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succession matters invoLving chiLdren
islamic law does not recognize succession rights for children born outside of marriage (‘illegitimate children’) 
from a father’s estate. children born outside of marriage can inherit from their mothers. fathers, on the other 
hand, can make gifts to such children or endow them with rights by ‘legitimizing’ them through marriage to the 
children’s mother. 
as things stand, the principle of the best interests of the child does not prevail over this long-standing custom or 
legal rule in the courts and ijs of niger. While religious officials may exhort parents to marry or to provide for a child 
born in this way, the rules on succession are quite clear in saying that such children have no rights to inherit. this 
is accepted as a fact of life, according to the (provider) interviewees, and such cases do not normally even come to 
court. (in a similar way, unmarried ‘partners’ have no succession rights.) While numerical data on the practice of the 
different legal instances was not available on this question, this would seem to be true for chiefs’ courts, religious 
authorities and for the application of custom by the courts.
one interviewee pointed out that there is the possibility of intervention by a prosecutor if lack of provision for a 
child born outside of marriage amounts to abandonment according to the penal code.50 in cases where paternity 
is proven or not contested, the threat of a penal case according to this article could be of some use to women 
seeking child support, or even succession benefits, if a litigant were able to get access to a prosecutor. reportedly, 
these provisions authorize a prosecutor to intervene in a civil case in favour of the succession rights of a child.
matters reLated to the custody of chiLdren
one court visited51 said that there was little difficulty seen in relation to hearing children in custody cases, though 
it depended on age and maturity. several interviewees mentioned an islamic practice where an age limit of seven 
years is determinant. Women retained custody of children under the age of seven and men were entitled to cus-
tody after this age (thus, children who reach the age of seven after a dissolution would leave the mother and join 
the father). this assumes that the father is willing to take them into his care. if not, the mother would attempt to get 
assistance from her family to support the children. rural women interviewed said that, in practice, it is entirely up 
to the man to decide whether he will take custody of his children and the village chief would usually not interfere 
in the matter. more research would be necessary to determine whether this is a general practice across the country 
and whether male and female children are treated differently, which was permitted in some places. 
other respondents indicated that, if the man wanted to take custody of the children, he could do so. if not, they 
remained with the mother. girls might be given the option of remaining with their mother, even if the father dis-
agreed. (see also text on child marriages.) research could also usefully distinguish between issues of custody and 
guardianship, where the latter refers more to the right to exert parental authority and hence to decide on many 
issues relating to the upbringing of a child. (this could be an important factor when it comes to decisions relating 
to arranged marriages, particularly when girls reach the age of puberty.) the rule is known in other predominantly 
muslim countries,52 although experience from many countries shows that there is considerable scope for the best 
interests of the child principle to gain more prominence in custody decisions, either through the adoption of legis-
lation or sensitization of adjudicators. this practice was the subject of criticism and a recommendation for change 
in the concluding observations on niger of the committee on the rights of the child.53
50 the Penal code contains a number of relevant articles, including article 253 on abandonment, or denial of care to a child under 
article 227. 
51 court of first instance of gaya
52 see ‘Knowing our rights: Women, family, laws and customs in the muslim world’ in Women Living Under Muslim Laws, isBn 
0-9544943-4-2, 2006. see especially p. 337 et seq.
53 niger, crc, crc/c/118, 2002, 37, paragraph 163.
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proceduraL matters reLating to chiLdren
in relation to whether children could be parties to cases, while none of those interviewed responded negatively, 
chiefs tended to respond in an abstract manner, indicating that this situation did not often arise in practice, but 
that it would depend on the maturity of the child. they said that minors bringing complaints would be listened to. 
one chief said that children would not be heard, responding that, ‘with the Peuls, everyone knows his place’ and 
that a person would have to be 30 to 40 years of age in order to be heard. a senior chief54 agreed that the family of 
the child should nominate a representative to assist the child in a dispute where the child has an interest in being 
heard. rural women interviewed said that children below the age of 10 would not be heard by the traditional 
chiefs and would be represented by their father. (nevertheless, the impression of the team was that it could not 
be expected that traditional adjudicators would actively intervene to ensure that this question was explored and 
steps taken. it was rather a question of not opposing the idea when it was suggested to them.) 
programming for informaL Justice systems 
in niger
findings
from a policy or political viewpoint and related to the legal position, some structural issues are of great impor-
tance. first, there is the role of the chiefs and the link to politics. it cannot be doubted that the institution of the 
chiefs, while enjoying varying degrees of legitimacy in the country, is highly politicized. the chefferie is a vital tool 
of mobilization for political parties and leaders. this is related to the question of the role of the judiciary in a fragile 
political environment. the relative power of the judiciary and the traditional chiefs is an important indicator of the 
separation of powers and of accountability of powerful actors in society. 
second, the tension between the secular state55 and the role of islam continues to dominate the debate on cus-
tomary law and informal justice in niger. islamic norms have, as noted, gradually replaced older custom. While 
this has not been the result of any design on the part of state actors, it is now a reality accepted by the courts 
and represents a challenge to the secular norms of the constitution. While greater compliance with islamic norms 
would improve the protection of the weak in a number of areas, the structural inequality of men and women poses 
challenges to international and constitutional standards. 
third, linked to this is the question of the role of constitutional standards and the willingness of the judiciary to step 
in and fill the gap left by legislative inaction in controversial areas. thus, a gap seems apparent between what is 
legally correct and what may be deemed politically prudent. it may be a tall order to expect the judiciary, the least 
powerful branch of government, to tackle thorny issues that parliament has failed to grasp, particularly in such a 
fragile political context.
finally, several interviewees pointed to the shortness of the period in which the justice system of niger has received 
concerted international assistance. they pointed out the significance of there now being a court in each depart-
ment in the country, saying that these improvements need to be built upon and continued.
in general, informal justice has not been the object of a great deal of programming focus for justice in niger. the 
programming that has taken place has been in the area of training for some chiefs on mediation and record-keep-
ing. Beyond this, there is primary justice programming through ngos, which has partly targeted chiefs as such 
through training and sensitization and partly aimed at providing legal services at the village and grassroots levels.
54 chef de canton de gaya
55 article 4 of the 1999 national constitution establishes the separation between the state and religion.
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LegisLation
as mentioned above, attempts to introduce a family code foundered in the early 1990s and most interlocutors 
were pessimistic at the prospects of success of new initiatives in this direction. some thought that it would be 
possible to introduce legislative changes in the area of family law bit by bit, rather than comprehensively. the 
ministry for Promotion of Women and Protection of children is working with a cabinet of jurists on draft legislative 
proposals. (many in niger are looking at the situation in neighbouring mali, where a new family code adopted by 
parliament was not signed into law by the president following opposition from religious groups). some ngo rep-
resentatives pointed out that much of the content of ceDaW, the maputo Protocol and associated policy recom-
mendations could be legislated in niger without popular opposition. according to this view, the hardest sticking 
points (especially in relation to islamic law) are questions of succession portions, the age for legal marriage (if it 
were to be set at 18), and questions related to family planning and limiting family size.
in the area of land law, there is a Code Rural dating from the early to mid-1990s. some interviewees thought that it 
would be good to go a step further and have a codified law on land ownership (Code Foncier). this would obviously 
have to take custom into account.
training and education
the chiefs interviewed, especially at village level, expressed a keen interest in attending training activities, espe-
cially in the areas of land and real property law and family law. 
proJect on training of chiefs in record-Keeping
Written records of case settlements are often not provided to the administrative and judicial authorities as they 
should be. Doing so would give both of these authorities the possibility to conduct a better informal dialogue 
with chiefs. this could be supplemented by training and dialogue sessions where both sides discuss issues and 
exchange views on practice and challenges. there would be a possibility to enhance this with the participation of 
other parties, including occasionally the police and ngos. Dialogue could take place at the time when allowances 
are paid to chiefs. 
at the time of the visit, there was an ongoing project involving training in record-keeping for chiefs and standard 
forms had been produced and agreed upon. the initiative enjoyed the support of chiefs interviewed, one of whom 
held a senior position in the national association of chiefs. an obstacle to progress in this area is the estimated large 
number of chiefs who are not literate. according to one estimate, out of some 10,000 chiefs and headmen in the 
country, perhaps 125 have received some form of tertiary education, and no more than a few hundred would be 
able to write and understand a written procès verbale. Where ngos are present in communities through village-
based paralegals, focal points femmes relais, etc., it could be possible to envisage cooperation between headmen 
and these other primary justice actors for the purpose of such record keeping. it could likewise be the basis on 
which cooperation in other matters – including training and sensitization on children’s and women’s rights – could 
be built up.
training in mediation
some training in mediation has been carried out for chiefs in gaya under a swiss-funded programme for justice 
and governance in the area. the training was provided through a local ngo. unlike the question of record-keeping, 
training in mediation would not necessarily require literacy, although training materials and approaches would 
have to be tailored to the educational level of the target group.
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survey on substantive norms
the eu-financed PajeD programme financed a survey (recensement) of customs that was conducted in the first 
months of 2010. the aims of the survey are to gather knowledge and provide a basis for discussion and debate 
among practitioners, academics and legal sector actors. there is no immediate (or even medium-term) aim to 
legislate on customary matters. a ’coutumie’ or (reportedly) rather comprehensive study was carried out in the 
colonial period for the whole region (in 1939). according to some reports, this remains accurate in many respects. 
a more (geographically) limited study was made for some departments of niger in 2001 and a number of anthro-
pological studies of various ethnic groups also exist. 
the study looks at most of the issues with which customary law is typically concerned, especially personal status 
and family law (including marriage, its obligations and dissolution, and custody of children) and succession and 
real property law. less attention is paid to issues of conduct and public order, including the exercise of ‘criminal’ 
jurisdiction. children’s custody, maintenance and succession issues are dealt with substantively. the draft report 
obtained does not explore issues of children’s (or women’s) participation, as it is concerned with substantive rather 
than procedural and structural issues.
unicef financed an analysis of the situation of women and children in niger in 2008 and 200956 that was published 
under the auspices of the ministry for the Promotion of Women and the Protection of the child. the study recom-
mends legislating a children’s code to combat violence and abuse against children and to regulate the age of mar-
riage. While most of the recommendations in the area of legal protection are focused on state-centred measures, 
mention is made of developing partnerships with parents and communities. it also speaks of giving advice and 
material assistance to families who are attempting to reintegrate children who have been in difficulty with the law. 
interlocutors in the judiciary thought that a written guide to customary law would be helpful. most thought that 
any such guide should be based on ethnicity rather than on the region concerned, though account would have 
to be taken of regional differences. some recognized the risks inherent in reducing custom to a written guide, 
removing the flexibility that is present in traditional methods. some observed that it is a question of how such an 
instrument is used. it should not be seen as an authoritative source where definitive answers can be found, but 
rather as a guide to understanding for members of the judiciary who are trained in a different way of thinking. the 
customary assessors interviewed in gaya were of the opinion that a written guide on custom could never replace 
the function of the assessors. 
monitoring
according to maitre chaibou, the trust in which a particular traditional chief is held can be quite directly seen in 
the number of cases reaching the lowest formal court in an area, either at first instance or after having been heard 
by that traditional chief. such an analysis can thus be a valuable monitoring instrument. it could especially be used 
in connection with an initial identification assessment of what is happening in an area, prior to commencement 
of programming initiatives.
the presence of paralegals, femmes relais (women focal points) and legal aid providers providing legal assistance 
will likely have an impact on the action of chiefs. all observers in gaya tended to agree that these measures meant 
that there was greater respect in gaya for the law requiring chiefs to stick to conciliation. While not conceived of as 
an instrument of monitoring per se, such measures created openness and transparency.
the disciplinary rules and systems for chiefs are not much used in practice. any large-scale programming efforts in 
relation to chiefs should include attention to accountability mechanisms. 
56 found at http://www.unicef.org/wcaro/wcaro_ansitef_niger_2009.pdf
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outreach instruments
unsurprisingly, ngo representatives felt that they were capable of having the most successful outreach to the level 
of chiefs’ courts and dispute resolution mechanisms. their commitment, willingness to work long hours and net-
works of contacts at the village level (through previous training exercises and membership) gave them advantages 
in this regard. ngos generally agreed that activities that enabled them to develop such networks were extremely 
valuable. ngo presence, and contacts to a network or larger organization, could help in ensuring that decisions 
were actually implemented. however, there may be a possibility that even the ngo representative in a village will 
be someone who is close to the local power structure. it is difficult to avoid this concentration of power, as ngos, 
like others, usually require the goodwill of the local chief to be able to work effectively in a village or community. 
this is especially the case if they conduct mediation or otherwise assist in solving individual cases.
ngos such as association nigérienne pour la Defense des Droits de l’homme (anDDh) assisted judges to visit 
local communities. they found this helpful in improving relationships between the formal and informal systems 
and in improving understanding of each other’s roles and functions.
ngos felt that the greatest impact on the quality of justice available from traditional chiefs could be had through 
capacity-building among chiefs and sensitization of the public. education through drama (including by showing 
films and discussing them afterwards) and radio broadcasts were felt to be effective. it was necessary to break the 
‘culture of fear’ that existed in relations between people and the traditional authorities, they said.57 mention is made 
above of unicef’s work to sensitize chiefs against child marriage. 
addressing an issue such as providing for the succession rights of children born outside of marriage through 
working with religious officials to systematically exhort fathers to acknowledge and provide for them might be 
moderately effective if it is not possible to pass legislation on intestate succession that provides for such provision. 
programming aiming at improving Women’s access to Justice and 
protection of Women’s rights
addressing structuraL imbaLances
most interviewees agreed that people were not yet ready to accept women as chiefs. the afjn felt that there 
should be a concerted effort to promote women as customary assessors, saying that this would be a visible and 
important signal that would have an effect on women’s participation and access to justice. they expected that it 
would bear fruit in terms of case outcomes. reportedly, rDfn58 in gaya requested the mayor of gaya to propose 
women as candidates and assessors, who did so, but his letter went unanswered. 
vioLence against Women
the unicef/ministry for the Promotion of Women and Protection of children study mentioned above recom-
mends sensitization measures against VaW, directed at men and women, coupled with strengthening women’s 
access to the courts and to counselling services. the lack of realistic prospects for sustainable protection measures 
(including trained, sympathetic and understanding reception of victims in law enforcement and justice, enforce-
able restraining orders, shelters and effective sanctions) in relation to violence against women would seem to 
demand that most attention be paid to prevention and awareness-raising initiatives at the local level in all but the 
most serious cases. the highly family-oriented structure of local communities will often mean that women close 
to the chef du village or chef du quartier are persons of influence in their own right who may assist in resolving 
cases that particularly involve women. Prevention through promotion of a culture at the local level where violence 
57 the Commandant de Brigade of gaya also acknowledged this factor.
58 rassemblement des femmes Démocratiques du niger
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against women is deemed unacceptable and is tackled at an early stage through, for example, warnings and family 
counselling, may be among the most effective measures. the positive experiences of ngos with women focal 
points (femmes relais) in communities could be worth building on in this respect. 
Women’s rights in marital and family matters in general
any couple marrying can choose to conduct a civil marriage, which would give some legal protection to women 
in terms of dissolution, custody and succession. in order to be accepted in society, a civil marriage would have to 
be accompanied or followed by a religious one. While more could be done to promote use of the civil code when 
marriages are conducted, there are not many indications that this could change much in the short to medium 
term. there are many reasons for this. one is that the civil code is outdated, being based on the law as it stood in 
france in the late-1950s (so that a husband’s permission is required for a woman to get a job, open a bank account, 
etc.). another obstacle is seen in the distance for people to a mairie, where a marriage could be conducted, and 
the legal formalities required (e.g., birth certificates and prior announcement). 
programming aimed at improving chiLdren’s participation
mention was made of unicef’s work with traditional chiefs to address the problem of child marriages. the 2008-
2009 study on the rights of women and children recommends addressing the chiefs to sensitize them on the 
benefits of encouraging the participation of women and children as well as of promoting education. 
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methodoLogy
this report is based on desk research, as well as both qualitative and quantitative interviews and surveys, con-
ducted with users and providers of informal justice systems (ijs), government officials, ngos and development 
partners. 
the study was divided into two stages. in august 2009, the study team carried out a series of qualitative interviews 
and information-gathering in four locations: Port moresby/national capital District, eastern highlands Province, 
simbu Province, and in the autonomous region of Bougainville. 
During october 2009, a quantitative study was carried out in selected districts of eastern highlands province, as 
well as in the remote Karimui-nomani District in simbu Province. eastern highlands Province was selected because 
it is one of six provinces in which the unicef-sponsored Women’s and children’s access to community justice 
(child Protection) Programme is being implemented. this programme is the first of its kind in Papua new guinea 
(Png) and, while this report is in no way a review or evaluation of the Programme, the study team wanted to make 
an assessment of the extent to which the programme has changed perceptions of practices of ijs in those districts 
of simbu Province in which it is operational. 
Karimui-nomani District in simbu Province was selected to provide a point of comparison with the districts chosen 
in eastern highlands. Karimui-nomani is a very isolated district with very weak links to the central administration. 
there are no formal justice sector institutions (police, magistrates court or village court) operational in the district. 
the only justice services available are provided by informal service providers.
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bacKground
typoLogy: the operation of informaL Justice systems in png 
for hundreds and perhaps thousands of years in melanesia, disputes have been resolved through community-
based mediation. throughout Png and in the autonomous region of Bougainville, community-based mediation 
in one form or another continues to be the means by which the large majority of disputes are addressed and 
resolved. mediation happens everywhere and every day, in all facets and at all levels of Png society. 
in local communities, disputes are mediated by application of traditional customary norms to the facts of the case. 
custom is not fixed, but changes over time. custom is rarely if ever written down, but is passed on in the commu-
nity from one generation to the next. 
Png is a remarkably diverse country with over 600 distinct cultural and language groups. any report that purports 
to explain the operation of traditional justice systems in such a country, or to make recommendations for program-
ming on ijs, must therefore be read with a grain of salt. While the nature and functionality of community justice 
mechanisms will inevitably vary from one province or district to the next, the following mechanisms are common 
to many local communities in Png.
Leader court (hauSline)
the leader court, used in this study to refer to tribal chiefs dispensing traditional justice in villages, is the most 
traditional justice mechanism of all in Png. the members of the leader court are the traditional leaders of the 
community, men who inherit their position of leadership by descent. members of the leader court decide cases 
by applying traditional customary law. traditional leaders continue to enjoy great respect in the majority of com-
munities across the country. 
the central concept in traditional justice in Png is wanbel, the process by which people or clans in dispute, through 
mediated discussion, reach agreement and agree to resolve a conflict. the resolution of the dispute is publicly 
demonstrated through the payment of compensation (bel koal) to stop the tension in the community from 
rising further. 
in traditional mediation, compensation is almost always paid by both parties to the dispute. What is central to the 
process is the restoration of harmony in the community. if wanbel has not been achieved, there is a risk that the 
dispute will arise again in the future, perhaps perpetuated by relatives or descendants to the original parties to the 
conflict, with violent consequences for the families involved and for the community as a whole. 
compensation was traditionally non-financial: a pig, a cassowary or some shells were paid by one side to the other 
or a feast was arranged to mark the reestablishment of harmony in the community. today, compensation will usu-
ally be monetary, sometimes accompanied by a pig or other item. 
in urban areas, the traditional clan system has broken down or become unmanageable due to the intermixing of 
people from many different tribes from different parts of the country. here, the village courts, supplemented by 
community-based mediation services at settlement level, can bridge the gap that would otherwise exist. 
the traditional system is also under pressure in other parts of the country, e.g., in districts where there are large 
mining operations that have brought with them new people, new cultural practices and value systems, and social 
ills in the form of alcohol and drug abuse. in parts of eastern highlands and simbu Provinces, where the study took 
place, respect for traditional leaders is breaking down and groups of young men without livelihood or prospects 
are challenging the power of the traditional leaders.
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peace officers/ngo or church-sponsored mediation and dispute resoLution
in addition to the leader courts, various other forms of ijs, some of them people-driven initiatives, others ngo
or government-sponsored, are present in many local communities. these different justice mechanisms tend to 
complement rather than compete with other ijs in the community. it is not uncommon for a village leader to 
also perform a role in relation to a community-based mediation programme and at the same time to be a village 
court magistrate. 
many of the ‘non-traditional’ or ‘non-formal’ dispute resolution mechanisms have developed in response to identi-
fied gaps in the justice system in the community. in some isolated districts where government presence is poor 
or even non-existent and where village courts are not operating, church leaders take on roles as peace-brokers in 
cases of inter-tribal conflict. 
in many highlands districts, peace officers, or peace and good order committees, established in an honorary 
capacity by provincial authorities, work side-by-side with village leaders and village court magistrates to mediate, 
resolve and prevent violent conflict from arising within the community. 
also, in highlands districts ‘hevi komitis’, comprised of informal justice providers selected by the village or clan itself, 
perform the same function as Peace and good order committees under the tribal rights act. their role is to medi-
ate between warring groups or clans when there is inter-tribal conflict.
Women’s groups, church groups and others (some of them empowered by contact with women’s and children’s 
rights ngos or by organizations like Peace foundation melanesia), have established mediation services that sup-
plement the leader court and often bridge traditional custom and practice with an understanding of constitu-
tional and human rights norms and of the importance of the victim’s right to redress. these groups also seek to find 
a middle ground, respecting both the traditional wanbel conflict resolution model and Png’s new constitutional 
and legal order.
introduction to the viLLage courts
the village court is established by statute, with the intention of resolving disputes and maintaining peace and 
harmony in local communities, by the application of customary law. Village court magistrates are appointed by the 
provincial administration. they receive a modest salary, guidance on relevant law and procedures, together with 
some administrative support by the provincial and national government. magistrates may attempt first to resolve a 
dispute through mediation, with the goal of obtaining a mutually agreeable settlement. if a negotiated settlement 
cannot be reached, the village court has the power to determine a dispute of its own accord through the issuing 
of a declaratory order.
as with the leader court, the resolution of a matter, whether mutually agreed or not, will invariably involve the pay-
ment of some form of compensation by both parties to the dispute. 
Due to the existing cap of K 1000 on compensation payments in village courts, certain types of disputes, among 
them matters involving bride price, polygamy, or some serious criminal offences (which should by law be dealt 
with by the formal justice system), are resolved instead by informal justice mechanisms within the local com-
munity. in isolated districts, it is simply unrealistic for disputants to bring the case to the formal law and justice 
agencies; they are too far away and can, in any event, not be relied upon to provide support in the case of an emer-
gency. local people in these districts must resolve disputes and seek to restore and maintain communal peace as 
best as they can with the means available to them.
even in districts that are comparatively close to provincial centres, there is still a reluctance to approach the police 
for assistance in family marital disputes or in cases involving crimes of violence or sexual abuse. the fact is that the 
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formal justice system, which will decide a civil matter in favour of one party at the expense of the other or will pros-
ecute a violent offender and perhaps also provide some form of redress for the victim, cannot in isolation heal the 
rupture that has been caused in the community by the dispute or offence. Without a parallel process of mediation 
and reconciliation between the parties and their families or clans taking place at the village level, there will be no 
lasting resolution of the dispute and violence will be likely to erupt again in the future.
as knowledge of constitutional and human rights norms grows in some local communities and amongst village 
court magistrates and other officials, there is also increasing recognition of the needs and rights of victims, who 
may wish to see the perpetrator of a violent act prosecuted and punished. in such communities, there may be an 
understanding that the victim’s wishes should be respected if he or she wishes that the perpetrator of the act be 
handed over to the police. 
Joint sittings of tWo or more viLLage courts
if a dispute involves individuals or groups from different villages, communities, or tribes, a joint sitting of members 
or two or more village courts may be convened. 
district court
if one of the parties to a matter in the village court was dissatisfied with the outcome of the case, he or she could 
seek to have the matter heard de novo in the district court. the district court applies the formal rather than the 
customary law. in practice, ‘appeals’ from the village court occur extremely rarely. 
it is more likely that a village court may refer a matter up to the district court if the matter falls outside the jurisdic-
tion of the village court. examples of such cases are serious criminal offences, motor traffic accidents, or matters 
where the compensation sought is above the K 1000 limit payable in the village court. 
as mentioned above, many cases that fall outside the jurisdiction of the village court are nevertheless resolved in 
the local community through the leader court or another informal justice mechanism rather than by referral to the 
district court. 
operations of the viLLage courts 
the Village courts act, which establishes the village courts, the lowest rung in the Png judicial system, provides a 
procedural and regulatory framework in which the courts operate. Village court magistrates decide cases through 
the application of traditional custom, which may vary from district to district or from province to province and has 
not been codified. the primary function of the village court is to ensure peace and harmony in the area for which 
it is established by mediating in and endeavouring to obtain a just and amicable settlement of disputes.1 if media-
tion fails, the court also has a compulsory jurisdiction.2 
the village court has jurisdiction over all people normally resident within its area of operation. the courts exercise 
jurisdiction in both civil and criminal matters, although the distinction is often blurred in the court’s daily work. 
specific offences within the court’s jurisdiction are prescribed in the regulation. these include striking a person, 
using insulting and threatening words, damage to property, drunkenness in the village court area, failure to per-
form customary duties or obligations, and accusations of sorcery. 
a village court may order compensation of up to K 1000 and issue a fine or penalty of up to K 200 either in cash 
or goods. the court may also issue work orders not exceeding eight hours in one day, six days in any one week, or 
a total period of 12 weeks. Where a fine or work order is not complied with, the village court can issue a notice of 
1 section 52, Village courts act 1989
2 section 53, Village courts act 1989
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reminder. if the subject of the notice still fails to comply with the order, an order for imprisonment can be issued, 
but such an order must be endorsed by the district court magistrate before it is acted upon. 
Village courts can apply any law or custom3 as they find appropriate in the circumstances of the case. the court 
decides matters in accordance with ‘substantial justice’ and is free to determine its own procedures.
a number of local residents are appointed as village court magistrates, peace officers and clerks. there are normally 
nine village court officials in each court. the officials are entitled to receive an allowance of K 25 per month for their 
services. the amount of remuneration is set by the national government but paid for by the provincial government 
from its own annual operating budget. 
the Village courts act was proclaimed in 1973 and commenced operation in 1975, authorized by section 172 
of the Png constitution to provide for a system of village courts and peace officers, including their jurisdiction, 
powers, duties and procedures. today, there are over 1,400 village courts, staffed by some 14,000 village court 
officials, and dealing with over 600,000 cases and disputes each year. 
the national government is responsible for the jurisdiction of the village courts as well as for policy, monitoring, 
training and setting of performance standards. the national government is also responsible for appointment of vil-
lage court magistrates and proclamation of village court areas. the Village courts and land mediation secretariat, 
established under the Department of justice and attorney general (Djag), provide periodic training and capacity-
building for village court magistrates and officials and undertake research on various legal and thematic issues.
all village court administrative and financial functions were decentralized to provincial and local-level govern-
ments in 1996 after the passage of the organic law on Provincial government and local-level governments. 
Provincial governments recommend names for appointment of village court magistrates, chairmen and deputy 
chairmen to the minister of justice. Provincial governments are also responsible for providing stationery to the vil-
lage courts to record decisions made and to ensure that each village court has at least one copy of the village court 
legislation, regulations and procedures manual. 
local-level government (llg) has no power to make laws on village courts, but may make laws on maintaining 
peace and good order in the community and may facilitate dispute settlement through consultation, mediation, 
arbitration and community forums. Where llg has adopted its own laws, alleged breaches of the laws may be 
heard by the village court.
the large majority of village court magistrates are men, but there is a concerted effort from the central level on 
down to ensure that each village court has a minimum of one female magistrate. in august 2009, it was estimated 
that there were about 300 female magistrates country-wide. this number can be expected to increase in the years 
to come. 
almost without exception, village court officials interviewed by the study team said that their work was very 
demanding and often required their attention every day of the week, much more than the two days of hearings 
that they are officially required to conduct. in view of the amount of work involved, the compensation being pro-
vided (K 25 per month) is woefully inadequate. many magistrates interviewed said that they would continue to do 
the work regardless of the money they were paid, since they could see how important it was for the well-being of 
the community. however, they were adamant that they and their colleagues deserved greater recognition from 
provincial and national government for the work they were doing, with very little assistance, training or support. 
Village court magistrates have been described as ‘the slaves of the justice system’. in many districts, they are the 
only government body present on the ground and accessible to people seeking justice. in those districts where 
3 sections 57, 58, Village courts act 1989
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the village courts support programme is operating, it seems that they are quite dynamic and are making a valuable 
contribution to maintaining and strengthening community harmony. 
it is difficult to assess the extent to which village courts are functional across Png. the quantitative study under-
taken in eastern highlands Province, in which most, but not all districts, were covered, indicates that there is con-
siderable variation from district to district, and that, in some of the most isolated districts, where there is communal 
fighting or where law and order has broken down, village courts are weak or non-functional. in some of these 
districts, as described above, community members have taken it upon themselves to develop their own justice 
and peace-building mechanisms, sometimes inspired by similar initiatives taken by local people in other districts 
or by mediation training provided by national ngos. 
government poLicy on informaL Justice systems and pLanned reform of 
viLLage courts act4
Png government policy is that as many disputes as possible should be resolved through the village courts and 
other community justice mechanisms, which reflect the values and traditions of melanesia.
the current law and justice sector Programme, which the government is implementing with financial support 
from ausaiD, is seeking to prioritize restorative justice, which reflects melanesian history, culture and values and is 
considered to be the best justice model for Png. at the same time, attempts are being made to provide improved 
protection and better justice services for women, children and vulnerable groups, and, in so doing, to improve 
implementation of the ceDaW and the crc and related instruments in Png. the passage of the lukatim Pikinini 
(look out for the children) act through Parliament, together with the establishment and implementation of new 
guidelines on juvenile justice and on violence against women, as well as efforts to ensure that women are repre-
sented on all village courts across the country, are some of the measures that have been undertaken in recent years.
as a pilot activity under the law and justice sector Programme, a number of community justice centres (cjcs) 
have already been established. the intention of the centres is to increase exchanges and linkages between differ-
ent justice stakeholders in local communities and, in so doing, to increase the quantity and quality of traditional 
justice being dispensed in those communities. the establishment of pilot cjcs is recognition by the government 
of the invaluable role that is being played by ngos, church groups and other community-based organizations.
there is an acknowledgement by the government of the current reality that village courts often overreach their 
jurisdiction, hearing serious criminal matters that should be referred to the police and to the higher courts. unfor-
tunately, due to the limited reach of government services in isolated communities, there is no practical alternative 
at present. this is all the more reason for the government to give its backing to the work being done by ngos and 
by local community groups to fill the gaps where government services are lacking.
Djag acknowledges that the current salary of K 25 per month for village court magistrates is not adequate in view 
of their large workloads, which are often equal to or greater than ward councillors, who receive K 300 per month. 
Djag has been lobbying within the government for increased funding for village courts, to enable salaries to be 
increased and to provide a uniform for village court staff (which many village court officers have been calling for), 
since this can help to increase the respect with which court officers and decisions of the court are held by the com-
munity. Village court magistrates are part of the Png judiciary and they should be recognized as such. 
in the 2007 White Paper on law and justice in Png, the government committed itself to supporting the rejuvena-
tion of the village courts, and, in this regard, it is envisaged that the national government should take back respon-
sibility for appointment of village court officials, their tenure of appointment, and remuneration. furthermore, the 
4 information gathered from interviews with Deputy secretary of justice, mr. Benny metio, and mr. Peni Keris, national co-ordinator, 
Village courts and land mediation secretariat.
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White Paper proposes a review of the existing jurisdictional limits for imposition of penalties or compensation pay-
ments. since there is no limit to compensation in customary cases of bride price, child custody following marital 
breakdown, and death, these cases are rarely settled by village courts. Perhaps the law should intervene to set upper 
limits for compensation in such cases, so as to allow them also to be resolved at village court level in the future. 
it is proposed to revise the Village courts act and to rename it ‘the community courts act’, which would reflect the 
fact that village courts also operate in urban areas, and, furthermore, that purely non-state informal justice mecha-
nisms (leaders courts, ngos and others) are also providing justice services at the community level. as with the 
existing Village courts act, the revised law will not attempt to codify custom, but rather to provide a renewed juris-
dictional and procedural framework within which the existing village courts can operate, one that gives greater 
recognition to the plurality of justice service providers that exist in many communities. 
community-based Justice, mediation and peace-buiLding initiatives
in response to supply-side justice shortages at the local level, there have been numerous initiatives, some intro-
duced into the community and some home-grown, to provide alternative community-based justice and media-
tion mechanisms. 
the quantitative data gathered in connection with this study (some of which is illustrated in the diagrams in sec-
tion 3 below) shows that people are just as likely to seek resolution of their disputes through community mediation 
forums as they are to approach the village court, and, furthermore, that both these forms of ijs are considerably 
more popular amongst users than the leader’s court. 
one of the best known ngos in Png, Peace foundation melanesia (Pfm), has for almost 20 years been providing 
conflict and community justice training to people in communities across the country. the organization has been 
recognized internationally for its work in facilitating peace and reconciliation in the autonomous region of Bou-
gainville after the cessation of hostilities in 1993/94. 
one of the legacies of Pfm’s work in Bougainville are the Peace and good order committees that exist today 
in each village to administer community justice through the use of win-win mediation and restorative justice 
through cooperation between chiefs, village police and village courts. 
today, Pfm is working in a range of provinces, undertaking baseline data collection on law and order problems, 
carrying out community justice courses where invited village leaders assist local people to establish their own 
community justice committees, and provide ongoing monitoring and mentoring.
Very few local communities have regular police presence; it is a common complaint amongst village people that 
the police do not come to assist when they are needed, even if someone from the community travels many hours 
by foot to reach the nearest police station and request help. lack of consistent formal sector agency involvement 
has resulted in chronic law and order problems in many communities. ongoing conflicts and violence inhibit 
development and prevent people, not least women and children, from realizing their potential to contribute posi-
tively to the well-being of the community. 
in eastern highlands and simbu provinces, there are a number of examples of communities that have success-
fully resolved communal conflict through the establishment of their own peace-restoring and dispute resolution 
forums. People have taken the attitude that, if the government cannot guarantee law and order or provide basic 
justice services, then they must find solutions themselves. in Kup District of simbu Province, the organization Kup 
Women for Peace (KWP) was founded by a group of women in the village who wanted to fight back against the 
communal violence that was killing their husbands and sons and causing women and girls to live in fear of physical 
or sexual assault. 
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the mandate of KWP is to prevent and ameliorate outbreaks of violence in the community. after receiving initial 
training in community dispute resolution, they facilitated the establishment of community justice centres in the 
district. they have promoted the incorporation of rights principles into the work of the community justice centres, 
recognizing the necessity of the traditional restoration of peace through the exchange of compensation between 
the parties to the dispute, but at the same time insisting on the importance of handing offenders in serious crimi-
nal matters over to the authorities for prosecution. 
KWP have also provided training on victim’s rights, on the crc and ceDaW to village leaders and to village court 
officials. in response to the lack of police presence in the district, KWP together with village leaders decided to 
appoint ‘community police officers’ who could be a link between the community and the nearest police station 
in Kundiawa. 
in focus groups discussion held in Kup, village men said that they recognized the contribution that the village 
women had made to restoring peace in the community. as one man related that, “We realize that we are born of 
women. We know that the women have been feeling pain for a long time. in our traditional culture boy children 
are born to be warriors, but it is the women who suffer.”
another example of a home-grown community justice and peace-making initiative is in fomu district in eastern 
highlands Province, where the village leaders decided about five years ago to give up their claim on a piece of 
land which had been the subject of continual inter-tribal fighting. the village leaders told the research team, “We 
realized that only in peace-building, and living in harmony with neighbours can there be freedom of movement 
and access to social services.”
since the fighting has ceased, the community has been able to build a community school for the first time, for 
which they are now seeking government recognition and support. 
community justice programmes have also been successfully established in urban areas as a supplement or, some-
times, an alternative to the formal justice system. the saraga Peace good order and community Development 
association, at six mile settlement in Port moresby, offers conflict mediation services in a community comprised 
of people from 34 different ethnic groups. at the time the association was established, there was little cooperation 
between the different groups: “everyone had their own way of dealing with things and people did not dare to go 
into the other groups’ territory.”
after receiving initial training from Pfm, it was decided to establish a conflict resolution committee based on 
win-win mediation and restorative justice principles. there are currently 34 members on the committee, one rep-
resentative for each ethnic group. five of the 34 members are women. When a dispute comes to the attention of 
the committee, a mediation panel is formed, comprised of those members of the committee who are best able to 
deal with the matter. When mediation has been successfully completed, it is marked by the exchange of money, a 
pig and/or the holding of a ‘mumu’ (feast) for the disputants and their families or clans. in some cases, the commit-
tee may request the participation of a village court magistrate or a police officer in the mediation. the committee 
takes up a wide variety of cases, but not matters involving car theft, car accidents, killings, matters of serious sexual 
abuse, child welfare, or custody cases.
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preferences of users and profiLes  
of providers
user preferences
as part of this study, quantitative survey instruments were administered to 124 informal justice ‘users’ and 42 ‘pro-
viders’ (i.e., traditional leaders, village court magistrates or community mediators) in selected districts of eastern 
highlands Province as well as in Karimui-nomani District in simbu Province. the results of the users’ survey reveal 
that an overwhelming number are of the opinion that informal justice providers are best (figure 3.1.a). given a 
range of possible justice providers, a very large majority of respondents said that they would first approach tradi-
tional village leaders, elders or community mediators (i.e., justice providers that had no connection with the state) 
if they had a problem or case where they needed assistance. a small fraction of respondents nominated the village 
court as the justice provider they would approach in the first instance. only a fraction of respondents said that they 
would approach a formal sector agency or authority first (figure 3.1.b). 
user preferences for different justice forums may be at least partly related to cost or perceived cost. for exam-
ple, 31 percent of respondents said that they would not be able to approach the village court because of the 
costs involved. similarly, 26 percent and 22 percent of respondents said that they would not be able to afford to 
approach the magistrates’ court or the police for assistance in resolving a dispute. on the other hand, very few 
respondents felt that cost would be a prohibitive factor in approaching traditional leaders, family elders, commu-
nity mediators or paralegals, if those were present (figure 3.1.d). this seems to be a confirmation of information 
gathered during qualitative interviews that these ‘purely informal’ justice providers rarely if ever require any form 
of payment for their services.
When asked ‘what characterizes a good justice provider’, respondents were twice as likely to concur with the state-
ment ‘keeps peace in the community’ as any of the other options provided (see figure 3.1.c). this arguably reflects 
the cultural context of justice processes in melanesian societies as being primarily about the restoration and main-
tenance of peace and community harmony. many respondents also agreed with the statements ‘treats everyone 
coming to have a case heard the same’ and ‘knows the law’. even though the sample size is small, it is interesting 
to note that these two statements, which emphasize the quality of consistency and fairness in decision-making, 
rated highly. at the other end of the scale, two characteristics of justice providers that are often prioritized in formal 
justice systems, confidentiality and the opportunity for the parties to the case to discuss the resolution, were only 
considered important by a few respondents.
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WHAT CHARACTERIZES A GOOD JUSTICE PROVIDER?
7%
16%
40%
4%
2%
11%
20%
Treats Your Case Condentially 
and Does Not Speak to Others 
About What Has Been Said
Treats Everyone Coming to Have 
a Case Heard the Same
Is Sensitive to Your Needs and Interests
Keeps Peace in the Community
Allows the Parties in the Case to 
Discuss the Resolution
Knows the Law
Treats You with Respect and Politeness
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WHICH JUSTICE PROVIDER WOULD YOU NOT BE ABLE 
TO APPROACH BECAUSE OF THE PRICE/COST?
2%
2%
2%
2%
32%
1%
27%
22%
12%
Magistrate Court/F.I. Court
Police
Prosecutor
Local Administrative Person
Local/Village Court
Traditional Leaders/Chiefs
Clan/Family Elders
Paralegals
Village/Community 
Mediators (VM)
35. Annex 5 – Page 15
provider profiLes
a characteristic of informal justice providers is that they respond to matters as they arise, rather than working 
according to a fixed schedule. Village court magistrates who participated in qualitative interviews conducted in 
the first part of the study regularly made the observation that, although they formally meet to hear disputes one 
day a week, in reality they are working every day, responding to requests for assistance that are made in accor-
dance with the Village courts act or which they received ‘informally’ by virtue of their status within the community. 
human rights issues arising from informaL 
Justice systems
introduction
Png has ratified many international human rights treaties, including the iccPr, the icescr, ceDaW and the crc. 
the Png constitution contains an extensive Bill of rights, and a guarantee, in article 57, that a person whose guar-
anteed rights or freedoms have been or are at risk of being infringed may seek legal redress. the government of 
Png has also taken measures to reform its national legislation and practice with a view to improving compliance 
with its human rights obligations. the passage through Parliament of the 2007 lukatim Pikinini act, which replaces 
the child Welfare act, is an example of a law adopted so as to incorporate in greater measure the principles of the 
crc into Png law and practice. 
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against these developments in the legal framework for facilitating enjoyment of rights by the people of Png is the 
fact that people in many parts of the country today are living in communities that are characterized by widespread 
violence and insecurity and where traditional values and governance structures have become weakened, but where 
the national government has been unable to provide sufficient services or support to guarantee personal safety. 
as mentioned earlier in this study, Png is a remarkably diverse country and any attempt to make comments about 
human rights issues arising out of ijs will inevitably be general in nature, drawing on comments and statistics 
gathered from the comparatively few districts in which the study was conducted. in the following subsections, 
special attention has been given to rights issues particularly affecting women and children, reflecting the fact that 
women and children have traditionally been and continue to be disadvantaged as regards access to and influence 
over decision-making in ijs.
ijs of various kinds are regularly used by people in all parts of Png, be they rural villagers, islanders, residents of 
squatter settlements, or town residents. though conflict resolution and peace mediators play an important role 
in ijs, there is comparatively little government attention to ensuring that due process is followed in terms of the 
execution of law and respect for human rights principles. 
although there increasingly is recognition within local communities of the rights of victims and of the moral 
and legal imperatives that demand that a serious criminal offender should be punished for his or her actions, the 
process of trying to find wanbel in community-level ijs is focused first and foremost on trying to maintain peace 
and good order in the community. even if one party to the dispute is not really in agreement about the means by 
which the case has been resolved, feeling that there should be an acknowledgment of individual responsibility (on 
the part of the offender) or of individual suffering and loss (on the part of the victim), there is strong communal 
pressure to agree to mutual compensation payments, since this is seen as the only means by which harmony in 
the community can be achieved. the reality is that the interests of the community trump individual rights. human 
rights principles and ‘justice’ – or at least justice from the perspective of the victim – are at best secondary and at 
worst insignificant in nearly all conflict cases handled by traditional leaders. 
the only long-term and meaningful way to apply a human rights-based approach to dealing with law and justice, 
and in particular the promotion of the rights of women and children, is for government and cooperation part-
ners to prioritise working through the village courts and through other ijs at the village and community levels. 
Promoting the observance of core human rights principles in all aspects of the functioning of community-based 
justice forums would help to decrease violence against women and children in local communities and would 
provide the safe space that is necessary for women to participate more meaningfully in community decision-
making processes.
Women and informaL Justice systems
Women’s participation in informaL Justice systems 
Despite efforts to date by the government and by support programmes to increase awareness of ijs of the right 
of women to equal access to village courts, the large majority of village courts and other types of ijs remain domi-
nated by men. this was certainly the view of the women interviewed in focus group interviews in most of the 
communities visited during the study. By way of example, women in one of the focus groups in eastern highland 
Provinces related the following:
“It seems that the men are in collaboration with each other. We can stand in Court and say that we 
were beaten up or our husbands are committing adultery or taking new wives. The magistrates 
handle our cases as if it is no big problem. Sometimes our husbands tell the Court that if we wish to 
go, we are free to do so and they can then live with their new wives in peace. The Court may award 
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us compensation; the highest amount would be around K 300 and a pig, and tell us to leave the 
house. But how can we go back to our own people? We become a burden to our families when we 
return to our village. It seems we are the great losers whenever our husband takes a new wife.”
nevertheless, research findings in this and other recent reports demonstrate that women continue to use vil-
lage courts because they are affordable and more easily accessible than other formal or informal justice mecha-
nisms. this provides a strategic opportunity for the government, for cooperation partners and for agencies such as 
the national family and sexual Violence action committee (fsVac) to work to improve women’s and girl’s rights 
enjoyment and human security through capacity-building initiatives focusing on gender equality, women’s and 
children’s rights, and peace-building initiatives.
Justice and protection mechanisms for Women and chiLdren accused  
of sorcery
many studies and reports undertaken on gender-based violence identify negative customs and traditions as the 
main problematic areas in dealing with crimes of violence against women and girl children. Women are par-
ticularly vulnerable because they may, without reason, be accused of sorcery practices and their children may be 
subsequently ostracized from the community as children of sorcerers, considered to be ‘devilish’. there have been 
many instances in highlands provinces and elsewhere where women accused of witchcraft have been murdered 
or have fled their home district for fear of being attacked. 
at present, there are no effective protection services at the provincial or national levels to protect women and 
children caught up in the sorcery-violence epidemic. Village courts have jurisdiction to hear cases of ‘false accusa-
tion of sorcery’, but, in practice, it is not possible for the court to resolve such a case since there it is impossible to 
prove or disprove the allegations. traditional leaders, village court magistrates and community police are afraid to 
intervene for fear of themselves facing reprisals. husbands of women accused of sorcery may be unable to protect 
their wives from gangs of young men who have taken it upon themselves to ‘protect’ the village from sorcerers and 
who do not respect the authority of the traditional village leaders.
in ungai-Bena District, close to goroka and eastern highlands Province headquarters, women stated in the focus 
group meeting:
“We are just there. We can’t do or say much. When it comes to someone dying or being ill and the 
cause is decided [by family members of the sick person] as related to sorcery then we automatically 
live in fear. We just know one of us will be attacked, tortured, or even killed. We just do not know 
which one of us will be the victim. When it happens, it is so sudden, and takes everyone by surprise. 
Our husbands cannot stand up for us, unless we have many sons. Then, he can take a stand against 
the accusation ... We simply have no rights.”
concerns about the persecution of women accused of sorcery have been reported in the newspapers for many 
years. an editorial in The National strongly argued that education and the knowledge of the true causes of illness 
and death that it will bring are the best means to respond to sorcery and witchcraft-related issues.5 more recently, 
the Png parliament proposed a review of the sorcery act so that the state is in a better position to respond to the 
many complex challenges that it poses for security and safety in local communities. 
in the short term, however, the onus must be on the Png police to instil in their officers a commitment to act deci-
sively to protect women at risk of attack and to apprehend those responsible for persecution or threats of violence, 
irrespective of the personal risks to which they may expose themselves in so doing. if the problem is a lack of police 
capacity, then the onus should be on the national government to prioritize increased resources for policing in local 
5 the national, 23 march 2006, p. 18
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communities. the capacity constraints facing the police service have been well documented and they cannot by 
themselves change complex and long-standing community belief systems. But the police are the only 
institution with a mandate to ensure human security; no one else can perform this function, which is a precon-
dition for the restoration of law and order. By acting decisively and in unison, the police can begin to fight back 
against the sorcery epidemic and, in so doing, create safe space in local communities where community leaders 
and informal justice providers can again exercise their authority to address and resolve sorcery allegations without 
members of the community taking the law into their own hands.
the study team heard of one very positive example of action to protect women at risk by the catholic church in 
Kerowagi District. the catholic church has been active in educating parishioners about the medical causes of illness 
and death, rather than emphasizing, as some other denominations do, the conflict in the spiritual world between 
the forces of good and evil, in which acts of sorcery are said to play a part. the catholic Bishops’ conference has 
issued a direction that any parishioner found to be accusing another of sorcery will be disbarred from the church 
community. furthermore, church group leaders have been providing safe haven for women and families at risk 
of attack, sheltering them in their own homes or arranging temporary refuge for them in other towns or villages. 
there have been several instances of church members being accused as co-sorcerers and threatened or assaulted. 
rights of Women viS-à-viS poLygamy
a village court magistrate in goroka district, where human rights training has been received from the village court 
liaison officer in the provincial administration, mentioned that conflict arising from the practice of polygamy is a 
serious and growing problem. in the past, it was only chiefs who took more than one wife, and this was consid-
ered justified since the workload involved with being the chief’s wife, growing vegetables and tending livestock, 
preparing for functions and entertaining, was more than one woman could handle alone. in recent years, however, 
polygamy has also begun to be practiced by rich men in the village, who see it as their right as wealthy men to take 
a younger wife, or two, as a sign of their status in the community. in the magistrate’s point of view:
“When a man brings another woman into his house and village, the first wife is expected to live 
in harmony with the other woman. Sometimes, the first wife may take the matter to court as an 
adultery case, but if the husband insists that he has decided that both women should be his wives, 
then the court cannot decide the case against him since he is the boss or head of the family. His 
point of view as to whether it is a case of adultery or of having taken a second or third wife must be 
followed by the court since we follow customary law in our decision-making.”
there is a pressing need for the government to legislate on polygamy, so that village courts can be guided on how 
to resolve such cases in an equitable manner.
responses to domestic and seXuaL vioLence targeting Women and girLs
the extremely high rates of violence against women in melanesia, especially in Png, have been explained by 
researchers in terms of the negative consequences of traditional authority structures in the country. customs that 
effectively render women legal minors, that refuse them property rights independent of their husbands or male 
relatives, and that require females to defer to adult men, are common in many regions.
a village court magistrate interviewed in simbu province emphasized the need for the government to address vio-
lence against women and children by providing the necessary resources to enforce existing laws and guidelines. 
Violence against women, as an endemic problem across the whole country, was illustrated by comments by a 
women’s focus group in ieta village, close to the administrative capital of Bougainville on the island of Buka: “those 
women who know their rights go to the women’s ngo (in the administrative capital) for assistance. those who do 
not, just wait for the next Boxing Day.”
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the women in ieta village said they were frustrated that the resolution of domestic violence, rape or child sexual 
abuse cases was often decided within the village, without the village elders alerting the community police. the 
women would prefer to see the perpetrator in such cases handed over to the authorities to face criminal justice, 
but dare not take action of their own accord since they are afraid of their husbands. 
it was encouraging during the study to hear of initiatives to encourage men in their capacity as fathers, husbands 
and brothers to take responsibility on family and sexual violence issues. for example, the catholic church in east-
ern highlands Province has been, through men’s fellowship groups, encouraging men to stand up as advocates 
against all forms of violence and lawlessness, particularly those affecting women. some respondents reported 
incidents where men had publicly denounced other men known to be perpetrators of violence against women or 
had even beaten such men in public. 
While acts of ‘citizen’s justice’ such as these must never be condoned, they illustrate that attitudes toward this 
subject can and are changing in those communities where there has been awareness-raising on women’s rights 
and on domestic violence. Where awareness-raising and training have taken place, there must be a commitment 
by the government to provide necessary policing resources to ensure that cases that are reported are followed up 
and that women at risk have viable options to report violence safely without fear of reprisal. 
Women’s inheritance and property rights
in traditional times, if a women’s husband died, the woman would normally have to marry one of her husband’s 
brothers, who would then be responsible for caring for her and for her children. this practice continues today, but 
a woman who does not wish to remarry one of her brothers-in-law is not under any obligation to do so. if a woman 
chooses not to remarry, she may still continue to live in the family home; however, if she wishes to do so, she can 
also return to their home village.
the custom that land and property are inherited through the male line continues to be practiced today in the 
highlands provinces. a distinction can be made between rights of ownership over real and personal property. 
Women cannot inherit or own land, but they may have ownership over certain items of personal property (cloth-
ing, household items, etc.).
on Bougainville, land and property rights are (except for the southern tip of the island) matrilineal and so the prob-
lem of a woman being displaced from her home if the marriage breaks down does not arise in practice.
the issue of women’s right to property in the event of breakdown of the marriage is one of the subjects addressed 
by the unicef-sponsored human rights training delivered to village courts in some districts of eastern highlands 
Province. Village court magistrates reported to the study team that, since they have received the training, they 
now take greater account of the woman’s economic position and of her contribution to the marriage, rather than 
deciding cases merely by reference to bride price. if one or both parties to the marriage come to the village court 
seeking a dissolution, that person or couple will start by granting a one-month separation order and encourage 
the couple to try to resolve their differences with the help of family and friends. if, after one month, the mar-
riage dispute still cannot be settled, a dissolution order is granted. When deciding what compensation the wife is 
entitled to, the court will take into account the number of years the marriage has lasted, how many children there 
are, and the amount of bride price that was paid by the husband’s family. sometimes, women are afraid to speak 
in the courtroom, but the recent appointment of a female magistrate to the village court has helped in this regard.
While this example is not representative of village courts in Png in general, it illustrates the great potential that 
human rights and access to justice training targeting village courts have to promote change in village court prac-
tices that can, in a comparatively short period of time, positively influence attitudes and decision-making in other 
justice forums at the village level.
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chiLdren and informaL Justice systems
chiLdren’s participation in informaL Justice systems
in village courts and ijs across Png, the rights or wishes of children are generally not taken into consideration and 
it would be rare for any child under the age of 16 to appear in person in a village court hearing. Where matters arise 
affecting their interest, an adult relative (sometimes the child’s uncle if the child’s parents are the disputants in the 
case) will speak on behalf of the child. 
it is very unusual for an informal justice provider to be under 30 years old; in traditional society, decision makers and 
mediators were and continue to be almost exclusively drawn amongst the older men in the village. the concept 
of ‘youth’ is different in melanesian culture to that in some other societies. on the one hand, men and women take 
on adult responsibilities from the onset of puberty: work, marriage, child-bearing, and even fighting in those com-
munities where inter-clan violence continues unabated. on the other hand, men are not considered old enough 
to make decisions or to resolve disputes on behalf of their community until they have reached middle age or older. 
in those communities that have had more contact with women’s and children’s rights ngos or that have been 
reached by, for example, the child protection programme that has been piloted in eastern highlands Province with 
support from unicef, attitudes towards the participation of children and their right to be heard in disputes affect-
ing their interests can be expected to be gradually changing. But the geographic scope of these programmes is 
currently very limited.
JuveniLe Justice and chiLd protection programmes
eastern highlands and simbu Provinces have initiated a juvenile justice and child protection programme with 
support from unicef. juvenile justice working groups have been established in each province, and liaison officers 
have been appointed to educate law enforcement agencies, village courts and village leaders about juvenile jus-
tice principles and the requirement that cases of children in conflict with the law should not be dealt with by the 
village courts but referred to the specialized juvenile justice authorities. 
Village court magistrates interviewed in goroka district confirmed that, since they have received training on the 
new juvenile justice arrangements, they no longer hear criminal matters involving juveniles. instead, the matter is 
referred back to the community for mediation and/or is passed on to the juvenile welfare officer for further action.
in eastern highlands Province, the juvenile justice committee has been with the Png police highway patrol, which 
has assisted the committee in disseminating information about juvenile justice along the highway to nearby vil-
lages and public places. 
the perceived value of the programme was emphasized to the study team by provincial administrators, by district 
and village court magistrates, by the police, and by local community organizations. 
What is needed is to extend the programme so that it can reach all parts of eastern highlands and simbu Provinces 
and, in time, the whole of the country. it is noticeable that there is still very little knowledge of the contents of the 
new national juvenile justice policy or of the luaktim Pikinini act away from the district capitals.
another unicef-support initiative that was praised by local community and government representatives is the 
caritas Png child protection programme in simbu Province. in Kerowagi Province, 16 care centres addressing 
issues of custody, adoption, inheritance, stigma and support for children suffering from hiV/aiDss have been 
established. this programme is filling a gap in government services and at the same time making a valuable con-
tribution towards securing the rights of children at risk while sensitizing the local community about issues of child 
rights and equal treatment. 
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there is a pressing need for advocacy programmes by the government, churches and ngos in all parts of the 
country for the protection of children in conflict with the law through the application of juvenile justice principles, 
since the physical punishment of child offenders is a very common practice and is widely perceived as a suitable 
punishment and form of instruction for the child, rather than as a crime being committed against them. While 
those village court magistrates who have received human rights training understand that such forms of pun-
ishment are unlawful, they continue to take place in the community. in many cases, disputes involving juvenile 
criminality are resolved privately as a matter between the two families; they are not brought to the attention of 
the village court at all. 
custody disputes and payment of maintenance
Where a marriage has broken down in the highlands provinces and a child is seven years or younger, the child will 
normally remain in the custody of his or her mother. male children over the age of seven years would as a general 
rule stay with their father’s family, since the right to inherit property follows the father’s line. girl children may go 
with the mother if she chooses to go back to her village, but this may give rise to conflict when the time comes for 
the girl to marry and for bride price to be determined.
Village court magistrates in one ward of goroka District told the study team that, following the training they had 
recently received on children’s welfare, any custody disputes coming before them are now passed on to child wel-
fare authorities for decision. Previously, custody disputes would have been decided with respect to the bride price, 
which meant that the child would go with the father.
the new approach is in line with the provisions of the lukatim Pikinini act, which incorporates the principles of 
the crc into Png law.
Women in focus groups reported to the study team that it can be quite a challenge to get an ex-husband to meet 
his responsibilities to pay maintenance for his children if he has abandoned the family. a woman from lufa district 
in eastern highlands Province described in a focus group discussion how she had successfully gone to court to 
obtain maintenance for her children from her ex-husband:
“I was determined that my husband would not run off with another woman without any responsibility 
for the children’s upbringing. But it’s a very long process. You have to be very determined and keep 
looking for people who can help you. Not many of my sisters were able to do what I did. Many of 
them have ‘fatherless’ children.”
another case example was provided by women from goroka district. a woman whose husband decided to marry 
another woman brought a case against her husband in the district court. the district court advised her to bring 
the matter to the leader and village court first, which she proceeded to do. eventually, she obtained a decision in 
her favour in the village court that both the husband and his new wife should pay her K 350 each, in addition to 
which the husband should pay regular maintenance for his two children. the new wife was not very happy with 
the decision, but she had to pay. the women in the focus group thought that this was a very just decision, showing 
understanding for the difficult position in which the abandoned wife had been placed. But they said that such an 
outcome was rare; in most cases, village courts did not take maintenance cases seriously.
inheritance rights
in Png, rights to property and inheritance follow the father’s line of descent. on the island of Bougainville (with the 
exception of the extreme south of the island), property inheritance is matrilineal. 
the study team did not hear any examples of cases in which child rights principles had been considered or applied 
by village courts or other ijs in relation to inheritance rights. 
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the link between child rights and rights of inheritance is being made, however, by the caritas-supported care 
centres for aiDs orphans in Kerowagi District. in addition to those orphans living in communal care, a further 65 
orphans in the district, living with other family members, have been registered by the programme and are visited 
by the centre staff from time to time to ensure that their needs are being met. several cases have come to atten-
tion where the extended family members have tried to take the land that an orphan has inherited. there is a need 
for legal assistance to defend children’s property rights in such cases.
chiLd seXuaL abuse 
Village court magistrates interviewed by the study team said that it would be very rare for a case of child sexual 
abuse to be the subject of a mediation or court hearing. it would be more likely that such a matter, if it comes to 
light, would be dealt with within the family so as to avoid shame. in the highlands, the child’s uncle has a special 
duty of care in relation to his cousins and he could decide to take over custody of a child in such a case if he did 
not believe the child’s parents were capable of carrying out their duties. in the case of a girl child, this would mean 
that the uncle’s family, not the parents, would receive bride price when she marries.
informants spoke of cases of sexual abuse of older girls less than 18 years old by men who prefer younger girls for 
sexual gratification rather than for a genuine relationship. such cases, where the girl or the girl’s family complain, are 
treated as adultery, rape and/or carnal knowledge. in practice, they are almost always handled at the community 
level through leader court, peace mediations or the village courts rather than by the law enforcement agencies.
chiLdren’s rights and marriage
in traditional society in many parts of Png, children, especially girl children, were promised in marriage to another 
family or clan by their parents at an early age. this practice has now died out in urban areas and in many rural com-
munities as well. informants in most of the locations visited said that girls and boys now choose whom they wish 
to marry themselves; they are no longer expected to follow their parents’ wishes. 
nevertheless, interviews carried out in some more remotes areas, such as Karimui in simbu Province and obura 
Wonenara in eastern highlands Province, revealed that the practice is continuing, even though it does not have 
the level of acceptance that it had previously. in Karimui District, as in many other remote communities in Png, 
there is little or no central or provincial government presence, and it is only the church or missionary groups that 
can seek to intervene or mediate if such a case arises. 
assessment of eXisting programming  
and government initiatives on informaL  
Justice systems 
the study revealed that some very good pilot initiatives are taking place in eastern highlands and simbu Prov-
inces and on Bougainville to link formal sector justice and law enforcement systems to village courts and other 
community-based justice processes. 
the unicef-supported village courts programme in eastern highlands and simbu Provinces was praised by village 
court magistrates who have participated in training sessions and there was a request for further and ongoing train-
ing and support from the provincial and national government. even with limited financial and personnel resources, 
it was apparent that the programme is having a significant impact in those districts in which it is taking place. 
the establishment by the government of pilot community justice centres (hausbang), and, with it, the explicit 
recognition that is being given to the work of ngo and local-level justice initiatives, is a very positive development 
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and could prove to be a valuable forum for coordination and maximization of efforts between those institution 
and groups that make contributions to community justice and peace.
community justice centres, which bring together representatives of all ijs at the local level, can be used strategi-
cally in training programmes. By bringing together all informal justice providers, it could be possible to achieve 
significant impact in local communities vis-à-vis implementation of women’s and children’s rights, respect for the 
rights and wishes of victims, and in the identification and promotion of ‘good cultural practices’ that are supportive 
of or reinforce constitutional and human rights principles.
the study revealed that the functionality of village courts varies considerably from district to district. many village 
court officers said that they had never received any formal training for their work. some were not even aware of the 
existence of the village court manual. it is probably fair to assume that the situation in eastern highlands Province 
would be better than some of the more isolated parts of the country.
Village court magistrates are requesting more information about the formal law, including knowledge of the con-
stitution, so that they will be better equipped to carry out their work.
Village courts, especially in urban or semi-urban areas, are very overworked. the allowances paid do not reflect the 
work being done or the contribution village court officers are making to the maintenance of peace and order in 
the community via the justice system. 
although women reported that village courts often do not take their concerns seriously, they are nevertheless 
active participants in village courts, and especially so in those districts where female village court magistrates have 
been appointed. anecdotal evidence from some informants suggests that women also use justice mechanisms 
strategically and may not bring a case to the village court if they are not confident of having community support 
on the matter. 
the Village courts secretariat is carrying out a very promising research project on women, custom and ijs in coop-
eration with the manus provincial government. the research seeks to identify examples of customs that support 
and promote gender equality and women’s participation in justice processes.
in those courts where women magistrates have been appointed, the response of the existing magistrates and of 
the local community seems to have been very positive. respondents from different groups (women, men and 
informal justice providers) all pointed to the benefits that the appointment of a female magistrate had brought 
to the court. the relative ease with which this change has been accepted by local communities is positive and it 
demonstrates that culture is living and can change rapidly.
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recommendations for future programming 
for informaL Justice systems 
the quantitative data on ijs in Png gathered in this study may well be the first data of its kind about in Png. this 
study was necessarily limited in scope, it being just one of six country studies carried out as part of a global report. 
it would be well worthwhile to continue to do research and baseline data collection in other provinces of Png, 
starting with simbu Province, national capital District and autonomous region of Bougainville, where qualitative 
interviews were carried out, but where there were not sufficient funds to follow up with quantitative research. 
as mentioned in the previous sections above, there are a number of very good initiatives underway by govern-
ment and cooperation partners to promote children’s and women’s access to justice and to support community-
based justice initiatives. the establishment of pilot community justice centres by the government, in recognition of 
the plurality of community-based justice initiative and of the desirability of promoting cooperation and coordina-
tion between informal justice mechanisms, is an excellent initiative that can become an important means to build 
the capacity of ijs and to increase awareness of and compliance with human rights norms. 
the programmes that have been established are for the most part in or close to provincial capitals. there are good 
reasons for why such programmes should begin close to political and institutional hubs: it is best to start a new 
programme in a location where there is a reasonable likelihood that it will meet its goals and objectives. there are 
also economies of scale: it is easier to connect to and service programmes that take place close to communication, 
infrastructure and transport links. 
But the programmes that are working well must over time be extended so that they are also available to more 
people in outlying communities. Development partners like ausaiD, unicef and others should be willing to take 
risks to introduce community justice programmes into some districts where government services are failing or 
have failed and also where communal violence continues to be an ongoing problem. the success of the pilot 
unicef children’s and women’s protection programmes in the highlands Provinces and on Bougainville shows 
that they are beneficial and worthy of replication. this can provide the impetus for extending them into more dif-
ficult operating environments, where there is an understanding at the outset of the programme that results will be 
more difficult to achieve and that negative customary practices or bad practices and lawlessness that have ‘been 
imported’ into the local community due to the breakdown of traditional cultural norms will take longer to change. 
Both development partners and the government should be more willing to accept risks if the promise that access 
to justice, equality and human security are rights for all is to be realized.
Village courts and other community justice mechanisms – including the police – are at present unable to provide 
adequate support and protection to victims and witnesses at risk. this should be a priority for future village court 
and community justice programming. unless there are effective protection mechanisms in place, people will be 
unwilling to risk their safety or that of their family members by approaching justice institutions.
the sorcery epidemic is one of the major law and order problems affecting women and children in the highlands, 
and the government must take concerted and long-term action to restore law and order and guarantee personal 
security. there is clearly a role for the village courts and for other community justice mechanisms to play in com-
bating the epidemic, but they can only act if law enforcement agencies are able (i.e., have the necessary resources) 
and willing to take effective and timely action when people are accused of sorcery or where attacks occur. the 
experiences of Kup Women for Peace and other community-driven justice and peace-building initiatives have 
demonstrated that there is a lot of capacity within local communities that can be co-opted in a public-private 
partnership to fight back against the accusers and the attackers and at the same time to provide safe havens and 
protection for women and their families when they are threatened.
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Dispute resolution based on the principle of ‘wanbel’, or the restoration of communal harmony, reflects the ancient 
culture and traditions of the people on the Png mainland and on Bougainville. these traditions have been recog-
nized in the constitutions of Png and of Bougainville and restorative justice principles are central to government 
thinking and policy in the justice sectors. But disputes should not be resolved by village courts or by other justice 
mechanisms at the village level in such a way that victims of serious crime, or people whose constitutionally pro-
tected rights have been violated, are unable to access effective remedies. 
Programming for village courts should continue to prioritize awareness-raising and training for court officials on 
gender equality, women’s and children’s participation, the right of the child to be heard in matters affecting his or 
her interests, and so forth. 
monitoring and accountability mechanisms for village courts and other community justice mechanisms are lack-
ing at present. the state’s protection obligation – that is, the obligation of the state to take positive measures to 
ensure that citizen’s rights are not being violated in ijs – needs to be engaged. there are potential roles for district 
court magistrates, for the police, for Djag and the Village courts secretariat and for provincial administration to 
play in monitoring efforts. the Village courts secretariat has identified the need to develop a monitoring system, 
which will also help to inform the needs and priorities for future capacity-building and training initiatives. any 
such system should recognize the mutuality of support requirements and obligations that exists between the ijs 
mechanisms and state structures. a monitoring system that is only ‘top-down’ is unlikely to gain the trust of provid-
ers who are frequently underpaid and lack the support they require.
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methodoLogy
the case study draws on three main sources of information: (i) a one-week visit in february 2009, (ii) a large quan-
titative survey carried out subsequent to this, and (iii) a desk study of available literature and some follow-up con-
tacts. During the field visit, interviews and focus group discussions were conducted at village and district levels in 
three districts of the central region of malawi. the team managed to reach a large number of representatives of 
justice sector institutions at the national and district levels, Police headquarters staff and community Police unit 
staff, traditional authorities (tas), group village headmen, village headmen, ngo representatives, village media-
tors, community educators, donor representatives as well as a district official. the field mission was preceded by a 
number of Danish institute for human rights (Dihr) visits in connection with the Village mediation Project (VmP) 
funded by irish aid and conducted by the Paralegal advisory services institute (Pasi). 
the malawi quantitative survey was the largest of the country case studies conducted. the following user and 
provider surveys were collected in the four police regions of malawi:1
region proViderS uSerS
Northern 82 218 
Central 64 236 
Southern 16 66 
Eastern 45 211 
Total 207 731 
1 malawi has three administrative regions for most governance purposes, but, for policing, four regions are used. the study uses the 
four policing regions.
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as is described in the main report, the quantitative data was collected through interviewers going out into the 
villages to ask the questions in the questionnaires and take down the responses on paper. in malawi, it was the 
regional Pasi paralegals who collected the quantitative data. 
Limitations 
only a limited number of districts and tas were visited during the field mission, and only in the central region. the 
malawi study was the first field study to be carried out, and some aspects which came to light later in the drafting 
of the overall study were thus not fully addressed during the field work. as a result, the knowledge and data gained 
during the field work has been largely supplemented by a desk study drawing on the work of other researchers. 
the large scale of the catholic commission for justice and Peace/Department of international Development 
(ccjP/DfiD) Primary justice Programme (involving cooperation with unicef) made it difficult to draw gener-
ally valid conclusions on this programme based on the relatively small number of districts visited and interviews 
carried out.
bacKground
the republic of malawi, located in southern africa and bordered by tanzania, mozambique and Zambia, is a coun-
try of 118,484 square kilometres. the most recent census, conducted in 2008, provided a total population figure 
of 13,066,320 people2 and a (high) population density of 139 per square kilometre.3 approximately 19 percent of 
the population is urbanized.4 the remainder continues to be largely dependent on subsistence agriculture. the 
country is divided into three administrative regions: northern, central and southern, and further into 28 districts.5 
according to unicef, children comprise 52 percent of the population.6
the population is composed of a number of major ethnic groups, including, in the northern region, ngoni and 
tumbuka. in the south and central regions, yao, mang’anja, and chewa are the largest groups. interestingly, much 
of malawi, including the largest (chewa) linguistic group, traditionally follows a predominantly matrilineal custom-
ary marriage system. some 20 of the 28 districts, especially in the southern and central regions, are considered to 
be traditionally matrilineal, meaning that this system predominates in the country’s culture and customs.7
the country was a British colony and inherited legal and administrative systems based on the common law that 
were and are broadly similar to those of many other former British colonies in africa. the system of autocratic one-
party rule that was introduced after independence (in 1964) persisted until the overthrow of President Banda in 
1994 and the drafting of a new constitution. the constitution guarantees the principles of democracy and the rule 
of law, including the independence of the judiciary, and a modern and progressive bill of rights that guarantees 
non-discrimination and the equality of the sexes. the new constitution allowed both the creation of a number of 
new independent institutions and civil society organizations that took advantage of the newly guaranteed free-
dom of association. most independent civic organizations are thus relatively young. the country’s legal and judicial 
institutions remain under-resourced, but have benefited from government and development partner attention 
in the years since the country became a democracy. in some respects, the pace of legal reform has been slow. 
2 2008 Population census, Preliminary report, national statistical office, september 2008. there are varying estimates of the 2010 
population. unicef provided a figure of 13.2 million, while the cia World factbook in july 2010 provided a higher estimate  
of 15,447,500.
3 government of malawi, 2008 Population and housing census, Preliminary report, september 2008.
4 cia World factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mi.html
5 ibid.
6 information received from unicef for the purposes of the present report. 
7 mwambene, Divorce in Matrilineal Customary Law Marriage in Malawi: A Comparative Analysis with the Patrilineal Customary Law 
Marriage in South Africa, university of the Western cape, 2005.
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Political deadlock prevented the adoption of reform-oriented legislation and policy in recent years, including on 
issues such as public service reform, access to information and decentralization, but also on important issues 
related to the rights of women and children.8
constitutionaL provisions and the recognition of customary LaW
the constitution of malawi is in general a very modern, progressive and ambitious document that lays out a com-
prehensive set of human rights, as well as a number of independent institutions to assist in securing and promot-
ing them. it reflects the wish of the malawian people to achieve a radical departure from the one-party state that 
dominated the republic of malawi for the first thirty years of independence. it is noteworthy that the guarantee of 
equality does not contain the limitations or ‘clawback’ clauses in relation to customary law that are seen in some 
other countries (see the main report). the constitution mentions customary law in several provisions, providing 
that customary law in force at the time of entry into force of the constitution will continue to have the force of law 
(article 200) subject to any legislation adopted to the contrary or to a finding of unconstitutionality by a compe-
tent court. 
article 13 of the constitution obliges the state to legislate and make policy for the full participation of women in all 
spheres of society on the basis of equality with men. article 24 provides that legislation shall be passed to eliminate 
discrimination against women, and particularly against customary practices of (a) sexual abuse, harassment and 
violence, (b) discrimination in work, business and public affairs, and (c) deprivation of property, including property 
obtained by inheritance. article 22 provides for the right to marry and, specifically, that no person shall be forced 
to marry and that this principle applies also to customary marriages. 
article 23 is concerned with the rights of children, who are defined in the article as persons under 16. the article 
provides that children are entitled to equality before the law and, inter alia, to protection from economic exploita-
tion or from work, treatment or punishment that is hazardous, that interferes with their education or that is harmful 
to their health or to their physical, mental or spiritual or social development. the constitution does not explicitly 
mention the principle of the best interests of the child, though a review of the constitution by the law commis-
sion has recommended a change in this regard. a legal age for marriage is not set by the constitution.
the constitution likewise protects the right to equality before the law, to access to a court, and to an effective 
remedy for violations. all of the complex of rights concerning liberty and security of the person and to a fair trial 
are well protected in the constitution. article 43 guarantees the right to lawful and procedurally fair administrative 
action where rights, freedoms, legitimate expectations or interests are at stake. the constitutional provisions apply 
to traditional leaders and even to all persons.9
the far-reaching constitutional guarantees have exerted a considerable influence on legal thinking in malawi, 
though at present this is reflected only in a series of progressive legislative proposals that have as yet not become 
law. it remains to be seen how the public and politicians will view the proposals once they are debated in Parlia-
ment and whether there will be difficulties in applying and enforcing progressive laws.
the adherence of the Parliament of malawi to the dualist doctrine concerning the relationship between national 
and international law means that the provisions of international human rights instruments ratified by malawi 
cannot be directly applied by the courts of malawi.10
8 as noted by the committee on the rights of the child: see crc/c/mWi/co/2, 27 march 2009, paragraph 8. the committee lists 
numerous pieces of proposed legislation: child (care, Protection and justice) Bill, the national registration Bill, the Deceased 
estates (Wills, inheritance and Protection) Bill, the marriage, Divorce and family relations Bill, the revised Penal code Bill, the 
criminal Procedure and evidence Bill and education act review.
9 Kanyongolo, 2006.
10 article 211 of the constitution provided for both dualism and monism, but this was removed by Parliament. see ceDaW, 
concluding observations on the combined 2nd – 5th reports, 2006, paragraph 9.
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Justice sector reform
the structure of the court system in malawi is designed as a four-tier system, but, in reality, only the level of third-
grade magistrate courts and the level of the high court exist.11 although a District civil appeal court is outlined in 
the legal framework as the second tier, it does not exist in practice (schärf, 2002). 
there are approximately 300 persons qualified as lawyers in malawi, of whom only a fraction are practicing law. 
in 1999, only nine of the 217 magistrates were professionally qualified lawyers, increasing to twenty-one in 2006. 
the rest have undergone shorter training. similarly with the police, most prosecution is undertaken by non-legally 
qualified police prosecutors. most magistrate courts are located in urban or semi-urban areas, and there can be 
up to 50 kilometres from a village to the closest magistrate court. courthouses are sometimes left empty because 
there is no accommodation for magistrates in remote areas. roads are generally bad in remote areas and means 
of transportation not readily available and expensive. the police reach out into the villages through community 
Police units composed of civilian volunteers. the structure of community policing is built up according to the 
administrative structure surrounding traditional leaders and authorities. there are thus community Police forums 
at the highest level of local chiefs/traditional leaders (in malawi termed tas – see below), crime Prevention Panels 
at group village headmen level, and crime Prevention committees at village headman level. the police, however, 
generally lack transport to respond to calls from the community Police units. Both police and magistrate courts 
face a significant backlog of cases. 
Development partners, especially the european union and DfiD, but also unDP, usaiD and unicef, have lent their 
support to programmes to enhance justice in the country. the unicef programme, which is primarily supported 
through DfiD, is the only programme designed to improve women’s and children’s access to justice at the infor-
mal and formal levels. While there has been support to the police and judiciary from these programmes, efforts 
to introduce a sector-wide approach to justice have (at time of writing) thus far not borne fruit, though they are 
currently being renewed. some innovative programmes have focused especially on the level of primary justice. at 
the formal justice level, unicef has worked on justice for children over the past decade, building the capacity of 
the police service to ensure children and women have their rights to protection, upheld by the justice sector. the 
establishment of supported Victim service units in each police station linked to community policing structures is 
one element of this work. the Pasi ngo, with the support of senior members of the judiciary and senior members 
of the Prisons service, has successfully promoted a model of paralegalism that is based on close cooperation with 
and among the main criminal justice institutions. significant reductions in the numbers of people on remand 
detention have resulted. a DfiD-financed primary justice programme, implemented by ccjP, provides training to 
traditional leaders.
typoLogy of informaL Justice systems
malawi currently has two types of informal justice systems (ijs) of relevance to the present study: the first is that of 
’Pabwalo‘ or ’mphala‘ (in the north of the country) or dispute resolution by customary leaders known as traditional 
authorities and their subordinate headmen. traditional leaders have continued to resolve disputes at the local 
level, using custom as their main normative basis. some ngos, with the support of development partners, have 
engaged with the traditional leaders in recent years, providing training and support. 
the second broad category is composed of mediation schemes that have been introduced at the village level 
whereby trained mediators assist people to solve their own disputes, primarily those of a civil character. as the 
scheme under which the mediators work is a pilot project, and no detailed research or documentation of the work 
11 there is not agreement on whether both third and fourth-tier subordinate courts operate within the justice system today. While 
the malawi law commission refers to their existence in their Report on the Law Commission on the Review of the Traditional Courts 
Act, Wilfried schärf (2002) argued that he has been unable to find documentation of the fourth tier in the seven districts that he 
studied as part of his research. he holds that when 4th grade magistrates left their position, they were not replaced. 
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carried out by the mediators is available, this informal justice system is discussed in the programming section of 
the study rather than in a separate chapter of its own.
unlike neighbouring mozambique and Zambia, malawi does not currently have a system of parajudicial12 state 
customary courts. nevertheless, as such a system has previously existed and may be reintroduced in malawi, issues 
related to such courts in malawi are also discussed.
the system of traditionaL authorities
as can be seen from the table below, the structure of traditional leaders starts at the lowest level with village head-
men at village level and has two main superior levels: group village headmen and traditional authorities. legisla-
tion also recognizes senior tas and some tas reportedly also employ other categories, including ’senior village 
headman‘, that are not recognized in legislation. there are an estimated 24,000 villages in malawi, each of which 
has its traditional justice forum, presided over by a village headman (Vh), though not all of them have been rec-
ognized by the ministry of local government.13 he or she is chosen according to customary rules and the position 
remains in the family entitled to the office by custom. a group of elders within the family typically decides who 
among the relevant family members (most often the children of the Vh or the children of his/her sister) are most 
suited to become the next village headman when one dies or withdraws. 14
prinCipal CHiefS
(7 in malawi)14
Senior Ta
28
TradiTional auTHoriT y (Ta)
(approximaTely 500)
Sub-Ta
61
group Village Headman (gVH)
(approximaTely 2,400)
gVH gVH gVH gVH
Village Headman (VH)
(approximaTely 18,000)
VH VH VH VH VH VH VH VH
the village headmen select among them the group village headman who presides over the area equivalent to a 
group of villages, and the group village headmen select in turn among them the ta or chief who is the highest 
authority within a given geographical and administrative entity. the exact s/election procedures and custom-
ary organization vary in the different districts of malawi. the term ’traditional authority‘ is also used in malawi to 
describe the geographical area over which a ’chief‘ holds sway.15 the team was not able to obtain an exact figure 
for the number of traditional authorities in the country, but consultation of maps suggests that the number is in 
the range of 400 to 500. a group village headman might typically be responsible for five to ten villages. 
12 see main report for an explanation of this term.
13 ‘”town chiefs” in malawi’, Diana cammack, edge Kanyongolo and tam o’neil, ‘africa Power and Politics Working Paper no. 3’, june 
2009. this accounts for the discrepancy between the number of village headmen and villages.
14 one principal chief having authority over some of the chewa people is based in Zambia.
15 in order to maintain clarity, this report reserves the terms ’traditional authority‘ and its abbreviation ‘ta’ for those layers of the 
traditional leadership system and the geographical areas where they have authority. the term ’traditional leaders’ is used more 
generally to include all layers of the system.
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all layers of the ta structure were paid a monthly stipend by the office of the President and cabinet (oPc). these 
amounts are currently set at 18,000 Kw for tas, 5,000 Kw for group village headmen, and 2,500 Kw for village head-
men.16 the powers and independence of chiefs and tas under Banda were simultaneously entrenched and closely 
circumscribed, so that the president could and did nominate and remove chiefs as well as create new chieftaincies, 
while at the same time the chiefs were given power over local development (through heading development com-
mittees that bypassed district councils). as the traditional authorities at the various levels receive payment from 
the office of the President and cabinet, some point to the problematic situation of the ta structure being tied to 
the political party structure and to the fact that the tas have been used to deliver votes and support to the ruling 
party.17 this phenomenon is well known in other countries. 
in the rural areas where the quantitative study was conducted, most of the providers interviewed from among 
chiefs and the ta system described themselves as farmers. of approximately 120 respondents, some 60 had com-
pleted only primary school education, whereas about 35 had also completed secondary school. the remainder 
had either had no schooling or had some form of post-secondary education, usually of a vocational nature. 
as in other countries in africa, a noteworthy development is that of ’town chiefs‘, where it can be seen that, despite 
urbanization trends, some traditional patterns of authority as well as respect for customs and traditions are repro-
duced to maintain order locally. although chiefs have no authority in respect of land allocation within towns, they 
may occasionally exercise it in practice with a high degree of acceptance from the local population, if not from the 
authorities. some such chiefs may exercise authority because of hereditary claims to do so in the area in question, 
although the area has changed character and become urban and ethnically mixed. in such cases, they may be 
entitled to stipends as described above and have an office recognized under legislation. others may have gained 
authority in other ways because of local prominence. the institution of town chiefs is a true instance of hybridiza-
tion, in that some such chiefs are elected locally, including through election processes that have the support both 
of the District commissioner and Paramount chief. some studies have shown that these authorities (even those 
with no claim to hereditary title as tas or headmen) enjoy forms of recognition from the authorities, including pay-
ment of stipends, and function as a channel for funding local projects, thus filling a gap that has partly developed 
out of practice over the past 30 years of urbanization and has partly been strengthened because of the stalled 
decentralization process.18 
functions of tas and chiefs
after the establishment of democracy in 1994, the role of elected district councils was intended to be enhanced 
(at the expense of the power of the chiefs), though decentralization has stalled for other reasons.19 tas remained 
the administrative heads in the local communities as provided for in the chiefs act of 1967. this legislation gives 
them the following functions:
  to preserve the public peace
  to carry out the traditional functions of his office under customary law in so far as the discharge of such func-
tions is not contrary to the constitution or any written law and is not repugnant to natural justice or morality
  to assist in the collection of tax
  to assist in the general administration of the district in which their area of jurisdiction is situated and for the 
purpose of carrying out such functions as the district commissioner may require 
  to carry out and enforce any lawful directions of the district commissioner
16 an estimated us$ 135.00, us$ 37.50 and us$ 18.75, respectively, in february 2009.
17 law commission, 2007, and schärf et al., 2002. see also cammack et al., 2009.
18 the source for the information on town chiefs generally is cammack, Kanyongolo and o’neil, 2009.
19 ibid.
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as cammack, Kanyongolo and o’neil point out,20 the cultural and ritual functions, especially those related to com-
munity organization around events such as funerals, should not be underestimated as a key element of the impor-
tance of chiefs locally, including in towns. retention of ’good standing‘ membership in the local community is an 
issue almost of survival and the authority that controls the ’gates‘ in this respect is highly important. the malawi 
human rights commission, in its 2006 report on cultural practices and their impact on human rights, documents 
the various roles played by chiefs in relation to a number of cultural practices that have harmful aspects. some of 
these are discussed in the sections on women’s and children’s rights.
Preservation of public peace will usually involve close liaison with the police, as well as keeping a close eye on, for 
example, who is living in which house, who moves in and out of the area, and direct (verbal) intervention in rela-
tion to any issues of ’misconduct’. During the Banda era, order was often maintained by officials of the ruling party 
and the malawi young Pioneers, an organ of the youth wing of the party (mcP). thus, chiefs were not the main 
enforcers of order at the local level.
By virtue of the land act, chiefs do not own customary land. title is vested in the state, represented by the presi-
dent. chiefs retained their role in relation to allocation of customary land21 in the Banda period. the malawi land 
Policy, approved by the cabinet in 2002, and a proposed new land Bill would deprive the chiefs of sole power to 
allocate customary land, aiming to democratize this control through local representative structures (customary 
land committees).22 the limited amount of new land to be allocated also limits the power of the chiefs in this 
regard, and some authors note that chiefs in malawi do not appear to have enriched themselves by selling off cus-
tomary land to the degree seen in some other countries.23 the land policy makes it very clear that the authority of 
chiefs over land does not represent ownership, but a trust. officially, chiefs have no power to allocate land in towns, 
though some reportedly continue to do so, occasionally leading to conflicts with town authorities. 
gender representation among tas and chiefs
While the ta is male in most areas and the predominance of males in the system is universal,24 female village heads 
are found in the central and southern (matrilineal) areas, and they are even beginning to be encountered even in 
the north.25 female tas were encountered in Kuulunda and maganga (salima) during the mission, though there 
are generally fewer women at the higher levels of the system. the ta is generally assisted by an advisory coun-
cil (the members are known as indunas). Women may also be found as indunas in some areas. in njewa, visited 
during the mission, four of eleven counsellors were said by the chief to be female. of approximately 120 providers 
encountered in the malawi quantitative survey, about 20 were women. some tas have a specific women’s council 
designated to deal with what they consider delicate cases that require female intimacy (such as rape and domes-
tic violence). the malawi human rights commission, in their 2006 study on cultural practices and human rights, 
found that:
“[S]uccession to chieftaincy was in principle open to both males and females in all but a few ethnic 
groupings. This in principle opens the door for women to participate in decision-making positions at 
community level. The study found that in certain areas there had been remarkable progress in terms 
of women’s participation in decision-making positions. A case in point was the situation in Mulanje 
where there were three women chiefs out of a total of six chiefs at traditional authority level.”
20 ibid.
21 cammack, Kanyongolo and o’neil, 2009.
22 malawi national land Policy, government of the republic of malawi, ministry of lands, Physical Planning & surveys, january 2002.
23 cammack et al., 2009, cite Peters and Kambewa for this observation.
24 Kanyongolo, 2006.
25 see munthali, alister, ’the emergence of female Village headwomen in rumphi and implications for land use and management‘, 
conference paper, 2008, accessed at http://iasc2008.glos.ac.uk/conference papers/papers/m/munthali_111001.pdf
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the commission’s study is also interesting for its finding that “the responsibility of choosing chiefs was mostly 
given to women, particularly in matrilineal societies.” nevertheless, “the results often produced men as chiefs. this 
could be attributed to some of the contents of initiation ceremonies and general pieces of advice given to girls 
and women, which recognize men as more capable leaders than women.”
the mhrc found that having several wives is extremely widespread in society generally, and widely considered to 
add to the prestige of a chief. it can thus be fairly assumed that many chiefs are likely to be upholding polygyny. 
the adJudication function of the tas
While the chiefs act does not explicitly mention an adjudicative function, in practice, this is considered to be 
included under ’traditional functions of [his] office under customary law‘. in practice, it is recognized by community 
members, magistrates, police and local authorities, all of whom either refer cases to tas or accept referrals from 
them, use tas as a point of liaison for service of court documents or as expert witnesses on customary law, etc. 
the 1965 land act does not give recognition to the dispute resolution function of chiefs in land issues. neverthe-
less, magistrate courts do not have jurisdiction in matters pertaining to title of customary land26 and these cases 
remain among those most frequently dealt with by the chiefs. the land policy recognizes that “no formal arrange-
ment exists to ensure these functions are performed in a judicious and transparent manner.” it acknowledges new 
land management structures, which would continue to involve chiefs, but be supplemented by other respected 
persons elected from the community. this will require new legislation on the accountability of traditional leaders.27 
under the new arrangements proposed in the policy, the tas would continue to be involved in adjudication and 
dispute settlement by presiding over a traditional land tribunal.28 the district authorities would support this tribu-
nal, including through use of gPs technology. as mentioned, the policy had not yet been transformed into law at 
time of writing. thus, while chiefs continue to exercise jurisdiction in the area of land disputes, and that jurisdiction 
is acknowledged by state organs, this occurs on the basis of a vague and general legal framework.
in 2002, schärf and his colleagues29 found that chiefs were still (though without legal authority) dealing with cases 
of a criminal character and wanted to have their former powers to order detention and impose community service 
returned to them, feeling that their authority had been diminished. the 2009 report by Kanyongolo et al. reports 
that minor disturbances of the peace are dealt with by town chiefs, but that cases involving criminal behaviour are 
sent to the police. 
in practice, chiefs also settle disputes in marital and family law matters and a variety of civil disputes. a 2009 study30 
found that town chiefs were dealing with cases of the following kinds: (a) boundary disputes and minor damage 
to property, (b) inheritance cases, (c) attempting to reconcile partners in domestic violence cases, (d) disputes 
between domestic servants, and (e) quarrelling neighbours and ex-lovers. 
they were also found to be dealing with some kinds of family problems, including disputes arising out of teen-
age pregnancy by a neighbouring boy or a boy trying to get a girl to marry him without her family’s permission. 
according to the same report, they were not dealing with cases involving dissolution of marriage, sending these 
back to family elders (nkhoswe) or, failing this, to the courts. Witchcraft cases were among those dealt with by town 
chiefs. englund and Wlsa malawi31 describe the phenomenon arising in impoverished urban areas with ethnically 
mixed populations of suspicions by parents that their children are being led into witchcraft by neighbours. 
26 section 39 of the act.
27 land Policy, 5.10.2 (b)
28 ibid, 5.14.3
29 schärf et al., 2002.
30 cammack, Kanyongolo and o’neil, 2009.
31 englund, ‘Witchcraft and the limits of mass mediation in malawi’, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 2007, Wlsa, malawi, 2009.
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normative basis
the constitution recognizes customary law, and this is generally what is applied by the tas and chiefs, though 
there is likely to be considerable variation, based on knowledge of and attitudes toward particular provisions of 
statutory law and the constitution. in towns, town chiefs may apply a mixture of common sense, elements of statu-
tory law and the customs of different ethnic groups.
procedures empLoyed
in their 2002 study, schärf and his colleagues provide a description of the adjudicative process before chiefs and 
their counsellors. some extracts from this are provided below.
“Depending on the nature and seriousness of the problem any person may participate in the 
dispute resolution process: chiefs, elders/ndunas, victims, offenders, State officials, party officials 
and neighbouring chiefs. The system is characterized by its relaxed yet respectful atmosphere, an 
outdoor rural setting (often under a tree), informality of dress, common-sense language and a 
natural flow of story-telling and questioning.” 
“The dispute is dealt with in a holistic manner, taking into account interpersonal relationships, 
community status, local values and community perceptions. The entire context of the event which 
gave rise to the dispute is sketched and probed, rather than only looking at the precipitating act 
which brought the parties to the customary justice forum.” 
“The aim is first to ascertain the facts, and to do this the forum may have to hear a large amount 
of testimony, some of which may be quite irrelevant to the case. Standards of proof may thus be 
rudimentary. The maxim ‘no smoke without fire’ is adopted as opposed to proof beyond reasonable 
doubt and proof on the balance of probabilities.”
respondents said that, in practice, it is often the counsellors who hear cases at the higher level of the system. they 
refer their decision to the chief for confirmation or approval.
impartiaLity and independence?
some doubt as to the impartiality of the chief and the process is expressed: 
“A participatory or consensual approach to decision-making is adopted. What remains debatable, 
however, is to what extent other factors such as the need to protect his own authority and prestige 
finally influence the decision of the chief. Nonetheless, parties agree to the process as well as to 
all the other inter-personal dynamics at play. Chiefs seldom sit alone. They are accompanied  
by indunas.”32
these observations tended to be confirmed by statements heard in the qualitative study. it was noted that tas, gVh 
and Vh often have family ties to one of the parties (or some times both) in a case brought before them. although 
some tas emphasize the importance of impartiality and advise their gVh on this when they are appointed, it is 
very difficult to retain impartiality in all cases. many villagers report having encountered partiality, both in terms of 
whether a ta, gVh or Vh is willing to deal with their case and in the way the case is handled. 
it must likewise be remembered that chiefs continue to have executive governmental responsibilities. they also 
play a role in local and occasionally even (at the higher levels of the chieftaincy system) national politics.33 for this 
32 schärf et al., 2002.
33 schärf et al., 2002, cammack, Kanyongolo & o’neil, 2009.
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reason, there remains doubt about their independence from the executive arm and the political system; this is 
among the reasons why the law commission decided against having chiefs sitting on the proposed local courts 
(see below).
moreover, the presence of pressure to reach a solution is acknowledged: 
“Victim, offender and family members or relatives are called to appear before the chief or elders. 
Pressure is used to reach an agreement that satisfies the parties, social hierarchy, community 
expectations and the chief. Thereafter, the forum will reach a decision that satisfies the victim, and 
is considered reasonable by the chief and the wider community.” 
the process thus has elements of facilitated negotiation, and cannot be neatly categorized as arbitration 
or mediation. 
the chief and counsellors may not necessarily be neutral or impartial:
 “Factors at play include the interests of the chief to promote his authority and prestige, political 
influences and pressure, and the current human rights and democratic changes that have 
influenced some members of certain communities. More factors are the respective status of the 
disputants, and the likelihood of the case being taken to the formal state courts.” 
although counselling and advice may sometimes be given to the parties, the penalty is often in the form of pay-
ment of livestock. the nature of the offence, the age of the offender, the degree of outrage by the community, as 
well as other extra-judicial factors that may influence the chief and indunas, determine the penalty or order.
in interviews with users and other providers, chiefs were sometimes accused of corruption in relation to dispute 
resolution.34 in addition, the traditional practice of paying tribute to chiefs (typically a chicken for the chief and his 
indunas to eat) is hard to distinguish from the taking of bribes.35 the party who provides a greater gift or tribute 
may have expectations of being favourably treated. the system has no obvious safeguards against dangers such 
as these.
force of outcomes
it is difficult for a community member not to abide by the judgement or case outcome. While people do have the 
possibility of seeking a review of the decision of a village headman at higher levels of the customary system, the 
non-formalized nature of this system makes it subject to a host of uncertainties. chiefs faced with defiance of their 
decisions may have a number of means at their disposal, including mobilizing a community to ostracize a person, 
creating difficulties in accessing any public funds or services that would otherwise be available, denying access to 
graveyards upon the death of relatives or family members, and, because of their authority over land, even banish-
ment from the village in cases of suspicion of witchcraft. town chiefs claimed in some cases be able to secure the 
assistance of public authorities in having a person evicted from his or her home. families ‘harbouring thugs’ may 
be ‘shunned’. 36
accountabiLity measures in reLation to adJudication by chiefs and tas
accountability measures in relation to the tas are primarily within the ijs themselves. chiefs adjudicate in a col-
legial framework with the participation of indunas. Depending on the relationship between the chief and the 
indunas, this may be a strong or a weak measure of accountability. the hierarchical nature of the chieftaincy system 
is likewise an accountability measure, both through the possibility of appeal or referral to a senior chief and by 
34 ibid, p. 42.
35 ibid.
36 ibid.
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means of expectations of proper conduct. as regards appeal, it appeared that only a small number of cases reach-
ing the Vhs and gVhs go on to the ta, ranging between 2 and 6 per month in the areas visited. it also appears that 
wayward chiefs may be ’reined in‘ by their families.37
tas are to some degree accountable to governmental organs, from the district commissioner’s office up to the 
oPc, as they receive their allowances from these executive organs. there is no inspection or monitoring mecha-
nism of the adjudicative functions of tas. there is no set of procedural rules that tas are supposed to apply. refer-
ence is made to the provisions of the land Policy dealing with the need for an improved accountability framework.
schärf and his colleagues in their 2002 study38 found that significant efforts were made to keep records at the 
higher levels of the system (paramount chiefs). at lower levels, some village heads said that an effort was made 
to keep notes, but the quality of these is dubitable. as mentioned later in the report, capacity-building in record-
keeping is an element of the ccjP/DfiD primary justice project.
it can be concluded that, although there are some measures of accountability present in relation to some issues 
of conduct and discipline, few are available in terms of the protection of legal rights of individual litigants, and, as 
schärf and colleagues observe, “it would be a brave villager to report his/her chief to the chief’s superiors.”39 
the available studies say that it is customary to try to resolve a dispute at the level of the family elders and village 
headman before going to the courts or formal justice organs. if a solution cannot be found at this level, the Vh 
or other chief ’authorizes‘ a person to resolve the dispute at a higher level of the traditional system or at a formal 
court. While there is no basis in law for the need for an ’authorization‘ of this kind, it may carry weight in practice. 
there is no official appeal mechanism from the tas to the magistrate courts and a case has to restart if referred from 
one system to the other. in land disputes, a case that has been heard in the ta system can be appealed to high 
court. there are, however, only four high courts in malawi and, in most cases, referral to high court is not in reality 
an option for the vast majority of people. 
access issues in reLation to adJudication by tas
schärf and his colleagues also commented on issues of accessibility: 
“It is thus important to recognise that the system is undoubtedly more accessible in terms of 
distance, cost, language, values and outcomes. It also appears better able to respond to the needs 
of the poor as it is simpler, less time consuming, more accessible and better understood than the 
formal system.” 
the report goes on to say that cases are usually resolved on the day of the hearing.
ccjP reported figures indicating that 44 percent of cases before tas are brought by women.40 although the project 
has worked to improve reporting and documentation, detailed figures are not available in these reports on the 
kinds of cases involved. however, it may be assumed with some confidence that family, property (personal and 
real) are prominently represented as well as a variety of civil and minor criminal matters.41 these figures do, how-
ever, indicate that, in respect of the traditional leaders, the primary problem for women may not be one of access 
to these institutions as such, but rather the structural, procedural and substantive fairness encountered. these may 
hinder access to justice more broadly.42
37 Kanyongolo, cammack and o’neil, 2009.
38 schärf et al., 2002.
39 ibid.
40 ccjP, 2008, 7.2.2.
41 ibid. the more serious cases referred to the formal institutions reportedly include murder, grievous bodily harm, rape, incest, 
burglary and defilement. 
42 see the main report for a working definition and discussion of access to justice.
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fees and costs
chiefs reportedly levy fines and court fees on parties to a case.43 more research would be necessary to gain detailed 
knowledge on payments. 
the chiefs act is seen as permitting traditional leaders to charge a fee or in–kind contribution for hearing a case, 
and they generally do. in the quantitative study, approximately two thirds of the 120 traditional providers inter-
viewed said that some kind of payment was charged, though for some it depended on the kind of case in ques-
tion. approximately equal numbers said that it was or was not a fixed amount. in the qualitative interviews, some 
chiefs mentioned a value of 100 to 500 malawi kwacha.44 other respondents confirmed this and also mentioned 
fines levied by chiefs for civil misconduct (such as divorcing a wife) that would be payable to the chief rather than 
the victim of the misconduct.45
interestingly, the study reveals that cost is seen by users as a barrier to access to justice in respect of all providers: 
magistrate courts, police and the traditional leaders, as the chart and table below illustrate. responses indicate that 
cost holds people back from using all of the main justice providers,46 though it would not seem to be a significant 
barrier in relation to family structures. 
WHICH JUSTICE PROVIDER WOULD YOU NOT BE ABLE TO APPROACH BECAUSE OF THE PRICE/COST?
1%
2%
3%
2%
14%
3%
7%
4%
27%
24%
13%
Magistrate Court/F.I. Court
Police
Prosecutor
Local Adminstrative Person
Local/Village Court
Traditional Leaders/Chiefs
Clan/Family Elders
Church/Priest
Paralegals
Village/Community Mediators (VM)
NGOs/CBOs
37. Annex 6 – Page 17
most malawian ngo representatives and justice sector representatives considered it legitimate for traditional pro-
viders to charge a fee for these services. it may nevertheless act as a barrier to access to justice for some of the 
most vulnerable people in villages, particularly for women. ccjP informed the team in 2010 that they now counsel 
43 ibid. see also Kanyongolo, et al., 2009. 
44 about us$ 0.75 to us$ 3.50 at the time the interviews were conducted in february 2009.
45 from meeting with a party to a case in salima, february 2009. officials at the district commission office in another district 
confirmed the same information.
46 evidently, this issue could be explored in much greater detail in a more profound study. it was not possible to differentiate in this 
question between the different kinds of costs involved, such as fees for a summons and/or hearing, transport costs, etc. 
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chiefs against charging fees. a further aspect of the practice of paying fees to traditional authorities or headmen 
is the danger that a non-standardized system of donations or fees may present a risk that a party may gain an 
advantage by paying or giving more than the opposing party. this is discussed in the above section on impartiality 
and independence.
concLusions on the accessibiLity of the ta system
it seems clear that, for most malawians, the traditional system and modernized versions of it (the town chiefs) 
remain the most accessible of institutions outside family structures. however, access to institutions or mechanisms 
cannot itself be equated with access to justice. although many respondents point to attributes of traditional lead-
ers in terms of justice provision including appropriateness of procedures and proximity, many also raise issues that 
point to a lack of human rights compliance on several counts.
schärf and the other authors of the 2002 report are likewise candid about the lack of choice available to these and 
other vulnerable and marginalized groups. substantive human rights issues that arise out of the handling of cases 
are discussed later in this study. 
LocaL (customary) courts
until 1994, there was a system of state-controlled customary law courts (known as traditional courts) in operation 
in malawi, pursuant to legislation.47 these courts were under the authority and control of the executive rather than 
the judiciary. some chiefs sat in these courts while simultaneously adjudicating disputes in their own informal 
chief’s courts. under the Banda regime, the state traditional courts had competence even in capital cases. Because 
of its misuse against political opponents by the president under the one-party state, this system became highly 
discredited and was effectively discarded when the attorney general suspended their operation in 1994. as a result 
of this administrative action, most of the functions and officers of these courts were integrated into the lower tiers 
of the judiciary. nevertheless, the legislation on these courts remains on the statute book and the 1994 consti-
tution, in article 110 (3), provides that “the jurisdiction of such courts shall be limited exclusively to civil cases at 
customary law and such minor common law and statutory offences as prescribed by an act of Parliament.”
a 2007 report by malawi’s law commission recommended re-establishing a system of local courts that apply 
customary law. 
bacKground
What eventually became the traditional courts had their origin in the so-called ‘native courts’ that were established 
under the colonial government by the native courts ordinance of 1933. the scheme set up by this legislation was 
similar to those established in some other British colonies in africa. custom – or what became customary law – 
was administered through provincial commissioners and chiefs, the latter acting as advisers and assessors to the 
commissioners.48 By this measure, customary law was brought under the control of the colonial state. the govern-
ment’s control was extended by virtue of a new ordinance in 1947 that brought the establishment or constitution 
of such courts under state control. 
the local courts ordinance of 1962 superseded these pieces of legislation, which were again amended and 
renamed as the local courts act in 1964, upon independence. in 1969, the traditional courts act renamed these 
courts, henceforth calling them ‘traditional courts’. at that time, the jurisdiction of the traditional courts (at a 
regional level) was extended to include capital offences (law commission, 1997). in 1970, the appeal procedures 
47 the traditional courts act
48 report of the law commission on the review of the traditional courts act, malawi law commission, law commission report no. 
17, september 2007. isBn: 978-99908-85-01-09.
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for the traditional courts were changed, removing the jurisdiction of the high court to function as an instance 
of appeal in relation to these courts, so that the highest court of appeal was now the national traditional appeal 
court. this meant the establishment of a parallel court system, one referring to the judicial branch of government, 
the other referring to the executive.49 chairpersons of these courts were appointed by the minister for justice, and 
could likewise be removed by the minister for a variety of reasons. 
until 1993-1994, the traditional courts were recognized as first instance courts. their adjudicative functions were 
transferred to the magistrate courts after the introduction of democracy and the process of making and introduc-
ing the new constitution began. the traditional courts had been established by ministerial warrant. as such, they 
were legally suspended by means of an order of the attorney general. thus, while the legislation establishing these 
courts remained in place after 1994, in practice, the law fell into abeyance.50 the presiding officers of these courts 
were integrated into the lower tiers of the magistrate courts as magistrates. the influx of these new magistrates 
decreased the general level of qualifications within the overall cadre of lay magistrates. magistrate courts are thus 
now applying customary law in relation to some areas of family law and other areas of civil jurisdiction.
While it may be that few malawians bemoaned the passing of the regional traditional courts, which had been 
used as an instrument of political repression by former president-for-life Banda, the disappearance of the tradi-
tional courts at the local level meant a loss in access to justice for many malawians. these courts operated in the 
vernacular and applied customary law that was familiar to ordinary people. since 2000, magistrate courts have had 
jurisdiction over disputes arising out of customary marriages. When, after 2000, they started to handle such mat-
ters, there has, according to the report of the law commission (2007), been dissatisfaction with the process due 
to a lack of expertise in customary law among magistrate courts. the magistrates are not given any information 
about customary law except in relation to family law,51 and it is up to the individual magistrate to what degree and 
in what way he combines notions of customary law and common law.52 
a particular problem arose initially out of the haste with which traditional courts were effectively abolished, when 
no legislative provision was made to modify the jurisdiction of the magistrates so as to provide a forum for areas in 
which the traditional courts had previously enjoyed exclusive jurisdiction. this was the case with cases concerning 
guardianship or custody of children, dissolution of marriages and declarations concerning paternity.53 the result 
was that people had nowhere to go with cases of these kinds. Parliament subsequently amended section 39 of 
the courts act to confer jurisdiction on magistrate courts over these matters. 
traditional courts formally retained some areas of jurisdiction on land and customary marriage (through the land 
act and the law on inheritance), although they had in practice ceased to exist. Disputes arising out of any such 
settlements cannot be brought before the magistrate courts, but can be appealed to the high court. 
perspectives for LocaL courts
reinstating local courts is a topic that is frequently discussed in justice circles in malawi, and a great deal of seri-
ous work has been done on the subject. for this reason, as well as for comparative purposes, it is interesting to 
examine and discuss the proposals in some detail although the possibility remains hypothetical. the malawi law 
commission has, over the past decade, worked on various research projects and legislative proposals on the struc-
ture of the courts and the role of customary law and traditional justice providers. a bill for the establishment of 
local courts was drafted in 2007 and was adopted by Parliament in early 2011. the act establishes local courts as 
49 ibid.
50 see afrimaP, ‘malawi, justice sector and the rule of law’, 2006, p. 45.
51 Paper delivered by justice of the high court, Kenan tilombe manda, conference in cape town on traditional justice, march 2010.
52 justice manda, 2010.
53 see schärf et al., 2002.
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a parallel structure to magistrate courts with an appeal function at district level (to a district appeals local court) 
and up to the high court and supreme court. the law commission reasons that, even if there were magistrate 
courts available to people in the remote, rural areas of malawi, their access to justice would still be impeded by 
the lack of “access to familiar courts and to familiar court procedures” (law commission, 2007). the introduction of 
local courts would be coupled with a phasing out of third and fourth-grade magistrate courts, currently staffed by 
non-jurist magistrates. the law commission observes that the judiciary has been blamed for general inefficiency 
because magistrates lack knowledge of customary law and traditional authorities lack knowledge of criminal law. 
Previous studies have documented a serious problem of a lack of familiarity with legislation among adjudicators 
and other court personnel at the magistrate courts,54 though the situation may have improved somewhat since 
the study was conducted in 2002. While unfamiliarity of magistrates with customary law is a problem, there is an 
equal risk that justices of the proposed local courts will be unfamiliar with provisions of statutory law and the guar-
antees of the constitution and thus perhaps unable to ensure conformity with the latter. 
the malawian proposals are interesting because they represent an attempt at reconciling a perceived need for 
proximate courts based on customary norms and procedures with concerns about gender equality, the protection 
of children and constitutional human rights guarantees. here, we confine ourselves to outlining a few elements 
of the Draft Bill. 
composition
the law commission recommends that the presiding officers (chairpersons) in local courts be “lay persons” rather 
than chiefs, considering that having chiefs sitting as presiding officers would offend against the principle of the 
independence of the judiciary. the commission recommends imposing an educational qualification of the level of 
secondary education,55 a level of proficiency in english, adequate knowledge of the customary law and language 
of the area. a minimum age of 35 years would be required, as well as fitness and character requirements. local 
courts would have assessors sitting with the chairperson in civil matters, appointed by the registrar to advise on 
customary law. 
Jurisdiction
the law commission states that the jurisdiction of proposed courts “is confined to the administration of custom-
ary law in civil matters and exercising limited jurisdiction in criminal matters. […] [t]he commission recognizes 
that there are certain civil matters at customary law which are handled to the detriment of women and children 
due to established customs and other matters which result in persecution of suspects.“
thus, a number of matters often dealt with by customary law would, according to the law commission, be 
excluded from the subject matter jurisdiction of the local courts:
“The Commission thus proposes to exclude such matters from the jurisdiction of Local Courts. Such 
matters include: inheritance issues, matters involving custody of children, cases of witchcraft, land 
disputes and matters involving distribution of matrimonial property.”
the proposal to vest jurisdiction for these matters in magistrate courts rather than in local courts should be seen in 
the light of the legislative bills that are pending on issues of marriage and property succession, as discussed in the 
section of this study dealing with human rights issues. the far-reaching changes that are mandated by the consti-
tution and proposed in the legislative bills would abolish polygamy and customary rules on inheritance, making 
54 ‘access to justice for the Poor of malawi? an appraisal of access to justice Provided to the Poor of malawi by the lower 
subordinate courts and the customary justice forums’, Wilfried schärf, chikosa Banda, ricky röntsch, Desmond Kaunda, and 
rosemary shapiro, DfiD, malawi, 2002, accessed at http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/ssaj99.pdf
55 the malawi certificate of education
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these matters the subject of statutory rather than customary law. thus, a move toward dealing with these issues 
through statute as opposed to custom would be accompanied by a move toward statute-based courts. 
in some sections of the Draft Bill, for example section 136 on abduction of girls under sixteen, the law commis-
sion does not conclude on the jurisdiction of the local court, but raises the possibility that local courts should be 
allowed to try such offences both in order to ensure a fast process and in order to create awareness within the 
community that such practice is criminal and not condoned by law. this perspective may, of course, be challenged 
in terms of whether it is in line with the above-quoted statement about areas that should be excluded from the 
jurisdiction of the local courts. 
remedies and sanctions
in civil cases, local courts would award compensation and costs of the legal action, the restitution of property, 
specific performance of any contract entered into under customary law, or any other order required by the case. in 
criminal cases, local courts would be able to impose community service, fines not exceeding 5,000 mw. Kwacha, 
the payment of compensation, obtaining sureties of good behaviour, forfeiture (if authorized by legislation), or for 
aggravated offences or repeat offenders, imprisonment for periods up to 12 months (in a prison authorized under 
the Prisons act). the local court would be able to order a person to enter into a bond to keep the peace and be of 
good behaviour. it would also be empowered to dismiss a case with a caution, without proceeding to judgment. 
for common assault or an offence of ’a private nature‘, a court would be entitled to stay proceedings and encour-
age reconciliation.
proceduraL ruLes and proceduraL rights
Proceedings in local courts could, in the commission’s proposals, be conducted in the vernacular language (with 
the approval of the chief justice), but records would be required to be kept in english in order to facilitate appeals. 
the commission proposes two sets of procedural rules for civil and criminal cases, respectively, with the specific 
purpose of conforming to constitutional guarantees. some legal guides on terminology and procedure already 
exist in some national languages. 
the draft legislation and report also deal with the question of legal representation of parties, referring to paralegals 
in this regard. it is proposed that legal representation (by legal professionals) would only be permitted in criminal 
cases.56 the commission also considered representation by other persons. concerned about the abuses that could 
arise from unregulated paralegals offering legal services of dubious quality for remuneration, it was considered 
that, if paralegals appear in these courts, it should be as a ‘next friend’ and the service of the paralegal should be 
free of charge. it did not address the issue of whether this rule should be amended if legislation were to be adopted 
providing for a regulatory scheme for paralegals. in addition, it was recommended that, although the customary 
practice of being represented by certain family members should be retained, adult women should have discre-
tion as to whether to be represented. this was in order to ’uphold the principle of gender equality before the law‘. 
normative basis
in addition to customary law, the new local courts would be able to apply other legislation adopted giving them 
jurisdiction, and rules, regulations, by-laws, etc. as adopted by local government in the area. as regards criminal 
law, no criminal penalties would be able to be ordered except on the basis of state legislation. 
56 malawi law commission, september 2007, p. 31.
319
a
n
n
eX
 s
iX
a stuDy of informal justice systems: access to justice anD human rights
revieW and supervision
the commission recognized the need for an effective supervisory mechanism because of the effective unavailabil-
ity of appeal mechanisms to poor litigants. functions in this regard – both appellate and supervisory – would fall 
to a district appeals local court and would apply both in civil and criminal matters. the supervisory powers would 
include the power to issue instructions on the further conduct of a case.
outreach and adr by formaL Justice institutions
community poLicing and victim support units
the Victim support unit (Vsu) is a programme of the malawi Police service supported by unicef, with funds from 
DfiD.  Part of its function is to strengthen the ability of the informal justice providers to provide justice relevant to 
the needs of woman and children. the Vsus are in all police stations and are attached to the system of community 
policing that operates in malawi and are guided by standard terms of reference and operational guidelines. they 
include police child protection officers and a range of personnel trained in responding to women and children. 
community Victim support units are established at the ta level and are headed by the traditional authority. they 
provide emergency accommodation and a safe house for woman and children fleeing violence and access to com-
munity leaders for immediate protection. they also include community leaders and representatives of the police, 
schools and health services, and a child protection officer and other members of the community concerned with 
ensuring that the rights of women and children are protected, particularly in relation to justice issues. they strive 
to have a gender balance. among their aims are the promotion of restorative justice through mediation and diver-
sion and the prevention of violence, abuse and exploitation by engaging community leaders in understanding the 
specific needs of women and children in terms of informal justice and through outreach and prevention activities. 
insufficient data was collected to make conclusions about this programme. however, some observations can be 
made based on communication with unicef, ngo representatives and villagers as well as visits to one Victim sup-
port unit and some police stations in the central region. 
among the most significant categories of cases being brought to the Kanengo Vsu, cases generally related to 
family disputes are featured prominently. thus, ’failing to maintain the family‘ accounted for 14 percent of cases, 
and insufficient support a further 7 percent, while wife desertion accounted for 13 percent and a more general 
category of ‘family disputes’ comprised 10 percent. common assault accounted for 9 percent of cases and 5 per-
cent were wife battering.57
the community policing structure consists of community policing forums at the ta (geographical entity) level, 
where the ta (chief ) is a patron of the scheme. at lower levels of the system, there are crime prevention panels (at 
the gVh level) and crime prevention committees (at the Vh level) where problems of safety and security affecting 
the community are discussed. uniformed community policing volunteers assist the police and receive some train-
ing. the level of functionality of the committees varies from district to district. community Victim support units 
and child protection committees are linked to the community policing structures. 
these structures are the means by which the police interact with the communities in their areas of operation, and 
headmen and chiefs play an important role in them. the visit to the Kanengo (model) police station revealed that 
the DfiD-sponsored Primary justice Programme and the training of village headmen by ccjP (in which the police 
have participated) has resulted in cooperation of various kinds. ccjP (in common with other malawian ngos) uses 
community-based educators (cBes) in a number of its programmes, including the primary justice programming 
that targets chiefs and headmen. the educators are chosen from a variety of local structures, including community 
police and local government. 
57 statistics obtained during the field visit to Kanengo Vsu. copy with Dihr. the figures received do not make it clear whether some 
cases classified as ’common assault‘ are cases of gender-based violence.
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referraLs
a number of minor dispute cases are being referred back to the community level by the Kanengo police station. in 
interviews, these were said to include cases of ’misunderstandings in the family‘ and non-payment of debt cases, 
as well as land disputes. however, statistics on referrals obtained during the mission revealed that a large number 
of cases relating to chieftaincy disputes and witchcraft were being referred back to the headmen, as well as land 
disputes. Disputes concerning marital infidelity were often referred to family elders. 
findings
most of those who knew of and had benefited from the Vsu programme praised it for filling an important function 
of giving the victims an accessible place to go for support and for being a way of giving village members an entry 
point to the formal police institutions in more serious criminal cases. the structural linking between state institu-
tions and informal community-based structures, which is recommended in the overall study, gives the possibility 
of referrals both ways and the potential of communicating government justice policy – including on gender and 
family issues – to adjudicators, beneficiaries and potential perpetrators. the integration of this programme into the 
existing justice sector institutions may render it more sustainable. 
the staff of the community police units were not trained to the same extent as ordinary police. a visit to one Vsu 
and a community police officer in charge revealed dedicated staff and good facilities that met the needs of victims 
for immediate protection from violent husbands (including a place to stay for the night within the facility). never-
theless, the visit suggested a need for more human rights training for Vsu staff.58 
it appears that the police are not able to meet the tas and discuss things with them as often as initially intended 
(once a month) because of a lack of transport facilities. the same problem impairs interaction between the police 
and the community policing structures. While it appeared59 that the trained police officers met were generally 
capable of assisting and advising the community police officers on issues of legislation and human rights, the 
support functions are impaired by lack of transportation at police stations. another issue concerns impartiality and 
accessibility. the community policing structures fundraise locally in order to sustain their activities. this could risk 
affecting policing priorities in the communities and districts. if the referral of witchcraft cases back to the headmen 
indicates a general practice and view among the police that such cases should be handled locally and by tradi-
tional institutions, this could be problematic for the legal protection of women and children in particular.
adr and the courts
the court (mandatory mediation) rules were adopted by the judiciary (high court) and came into operation in 
august 2004.60 the rules require (with some exceptions) that in all civil actions pending before the high court and 
subordinate courts, the parties attempt mediation. the parties should choose a mediator from a list maintained by 
the court registrar or one whom they have chosen of their own accord. 
one opportunity is to make use of the framework that has been set down by the courts for mediation. commu-
nity-based mediators or traditional chiefs could work together with this system to a greater degree, though this 
would demand some form of quality control and certification system.
58 Pictures on the wall depicted complainants and perpetrators in different cases, one with a child posing next to her rapist and 
surrounded by the family. the perpetrator was imprisoned according to the officer, but the rights and needs of the child were 
obviously not being met in the process. 
59 albeit impressionistically.
60 ‘courts, (mandatory mediation) rules 2004’ leaflet, published by the high court of malawi.
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user preferences 
WHEN YOU HAVE A PROBLEM OR CASE, WHICH JUSTICE PROVIDER DO YOU 
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the data collected confirmed previous conclusions that a major proportion of the population primarily use ijs. in 
the qualitative data collected, approximately one third of the respondents said they preferred to take a case to the 
traditional leaders first (see below), while another third would first go to church leaders. While the nature of the ser-
vices provided by church leaders tends to differ from ijs, and a religious official or paralegal might provide advice 
rather than dispute resolution as such, it can be said that the main sources of help for people facing disputes are 
the family counsellors, religious leaders, ngos/cBos, and traditional authorities (tas). in regions where the Village 
mediation Programme has been carried out, the village mediators are another important informal justice provider. 
the quantitative data indicates that people in the rural villages visited prefer to take cases to traditional leaders 
or sometimes to church leaders. there were too few respondents living in proximity to the magistrate courts61 to 
enable findings on whether people would have this preference if distance to the court were short. Women raised 
issues of distance to the police or courts as important in choosing not to approach these institutions. During inter-
views, some women pointed to the danger of assault or rape when they travel far, especially by night. on the other 
hand, some respondents showed a willingness to travel considerable distances to have their cases resolved by the 
instance of their preference (including the village mediators). this was explained by the respondents in terms of 
the perceived partiality of the traditional leader closest to them. 
61 80 percent of ijs users interviewed during the quantitative part of this study live more than 16 kilometres away from the closest 
formal court. 
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WHICH JUSTICE PROVIDER IS IN YOUR OPINION THE BEST?
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user choices in reLation to particuLar LegaL domains62
WHICH JUSTICE PROVIDER DO YOU PREFER 
FOR CIVIL CASES?
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62 the different types of cases have been regrouped according to the categories shown here. 
323
a
n
n
eX
 s
iX
a stuDy of informal justice systems: access to justice anD human rights
WHICH JUSTICE PROVIDER DO YOU PREFER 
FOR CRIMINAL CASES?
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as is evident from these graphs, the respondents use the broad spectrum of justice providers according to the type 
of case in question, and people will in many cases approach the police if it concerns a criminal case. earlier studies63
tend to confirm this, especially if more serious violence is involved. When the data shows that respondents gener-
ally prefer to go to traditional leaders and church leaders as their first choice, it probably signals that most cases are 
civil in nature. Both the preferences of users and the attitudes of providers vary from case to case. a 2010 follow-up 
interview with those responsible for the village mediation programme revealed data showing that traditional lead-
ers in the rural areas where the programme operated tended to resolve land disputes themselves, but preferred to 
refer family disputes to the village mediators. 
user choices also related to characteristics of processes and providers. the publicity or confidentiality surrounding 
the process was important to several women interviewed. some in areas where there is a Village mediation Pro-
gramme said that they chose the village mediator because the case is handled with confidentiality and in privacy, 
rather than being a public matter for the whole community. this is discussed below in relation to domestic vio-
lence cases. some point to the importance of the justice provider treating everybody the same. this is supported 
by the quantitative data presented below. Women raising the importance of being treated the same, since it is 
generally recognized64 that, especially in particular types of cases such as inheritance and land conflicts, women 
are not treated equally and in accordance with human rights. 
63 such as those by schärf et al., 2002 and cammack et al., 2009.
64 see the law commission report of 2007.
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WHAT CHARACTERIZES A GOOD JUSTICE PROVIDER?
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Key human rights issues
criminaL Justice issues
the reports seen and persons interviewed do not indicate that chiefs and tas are handling cases involving serious 
crime on a large scale. there appears to be a fairly widespread understanding on the part of chiefs that criminal 
matters are to be handed over to the police. nevertheless, this does occur in a number of areas and in relation to a 
number of issues,65 particularly those involving minor assaults, theft and domestic violence. 
the strong link between justice and security at the local level is important. the previous studies cited discuss links 
between chiefs and police. community police officers are trained in legislation, but the training only reaches the 
level of community police forums and not further to the community police panels and committees. schärf et al. 
(2002) report the worries expressed by nice that chiefs in some cases overtly or covertly sanctioned ‘mob justice’ 
due to limited understanding of the right to bail and other human rights and democratic principles. reference is 
made earlier in this study to the means at the chiefs’ disposal to enforce norms of conduct. 
Women’s rights and Justice issues
the government of malawi’s sixth report to the un ceDaW committee mentions a programme of law reform sup-
ported by the government that has produced several pieces of draft legislation that still await political debate and 
legislation. the legislation would strongly impact customary law as currently practiced in the area of marriage and 
the family. 
65 schärf et al., 2002, at 39 and 41, cammack et al., 2009, at 48, as well as citing other authors (ndelemani, 2008).
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issues reLated to marriage
the mhrc reported that, “according to interviewees, culturally, women do not marry but get married.”66
malawian law currently recognizes three kinds of marriage: civil marriages, customary marriages and marriage by 
cohabitation or reputation. one important area of concern is the consolidation of various laws on marriage into a 
Bill on marriage, Divorce and family relations. the law commission recommended the repeal of all the statutes67
and instead the enactment of the proposed new bill. after some years of political deadlock, there are signs that 
progress may be forthcoming.68 steps like this, if adopted by legislation, represent a rather radical departure from 
malawian custom. the legislation is pending introduction in Parliament and political debate. 
marriage by repute or cohabitation
customary law in malawi traditionally did not permit a marriage to be entered into in the absence of consent 
by marriage guardians (ankhoswe) in matrilineal cultures. in patrilineal cultures, the payment of lobola would be 
required by custom. article 22.5 of the constitution, however, explicitly recognizes marriage by repute or cohabita-
tion. the courts have ruled that this provision can require that a marriage be recognized despite non-compliance 
with tradition.69 this would effectively allow people to dispense with traditional requirements. the 2002 report by 
schärf and his colleagues observed strong opposition among some communities to the recognition of marriages 
based on cohabitation. 
in consultations by the law commission on the constitution, representatives of christian and islamic religious 
communities recommended removing the constitutional recognition of marriages based on cohabitation and 
repute, but the law commission decided against doing so. the law commission notes that:
“This conclusion came under heavy criticism at the Second National Constitution Conference as it 
was viewed as tantamount to sanctioning adulterous unions. The Commission however maintained 
its position principally on the understanding that marriages by repute or permanent cohabitation 
are a necessary evil to protect the weaker party in such relationships who, in most cases, happens to 
be a woman. The Commission also considered that from a religious perspective such relationships 
are not condemned outright but rather that couples are invited to formalize the unions. Thus, the 
law should be seen to do the same in a different way.” 
the law commission’s proposed Bill on marriage, Divorce and family relations elaborates on the constitutional 
provision, giving legislative recognition to such marriages.
poLygamy/poLygyny
the mhrc report found polygyny to be a familiar practice in 98 percent of the areas visited for their 2006 study.70
figures were not available to the team on the numbers of polygamous unions in the country. the Bill on marriage, 
Divorce and family relations would contain a prohibition of polygamy, on account of its discriminatory effect and the 
negative impact it has on women. the prohibition would be in part motivated by what the commission describes as 
“sometimes wilful neglect of women and children during marriage and not just after divorce or during separation”. 
66 mhrc report on cultural practices, 2006, p. 21.
67 the existing legislation in question includes the marriage act, the african marriage (christian rites) registration act, the asiatics 
(marriage, Divorce and succession) act, the Divorce act, the married Women maintenance act, and the maintenance orders 
(enforcement) act as well as customary laws relating to marriage and divorce.
68 Nyasa Times of 27 april 2010 quotes Patricia Kaliati, the minister of gender, Women and children, as saying that the bill will be laid 
before Parliament in september 2010.
69 see mwambene, 2005, citing civil cause no. 70 of 2004.
70 Page 19.
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dissoLution of marriage
some authors suggest that it is easier for women to initiate divorce in a matrilineal (and uxorilocal) marriage cul-
ture, where the husband moves to live with his wife’s family. in this case, there is no lobola that must be returned, 
and it may be easier for a woman to secure the understanding of marriage counsellors (ankhoswe) on her side.71 
’no-fault‘ divorce may be allowed simply on the basis of incompatibility and can be initiated by the wife on various 
grounds, including failure by the husband to provide for her. nevertheless, there is not full equality of treatment 
in this regard.72 according to mwambene, the practice is that customary divorce can currently be granted by local 
chiefs or marriage guardians (ankhoswe). in patrilineal cultures, return of lobola is required, something that is usu-
ally out of the control of the wife.
in matrilineal cultures, the custom was said to be that there is no obligation on the part of a divorcing husband to 
maintain the wife he is divorcing, though the courts may now tend to decide otherwise, imposing such an obliga-
tion based on article 24 of the constitution.73 the government reported to ceDaW that specific provisions have 
been recommended in the new bill relating to the welfare of women and children both in terms of maintenance 
and in terms of giving the knowledgeable child an opportunity to state his views on issues relating to custody.
the question of matrilineal/matrilocal culture as opposed to patrilineal/patrilocal culture also has consequences 
for the custody of children upon dissolution of marriage. children of matrilineal marriages usually belong to the 
family or clan of the wife. according to mwambene, the former traditional courts generally upheld this custom. 
she also writes how magistrate courts may be moving away from this position toward one based on the welfare 
of the child. nevertheless, it should be remembered that only a tiny fraction of marriage dissolution and custody 
cases would actually come before a magistrate court. it should also be noted that such maters will not be within 
the competence of the local courts if the bill on local courts as currently drafted passes into law.
forced marriage
according to the mhrc study on cultural practices, various forms of forced marriage exist in malawi. they include 
wife inheritance, which seemed to be on the decline, and ’wife replacement‘, where a wife who dies is replaced by 
a younger sister of the wife. mhrc found familiarity with this among 40 percent of respondents. it seemed to be 
especially common in the northern region, where patrilineal marriage systems are the norm. in the northern part 
of chitipa, ‘bonus wife’, or kupawila, is the practice whereby the girl’s parents get into debt and, as payment for the 
debt, they offer the daughter in marriage to the creditor.
the report does not discuss the extent to which women in general exercise freedom in the choice of a spouse. 
mwambene (2005) is of the view that the matrilineal system affords greater freedom of choice to women than 
the patrilineal. 
issues especiaLLy affecting chiLdren74
the law commission’s report on the constitution75 recommends changing the constitutional definition of a child 
to include persons up to 18 years of age. a bill is pending before Parliament to give constitutional recognition to 
the principle of the best interests of the child.76
71 see mwambene, 2005, citing other sources. 
72 ibid. 
73 ibid, citing civil cause no. 28 of 2004, Zomba district magistrate court.
74 several of these issues are of particular relevance to girl children as well as to women.
75 op cit.
76 ibid.
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age of marriage, chiLd marriages and defiLement
the customs of the main ethnic groups in malawi do not set down an age for marriage. instead, puberty, estimates 
of maturity and completion of an initiation ceremony are the main basis.77 the mhrc report on cultural practices 
found child marriage to be common in all of the areas covered by the study, often of girls down to the age of 
puberty – about 12 years of age. the consequences of such child marriages, including fistula, abandonment of 
education and entering into a position of subservience as the junior wife in a polygamous household, are some 
of the negative consequences mentioned by the human rights commission. child marriages were found to be 
often of a forced character. 
the issue of the age of marriage has been taken up in un treaty body reporting processes.78 section 22.8 of the 
constitution says that the state will “discourage” marriages where one party is below the age of 15. it requires 
parental consent to be obtained in marriages in which one party is or both parties are below the age of 18. the 
lack of clarity as to whether marriages of persons below 15 are legally permissible79 has led the law commission to 
recommend “that the age of marriage with parental or guardian’s consent should be sixteen years for both sexes 
and that persons who are eighteen years old may marry without consent.”
the crime of defilement (statutory rape) as currently defined means having sexual relations with a child under 
the age of 13. the law commission’s report on the review of the Penal code recommends raising the age limit 
for the offence of defilement to sixteen. While data collection in malawi did not reveal a great deal of material on 
which to base specific findings on this issue, the age limit seems a reasonable one. nevertheless, the law needs to 
distinguish consenting relationships from abusive ones, also for 16 to 19-year-olds. legislation in this regard needs 
to tread a careful balance between protecting children against predatory conduct and harmful social practices on 
the one hand and draconian punishment of consenting teenage sexual relationships on the other. research and 
analysis in other countries, including in the context of the present study, reveal that families are often reluctant to 
bring cases arising out of relationships between consenting teenagers to the criminal justice system, often prefer-
ring to settle such cases through marriage agreements or payment of compensation.80 such practices raise difficult 
issues of the relationship between social norms, children’s and parents’ rights and the law. it is very important to 
work for solutions where the views and maturity of the minors involved are taken into account, in accordance with 
the convention on the rights of the child.
harsh criminal penalties for this kind of case (as opposed to those where there is a significant age gap) are a far 
from ideal solution. thus, any change to penal legislation and prosecutorial and court practice should in our view 
permit a clear distinction between the two case types. the overall study contains a discussion of policy and pro-
grammatic questions linked to this issue.81 
property rights and inheritance
While matrilineality is relatively widespread in malawi, this does not generally mean that real power over land in 
traditional communities is exercised by women.82 nevertheless, some security for women is present in that, in 
matrilineal cultures in malawi, women may also be considered the owners of the matrimonial dwelling, which the 
husband is obliged to build for her.83 indeed, the custom in matrilineal communities is described in the saying that 
77 mwambene, 2005.
78 see the 2006 ceDaW concluding observations and those of the crc in 2008.
79 malawi’s sixth state report under the ceDaW, 2008, discusses the issue and acknowledges the lack of clarity, but does not provide 
an answer.
80 occasionally, the same tendency will be seen even in regard to more clearly abusive relationships.
81 the uganda case study also deals with the issue in some detail. 
82 see Wlsa malawi, 2009.
83 op cit., mwambene, 2005.
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a divorcing husband ’leaves with his blanket’.84 in practice, he may have been allowed to take the harvest85 and 
fixtures that he can show that he brought to the marital home, but the home itself and the land that the couple 
possessed belongs to the wife. if cases are brought to a magistrate court, the latter may order an equal distribu-
tion of property. the situation may be very different for more urbanized couples. article 24 of the constitution 
provides protection of women’s rights in malawi. there is a right to equal disposition of marital property that is 
’jointly held‘. Wlsa malawi points to a generally conservative interpretation86 of this provision by the courts that 
does not recognize women’s contribution as homemakers and caretakers or even women’s financial contribution 
as providers of daily necessities. Wlsa lobbied for change to the constitutional provision that would recognize 
their contributions.
in 2002, the ngo Pac/nice expressed concerns about the tendency of customary justice to discriminate against 
women and children, especially in inheritance and domestic disputes.87 Wlsa reports that property-grabbing 
is widespread.
the law commission reviewed the Wills and inheritance act and recommended the adoption of a proposed 
Deceased estates (Wills, inheritance and Protection) Bill. this bill would specifically abolish all customary laws 
involving succession. of particular relevance to women under this programme is the abolition of discriminatory 
inheritance practices between the girl and boy child.88 the latter would be matters excluded from the jurisdiction 
of the proposed new local courts, according to the Bill on inheritance practices, though the proposal is of course 
subject to political debate and the legislative process.
domestic vioLence and gender-based vioLence
the malawian government reported to the ceDaW committee that gender-based violence is a persistent problem 
for women and girls in malawi.89 the state report says that, in 2004, 28 percent of women had experienced physi-
cal violence by the age of 15 years, as had 13 percent of married women. intimate partners, such as husbands, are 
often key perpetrators and the most common forms include slapping and arm-twisting (16 percent) and forced 
intercourse or marital rape (13 percent). 
many cases of domestic violence never reach the police. in discussions between the malawi delegation and the 
ceDaW committee, it was acknowledged that perpetrators of domestic violence are rarely reported to the author-
ities since families perceive that the penalization of the breadwinner would impoverish the whole family.90 some 
villagers also say that one reason is that they know of no cases that have gone to the police where the perpetrator 
is prosecuted. among the domestic violence cases that are in fact taken to the police, almost none of the cases 
end with a conviction because the woman withdraws the charge or because there is lack of evidence and the 
police do not have the resources to investigate and seek evidence. thus, the preference of many women would 
ultimately seem to be for remedial, preventive and restorative solutions to domestic violence, except perhaps in 
the most serious cases (unless society or the justice system shows itself capable of addressing the survival issues 
that arise).
many women raised the issue of confidentiality and noted that privacy is important for them, especially in cases 
of rape or domestic violence. if the case were to be taken up before the ta, the case might be heard in an open 
84 ibid.
85 Wlsa malawi, 2009.
86 though with inconsistencies among the different high courts and some notable exceptions. see p. 17, discussing the case of 
Kayira v. Kayira, civil cause no. 44 of 2008.
87 schärf et al., 2002.
88 sixth periodic report to the ceDaW committee, 2008, paragraph 48.
89 sixth periodic report, 2008.
90 international service for human rights: http://www.ishr.ch/treaty-body-monitor/cedaw/658-ishr-report-on-cedaws-examination-
of-malawi-22-january-2010
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forum in the community and the woman would have to stand in front of the whole community. according to the 
women interviewed, this practice of communal dispute resolution results in many women not speaking up, and 
those who do speak up feel even more victimized by the process and often do not experience justice as having 
been done. according to some tas, this difficulty is tackled by allowing the women’s council of the ta to play a 
role in talking to the woman separately (or examining for evidence) and then relaying the knowledge back to the 
chief. it was not possible to examine the question of whether examinations of this kind could be unduly intrusive 
or whether consent to them is voluntary.
concerning rape cases, headmen interviewed said that they would generally refer these cases to the police, 
though they would first try to ascertain whether the case concerned allegations of rape that are raised because a 
man had ’failed to fulfil what the parties had agreed‘ before having sexual relations. if they found that the situation 
was of this kind, the headmen interviewed said that they could deal with the case. 
programming on domestic vioLence
support to the Vsus is one important initiative in this regard. Police, ngo representatives and village members 
interviewed for the study, told of their impression of a decrease in domestic violence cases in places where ngos 
or police (supported by ciDa) have been raising awareness on gender-based violence. however, specific docu-
mentation of this has not been available to the study team. 
the government of malawi reported to the ceDaW committee that it had inherited a process spearheaded by the 
civil society that led to the enactment of the Prevention of Domestic Violence act in april, 2006. Wlsa observed 
in an alternative report to ceDaW in 2009 that the Prevention of Domestic Violence act of 2006 is not being effec-
tively implemented because of a lack of resources.91 the government had reported that, although the law is effec-
tively in force, there are a number of areas that need further development before the law is made fully operational. 
the ministry of Women and child Development is aware of the existing gaps in the law and is making an effort to 
review the law.
other harmfuL practices
fgm is not widespread in malawi,92 though the mhrc reports on a variety of other harmful practices. With par-
ticular regard to the traditional ijs, some of these included practices associated with chieftaincy, such as shazi, 
whereby women and girls are chosen to provide sex to prominent guests at the installation ceremony of the chief. 
ccjP refers to similar practices in their reporting on the primary justice programme.93 also reported by the mhrc 
are rituals associated with death and funerals that are often discriminatory against women and degrading to them. 
some practices may particularly involve children. the ishr reports on the proceedings of the ceDaW committee 
in january of 2010, where it is mentioned that traditional healers prescribe sexual intercourse with young girls to 
heal those within the community who have contracted sexually transmitted diseases. While many of these prac-
tices are unlikely to be the outcome of ijs decisions, they illustrate the challenge inherent in the chief’s role as cus-
todian of culture, putting the chiefs in an ambiguous position in relation to efforts to eradicate harmful practices.
Witchcraft and banishment
Wlsa reports encountering an average of four women in each of the eleven prisons visited on charges related to 
witchcraft. Witchcraft itself is not an offence in malawi,94 but the justice system can penalize suspects on charges 
of ’breach of the peace‘ that have their origin in accusations of practicing witchcraft. Wlsa reports that the profile 
91 Wlsa malawi, 2009.
92 the mhrc report on cultural practices found that it was reported as known by only 5 percent of respondents. it seemed to be 
concentrated in one area and, even there, there seemed to be strong opposition to it. see page 40 of the study.
93 malawi Primary justice Programme, annual report 2008.
94 the Witchcraft act penalizes accusing a person of witchcraft. 
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of the suspects or ’offenders‘ conforms to the unfortunate pattern observed in other countries: they are likely to 
be elderly women whose relative wealth provokes the envy of neighbours or who are otherwise unpopular. While 
these are cases from the formal justice system, and thus outside the scope of the present study, it is probably fair 
to say that they represent two things: (1) the tip of an iceberg that extends down into informal justice as meted out 
by chiefs and (2) magistrates and police may themselves believe that witchcraft was being practiced or that they 
feel a need to conform to the expectations of the public. some women were even given sentences exceeding the 
maximum permitted for the offence of causing a breach of the peace.
children may be affected at the level of ijs. Belief in witchcraft is widespread, and extreme measures against 
children can receive the support of even well-educated ngo and state representatives. cases of children being 
expelled from villages by the chiefs are widely known in malawi, but the extent of the problem does not appear to 
have been documented. the study is not aware of any studies carried out on the extent of this sensitive problem. 
the children are expelled, most often, as a result of accusations of witchcraft and particularly of accusations of 
being bewitched to kill their own parents by ‘giving’ them hiV/aiDs. this, of course, represents a serious issue of 
human rights abuse for the children of malawi. 
programming reLated to Witchcraft
the proposed Bill on local courts would exclude witchcraft cases from the jurisdiction of the local courts. While 
this is no doubt intended as a safeguard, it may in some cases also have the effect of pushing cases downward to 
even less formal mechanisms rather than upward toward the courts.
as with other practices rooted in culture and belief, the criminal justice system may, in many cases, not necessar-
ily be the best instrument to combat harm done to women and children in this way. a later section discusses the 
recommendations regarding programming to deal with cultural practices that are made by the mhrc.
the scope of the study did not permit an examination of how informal justice mechanisms deal with petty offences 
of theft and misconduct by minors systematically. Practice in malawi and other countries indicates that it is prob-
able that a great many such matters are dealt with at the family level and thereafter at the community level, where 
village headmen would become involved. traditional leaders at the various levels, both in malawi and in other 
countries who responded to questions of this kind, often stated that it is only in the case of repeated offences of 
this kind that they would refer a matter to the police or encourage a community member to do so. most often, 
such offences would be resolved between families through payment of compensation. any actual punishment 
imposed is more likely to be imposed by members of the alleged perpetrator’s own family.
programming
Programming impacting ijs in malawi consists both of those initiatives institutionally located in the formal justice 
system that affect ijs and those that directly target ijs. the former include law reform programmes that would, by 
legislative intervention, attempt to change custom in a number of areas, including land ownership, inheritance, 
personal status and family law. outreach initiatives of the formal justice system, such as community policing and 
the involvement of the Vsus on this level (supported by unicef), can also impact ijs and present opportunities for 
greater engagement with them. as shown below, even those initiatives that directly target ijs tend to be delivered 
through formal state institutions or ngos.
LaW reform
one lesson learned in this regard related to the importance of proper planning when carrying out a judicial reform 
with far-reaching consequences for access to justice. the gaps that were left by the effective abolition of traditional 
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courts illustrate the necessity to take consequences like this into account when planning such moves (including 
by means of legislation) and also to provide education, training and legal materials to prepare courts for their new 
functions and areas of jurisdiction.
also in relation to law reform, much of the work of the law commission mentioned in this study was donor-funded 
through DfiD programmes in the area of justice in malawi. it is difficult to draw ultimate conclusions on this work. 
on one hand, the law commission has carried out excellent work, both in consulting stakeholders and groups 
in society and in producing legal (and sometimes also social and policy) analysis and a set of legislative bills that 
would go very far in relation to legal gender equality, inheritance, and judicial organization. the political deadlock 
of the past years in malawi has unfortunately meant that the far-reaching legislative recommendations remain on 
the shelf. for the purposes of this study, it has not been possible to gauge the political support for or opposition to 
many of the proposals. it is probable that they would give rise to lively political debate.
community aWareness-raising programmes
several organizations carry out awareness-raising programmes on issues related to primary justice and human 
rights. one of them is nice, an eu-funded, project-based organization that works in partnership with the malawi 
human rights commission, gtZ, the forum for Dialogue and Peace, Pasi, traditional authorities and justice sector 
institutions. While most analyses95 support the need for awareness-raising, a weakness is that programmes are too 
often carried out as one-off trainings. also, many programmes are carried out in the most accessible districts and 
not where it may be needed the most. on the positive side, the programmes are generally carried out by (or in 
collaboration with) cBos or police who are located within the communities and are able to follow-up informally. 
the support to the work of the Vsus in this regard has been discussed above.
training of chiefs
the 2002 study by schärf and his colleagues found that chiefs would welcome training on a number of subjects, 
including human rights, the constitution, gender issues, court management, dispute resolution skills and sentenc-
ing principles.96 nevertheless, this should not be taken to mean that traditional authorities at all levels would easily 
embrace all of the values inherent in human rights treaties and the constitution. the same study noted opposition 
to the recognition of marriage based on cohabitation. other studies note popular opposition to the release of 
suspected thieves. the issue of chiefs and headmen being associated with a number of cultural practices that can 
be harmful is discussed in other sections of this report.
the District commissioners office provides tas with knowledge about the constitution of malawi, basic legislation, 
and tas’ obligation to be impartial in case handling when they are appointed. it is up to the individual tas whether 
they transfer this knowledge to their group village headmen and their village headmen. headmen interviewed 
during the field mission also mentioned initial briefings by the ta after appointment, where rules of conduct are 
laid down. the study found a great variation in the transfer of knowledge beyond the chiefs on justice issues. the 
study was not able to obtain a review or evaluation of the ccjP programme on training of tas and cannot express 
an opinion on its impact. in other areas, notably on hiV/aiDs, studies have shown that training programmes can 
influence chiefs’ knowledge and practices, but that training alone may not be enough to change well-entrenched 
attitudes among the chiefs.97
the largest programme for training of headmen and chiefs has been the malawi Primary justice Programme of 
the ccjP, sponsored by DfiD. the programme (july 2007 to june 201098) was based on the lessons learned in the 
95 schärf et al., 2002; cammack et al., 2009; mhrc 2006.
96 schärf et al., p. 43.
97 Botha, 2007.
98 the programme will reportedly be extended for a period pending the finalization of a new programming cycle.
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prior massaj Primary justice Pilot Project from 2004 to 2006. a number of implementing agencies in all districts 
of malawi, mostly from local government, but also from faith-based organizations or other ngos, were responsible 
for activities under the programme at the district level, with overall national coordination by ccjP. traditional lead-
ers were identified as the major providers of primary justice. the Programme developed a manual for the purposes 
of the training (in english and chichewa) and a case record-book for use by traditional adjudicators. a revised 
version of the training manual had reportedly been developed in 2009/10, though (as of april 2010) this was only 
available in chichewa. comments made herein are thus based on the 2007 version. 
the manual is for the use of trainers drawn from local government, traditional leaders, community members, 
ngos, cBos, and religious leaders. it includes modules on teaching skills and organizational and communication 
issues related to the preparation and conduct of training. substantive modules covered include the constitution, 
the meaning of primary justice, and the process of case handling. there is also a module on conflict transformation 
that addresses basic concepts in relation to conflicts and (relatively briefly) describes the elements of a mediation 
process. there are also modules on data collection and record-keeping and on advocacy, project monitoring and 
evaluation, as well as an appendix on community policing. forms for referrals and recording of outcomes are pro-
vided in the manual. 
in addition to targeting traditional leaders, the programme also seeks to increase knowledge of legal rights among 
individual men, women and children in the targeted communities by means of semi-monthly meetings. commu-
nity-based educators facilitate these meetings. the primary justice programme, likewise, facilitates opportunities 
for cooperation and coordination between chiefs and other primary justice actors, including through interaction 
with court users’ committees. 
from the (albeit limited) opportunity that was available to learn about this programme, it appears to have several 
important strengths, including the attempt to link to other initiatives, such as the community policing structure 
and district stakeholders. the combined targeting of adjudicators and community members and the open forums 
in which primary justice is discussed at the village level would also seem to be very worthwhile. ccjP reports that 
these forums have been used by women to raise discussion of harmful practices (see discussion on shazi, or “the 
chief’s blanket”, above). similarly, other changes have been agreed upon at the village level, including increasing 
the representation of women on village courts.99 
the choice of modules in the training module seems to reflect the wish for trainers to reach a variety of target 
groups, including community members, headmen and chiefs and other local stakeholders, and for the manual to 
serve a number of purposes, including in relation to the implementing agencies under the project. this applies 
especially to the module on monitoring and evaluation. the advocacy module is likewise directed more at the 
implementing agencies and their staff. While a holistic approach to programming and targeting is useful in rela-
tion to ijs, it may lead to a dilution in relation to the manual itself, as it does not appear to be a tool relating to the 
specifics of the adjudication function of chiefs.
the training manual module on procedure discusses use of the courts as compared to alternative (non-legal) 
avenues. it lists necessary skills for persons providing legal assistance, appearing to be directed toward this func-
tion rather than at persons (such as traditional leaders) who are involved in deciding cases. While mediation is 
dealt with (though rather briefly), it appears that traditional leaders do not generally use mediation as a procedural 
method. By all accounts, most cases are decided by a form of facilitated negotiation or arbitration. the training 
manual does not appear to include issues such as the requirements of procedural fairness in proceedings of this 
kind. as issues relating to fairness and accessibility are likely to come up in the primary justice forum discussions 
under the project, it could be useful to include discussion guidelines on issues of this kind (including the obstacles 
that typically arise). 
99 ccjP 2008 at 4.4.1.3.
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a manual that was more specifically directed toward traditional adjudicators might also include some guidance on 
a number of the typical substantive issues dealt with by traditional leaders. (the manual provides a list of these.) 
nevertheless, there are two difficulties in this regard. one is that, as discussed in previous sections, chiefs do not 
have legal competence to deal with many of the questions that they are in fact adjudicating. While there may be 
no legal obstacle to their ‘proposing’ non-binding ’solutions‘ in this regard, the lack of a legal basis makes this diffi-
cult to do in practice. second, training on substantive law might demand knowledge and skills in excess of what is 
available from the pool of trainers. the 2008 report acknowledged that some cBes are not fully capable of dealing 
with all of the issues, and recommended more training.
the Primary justice Programme is ambitious in size, attempting to reach all of malawi. as mentioned, a variety of 
delivery agencies are used to carry out activities under the project. While pragmatism was undoubtedly necessary 
in taking account of local capacities to implement activities, this diversity of partners could also have certain costs 
in terms of structure and uniformity of philosophy and approach. there would be advantages in using the same 
delivery structure nationally in terms of gathering experience and harmonizing policy. the limited scope of the 
mission did not provide an opportunity to explore this issue in detail, however.
a final issue concerns the use to which the recorded decisions are put. the Primary justice Programme has done 
a lot to distribute forms for recording decisions and registering cases. Keeping case records can potentially serve 
several purposes, including enhancing enforcement, promoting legal certainty (if the written records are capable 
of being consulted by other potential litigants), and enhancing accountability to the public, to more senior chiefs 
and to stakeholders in the formal justice system (if available for consultation by these). they can also be a source of 
knowledge and guidance for the providers, both within the same court and among a wider circle of adjudicators. 
this last purpose was emphasized by those responsible for the project. it appears as though more thought and 
resources could be given to these purposes and functions. the monitoring that is contemplated in the manual 
is concerned with achievement of project goals, and there does not seem to be a system in place for monitor-
ing of case outcomes. While there is no doubt that this would be an ambitious and expensive undertaking for a 
programme that is targeting the whole country, monitoring and use of outcome results could be explored on a 
pilot basis.
viLLage mediation programme – pasi/dihr
the Village mediation Programme (february 2008 – september 2009) is a pilot programme with the objective of 
promoting access to justice at the village level by building the capacities of village mediators in each village cluster 
to mediate in minor cases in a way that complies with human rights standards and gives the parties the space to 
come up with the best solutions for them. it also aims at supporting a diversion process and ensuring that serious 
criminal cases go to the police and the courts. the programme draws on experiences of community mediation 
from other parts of the world.
Pasi carried out the programme with the support of Dihr. mediation trainers were trained in three districts. the 
trainers went on to train three village mediators in each village or village cluster (a total of 75 village mediators in 
each of the six involved tas). trainers and mediators are thoroughly trained on the basis of a curriculum and set of 
materials tailor-made for the project by a specialist in mediation education, and the trainers underwent intensive 
training for 15 days spread over three modules. the training focuses on mediation skills and methodology, human 
rights and justice concepts. Both among trainers and mediators, there is more or less even gender representation.
since the trainers are generally located within the respective tas, they are able to supervise and co-mediate in 
order to continuously support the village mediators. Village mediators are trained to mediate in teams of three in 
order to secure impartiality and the non-adjudicative nature of the mediation process. 
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although there was initially some opposition from tas to the programme, this has generally changed when seeing 
the impact and mode of cooperation of the village mediators. once properly briefed and consulted, traditional 
leaders interviewed were generally happy about the village mediation programme. the need to gain the tradi-
tional leaders’ acceptance of the mediators and their activities was underlined by the mediators themselves and 
during interviews. it was necessary to observe the traditional hierarchy to gain this acceptance. in some areas, 
the traditional leaders began by insisting that they be allowed to sit in on mediation sessions between parties 
to a dispute, and it was necessary to explain to them that the confidential and consensus-oriented nature of the 
mediation process would not permit this.
similarly, the necessity to brief the community on the nature of mediation was important. some community mem-
bers had expectations that cases would be adjudicated and ’decisions‘ enforced. leaflets were produced explain-
ing the process and the role of the mediators. 
the village mediators in the three districts had, as of the beginning of 2010, facilitated the resolution of over 800 
disputes in the six tas.  in some places, the case-load of gVh has gone down from six cases to one case per month. 
according to the gVh, Vh and tas interviewed, this allows them to spend more time on development issues. a 
2010 examination of some of the cases referred to mediators by traditional leaders indicated that minor family 
disputes and issues of conduct tend to be referred, whereas headmen and chiefs retain the cases that relate to 
inheritance, property and land. 
although the pilot programme formally ended in 2009 and is still seeking funding to continue, Pasi has main-
tained contacts with the trainers and mediators.  they carry out monthly visits to the tas, where they supervise the 
trainers and mediators and collect the case records.
in the pilot areas, the village members reported major improvements in their access to justice, especially among 
the most vulnerable groups. Women pointed to the importance of privacy and confidentiality in cases of domestic 
violence as important for the protection of their integrity and equal treatment. many also pointed to the lack of a 
fee when approaching the village mediator as being important for their ability to get any help at all. some come 
to the mediators when others have given up or refuse to deal with their case. the structure of the mediation team 
and the process of mediation, both designed to ensure impartiality, are evidently important to parties as is the focus 
on bringing in both (or all) parties’ perspectives on an equal footing and giving the parties the ownership of the 
solution to the dispute. according to parties who have gone through mediation, this makes the dispute resolution 
process more fair and equal and provides a better foundation for the parties to actually implement the solution. 
a success of the VmP programme is its thorough approach to development of an educational curriculum that is 
precisely targeted to the profiles and functions of its users, using simple language and concepts and a training 
methodology that was tested and refined. these features have already led the curriculum and materials to be 
adopted and applied in other countries.100 While the VmP was able to improve access in the areas of its operation, 
the familiar challenges of distance and accessibility do also arise in relation to the work of mediators. the three 
mediators chosen in a case may live at some distance from one another and from the parties. the mediators 
themselves were keen on having three mediators in each case, though logistical challenges can make this difficult 
to comply with. likewise, communication with trainers and Pasi paralegals would require resources and paid 
work time.
the Village mediation Programme is not embedded in an existing structure. although the programme was 
intended to be embedded in a broader national paralegal programme, this proved not to be possible. the larger 
paralegal programme is implemented by an ngo that is dependent on donor funding and is itself one that could 
100 Pasi and the training expert (ms. Brenda Brainch) were invited to sierra leone to introduce the programme there. 
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most usefully be integrated into state structures. the lack of linkages to formal institutions gives the programme 
little chance of sustainability on its own and of long-term provision of access to justice for the most vulnerable 
groups. this would also make it difficult to expand to the national level. 
another challenge is that the village mediators do not have easy access to advice or support from people with 
legal or human rights expertise in the current structure, and referrals to formal justice sector institutions or others 
are difficult to follow up on. 
although case records have been collected on the cases mediated so far, a system remains to be developed that 
will generate a good foundation for monitoring and for providing the necessary supervision and linkages to the 
village mediators. 
a continuation of the programme would be necessary to evaluate practice and success in relation to tackling 
sensitive human rights questions. the nature of mediation does not permit the mediator to dictate the terms of 
the solutions chosen by the parties, so the project used other means – mostly structural and procedural – to try 
to address human rights concerns. By building human rights norms into the education of the mediators, an effort 
is made to bring ideas based on human rights into the dialogue between the mediator and the disputing parties. 
second, the mediation process secures a high degree of real procedural equality between the parties. third, the 
more or less equal gender representation among mediators attempts to ensure a forum accessible to both gen-
ders. the lack of fees and voluntariness of the service is also a measure of accessibility.
research and studies
Kanyongolo cites studies of customary law in malawi carried out in the 1970s,101 saying that these were the last 
studies of their kind to be carried out. meanwhile, scholars refer also to the jurisprudence of the national traditional 
appeals court (ntac) during its period of operation until 1994. a number of articles and research papers are avail-
able on land issues, and reference has been made to the 1999 government study on this. less research and data 
seem to be available in the area of women’s rights, as pointed out by the ceDaW committee in its examination of 
country reports. apart from this, there are a number of shorter studies and research papers, including Prof. Kanyon-
golo’s own work, as cited herein. 
programming reLating to chiLdren
reference is made to the section on outreach dealing with the work of the Vsus earlier in this case study. Particu-
larly at the cVsu level, programming related to children is possible. in addition, there are some other efforts worthy 
of note in relation to children. 
the government made a national Plan of action for orphans and other Vulnerable children (oVc) 2005-2009. 
While the plan’s six strategic areas do not include justice provision, there is mention of a plan to provide the legal 
framework and coordination to protect the most vulnerable children.
in relation to customary ijs, programming on justice can often usefully be linked to programming on health. many 
of the issues related to women’s and children’s rights, especially those related to domestic violence, child mar-
riages and the property and well-being of children, are issues of women’s and children’s health, as well as coming 
to the fore in connection with justice. likewise, programming in the domain of education can tackle difficult 
cultural issues. 
101 j. o. ibik, ’the law of land, succession, movable Property, agreements and civil Wrongs’ in series Restatement of African Law, Vol. 4. 
sweet & maxwell, 1971.
336
a
n
n
eX
 s
iX
a stuDy of informal justice systems: access to justice anD human rights
programming reLated to cuLturaL practices
malawi human rights commission’s (mhrc) 2006 report on cultural practices,102 makes a number of useful recom-
mendations on programming that addresses such practices. the mhrc’s recommendations on addressing harm-
ful cultural practices are paraphrased in the following paragraphs. While they extend far beyond the field of justice, 
they may also be relevant to it.
the mhrc recommends attempting to introduce alternative practices rather than trying to ban harmful practices 
outright. this approach has been taken in relation to fgm in other parts of africa (tanzania). an attempt to modify 
cultural practices that are deeply culturally embedded may have educational and health aspects as well as justice 
ones. in some instances, they may be better tackled through interventions that adopt a multifaceted approach. 
relationships with local communities or traditional leaders that are working in the field of health or education may 
present the best opportunity for addressing harmful practices that can yield benefits in the field of informal justice.
changing harmful traditional practices is a complex process that must involve all stakeholders, including tradi-
tional leaders, community members, religious groups that may be reluctant to speak out about the practice, and 
the government. awareness of rights must be promoted, and harnessing traditional and religious leaders is neces-
sary in the effort to spread knowledge of rights. in interacting with traditional or religious leaders, there is a need 
to respect positive or ’neutral‘ traditional practices in order to demonstrate good faith in relation to the aim of 
encouraging and endorsing culture and diversity. 
the power balance must be understood. Women and children are especially vulnerable because of their lower 
social and economic status. outreach programmes on gender equality targeting all sectors of society need to 
create public awareness through information. children and young women need to be empowered. Practices that 
directly or indirectly confer higher status on boys and men than on women and girls should be modified so that 
males and females enjoy equal status. Women, as one category of the main victims, must be given the opportunity 
to participate in the process of modifying the ’negative‘ practices.
it is important to gain an understanding of the details of the practice from its cultural underpinnings. the latter 
may make people hesitant to sacrifice what is perceived as important, although they understand it to be harmful. 
offering substitute activities or a modified version of the practice is constructive, so the abolition or modification 
of the practice does not leave a vacuum.
People who perform harmful practices often do what they think is best for the children. engaging them regularly 
on the significant role they play in the upbringing of children by emphasizing the positive information they pass 
on to children and at the same time making them see elements in the practices that are negative, would be worth 
pursuing. the ‘unwritten curricula’ (used by malawian anankungwi) during initiation should be reviewed by regu-
larly engaging them in dialogue or interactive discussions. information that is passed on to the initiates must be 
appropriate for the initiates and must not centre on how to perform sex, but on good behaviour. it is therefore rec-
ommended that the anankungwi should undergo training on sex and sexuality and how best information about 
this subject matter can be passed on to the initiates. interactive discussion with them on a regular basis by all those 
interested in promoting the rights of children could be helpful.
the ministry of health should take a leading role in promoting healthy cultural practices by giving advice to all 
participants in cultural practices such as circumcision and discouraging unhygienic practices.
education for women is vital to the realization of their rights. unless girls’ education is promoted so that girls real-
ize their full potential, the status of women in malawi will remain low and women’s rights are likely to continue to 
be violated.
102 Cultural Practices and their Impact on the Enjoyment of Human Rights, Particularly the Rights of Women and Children in Malawi, 2006.
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many of the harmful practices have legal and/or administrative implications. the mhrc recommends that the law 
commission should thoroughly study the practices discussed in the study with a view to initiating a process of law 
reform pertaining to culture.
the mhrc report refers also to a study sponsored by unicef in 2001 in one area of malawi. 
recommendations and findings
most findings are presented in the thematic sections and chapters above and will not be repeated here. some 
tentative suggestions are also made in relation to some aspects of the training of chiefs, though it is possible that 
these have been overtaken by reality in the implementation of the programme. 
malawi presents an example of a comparatively large programmatic focus on traditional chiefs as ijs providers as 
well as of significant work in law reform in areas of relevance to ijs and the majority of malawians. 
the legislative reforms proposed by the law commission and in the land Policy would be extremely far-reaching 
if implemented. While it may have been beyond the scope of the mandate of the law commission to assess pro-
grammatic (and budgetary) implications of the (re)establishment of local courts and the division of jurisdiction 
among them and the magistrate courts, this would appear advisable before any such legislation could enter into 
force. the demands that new legislation on marriage, inheritance and land would pose on the magistrate courts 
and other actors in terms of knowledge and enforcement powers could be very significant, requiring retraining, 
provision of materials and interaction among various justice agencies.
a key element in plotting the way ahead consists in enhancing the interaction between various providers at the 
local level. an interesting aspect of the programming work hitherto done in malawi is the focus on interaction 
among various primary justice stakeholders. the results reported in relation to the ccjP Primary justice Programme, 
the VmP and the Vsus would all seem to indicate that this has been very productive in terms of improvement and 
change. all of these bodies (as well as the local courts, if re-established) would face the same difficulties and chal-
lenges in terms of support, monitoring and referral systems. there are thus good reasons to attempt to maximize 
the extent to which some mechanisms of support could be shared among the different primary justice institu-
tions. the various programmes analysed herein each have their strengths, weaknesses and particular contribu-
tions. there is ample opportunity for the sharing of methodologies and resources.
more detailed study of the programmatic work could yield valuable knowledge on the interaction between police, 
community policing structures and traditional chiefs. nevertheless, resource constraints (most often for transport 
and communication) continue to pose difficulties and mean that targets are sometimes overly ambitious. 
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introduction
the different regions in uganda focused on in this study – the central, north, and north-eastern areas of the coun-
try – illustrate a nuanced relationship between formal justice systems and ijs. they underscore various approaches 
to concepts of justice that have emerged as a result of customary tradition, prolonged states of conflict, and gov-
ernment priorities. uganda is a useful case study within this ijs study precisely because it depicts the complexity 
of how a plurality of systems, informal and formal, interacts within a single country. in the north, for instance, the 
longstanding conflict between the lord’s resistance army (lra) and uganda government forces (uPDf) rendered 
justice systems dysfunctional for over two decades. meanwhile, central uganda and urban areas such as Kampala 
have maintained peace and relative prosperity for the last twenty years and today has a system based in a formal 
justice model conducive to supporting an integrated justice, law and order sector (jlos) approach. this contrasts 
starkly with uganda’s economically and politically marginalized Karamoja region, which has long had to rely on 
its own traditional system of government and administration of law and order, evolving into a dominant informal 
justice system. 
therefore, a case study of uganda provides insight into a system marked by strong and disparate customary prac-
tices across ethnic communities at the local level that nationally maintains and promotes the Western model of 
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justice, as reflected primarily in the retributive penal justice system. notions of justice – retributive and restorative – 
especially in communities transitioning from war, are recurrent themes in uganda’s recent history and are relevant 
and included in this discussion. 
methodoLogy
this report is based on an extensive desk study of existing research that has been conducted on formal and infor-
mal justice in uganda. the desk study was supplemented by a two-week qualitative field mission to the country in 
october 2009 by two researchers. research on the ground comprised key informant interviews with representa-
tives of formal justice sector institutions at the national and local levels, donor representatives, ngos, informal jus-
tice providers and focus group discussions with users in central, north and north-eastern uganda in the mukono, 
Kitgum, and moroto districts, respectively. guidance for the appropriate contacts to aid in the research was pro-
vided by un agencies in Kampala as well as a local ngo partner, foundation for human rights initiative (fhri) and 
other Danish institute for human rights (Dihr) contacts. 
Due to the disparity of social contexts within uganda, requiring multiple and large sample sizes to provide sig-
nificant results, as well as time constraints, it was decided this case study would not include quantitative research, 
opting instead to focus on a more comprehensive qualitative analysis. uganda has already had a vast amount of 
research conducted on it with respect to the different regions and justice issues. thus, the case study presents an 
opportunity to present greater background on the justice system in general than is the case with the other country 
studies. limitations acknowledged with regard to the fieldwork include the short time period for the on-ground 
research and logistical and security challenges, both of which restricted the scope of the geographic areas that 
could be included for qualitative study. 
Programming implications will be addressed in each of the regional sections. given that this case study reflects 
purely qualitative data, it does not follow the exact same format of the other case studies contained in the overall 
ijs study. the uganda study aims to provide a comprehensive contextual overview and analysis of how formal and 
informal systems function in different areas of the country itself.
bacKground
uganda, which gained independence from British rule in 1962, experienced a series of coups and civil conflicts 
up until the current president seized power in 1986. this period was marked by widespread political violence and 
repression, which culminated with a great concentration of power in the hands of the head of state.1 milton obote, 
uganda’s first president, was overthrown by idi amin in 1971. With a suspension of the constitution, amin ruled 
under a provisional government until 1979 and conducted what many call a reign of terror, systematically killing 
presumed obote supporters and opponents in general. in 1979, amin’s forces were defeated and obote ‘won’ 
the subsequent election in 1980. a new series of grave human rights violations commenced that was not much 
different from amin’s regime. obote was overthrown in 1985 by a faction of the military and, in 1986, the current 
president, yoweri museveni, and his national resistance movement (nrm) seized power. 
an estimated 800,000 people were killed during the political violence between amin’s coup in 1971 and the end 
of civil war in 1985.2 Between 1986 and 2006, President museveni’s government has faced more than 20 armed 
insurgencies, with the conflict between the lord’s resistance army (lra) and the government of uganda (gou) in 
the north being by far the longest lasting and most devastating. Peace talks between july 2006 and march 2008 
resulted in a final peace agreement and annexure (the juba Peace agreements).
1 joanna r. Quinn, Social Reconstruction in Uganda: The Role of Customary Mechanisms in Transitional Justice, june 2005.
2 aili mari tripp, ‘the changing face of authoritarianism in africa: the case of uganda’, Africa Today, Vol. 50, no. 3, spring 2004, p. 4.
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Political parties were until recently banned from operating in uganda on the grounds of threatening unity and 
the risk of promoting divisions along ethnic and regional lines. however, following the national referendum in july 
2005, multiple parties have been allowed to organize and operate. following an amendment to the constitution, 
museveni ran for and won a third term in the subsequent presidential and parliamentary elections in february 2006. 
international donors have sometimes been accused of holding uganda to a different standard than many other 
african countries. they have sometimes overlooked uganda’s political record because of its strong economic 
growth and its eagerness to adopt structural adjustment programs promoted by the West.3 the approach of 
museveni’s government to tackling the aiDs epidemic in the country, as well as the relative advances in human 
rights compared to uganda’s previous regimes, have elevated its status among donors as a system that could be 
emulated in other parts of africa. under museveni, uganda has seen reductions in poverty and improvements in 
health and education. this has led to uganda being widely characterized as a country that went from ‘basket case’ 
to ‘success story’, according to the World Bank.4 
gender inequality is prominent in private and public sectors both in relation to the law and in terms of access 
to justice. net enrolment of children in schools, however, has more than tripled in the previous eight years, and 
gender parity in education has also nearly been achieved.5 of course, given that there are significant regional and 
rural-urban variations, it is important for the purposes of this study to look specifically at the situation of women 
and children in relation to different ijs contexts, such as within Karamojong society and post-conflict northern 
uganda, which will be discussed in depth.
typoLogy
as discussed in the typology chapter in the main ijs study, a number of mechanisms of ijs are considered in this 
case study. these include those anchored in customary and traditional leaders, local administrators, customary 
courts, ngos and cBos, and paralegals. many of these systems are actively in use in uganda. in this report, three 
main forms of informal justice in uganda are examined: (1) the local council court system for settling disputes; (2) 
settling of disputes in post-conflict northern uganda by traditional authorities; and (3) the Karamojong traditional 
system for governing and settling disputes in the north-eastern region. Whereas the latter two can be said to be 
pure non-state systems, the first is established and regulated by law and forms part of the local government system.
the local council system with the local council courts (lc courts) is an example of a model bridging the many 
grey areas between formal and informal justice providers through the decentralized government structure. the 
lc system is an example of locally elected officials with an adjudicative function, established nationwide with the 
aim of providing grassroots justice and reconnecting the people with their customary traditions. following legisla-
tive reforms in 2006, the higher levels of the system are now more akin to a ‘parajudicial’ (hybrid) customary court 
system. the lc courts apply customary law and the by-laws passed by local executive councils. today, lc officials 
are salaried or at least supported by the state (depending on the level). however, they report diminished scope of 
powers and therefore face challenges to effective functioning in their roles. ongoing challenges to the effective-
ness of the lc court system, including the danger of political interference in case decisions due to close links with 
the executive branch of government, will be discussed in further detail. 
in uganda, traditional leaders are particularly influential in administering justice in the rural areas of some parts 
of the country, as will be examined in the sections on Karamoja and the northern region of this case study. the 
use of customary law is often distinct and particular to each tribe. in the north-eastern region, traditional courts 
comprising a council of elders deal with virtually all disputes and form part of a separate traditional governance 
3 ibid., pp. 9-20.
4 monica Duffy toft, Securing the Peace, Princeton university Press, 2010, p. 105.
5 ibid.
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system that has developed due to long periods of instability and little presence of the formal state governance and 
justice system. similarly in the north, the dominant tribes have a long history of particular traditional practices and 
justice with traditional leaders based on a heredity system. however, long periods of conflict and displacement in 
the area have changed the dynamics of the communities, and its impact on the traditional systems and notions of 
justice will be discussed further.
as in many countries, the decision to use informal systems over formal ones appears to result from a combination 
of tradition and inaccessibility and/or weakness of the formal system. While uganda has a relatively strong formal 
justice sector by african standards, enjoying consistent development partner support to a sector programme over 
a decade, it remains largely inaccessible to the majority of the population, who rely on a variety of informal justice 
providers in their efforts to access justice.
formaL Justice in uganda
constitutionaL recognition of traditionaL Leaders and Limits on 
their poWers
this section provides an overview of the formal judicial system and the linkages that currently exist to the informal 
system. it also addresses the subject of policing and prison systems in uganda. these issues are relevant to the 
discussion of ijs, as a majority of respondents in this study cited mistrust and inefficiency of the police, as well as 
an unjust prison system, as reasons why they utilize informal systems.
to begin, the formal justice system in uganda legally recognizes traditional institutions and customary law. By 
virtue of chapter 16 of the constitution of uganda (1995), the ‘institution of traditional or cultural leaders’ is given 
legal status. Paragraph 246 (1) determines that the existence of such leaders shall be in accordance with the cul-
ture, customs, tradition and aspirations of the people to whom such an institution applies. Paragraph 6 defines a 
traditional leader as follows: “a king or similar traditional leader or cultural leader by whatever name called, who 
derives allegiance from the fact of birth or descent in accordance with the customs, traditions, usage or consent of 
the people led by the traditional or cultural leader”.6
Paragraph 2 establishes that the community concerned shall resolve the issue of traditional institutions where it 
has not been solved, as prescribed by the parliament. Paragraph 3 determines that the institution of the traditional 
leader is a legal person – and so has legal capacity, which can be conferred by the gou or by virtue of culture, 
custom or tradition. People do not have to pay in order to maintain such institutions. moreover, under Paragraph 
3, section (f ), it is forbidden that such leaders exercise administrative, legislative or executive powers, and they are 
not afforded any judicial powers or right to hold customary courts – powers that were removed from them and 
transferred to the local government system through the lc courts after 1986.
the role of traditional leaders is recognized, but with limited powers, and there is a clear hierarchical preference 
for the formal systems over the informal within the constitution, with the lowest formal level being the lc courts 
system. although customary law and practices are recognized in the constitution, it prohibits ‘laws, cultures cus-
toms or traditions which are against the dignity, welfare or interest of women or which undermine their status’.7 
furthermore, women have the right to affirmative action to redress any imbalances due to history, traditions or 
custom.8 the ugandan constitution is, with these and similar provisions, regarded as one of the most progressive 
constitutions in africa from a gender perspective.
6 constitution of the republic of uganda 1995, chapter 16.
7 ibid. article 33 (6).
8 ibid. article 33 (5).
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according to the judicature act, the high court can observe and enforce customary law as long as it is ‘not repug-
nant to natural justice, equity and good conscience and not incompatible either directly or by necessary implica-
tion with any written law’.9 magistrate courts also exercise their general jurisdiction in accordance with the high 
court and the judicature act and likewise can observe, apply, and enforce any civil customary law as long as it is 
not ‘repugnant to justice’. in civil cases or matters where no expressed rule is applicable, the magistrate courts ‘shall 
be guided by the principles of justice equity and good conscience’. 10
the ugandan court system 
the chart below provides an overview of the ugandan civilian court system hierarchy. magistrate courts handle 
the majority of civil and criminal cases in the country and are divided into three layers: chief, magistrates grade 
i, and magistrates grade ii courts. magistrates are appointed by the judicial service commission and hear cases 
individually. their jurisdiction is limited both geographically as well as substantively in civil and criminal matters. 
magistrates grade ii can hear any criminal offences that are not of an aggravated or serious nature (in accordance 
with section 161 (1) of the magistrates court act). 11 they do not have jurisdiction over capital offences, but can 
hear cases related to criminal offences committed by children, as well as civil matters where the value of the 
subject matter does not exceed 500,00012 ugandan shillings. magistrates grade i can hear claims whose value 
does not exceed 2,000,000 ugandan shillings and have unlimited jurisdiction over civil matters governed solely by 
customary law. they can also hear any criminal cases, provided they do not involve life imprisonment sentences 
or the death penalty.13
the chief magistrate supervises both the lc and magistrate courts. their jurisdiction over civil claims includes 
those where monetary values do not exceed 5,000,000 ugandan shillings; they are competent to hear criminal 
cases involving life imprisonment, but cannot try capital offences.14 
the superior courts include the high court, court of appeal, and supreme court. the high court is headed by 
a principal judge and exercises unlimited jurisdiction in both criminal and civil cases. it is the first court of appeal 
for the chief magistrates and magistrates grade i courts. the high court is divided into commercial, civil, crimi-
nal, family and circuit Divisions. appeals against judgements made by the high court are made to the court 
of appeals.15
the court of appeal is headed by the Deputy chief justice with the assistance of seven judges. the president 
appoints all justices who sit on the court. the court serves as the instance of appeal for high court judgements. 
the supreme court comprises the chief justice and six judges and is the final civilian instance of appeal in ugan-
da.16 all courts administer justice according to the same law: written law, common law and doctrines of equity, and 
any established or current custom or usage of customary law.17
a subsequent section will provide an in-depth explanation and discussion of the lc court system, the courts clos-
est to the people, including the debate about whether the lc courts actually fall under the formal justice system 
or instead straddle the formal and informal systems.
9 chapter 13 the judicature act, section 15, article 1.
10 article 10, magistrate’s court act: http://www.ulii.org/ug/legis/consol_act/mca232/
11 Access to Justice in Northern Uganda, office of the united nations high commissioner for human rights (ohchr) report, 2008, 51.
12 at the time of writing, ugX 500,000 is approx. equivalent to us$ 215 (oanda.com june 2010).
13 ibid.
14 under ugandan law, sentences of life imprisonment can be given for: incest (section 149, Penal code), attempted rape (section 
125, Pc), aiding committing suicide (section 209, Pc), killing an unborn child (section 327, Pc), or arson (section 327, Pc).
15 ibid.
16 ibid., p. 53.
17 odoki, 1994.
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supreme court
court of appeaL
chief magistrate
LC III Court at  
Sub-County Level
magistrate 
grade ii
magistrate 
grade i
LC II Court at 
Parish Level
LC I Court at 
Village Level
high court
(Commercial, Civil and Criminal Divisions + Circuit Courts)
Source: OHCHR ‘Access to Justice in Northern Uganda’ Report, 2008.
the Justice LaW and order sector
the justice law and order sector (jlos) is a justice sector reform programme through a sector-wide approach.18 
jlos is supported by nine bilateral donors, the eu and the World Bank. this sector-wide approach to the justice 
sector was the first of its kind in africa and has been in existence since 2001. 
jlos is pursuing the overall vision of ‘justice for all’ through six main intervention areas: (1) promotion of the rule of 
law and due process; (2) fostering a human rights culture across jlos institutions; (3) enhancing access to justice 
for all, especially the poor and marginalized groups; (4) reducing the incidence of crime, and promoting safety of 
persons and security of property; (5) enhancing the jlos contribution to economic development; and (6) building 
institutional capacity to enhance service delivery. four substantive focus areas have been selected for the pro-
gramme: criminal, commercial, family, and land justice. support to the lc court system is included under enhanc-
ing access to justice and is primarily focused on capacity building, which will be discussed below. 
18 jlos comprises the following core government institutions: ministry of justice & constitutional affairs; ministry of internal affairs; 
the judiciary; the Police force; the Prisons service; judicial service commission; Directorate of Public Prosecutions; the law reform 
commission; the human rights commission; ministry of local government (local council courts); and ministry of gender, labour 
and social Development (Probation services & juvenile justice). 
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although general progress has been made in relation to programme indicators, reform of the justice sector is 
slow and the backlog in the system remains substantial.19 moreover, despite efforts to increase the outreach of 
the system, the majority of ugandans still have little access. this is especially the case in the conflict-affected areas 
in the north, north-eastern, and western parts of the country. a stronger focus on ijs is therefore seen as critical; 
there appears to be an increased openness and focus on the lc court system, as well as traditional mechanisms. 
the ongoing discussions on the role of traditional justice systems in the transitional justice process in the north are 
important steps toward increased openness of ijs. research on transitional and traditional justice is being under-
taken as well as some studies on customary processes and practices. it is, though, only at the stage of formative 
studies and preliminary discussions on how the informal systems can feed into the formal system.20
a national Development Plan (nDP) for the period 2010/11 to 2014/15 was under development during the time 
of this field research study in 2009. the nDP has since been finalized and launched and it is noteworthy that the 
following two strategies have been included under the objective of ‘enhanced access to justice’: (1) promotion of 
use of aDr and innovative approaches to enhance justice within all four focus areas (criminal, commercial, land 
and family justice), with emphasis on conflict-affected areas in northern uganda and the strengthening of judi-
cial oversight of aDr and improved record-keeping; and (2) strengthening the capacity of local council courts 
through capacity-building, streamlining of funding, and the implementation and enforcement of the local coun-
cil court amendment act of 2006.21
the formulated ‘access to justice’ objective from the draft nDP reads: “to strengthen [the] capacity and role of local 
council courts and develop a national framework for the practice of informal, customary system[s] of justice to ensure 
conformity with human rights standards including gender equality, uphold[ing] the rule of law and complement[ing] 
the formal justice sector.”22 this highlights the increasing recognition of ijs by the jlos and its stakeholders.
a recent initiative under the jlos is the goal to professionalize the bench. the formal court system will phase out 
the grade ii magistrates, which will have implications for the accessibility of justice in the short term. it is envisaged 
that the lc court iii will fill this gap and, in the longer term, there will be more grade i magistrates. however, in the 
short term, all criminal matters above the lc court iii level will be assigned to the chief magistrates. in the short 
term, this gap will also be evident in relation to the family/child Protection courts on the ground. strengthening 
of the lc courts i-iii and establishing more grade i magistrates will be the longer-term solution. this initiative does, 
however, pose a challenge to the accessibility of the courts for the short to medium period to come; one of the 
major challenges to the lc system according to the ministry of local government (molg) is the numbers of those 
employed in the justice section. currently, lcs do not cover the whole country at all levels. in reality, there are many 
ugandans who do not have real access to the lc system and therefore make use of other informal mechanisms.23
poLicing in uganda 
research from this study and elsewhere suggests the challenges associated with policing in uganda are a signifi-
cant reason that people continue to rely on ijs. uganda’s history of conflict has meant that the strength of policing 
has varied throughout its history, with periods of a complete absence of policing, or the use of non-state policing, 
particularly in the north and northeast of the country. in recent years, the ugandan government, acknowledging 
that police play a key role in contributing to justice and law and order, has made efforts to improve the uganda 
19 nDP 2010/11-2014/15 and jlos 2008-09 Work Plan.
20 interviews with the law Development centre, Danida and the legal aid Basket fund, and the irish embassy (jlos lead Donor) in 
Kampala, october 2009.
21 national Development Plan (2010/11-2014/15), april 2010, objective 3, strategies 3 & 5, pp. 301-302.
22 objective 3 (enhancing access to justice for all especially the poor and marginalized groups in the draft national Development 
Plan), quoted to the team during the field visit in october 2009. 
23 interview with ministry of local government, Kampala, october 2009
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Police force, such as by initiating community policing initiatives and deploying special police forces to remote 
regions of the country. 
the ugandan Police force (uPf) structure is such that, at the district level, the force is under the command of the 
District Police commander (DPc), who reports directly to the regional Police commander (rPc). all police stations 
in urban areas and rural outposts are under an officer-in-charge (oic) who generally deals with minor crimes. all 
criminal investigations fall within the purview of the District criminal investigation Department (ciD) with a direct 
line of reporting to the DPc. in addition to the regular police forces, the police structure also includes special Police 
constables (sPcs), anti-stock theft units (astus),24 local administration Police (laP), and a child and family Pro-
tection unit (cfPu) comprised of officers responsible for handling family-related complaints. 25
a general underreporting of crime by the public and a lack of manpower, transportation vehicles, police equip-
ment, and systems to record crimes, are just a few of the challenges that the police face in uganda. corruption and 
poor public image are also a problem for the uPf, as is the recruitment of police officers. in rural areas, there still is 
generally not enough police presence on the ground. in 2005, there were 13,000 police in uganda. 40,000 police 
were needed for the national goal of 1:600 population ratio, while the international police ratio stands at 1:250.26 
Police numbers today have not increased significantly and salaries remain low; a police constable earns an average 
of 67,000 ugandan shillings a month.27 
Police remain reluctant to be posted to extremely remote regions of uganda such as Karamoja. in september 2009, 
120 of 200 police officers transferred to Karamoja under the restoration of law and order in Karamoja (reloKa 
program) failed to report to duty to the posts to which they were transferred.28 nevertheless, as of late 2009, police 
reported that increased community policing in Karamoja has led to the registration of an estimated 400 criminal 
cases per month, citing an improving law and order situation in Karamoja, which has restored public confidence in 
the police.29 in the north, where people retain a ‘militarized’ security mind-set due to the years of conflict between 
the uPDf and lra (during which the police were sidelined and rendered obsolete in the eyes of many), there is 
little confidence in the uPf to be able to address the scope of post-conflict security problems. 
across a number of regions featured in this case study, mistrust by the general population of the police was high 
due to corruption levels and a lack of response to cases. moreover, police do not have sophisticated and accurate 
record systems in place to compile crime statistics that could convince a sceptical public of their impact in the 
community. nevertheless, some communities report that their image of the police is improving, due to the friend-
lier attitude of police towards civilians and the noticeable reduction of crime in urban areas.30
When police posts are geographically distant from the villages, communities tend to use lc i courts or traditional 
leaders as their first instance of referral for crimes. according to Bruce Baker, evidence suggests that lc i courts 
have had a ‘remarkable ordering effect on social life and have acted as the first line of protection against serious 
disorder and crime’.31 although lcs cannot effectively replace the role of police, there is potential for them to work 
together in various areas relating to local justice and order. uganda’s lc court system is discussed in detail later in 
this study.
24 Primarily established for the Karamoja region.
25 Access to Justice in Northern Uganda, ohchr report 2008, p. 54.
26 Baker, p. 10.
27 Northern Uganda – Justice in Conflict, africa rights report, january 2000, p. 29. (67,000 shillings is approximately us$ 30 - oanda.
com on 5 august 2010).
28 ‘uganda: Police officers Decline to serve in Karamoja’ – www.allafrica.com 23 september 2009.
29 ‘uganda: Karamoja Police register 400 cases monthly’ – www.allafrica.com, 26 october 2009.
30 ibid., p. 6.
31 Bruce Baker, Popular Justice and Policing from Bush War to Democracy: Uganda 1981-2004, international journal of the sociology of 
law, 32, 2004, p. 10.
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the uPf also faces constraints from widespread political interference serving to undermine prospects for effec-
tive law enforcement. Police officers report that they cannot exercise their powers of arrest in communities where 
prominent politicians have interests.32 furthermore, at the community level, police are often constrained by the 
power and influence of the community elders. for instance, elders will often not allow the arrest of boys in their 
community or in cases where the individual is a member of their clan. additional challenges for the police include 
language barriers with communities that do not speak english (where police officers come from a region other 
than that to which they are posted), logistics (with a lack of resources and manpower), and the geographic vast-
ness of the terrain they are often mandated to cover in rural areas.33
Despite the aforementioned weaknesses of the uPf, Baker portrays a largely positive view of police interventions 
in uganda particularly in their efforts in ‘community policing’ initiatives. in an interview with the Deputy of Police 
in Karamoja conducted for the present study, it became clear that the uPf have put an emphasis on community 
policing in recent years; he explained that the first week of every month was earmarked for community policing 
initiatives such as going from homestead to homestead sensitizing communities on the role of the police.34 While 
it is true that the uPf are embracing the idea of community-oriented policing and have deployed community 
liaison officers in most regions, the current number of such officers is only 300 and they appear to so far have had 
limited impact nationwide.35 
gender issues and the poLice 
criticism has been levelled against the uPf for inadequately handling gender-sensitive cases and children’s issues. 
With a predominance of male police officers in the uPf, women often feel that cases they bring to the police are 
either not taken seriously or not handled in a gender-sensitive manner. Women report situations where police try 
to convince them to drop their complaint and reconcile with the perpetrator in cases of domestic violence.36 some 
survivors report that most police officers regard domestic violence, including marital rape, as ‘a domestic matter’ 
not necessitating police intervention. costs incurred in filing a case with the police also serve as a deterrent for 
women pursuing justice. many women are simply not able to afford to pay for medical expenses or for providing 
transport for the police during their investigation.
in cases of sexual and gender-based violence (sgBV), survivors are required to fill in a Police form 3 (Pf3), which is 
used to document physical and other injuries and requires a physical examination by a doctor or by government-
approved medical personnel. Without such a form, a victim of sgBV has no chance of successful prosecution 
against the perpetrator.37 moreover, if a doctor determines that a woman has not been raped, the case is regarded 
as weak and will likely be dropped; this is a determination that disregards the role of a court in determining whether 
sexual assault has occurred.38 Women are reportedly also required to pay for the medical examination required for 
the Pf3 form, a cost that is arbitrarily set and varies from district to district.39 finally, although forensic evidence 
is key to successful convictions of sgBV offences, the reality is that there are few forensic experts in uganda. this 
means there are delays for medical examinations and test results, or in some cases examinations cannot be carried 
out at all.
32 Social Justice Amidst Complex Realities: Protecting the Rights of Children and Women in a Traditional Pastoral Community – The Case of 
the Pokot in Northeastern Uganda, transcultural Psychological organization report for Dan church aid, 2008, p. 51.
33 interview with Deputy cox, Police administration – uPf Karamoja. (october 20, 2009).
34 ibid.
35 Community Policing Assessment in Northern Uganda, usaiD report, march 2005, p. 6.
36 ‘I can’t afford justice’: Violence Against Women in Uganda Continues Unchecked and Unpunished, amnesty international report, april 
2010. 39.
37 ibid., p. 44.
38 ibid., p. 40.
39 Access to Justice in Northern Uganda, ohchr report, 2008, p. 33.
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the ugandan prison system 
as in many african countries, the ugandan prison system is characterized by overcrowding, poor prison conditions, 
and backlogged cases, with a predominant number of prisoners on remand awaiting trial. Prisoner statistics from 
october 2009 indicate uganda has a total prison population of 30,957, with an overall occupancy rate for prisons 
estimated at 227 percent.40 such congestion can be attributed to the inefficient processing of cases through the 
formal legal system, leaving 56 percent of prisoners waiting for their day in court, sometimes for years.41 in 2008, 
overcrowding, malnutrition, poor sanitation, disease, overwork, and lack of medical care resulted in 149 prisoner 
deaths nationwide. 42
the ugandan Prisons service derives it mandate from the national constitution and the 2006 Prisons act. section 
5 of the Prisons act provides the functions of the prison service: (1) to ensure that every person detained legally 
in a prison is kept in a humane, safe custody and produced in court when required until lawfully discharged or 
removed from prison; (2) to facilitate the social rehabilitation and reformation of prisons through specific training 
and educational programmes; (3) to facilitate the re-integration of prisoners into their communities; (4) to ensure 
performance by prisoners of work reasonably necessary for the effective management of prisons; and (5) to per-
form such other functions as the minister, after consultation with the Prisons authority, may from time to time 
assign to the service.43 Prisons across africa, including uganda, have tended to focus on the custody role (safety 
and security) of prisons rather than the rehabilitation (corrections) aspect and therefore are often viewed with 
suspicion by local communities, who are inclined to focus on the latter in their ijs. 
the research team visited two ugandan prisons during this study: Kitgum Prison in the north and moroto Prison in 
the northeast. at the time of the visits, Kitgum prison had a population of 163, with 121 of the detainees being held 
on remand, while moroto prison was holding 103 prisoners, 76 of whom were on remand. Both were the only pris-
ons in the district, and Kitgum prison was over capacity in its number of detainees. at the time of this visit, moroto 
prison was under renovation, sponsored by jlos and the netherlands government, to physically strengthen and 
increase its holding capacity. the prison superintendent explained that, in December 2008, 23 prisoners had man-
aged to escape, six of whom are still at large.44 given the relatively small size of the moroto prison, prisoners serving 
long-term sentences are typically sent to ‘prison farms’ where they serve out their sentence while receiving training 
in carpentry, tailoring, adult literacy, and religious instruction.
the majority of prisoners in both prisons were being held on remand for a variety of charges including robbery, 
rape, defilement, illegal possession of firearms and murder. according the article 23 (6)(b) of the ugandan consti-
tution, the maximum holding periods of detainees is 60 days for petty offences and 180 days for capital offences.45 
in moroto Prison, the superintendent reported that 23 of the 163 prisoners had been held over their legal limit 
for remand, a reportedly chronic problem. the reasons for this include case backlog and the fact that court is not 
often in session. in fact, there is no chief magistrate in moroto; the closest is located in soroti, a district located in a 
completely different region to moroto, and only holds session once every three or four months.46 the infrequency 
of court sessions in different regions across the country, particularly in the north and east, poses a major stumbling 
block to accessing formal justice. 
40 ‘summary of uPs Prisoners statistical returns october 2009’. accessed at http://www.prisons.go.ug/reports/1009.pdf
41 ibid.
42 2008 country report on human rights Practices – uganda, us Department of state, 25 february 2009.
43 Options for Enhancing Access to Justice and Improving Administration of Law and Order in Karamoja, huggo and laBf report, 22 
December 2008, p. 103.
44 interview with mr. joseph outeke, superintendent of Prisons, moroto.
45 Access to Justice in Northern Uganda, ohchr report 2008, p. 20.
46 ibid.
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as mentioned, the congested justice process has contributed to a lack of confidence in the system and is a key 
factor in the continuing popularity of ijs in many areas of the country. in Karamoja, for example, frustration with 
the police and prison system has led some communities to disregard their role and services all together. this is 
particularly in response to the police’s mixed record of being able to handle the serious problem of cattle raiding 
that has threatened livelihoods and the security of the region for many decades. 
across ethnic groups in uganda, concepts of ‘justice’ vary, as do perceptions of whether justice is adequately 
administrated through the formal justice mechanisms. reasons that point to the preference for informal systems 
by some populations within uganda are the inefficacy of the formal system as well as the idea that ‘justice’ is not 
necessarily served by giving people prison sentences. communities may feel there are better, more expeditious 
ways to administer justice. indeed, the moroto prison superintendent explained that mob justice was a big chal-
lenge in the region. he added that traditional courts needed ‘boundaries’ and that the jurisdiction of formal justice 
systems and ijs need to be clarified and subsequently enforced.
the Paralegal advisory service (Pas), a pilot scheme that was introduced to uganda in 2005 with inspiration from its 
malawian parent, is aimed at providing legal advice and assistance to remand prisoners and those in conflict with 
the law. the presence of Pas paralegals working in Kitgum prison appeared to be making a positive contribution 
in helping to address the many bottlenecks in the formal system. nevertheless, paralegals report the challenges of 
resistance to them from the police and some prison officials, as well as high corruption levels. all of these factors 
hinder access to justice. Based on modest yet largely positive results thus far, using paralegals to provide linkages 
between formal and informal systems may be a constructive focus area for programme initiatives in the future.
Women and JuveniLes in prison 
overall statistics for uganda indicate 96 percent of prisoners are male and 4 percent female. Women prison cells 
are kept separate from the men, although there is no separation of detainees incarcerated for capital offences 
as opposed to minor ones, of juveniles and adults, nor between those in remand and those serving sentences. 
according to ugandan law, execution of persons under 18 is prohibited. however, a recent case was brought to 
light of 17 juveniles who have been sentenced to death in uganda’s luzira prison, but cannot be executed because 
the offenses were committed when they were below 18.47
dispute resoLution through the LocaL  
counciL court system
centraL region & muKono district
in the central and southern regions of uganda, the lc court system is the main conflict resolution mechanism 
for solving community disputes. mukono District in central uganda, an area representative of the region, was 
selected for the study of the local dispute resolution mechanism provided by the lc courts.48 it is a district where 
the lc court system appears to be widespread and functioning comparatively well. the central and southern 
regions have remained relatively peaceful for the past 20 years, and the formal state justice system here has been 
able to develop without disruption, unlike in other regions of uganda such as the north and the northeast. this 
allows for an assessment of the linkages between the lc courts, formal state courts, and other state actors under 
‘normal’ circumstances. 
47 ’17 children on death row’, the new Vision, 15 september 2009: http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/694877
48 the selection of mukono District was mainly based on input provided by the local partner organisation fhri and the unDP, 
unicef and unifem country offices.
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unlike other regions of uganda, the lc court system in the south and central regions appears to have taken over 
the traditional mechanisms and is the only functioning local dispute resolution mechanism, besides more informal 
family dispute resolution.49 none of the respondents in the selected case study area ascribed any role to other 
traditional or customary dispute resolution mechanisms; this is partly due to the predominantly urban setting as 
well as the relative success in the establishment of the lc courts across mukono District. 
mukono District has an estimated population of 1,114,30050 and 56 percent of the population is under 18 years of 
age (26 percent below the age of five). the District is made up of four counties and has four urban areas recognized 
as municipalities. District headquarters are located in mukono town. the district has 28 sub-counties, 144 parishes 
and 1,119 villages, which in principle means the same number of local councils and courts. mukono town is one 
of uganda’s fastest-growing urban areas. the political head of the town is the mayor, elected for a five-year term. 
the supreme policy-making organ in the town is the town council, composed of 28 elected councillors who serve 
four-year terms.
the LocaL counciL court system
the local councils, established within the local government system, have ‘quasi’ legislative and judicial functions. 
they have concurrent jurisdiction with the lower magistrate courts in civil matters and petty criminal offences. 
they are by some seen as fundamental to the nature of justice in uganda and as the most instrumental institutions 
for law and order.51 
as mentioned, the lc court system was established as a system falling within the category of elected/appointed 
local government officials with adjudicative functions, though legislation in recent years has modified this picture 
somewhat. the lowest level (lc i at the village level) is the court of first instance, and the lc courts formally form 
part of the judiciary. the statutory framework for the lc courts comprises the constitution, the local government 
act and the local council courts act. Whereas their procedural and structural foundation is based on statutory law, 
their substantive foundation is customary law and by-laws passed by the local councils. many describe the norms 
applied by the lc courts as a mix of common sense and customs of the area.52
civil society, in general, perceives the lc court system to be part of the formal state system and not as an informal 
justice system. however, jlos representatives in general view the lc court system as more of an informal system 
along the lines of other informal systems led by civil society and more traditional systems as seen in the north and 
northeast of uganda.53
the lc system (originally known as resistance committees) was established during the nrm guerrilla war (1981-
1986) to provide ‘government services’ to areas that were not reachable at the time. the local councils were 
thought to bring needed discipline and were perceived as more accessible and effective than the formal system 
in relation to geographical distances, costs, and the passing regulations adapted to local conditions. following 
the end of the conflict, they were formalized and spread out across most parts of the country. in the process of 
introducing the local councils nationwide, the old order of appointed local chiefs was dismantled. in 1988, formal 
regulation was put in place and the previous powers of the chiefs were transferred to the local councils.54 the 
lc courts were included in the local government structure in the ‘resistance councils and committee (judicial) 
49 interview with irish embassy, october 2009.
50 figures according to 2002 national census.
51 see, for example, Bruce Baker, ‘multi-choice policing in uganda’, Policing & Society, Vol. 15, no. 1, march 2005, pp. 19-41.
52 interviews with lc i, lc ii and lc iii representatives in mukono District, october 2009.
53 comments during interview with irish embassy (jlos donor lead), law Development centre and jlos institution representatives 
in Kampala, october 2009.
54 oloka-onyango, 1989, odoki, 1994 and Baker 2005.
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Powers statute’, which tied the courts to the local government administrative system. thus, the courts became 
part of the structure of the executive committees. the statute was changed to the executive committees (judicial) 
Powers act in 2000, which was replaced in 2006 by the local council courts act 13.55 this act separated the local 
council executive committees and the judicial powers for the lc iii courts. 
Besides its court function, the duties of the lcs at the lc i-lc iii levels include passing by-laws based on the com-
munity’s needs, mobilization of the community in law and order matters (including, for example, the establish-
ment of night patrolling units), law enforcement through local administrative police, and other related functions.56
some of the lc court informants interviewed mentioned patrolling at night as one of the positive ways the lcs 
contributed to establishing law and order in the community.
the local councils operate at the local government levels from village (lc i) through parish (lc ii) to sub-county 
(lc iii) levels and lc iV and lc V for division and town level. the lc V is responsible for the entire district. the lc 
courts iii, iV and V are at the same level, and from the lc court iii level appeals go directly to the chief magistrate. 
a number of acts give powers and responsibilities to the lcs and lc courts within different areas and include: 
the children act, the land act, the community service act, the Public health act, and the national environment 
act. a weakness is that the texts of these acts, however, are not always available to the lc courts, but can only be 
accessed at the district level. the laws applied in decisions by the courts are primarily the by-laws passed by the 
relevant local council, which have to be in accordance with the constitution.57 the lc courts can apply customary 
law as long as it is not in violation of statutory law, but notably do not specify which customary law and how it is 
to be applied. the act and the regulations are primarily concerned with the procedural aspects; it is not outlined 
which customary law should apply, for example, in disputes between individuals belonging to different communi-
ties and customs. 
most stakeholders generally assess the lc court system as a potentially effective structure for ensuring access to 
justice due to its accessibility, simplicity of procedures and requirements, cost, speed and emphasis on reconcilia-
tion and compensation.58 the most recent evaluation of the system carried out in 2006 provided an overall positive 
assessment of the system despite the identified weaknesses and challenges.59
according to users and other stakeholders interviewed, people prefer to go to the lcs because of the reconcilia-
tory approaches typically used and because they trust the lcs more than other institutions. the police acknowl-
edge that, in minor criminal offence cases, people will approach the lcs first and tend to turn to the police only 
if the lcs fail to solve the matter. however, family matters are sometimes brought to the police by women rather 
than to the lcs in instances where the woman might fear that her case will not be treated impartially. 
Jurisdiction of the LocaL counciL courts
the subject matter jurisdiction (referred to as legal jurisdiction in the act) of the lc courts includes civil matters 
and civil disputes governed by customary law (customary tenure land, marriage and divorce, identity of customary 
heir), violations of the by-laws passed by the lcs, and matters specified under the children act. the lc courts can 
order various types of relief in deciding these cases, including reconciliation, declarations, compensation, restitu-
tion, costs, apology, attachment and sale, and, in the case of breach of by-laws, impose fines, community service60
or other penalties authorized in the by-laws.
55 given the change to multiparty system in 2005.
56 interviews with lc i, lc ii and lc iii representatives in mukono District, october 2009.
57 interviews with lc i, lc ii and lc iii representatives in mukono District, october 2009.
58 interviews with donor representatives and justice sector representatives, Kampala, october 2009.
59 joint survey on local council courts and legal aid services in uganda report, unDP & legal aid Basket fund, july 2006.
60 an order of community services for both adult and children has to be endorsed by the chief magistrate.
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jurisdiction in criminal cases involving children61 includes affray, common assault, bodily harm, theft, criminal tres-
pass, and malicious damage to property. in addition to placing the child under guidance and supervision by a 
person appointed by the court, the court can order reconciliation, compensation, restitution, community services, 
apologies, and cautions. the lcs have to follow special procedures when handling matters involving children, 
which will be discussed in further detail below. legal representation is only allowed in the lc courts in matters 
concerning the violation of by-laws and cases involving children. in matters involving children as victims, cases are 
meant to be referred to the family and children court through the lc iii courts.
the lc courts’ jurisdiction in civil matters is restricted by a monetary value of 1 million shillings; it has no restrictions 
in matters governed by customary law. however, where compensation is awarded exceeding 500,000 shillings, the 
case must be referred to the magistrate courts that are authorized to reduce the amount.62 to the extent these 
procedures are followed, the informal and formal systems as such are highly interdependent. 
the majority of cases handled by the lc i-iii courts relate to land, theft, assault (often alcohol-related), and family-
related matters such as domestic violence and child/wife maintenance. the lc is do not have a formal legal man-
date to handle land disputes, but typically attempt to solve matters amicably before referring them to lc ii-iii courts 
or the District commissioner. according to lc officials interviewed, it is typically matters outside their monetary 
jurisdiction, or serious criminal cases, that are referred to higher levels of the lc system or the police, respectively. 
participation & gender
the lc i and lc ii courts comprise all members of the executive committees at the village and parish levels, respec-
tively, directly elected in local government elections. for lc iii, iV and V courts, the five members are appointed by 
the sub-county local council, on recommendation by the executive committee. for the lc iii, iV and V courts, the 
act and regulations determine that at least two of the five members shall be women, and if the chairperson is a 
man, the vice-chairperson shall be a woman, and vice versa.63
addressing gender representation in the local councils and courts has for the first time made the system more 
accessible for women. however, it is not yet considered to have had a significant tangible impact. there is some 
discussion as to whether these types of ‘affirmative measures’ make a difference within the local context, where the 
social status of women in the family and community continues to limit their independence and decision-making 
power. moreover, if the ‘electorate’ is male-dominated and predominantly subscribes to traditional norms, this can 
also influence how progressive the women elected will be. some have pointed out that the mandatory participa-
tion of women (and disadvantaged groups in general) has helped shift the monopoly of the adjudication process 
away from the typically elder men as traditional dominant actors. although there is little documentation on the 
impact of this so far, it is clear that it does not guarantee an impact on, for example, the bias against women liti-
gants in decision-making processes. this would require a broader shift in the power structure within the society.64 
amongst the women interviewed in this study, there was a general preference for using the lc system over the 
police. respondents indicated that the formal justice system was not seen as an option at all. in a focus group 
discussion in mukono, respondents indicated that it did matter to them that there were women in the lc, as they 
understood the needs of women better. unlike the police, the lcs were said to appreciate the general preference 
to solve matters through reconciliation and/or compensation for the woman and her children, rather than punish-
ment of, for example, an abusive or neglectful husband.65
61 over the criminally responsibly age of 12 years.
62 section 10 (2) and (3), local council courts act 2006
63 the local council courts act, 2006 and the local council courts regulations, 2007.
64 see, for example, Kane, oloka-onyango and cole, 2005.
65 focus group Discussion with group of eight women in mukono, october 2009.
352
a
n
n
eX
 s
ev
en
a stuDy of informal justice systems: access to justice anD human rights
accountabiLity issues and poLitics in the LocaL counciL court system
although established by law, many ugandans show acute awareness of how the lc system was set up during the 
period of ‘movement’ government by the ruling party at a time when other parties could not operate. as such, 
it is also a political system with inherent party political elements. the elections for the local councils involve the 
popularity and standing of individuals in the community, rather than knowledge of the law and justice, and it is 
these representatives who appoint members of lc courts iii and iV. the separation of the executive and legislative 
powers from the judicial powers is seen as a positive development, but it nevertheless remains evident how closely 
related the lc system is to the political system and party politics. 
these issues have an impact on the decisions and orders made by the lc courts. a concern iterated by users, 
representatives of police, and formal justice sector institutions, is that lc officials are often ‘more concerned about 
their votes than justice’, leading to bias and a lack of impartiality in their judgements. this is especially an issue that 
affects women and the poorest in the community. it also has potentially serious implications for politically sensi-
tive issues like land, where the lc system plays a big role in the administration and settling of disputes.66 the land 
issue has also led some donors to exercise caution with regard to full engagement with the lc system. Weaknesses 
of the lc system in respect of land that result from the combination of judicial and executive functions are also 
discussed in the section on land later in this country study.
most respondents, including representatives of government and the formal justice sector institutions, commented 
that the composition of the lc courts leaves them open to abuse of power, especially given the lack of alternatives 
and/or review of their operations and decisions. some government officials interviewed even went as far as to say 
that trust in the system and its long-term survival is dependent on a further separation of executive and judicial 
powers. the potential for abuse of the system as it exists now can, over time, serve to undermine it. this could lead 
to a decrease in access to any dispute mechanism for many communities using the lc system especially in the 
southern and central regions where it has replaced the traditional systems. 
the lc courts are increasingly accused of partisanship and partiality, decreasing their popularity. although the 
lc system is the only available option to most in central uganda, one user explained, “it comes down to a choice 
between the lcs, which might be biased and partial, or to give up on the matter as the lcs are the only option we 
have.” for the majority of people interviewed, the two main options for seeking justice are the lcs and the police. 
the police are generally seen as far away from the community (both geographically and substantively, in terms 
of understanding of issues relevant to the community), corrupt, and therefore biased towards those who can pay. 
the main form of accountability of the lc courts to the community is political accountability through the election 
of councillors. however, political accountability through elections does not address accountability in the daily 
operations of the lc courts and the exercise of the judicial function. as mentioned, lc courts are run by locally (s)
elected (depending on the level) administrators with an adjudicative function, rendering the question of qualifica-
tions less relevant. according to the act and regulations, there are no specific qualifications required for the two 
lower levels. for lc iiis, the main qualifications relate to residency, moral standing, knowledge of the local language 
and english, and the prohibition on simultaneous membership in an executive body (since the amendments made 
in the new act in 2006). informants interviewed for this study point out that the lack of formal training or qualifica-
tions of the officials has an impact on the understanding and ability of the officials to follow regulations.67 thus, 
while the judicial function is exercised in relation to individuals, political accountability is to the community as a 
whole. accountability to individual litigants or defendants can only be through requirements of compliance with 
substantive and procedural rules, and whatever appellatory and disciplinary rules exist in respect of these courts.
66 interviews conducted with users, police and formal justice sector institution representatives, mukono & Kitgum, october 2009. 
67 e.g., interview uganda law reform commission, Kampala, october 2009. 
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one major weakness of the system is the lack of consistency and record-keeping applied by the lc courts, which in 
practice means that there is limited opportunity for a real appeal. recent surveys68 show that a large majority of lc
courts only keep limited and partial records and do not understand the recording requirements nor appreciate the 
need for accountability. this issue was mentioned by the formal justice sector institutions as a serious weakness in 
the lc system when discussing the appeal and monitoring structure.69
While monitoring by the chief magistrate is foreseen in the act as a measure of accountability, challenges in rela-
tion to its practical functioning mean that it is rarely effective in practice. other aspects of monitoring are the 
responsibility of the molg. this aspect is discussed further below in the section on linkages. the lack of substantive 
monitoring and regular review of lcs by the magistrate courts contributes to limiting the protection of human 
rights, especially of vulnerable groups including women and children. Despite an elaborate appeal system, indi-
viduals in vulnerable circumstances are unlikely to appeal decisions made by the lc courts and the powers of the 
lcs in the process can be an obstacle. 
procedures of the LocaL counciL courts
Both the local council courts act and regulations70 include detailed directions on operational matters, the institu-
tion of civil matters and cases of breach of by-laws, as well as the procedures and the remedies applicable in the 
lc courts. in cases where the regulations are silent on procedures for civil and criminal matters, the civil Procedure 
rules and the criminal Procedure code act can apply, respectively. also included in the act and regulations are 
standard forms and formats to be applied by the courts. the instruments have been supplemented by a set of 
guides on local council administration of justice developed by the molg (specifically for the conflict areas in the 
north) with support from unDP.71 the guidelines, however, are sufficiently generic to be useful in all parts of the 
country and have been included in the training of lcs by the molg. 
according to the regulations and the guides, the lc courts should apply principles of natural justice, due process 
and fair trial, and should not pay ”undue regard to technical rules of evidence and procedure’, but rather have the 
matters solved expeditiously. they should adhere to principles of human rights, ethical conduct, natural justice 
and gender sensitivity.72 representation by a lawyer is not permitted before the lc courts except in cases of viola-
tion of by-laws. the lc courts are obliged to take into consideration the principles and guidelines developed in 
the national gender Policy to combat discrimination of women and girl children, as well as the provision of the 
national council for children act on coordination of all policies relating to children.
the language of the lc court is the main (vernacular) language of the area, but the records are meant to be trans-
lated into english as well. claims to the courts can be made orally or in writing to the chairperson. 
the court of first instance is the lc i (village level) for the area in which the case originates. People typically bring 
their cases to the chairperson of the lc court, who will then summon the other members of the court to establish 
a quorum. according to the respondents, the requirement of a quorum is sometimes disregarded in urgent cases 
‘to restore law and order immediately’.73 Parties to the dispute are invited (or summoned) to present their case and 
witnesses from the community are also called when needed. the lc court officials also conduct site visits when 
required, for example, if the case involves land boundary disputes. the proceedings have to take place in daylight 
68 see, for example, joint survey on local council courts and legal aid services in uganda report, unDP & legal aid Basket fund, 
july 2006.
69 interviews with formal justice sector institution representatives in mukono and Kitgum, october 2009.
70 local council courts act 2006 and local council courts regulations 2007.
71 local councils administration of justice – revised guides for local council courts, ministry of local government, march 2007. 
72 local council court regulations 2007 and revised guides for local council courts 2007.
73 focus group discussion with lc i and lc ii officials in mukono District, october 2009.
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(between 6 a.m. and 6 p.m.) according to the act and regulations, but, again, it was mentioned that this rule is 
sometimes disregarded when lcs are involved in an urgent matter, such as a serious fight. 
the 2006 act permits lc courts to make a variety of orders that are binding on the parties in civil suits, including 
for attachment and sale of property, for example. in cases concerning breach of by-laws, they can impose fines and 
other penalties, including community service. the lc courts also possess coercive powers to compel appearance 
of witnesses and to punish perjury. nevertheless, the lc court officials see their role as facilitating an amicable solu-
tion that is in all parties’ interest, and emphasize that the process is voluntary. according to respondents, whether 
the final decision is seen as binding (this varied from lcs i and ii to lc iii level) is not important because the lc 
courts’ solutions are found through a voluntary process in agreement with all parties. 
if the decisions are not respected, the lc courts can call on the police to institute arrests and executions of sum-
mons. according to all lc officials met, this is rarely done. for lc i and ii levels, they would refer a case up in the 
lc system if an amicable solution were not found. the lc iii level, in general, seems to encourage the parties to 
remain at the level of dispute resolution as the lc V (town/district) has an overburdened case-load and generally 
the lcs discourage parties to go the magistrate courts. the lc i through iii levels reported case-loads of up to 20 
cases per month, while the lc V receives up to 120 cases per month. although there are elaborate procedures for 
appeal through the lc system to the chief magistrate, it is clear that parties are discouraged from bringing cases 
to the formal state courts; issues of costs, distances, time, as well as lack of knowledge and understanding of the 
community or parties are emphasized.
the guides produced by the molg are elaborate and provide the reader with information on all relevant proce-
dures for various types of cases and stages. it provides relevant and contextual examples of steps to be taken and 
how to fill out records based on scenarios of civil customary matters. in this sense, the guides appear very useful 
and have been developed with participation of lc court officials. however, both the guides themselves, as well as 
the required formats, require a certain level of english language skills in reading and writing, as well as an under-
standing of the laws concerning responsibilities of the lcs. few lc courts in general appear to have been provided 
with any documents, copies of laws, and the necessary registry books and stationery – a problem for both the local 
courts’ officials themselves as well as other stakeholders and users. 
cost and access issues in the LocaL counciL court system
in the lc courts’ regulations, a fee structure has been determined covering allowances to court members (lc 
iii level) for stationery, on-site visits, and serving of summons. according to the molg, the lc system is built on 
voluntarism and service of the community. therefore, the lowest levels receive no remuneration except for the 
necessary equipment provided by the payment of fees by the parties. lc iii level courts receive a sitting allowance 
through the fees (and the local governments), while lc V levels are salaried. according to the 2006 survey of the 
local courts,74 users and civil society organizations, the fees charged by the lc courts are often higher than the 
prescribed fees, especially at the lower levels. stakeholders and users report that the lc officials, especially at the 
lc i and ii levels, charge higher fees than what is stipulated in the regulations. lc V levels (urban areas) normally 
provide their services for free, but these lcs are provided with salary and office structures.
for many community members, the fees charged by the lower level lc courts can be prohibitive for access to 
justice. this extends to services such as the provision of unofficial, but necessary referral letters (discussed further 
in the following section) for individuals to approach other institutions such as the police or the administrator 
general’s office. equally problematic is that the fees demanded can also create a bias in the lc courts towards the 
party with the most resources. such factors can affect the decision-making process, as well as the prioritization 
74 joint survey, 2006. 
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of cases. typically, women have less access to resources than men and several respondents mentioned that this 
was a contributing factor to lack of access by women despite the enabling formal framework for gender equality. 
in the communities, there is a level of understanding of why the lcs charge higher fees. the situation is blamed 
on lack of financial and material support (locally referred to as ‘facilitation’) of the lc courts by the government. 
the molg encourages the local governments to include lc court running costs as a part of already limited district 
budgets. however, the lack of support and adequate resources is mentioned by all stakeholders as one of the 
issues that lead to corruption and poorer functioning of the lc courts. the molg has delegated administration 
of the lc courts to the district level where the lack of financial and material support of the services is seen as a 
lack of support for the system by the central government. although trust in the system is undermined and acces-
sibility limited for some groups, it is reported to still be the ‘cheapest’ for users, also when compared to the police. 
(although the functions of the police and the lc, including its judicial functions are different in law, many ordinary 
people see the two as alternatives for the solution of their problems in many instances.)
LinKages betWeen LocaL counciL courts and other institutions 
the lc system is a gateway to and from the communities. no initiatives in the community take place that have not 
gone through the lc system75 and community members in practice need letters of reference from the lcs to go 
to other state institutions. in many instances, people will be referred to the lcs from the police or magistrate court 
if they have not notified the lc of the matter first (if the matter falls within the jurisdiction of the lc). this is not a 
formally prescribed procedure, but has emerged as an unofficial functional linkage to ensure that matters are dealt 
with as close to the communities as possible. as it serves to relieve pressure from other institutions, it has slowly 
become a rule enforced by the formal state courts and the police.
During a focus group discussion with a group of women in mukono, all agreed that if a matter needed to be 
taken to the police, they would first approach the lcs, who would then refer them to the police. one respondent 
expressed the following at a focus group discussion with a mixed group of community members: “even if you do 
not trust the lcs and would have preferred to take a matter directly somewhere else, you would still approach 
them first. Who knows what letter of reference you might need from them another time – would they be willing 
to provide that if you’ve passed them this time?”76
the official functional linkages between the lc courts and the magistrates’ courts are written into the act and the 
regulations, with legally established procedures for appeals from the lcs to the chief magistrate. the type of cases 
the lc system is allowed to handle and the threshold for referral to the magistrate courts is clearly defined. more-
over, the supervision of substance through monitoring of case records is clearly placed with the chief magistrate, 
presenting an example of substantial integration between the lc courts and the magistrate courts.
monitoring of Lc courts
however, the functional linkages with the formal justice system and the placement of the lc system as an inte-
grated part of the local government structure present certain challenges when it comes to monitoring, supervi-
sion and the upward accountability of the lcs. While the lcs are integrated in the local government structure and 
thereby fall under the molg, their court function falls under the judiciary. according to stakeholders, this gives rise 
to coordination problems in relation to the monitoring of their work and mandate. it also means that the respon-
sibility for the monitoring and supervision of the lc court function is not clear and not exercised. according to the 
act, the legal mandate to supervise the lc courts lies with the chief magistrate who holds the supervisory appeal 
mandate and is responsible for paying visits to check records and orders issued by the lc courts. lc court orders 
75 interview with law Development centre, Kampala, october 2009.
76 focus group discussions held in mukono in october 2009.
356
a
n
n
eX
 s
ev
en
a stuDy of informal justice systems: access to justice anD human rights
are admitted to the chief magistrate for execution and sentencing. however, such supervision, in practice, is lim-
ited and mostly takes place in the form of review of decisions on appeal. chief magistrates have heavy case-loads 
and limited resources and the sheer number of lc courts in itself presents a challenge. moreover, as the method of 
appointment is entirely different to and separate from the judiciary, there is little sense on either side of belonging 
to the same overall structure. in many instances, the lc courts refrain from referring cases to the chief magistrates. 
this can be ascribed to the lc courts’ role as a gatekeeper in determining which cases should ‘burden’ the formal 
court system, as well as to being a way of keeping control over community matters.
the local government structure also has a monitoring responsibility for the lcs, but, given the number of lcs (at 
all levels) and the limited resources available within local government budgets, the monitoring of the lcs is not 
considered a priority. the lc iiis report to the District commissioner, but it is not clear whether these reports are 
followed up on; none of the lc officials interviewed had received any monitoring visits. 
anecdotal evidence through interviews with representatives of the judiciary as well as other jlos institutions 
and civil society representatives77 suggests that record-keeping is a general problem. consequently, for the cases 
that are actually appealed, the records sent to the chief magistrate are often insufficient, which leads to tensions 
between the lc system and the magistrates. the judiciary generally views the lcs more as an informal mechanism 
than as a part of the judiciary and is critical towards lc officials when it comes to following procedures and respect-
ing their jurisdiction.
under the jlos programme, joint monitoring visits are conducted with the molg. however, the purpose of these 
visits is to monitor implementation according to jlos programme indicators, rather than general monitoring and 
supervision of the operations of the lc court system. one discussion was held with civil society organizations that 
provide training to lcs on children and juvenile detention. in discussing monitoring of lc courts, it appeared that 
all actors involved in strengthening lc operations were monitoring according to their own (programme) indica-
tors. no efforts had been made to coordinate and consider a joint indicator and monitoring framework. ultimately, 
this means that the lc court system is operating independently and without measures for quality assurance of the 
justice that is delivered through this system. this is recognized by all stakeholders as a major weakness of a system 
that, in principle, is the preferred (and for some the only) dispute resolution alternative to the majority of ugandans. 
in some areas, the lc system is operating in the absence of strong links to other institutions that could strengthen 
its operations, such as the police, probation officers, and the judiciary.
the official functional linkage with the police relates to summons and arrests, and referrals of criminal cases that 
are beyond the jurisdiction of the lcs. from other studies and reports as well as interviews in this study, there is 
indication that the police enlist the assistance of lcs for summonses and arrests. although the police are typically 
contacted in serious criminal offences, it is usually the lcs that bring ‘suspects’ to the police. the police representa-
tives interviewed see the lcs as a useful ‘gatekeeper’ to the community and an important component in providing 
communal peace and security, especially through initiatives such as community watch. the type of assistance lcs 
can provide the police with in terms of knowledge of community relationships, individuals, and other information 
relevant to criminal investigations is seen as extremely valuable.
a main concern of the police with regard to the lc system relates to lcs exceeding their jurisdiction. Defilement 
cases are the most frequently mentioned problem in this regard. rather than referring defilement cases directly 
to the police, lc officials will frequently deal with the cases themselves, thereby overstepping their jurisdiction. 
another example, mentioned by many, is the confiscation of property and other valuables until debt is paid off, 
77 interviews held in Kampala, mukono and Kitgum on october 2009.
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or in some cases ‘remanding’ the defendant until the family has paid the debt.78 the police representatives inter-
viewed mentioned that arresting and charging lc officials would be the correct measure to combat the problem 
of lcs overstepping their jurisdiction. however, no recent examples were given and these types of arrests do not 
appear to be made often, if at all. in interviews with stakeholders, areas of tension in the working relationship 
between the police and the lcs were mentioned. as members of the community, lc officials see the police as 
removed from the community context and potentially corrupt and biased towards the rich and powerful. more-
over, amongst the lower levels of the lc courts, there is limited understanding of the principles relating to evi-
dence in criminal matters, as well as to the police bond system; lcs often see the release of an accused person as 
an expression of corruption in the police rather than due process.
another concern relates to the fair trial principles stipulated in the framework for the lcs; in practice, lcs’ handling 
of cases does not live up to these standards. impartiality, as discussed above, is a major issue in relation to the lc 
system and is mentioned by users and other stakeholders. although all lc officials interviewed mentioned impar-
tiality as important, frequent reports of abuse of power are registered both through surveys and by the molg and 
the judiciary.79
human rights issues reLating to Women
many cases that proceed through the lc system are issues that specifically affect women and have a direct impact 
on their social, economic and physical security in ugandan society. these issues include land and inheritance 
rights, domestic violence, and sexual and gender-based violence, which will be addressed in detail in a later sec-
tion in this report.
the constitution of uganda prohibits discrimination of women in laws and customs, and customary law can only 
be applied if it does not violate constitutional guarantees and statutory law.80 the lc courts are to apply customary 
law as well as statutory law when resolving matters. this places the lc courts in a difficult position between apply-
ing customary law and following statutory law. this is often done with limited knowledge of laws and in cases 
where potential conflict is greatest – namely, in issues that relate to the status of women.81
Domestic violence is viewed as a family matter by both lcs and many of the women interviewed, rather than a 
criminal matter to be brought before the police. in bringing cases forward, the main aim for the women is to stop 
the violence. only if the intervention by the lc courts is seen as ineffective will they go to the police. some women 
in focus group discussions nevertheless emphasized that lc officials are from the same community, and biases 
against women can occur given traditional structures and the social standing of men in the community. With the 
requirement to obtain a letter from the lcs before going to the police, women often find themselves in difficult 
situations with limited possibilities for action. the ‘victim support units’ visited reported heavy case-loads, but still 
underscored the problem of real access by women in need. 
on the other hand, when the lcs do take cases of abuse and violence brought by women and a solution is found, 
implementation is strengthened by the fact of the solution having been achieved within the community. 
78 anecdotal evidence from other studies suggests that lc courts are also handing out sentences beyond their powers relating 
to corporal punishment, expulsion from the community and (short-term) imprisonment and detention. none of the informants 
interviewed in this study mentioned that the lcs in their area had handed out such sentences, but they had all heard of lcs that 
were still handing out sentences, especially corporal punishment, as part of their sentencing. all informants, however, were also 
aware that this was not according to the rules governing the lcs. 
79 ibid. interviews conducted with the molg and representatives of the judiciary in Kampala october 2009. 
80 constitution of uganda 1995 (article 33(6)).
81 see, for example, Kane, oloka-onyango & tejan-cole, 2005, and celestine nyamu-musembi, 2008.
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issues reLating to chiLdren in the LocaL counciL courts
any case brought to the lc courts by a child or ‘person of unsound mind’ has to be instituted by the ‘next of kin 
or next friend’ in the name of the child or individual. it is not clarified in the act, regulations or guides whether 
account shall be taken of the age of the child in this regard, and it appears from interviews conducted that chil-
dren will always be represented by an adult family member. although the children act clearly defines a child as 
any person below 18 years, in practice, the age of a child is less clear within the community context. civil matters 
involving children are mostly taken up as a family matter and for the family interest.
the lcs have an obligation to ensure the welfare of the children in their area, with special emphasis on the protec-
tion of their rights to property of their parents. it is also the duty of the lcs to ensure that children are protected 
from discrimination, violence, abuse and neglect. emphasis is put on reconciliation and mediation efforts between 
children and their guardians. 
for matters involving children accused of a crime, a child is defined as above 12 and below 18. there should be 
no cross-examination and the process should be as informal as possible. all decisions should take into account 
the guiding principles of the children act (including the welfare principle and rights of the child). in addition to 
reconciliation, compensation, restitution, community service, apology or caution, a guidance order can be issued. 
the lc courts cannot order remand of children accused of breaking the law.
the children act provides for ‘fit persons’ to be appointed; probation officers and civil society organizations see a 
potential for the lc system to play this role. this would help to avoid having to send children to district remand 
homes far from their communities. civil society organizations have provided training to lc officials as ‘fit persons’; 
nevertheless, lc officials, in general, remain hesitant to get involved in juvenile cases and diversion.82
cases relating to children are conducted in camera, with only the lc court officials and the parents or guardian 
present. the probation and welfare officer should be present as well, but, in practice, this is not always the case.83
in fact, it is their belief that, in many instances, lcs do not follow proper procedures and thereby violate the proce-
dural guarantees and rights of the child. a frequently mentioned example of the overstepping of mandates by the 
lc system relates to defilement cases. such cases are often treated as civil customary matters and the procedures 
for referral to the formal system, police, and welfare officers are not followed. With regard to offences relating to 
children as victims (or if they are charged together with adult), the matter should be forwarded to the family and 
children’s court through lc ii or iii.
there is further discussion of issues regarding children in the lc courts in the general section on children (section 
9.3) below.
programming for LocaL counciL courts 
at the time of the study visit in october 2009, lc local elections had still not been held. this meant that, in some 
areas, the lc court system at the village and parish levels was not operational and, in others, that they were func-
tioning without any legal mandate. this situation obviously had some impact on the implementation of program-
matic interventions towards the lc court system.
there is an interest amongst the jlos and the donor group to support the lcs, which the nDP also focuses on, but 
increased monitoring and follow-up will be necessary for further engagement. the inclusion of the lc system in 
the jlos and the judicial reform programme is an indication of the potential importance attached to the system. 
nevertheless, it is important to note that community-based informal or traditional systems and sector-specific 
82 interview with law Development centre, Kampala and Welfare and Probation officer in mukono, october 2009.
83 interview with Welfare and Probation officer, mukono, october 2009.
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adjudication bodies such as the institutional framework set up under the land act have not been mentioned in 
the programmes.84 With the new nDP, more focus has been put on the latter, which is important for the scope for 
linkages and complementarities. for the effective functioning of the system in other regions, such as the north and 
northeast, how this interlinks with traditional and other community-based mechanisms remains to be assessed, as 
does the scope for complementarity between the systems. 
education and training
With unDP support, the molg has carried out training for lc courts across uganda; however, this training was not 
given to all levels of the system. the training sessions were given by molg and mainly focused on legislation and 
procedures. the sessions did not address adjudication in substance matters, such as land disputes – a major area 
of concern to the communities and the lc system. as there is little monitoring of the lc system and no follow-up 
and reporting on the training, the process for further support to the lc court system has been delayed. in addition 
to the molg and unDP initiatives, some ad hoc training sessions have been implemented in the central and north 
regions by local and international ngos. such efforts, however, are not necessarily coordinated with the molg 
and other initiatives. in addition, the human rights commission has provided training to the lc courts on human 
rights, judicial powers, administration of justice and vulnerable groups, but no follow-up or monitoring activities 
have been included. the training is ongoing due to the relatively short tenure of the lc officials.
it should be pointed out that few lc court informants were knowledgeable about the substance of the amend-
ments to the 2006 act and the subsequently revised regulations. some of the lc court informants reported that 
some training was provided by the ministry of local government, but far from all of those interviewed had partici-
pated. moreover, they were provided with copies of some laws by the ministry, but had never received any training 
in the interpretation and application of these laws. continued training of lc officials is a clearly identified need. 
however, it is necessary to incorporate such activities into a more coherent framework where follow-up activities are 
linked with the feasibility to provide necessary support to the lcs through supervision, guidance and monitoring. 
informants in the communities generally pointed to their lack of adequate awareness of the powers and mandate 
of the lcs. this hinders the communities’ ability to demand and secure accountability of the lcs. most know little, 
if anything, of the legal framework on powers and regulations of the lc court system, including the latest revisions 
from 2006. 
overaLL findings on the Lc court system
the lc structure at the local government level is largely successful in providing law and order and access to a 
local dispute resolution mechanism. Besides the potential partisanship and politicization of the judicial function, 
the main issue surrounding the lc system is operational (including training, human and financial resources, and 
monitoring). the system has the potential to provide official functional linkages to the formal system. the legal 
framework, regulations and the guidelines for how to operate in accordance with constitutional guarantees and 
statutory laws are in place and should be implemented. however, as discussed, there are numerous challenges to 
ensuring the implementation and control of this dispute resolution mechanism at the community level. a more 
thorough mapping than currently exists on the type of justice provided by lc courts and their use by communities 
is needed, as well as consideration of the potential of providing justice through a mechanism that, at this level, is 
so closely linked to the executive branch.
the formal recognition and elaborate legal framework for the operations of the current system are seen as strengths 
and an unexploited resource for providing tangible access to justice to the communities. lcs are largely operating 
84 see Dr. celestine nyamu-musembi’s, Review of Experience in Engaging with ‘Non-state’ Justice Systems in East Africa, institute of 
Development studies, sussex university, 2003.
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according to the same values as the formal system with its legal framework, normative basis, and regulations, and are 
therefore open to change. such a mindset provides a potential platform for strengthening the system. many stake-
holders also point to the potential of the lcs’ role in the administration of juvenile justice and diversion mechanisms.
While some of the major issues relating to the lcs concern the effects of poor administration and operational 
problems, there are also issues relating to substantive deficiencies. an in-depth mapping of the system and its 
potential as well as the development of programming initiatives will have to distinguish between the two. 
it is evident that the lcs have a large number of current as well as potential responsibilities. in areas where the 
system functions well, it plays a key role in providing law and order to communities and is able to deal with the 
spectrum of issues that affect them. the ‘success’ of the system is built on its outreach and the fact that it derives 
from the community. it is a reward in itself to be elected by the community to help address local issues of concern 
and disputes. 
these positive aspects should, however, be balanced with an acknowledgement of the weaknesses of a system 
that is build on voluntarism and relatively short terms of office. When respondents mention lack of resources 
(‘facilitation’) of the lcs as a factor that contributes to undermining the system, it is unsurprising that lc officials 
are hesitant in taking on additional responsibilities. the scope for making use of this outreach and trust within the 
lc system for a larger number of areas in uganda, while enforcing stricter standards for record-keeping, administra-
tion and reporting, has to be balanced with commensurate resources available. 
dispute resoLution in northern uganda – 
achoLiLand
the post-confLict north
northern uganda comprises, in part, the sub-regions of acholi, lango, and teso. for the purposes of this study, 
focus will be on the acholi sub-region that includes gulu and Kitgum districts, known collectively as acholiland 
(due to the dominance of the acholi ethnic group numbering over 700,000). this region of uganda has experi-
enced the longest insurgency on the african continent, one that has devastated the region and spilled over into 
southern sudan, eastern congo, and the central african republic.85 the conflict between joseph Kony’s lra and 
the gou began in 1986 and led to displacement of over 80 percent of the population in the region. an untold 
death toll, an estimated 30,000 children abducted by rebels to act as soldiers, sex slaves, and carriers, and 1.8 million 
people living in iDP camps were some of the consequences.86 the roots of this conflict are manifold and beyond 
the scope of this research, as are the legacies of related conflicts in the north that extend across the sub-regions 
and ethnic groups. nevertheless, it is clear that political mishandling of power, periods of protracted conflict, and 
the marginalization of ethnic groups, from colonial times to the present, play a significant role determining how 
dispute resolution is addressed.
after the 23 years of internal conflict between lra and the uPDf government forces, the justice system in this 
region faces serious challenges. the juba Peace talks between the ugandan government and the lra began in 
2006 and, by the end of 2008, had resulted in the signing of a number of agreements entitled ‘agenda item 2 on 
comprehensive solutions to the conflict’ and ‘agenda item 3 on accountability and reconciliation’, which set a 
framework for a justice policy in the north. the government has since charged the jlos with the responsibility of 
designing a national transitional justice policy. in mid-2008, the third national jlos forum on transitional justice 
85 tradition in transition, Beyond juba Working Paper no. 1, july 2009.
86 Quinn, joanna r., ‘social reconstruction in uganda: the role of customary mechanisms in transitional justice’, Human Rights 
Review, july 2007.
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raised questions on the relationship between the formal and informal accountability mechanisms and how the 
two systems should and could be integrated to secure lasting peace as is mentioned in the juba Peace agreement 
as well.87 although transitional justice is not a focus of this study, it is an integral part of the discussion of justice and 
the relation between formal justice systems and ijs in this region. how these issues will be handled in a strategy 
for the north will have an impact on the relation between formal and informal justice in the country as a whole 
and on national legislation and programmatic initiatives. some of the issues raised at the national level relating to 
transitional justice will therefore be included in more detail below. 
Justice systems in the north
after a longer period of no lra activity, a tangible peace has descended upon the region and the question of 
which justice mechanisms – formal, informal, transitional, restorative – should be used to address past and current 
challenges to justice is a salient one to ensure a durable peace. During the two decades of conflict, atrocities were 
committed both by the lra, known for its killings, mutilations, abductions, forced recruitment of children, and 
sexual violence, and the uPDf, including extrajudicial executions, torture, rape and forcible relocation. more than 
three quarters of the population in northern uganda were displaced; many were living in iDP camps for protracted 
periods. moreover, a new acholi generation was born in the camps. this population has known no life outside 
the camps and many members of it distance themselves from traditional acholi culture and norms. in 2008 and 
2009, as the people in northern uganda began to return to their homes, the issue of land began to pose a major 
challenge to peaceful integration back in the acholi villages. customary land boundaries (that had never been 
documented) have become disputed and seen as ‘unresolvable’, as many of the elders who knew the boundary 
lines were killed during the war. the issue of land will be discussed in-depth in a later section in this study. northern 
uganda is now more stable than neighbouring Karamoja; however, its societal and judicial fabric remains fragile 
and complex. 
the formal justice system had always been inefficient and inaccessible to most of the rural population in this 
region. however, during the two-decade long conflict with the lra, the formal system in the north ceased to 
function all together. courts closed, as did police posts, and police deployment was limited as a result of an inabil-
ity of police officers to assure their collective safety. subsequently, many of the law and order functions became 
militarized as they were taken up by the uPDf. lc courts also filled the vacuum that was left, and the reliance of 
the population on lc courts for resolving issues outside their jurisdiction remains apparent today. even in the iDP 
camps, it was not uncommon for lc chairpersons to be elected as camp leaders. at the same time, it was not 
uncommon that elders ‘doubled’ as lc officials.
the resilience of local justice mechanisms to continue functioning during the protracted conflict should not be 
overlooked. over the years of chaos, atrocities and lawlessness, lcs remained the one link. it is even argued by 
some that lc courts remain the ‘backbone of access to justice in war affected areas’. for instance, in Pader District 
during the war, lc courts were handling 100 percent of disputes. in other areas, the figure was 90 percent.88 in the 
transitional process following the war, lcs were accorded ‘more powers’ to help restore order; communities had 
faith in them and had no formal institutions, including the police, which left them inadequately represented. With 
relative peace and stability since 2007, the additional powers granted to the lcs are being rolled back.89 however, 
the complaints levied against the lcs in today’s post-conflict period, including lcs exceeding their jurisdiction and 
not following correct procedures, illustrate that the system remains a flawed one. training has remained the key 
intervention for improving the quality of lc adjudication and dispute resolution and the molg and unDP have 
therefore emphasized training programmes for lcs on this region. 
87 jlos, report on the third national jlos forum – 30 july 30 – 1 august 2008, p. 4. 
88 justice resources, Law and Disorder: The Impact of Conflict on Access to Justice in Northern Uganda, november 2004, p. 31.
89 interview with ohchr, Kitgum, october 2009.
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the World Bank study on land administration and disputes in the north90 found a gradual decline in the number of 
disputes being solved by the clan and family institutions during the period of displacement. this was largely due to 
the geographical scattering of clan and family head of households and a weakening of the community structure. 
at the same time, the number of land disputes dealt with by the two lowest levels of lcs increased. the reduction 
in clan and family cases of land dispute cases declined even further upon iDP returns. lcs, however, continued 
to receive the same number of cases. at the lc iii level, case numbers increased as the system began to func-
tion according to its statutory mandate in land disputes. however, the percentage of land disputes being solved 
through the traditional system remains substantial and the lc system relies on assistance from the traditional 
system for advice (especially on land boundaries) and as witnesses. the World Bank study therefore recommends 
that the role of the traditional system as well as the lcs (at all levels) be clarified and properly integrated into the 
statutory system. land disputes are one of the areas where the formal justice system often refers cases back to 
the traditional system and is therefore seen by some as an example that could assist in other areas, especially with 
regard to the relation between formal and informal justice in transitional justice.91
dispute resoLution by achoLi traditionaL authorities 
Prior to colonial rule of uganda, traditional leadership tended to be grouped by family, clan or chiefdom. such 
groupings continue to be the organizing social structure today. identification to one’s clan (kaka), family (dogola) 
or household (ot) is said to remain central to acholi individual and collective identity.92 in acholi, the traditional 
leadership is organized within an institution called Ker Kwaro Acholi, headed by the acholi paramount chief. a 
council of traditional leaders is made up of ‘Rwodi’ (currently 53 individuals who hold hereditary posts) who elect 
among them the ‘LawiiRwodi’. the ‘LawiiRwodi’, in turn serves as head of traditional authority for his lifetime.93 By 
contrast in the lango community, the traditional authority is organized under the lango cultural foundation and 
headed by the paramount chief, the ‘Won Nyaci’. in keeping with the norm across uganda, the paramount chief is 
a non-hereditary elected post.
While both the acholi and langi have elaborate traditional dispute resolution systems, the acholi system is report-
edly the most developed. the systems are both based on the structure and organization of the clans and function 
alongside the formal justice system. how they are used to settle serious conflict depends on the severity of the 
violence involved in a specific case. the traditional system, in addition to hearing cases and deciding on verdicts 
(as in the formal system), will also focus on cleansing and reconciliation. even in matters involving death, where the 
perpetrator has been sentenced by the formal system, she or he will still go through a process of cleansing, rec-
onciliation, and payment of fines in the traditional system.94 During an interview, the grade i magistrate in Kitgum 
explained that the fine imposed for intentional murder is twelve head of cattle, while the fine for unintentional 
murder is six head of cattle. most fines for offences according to the traditional system are paid in cattle rather than 
money. however, with cattle harder to come by in the region, there has been a gradual move towards monetiza-
tion of the fines. 
an acholi belief in the ‘living dead’ and divine spirits influences the notions of justice and reconciliation. these 
spirits (‘jok’) play an important role in the world of the living. they guide the acholi moral order and, when a wrong 
is committed, they can bestow misfortune and illness (‘cen’) on the community until the elders take action against 
90 World Bank, Post-conflict Land Policy and Administration Options – The Case of Northern Uganda, 2009.
91 interview with michal otim, acholi elder and minister in the cultural center of acholi, october 2009.
92 justice resources, law and Disorder: the impact of conflict on access to justice in northern uganda, november 2004, p. 31.
93 international alert, p. 44.
94 World Bank, ‘Post-conflict land Policy and administration options – the case of northern uganda’, 2009.
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the offender. 95 as a consequence, the acholi discourage troublemaking due to the fact that consequences of mis-
guided actions affect the broader clan or community. there is a strong emphasis on the need to live in harmony 
with others and maintain good social relations.
as is often cited and analysed by researchers and academics the world over, the acholi people have a long and 
vibrant history of traditional customary practices and notions of community justice. acholi culture promotes tra-
ditional conflict resolution through reconciliation ceremonies that involve the acceptance and reintegration of 
those considered guilty of crimes back to the community. ‘Mato oput’ (drinking the bitter herb) is an acholi mecha-
nism of reconciliation aimed at restoring the relationship between clans that have been affected by either an 
intentional murder or accidental killing. typically, this takes place with the slaughtering of a sheep (provided by 
the offender) and a goat (provided by the victim’s relatives); the animals are cut in halves and exchanged by the 
two clans to share together along with drinking the bitter herb, oput. a payment of compensation usually follows, 
in the form of cows or cash. many acholi believe that the mato oput process can bring true healing in a way that 
formal justice cannot, particularly as it does not aim to establish an individual’s level of guilt, but rather seeks to 
restore the social harmony that has been disrupted within the community.96 the process also involves active par-
ticipation and deliberation by the entire conflict-affected community and acknowledgement by and forgiveness 
of the perpetrator of the crime.
another common ritual is ‘Nyono Tong Gueno’ (‘stepping on the egg’), a ‘cleansing ceremony’ traditionally intended 
to welcome home family members who have been away for an extended period of time. in the current context in 
northern uganda, it is performed on those returning from the bush either as ex-combatants or from lra captiv-
ity. an estimated 20 percent of those returning in this way have participated in such traditional practices of their 
own volition.97 other similar ceremonies included ‘Monya Kum’ (the cleansing of a body) for persons returning from 
captivity and ‘Mono Piny’ (cleansing of an area), which involves goat sacrifice to appease ancestors and cleansing 
an area of evil spirits where war-related massacres occurred. 98
the systems, however, also include a punitive/retributive element with punishments, such as caning, meted out for 
certain offences. in cases of murder, however, the practices aim at preventing further violence such as revenge kill-
ings or mob justice. again, the focus is therefore on reconciliation (e.g., mato oput) and can include the exchange 
of a girl-child to the victimized clan, where her first-born will be a ‘substitute’ for the murder victim.99
While these practices have come to symbolize the broader system of traditional justice in northern uganda, it 
should be underscored that today (given that so many were killed, including elders, in the past 20 years of conflict) 
traditional linkages have become weaker as the younger generations are not as adherent to tradition and custom-
ary laws. moreover, the fragmentation of communities due to decades of displacement and war has left behind 
an extremely fragile and eroded social fabric that cannot possibly function or be regulated in the same way it did 
prior to war.
main issues reLating to the traditionaL achoLi Justice system
Despite the prevalent use of mato oput, research conducted by tim allen found little widespread enthusiasm for 
it or other similar ceremonies, citing some acholi people who believed that such public rituals were useless and 
were only concentrated in urban centres. his research also revealed that other ethnic communities, such as the 
95 Patrick tom, ‘the acholi traditional approach to justice and the War in northern uganda’, august 2006, 
96 tom, 2006. 
97 erin K. Baines, ‘the haunting of alice: local approaches to justice and reconciliation in northern uganda’, The International Journal 
of Transitional Justice, Vol.1, 2007, p. 113.
98 ibid.
99 interview with ohchr, Kitgum, october 2009.
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langi, madi, and itesots, were also dismissive of these rituals in today’s context. allen further asserts that there are 
inherent problems associated with equating social healing rituals with ‘justice’ and questions of who has the right 
and authority to speak for the acholi people on issues such as rejecting the icc and the national justice system 
for mato oput. 100
concurring, nakayi argues that a majority of lra fighters were abducted minors, who neither knew much about 
acholi rituals nor experienced them during the two decades of war. in addition, she notes that many non-acholis 
live in northern uganda and have also been greatly affected by the lra conflict, but have little knowledge of 
acholi traditional practice and its relevance to them. she adds that traditional mechanisms are sanctioned by the 
community and therefore tend to be focused more on the community than on the individual.101 acholi notions 
of forgiveness and reconciliation are indeed central to their culture. nevertheless, given the types of crimes that 
a community is faced with after decades of brutal war, this notion of forgiveness and reconciliation is assumed to 
apply to all individuals in the community. allen argues that the acholi’s capacity to forgive may be overestimated 
by researchers, journalists, humanitarian aid agencies, acholi elders and religious leaders. moreover, this approach 
to forgiveness overlooks the nature of personal choice in forgiveness and disregards the idea that some victims 
may want retributive justice over traditional forgiveness.102
this highlights the issue that the scope of informal justice mechanisms may be limited and highly context-specific 
to each community in uganda. informal mechanisms that apply to the acholi in Kitgum may hold little or no 
resonance for the Karamojong in Karamoja, nor the Baganda in the central region. even within one community, 
the acholis’ mato oput may be relevant to addressing traditional serious crimes within their society, but perhaps 
not suitable to apply to ‘untraditional’ crimes such as the mass atrocities committed by the lra (not least, it can 
be argued, because mato oput requires acquaintance with perpetrators and their participation in the ceremony, 
which is often not possible when crimes were committed by lra members in villages other than their own). on 
the other hand, national mechanisms and those within the formal justice sector may be more broadly applicable 
and legally legitimate to post-conflict settings, but can lack de facto legitimacy or on-the-ground support. added 
to this, the blurred line between perpetrator and victim in wars such as with the lra, particularly when children 
are involved, means that criminal trials and a retributive justice mechanism may be inappropriate when taking 
into account the specifics of this particular conflict. nevertheless, some argue on the basis of recent studies that, 
although traditional justice is practiced with variable frequency, it is respected in principle and, given the short-
comings of the formal justice system, is valued in its ability to deliver and its accessibility to the community.103
transitionaL Justice in northern uganda and the reLation be-
tWeen Justice systems
Based on literature reviewed for this study and interviews conducted in Kitgum, a clear divide exists between 
advocates of traditional mechanisms such as mato oput and those who feel it has lost its relevance, especially 
in northern uganda’s post-conflict context. on the one hand, there are those who believe, given the absence of 
a strong formal system in uganda as well as the limited scope of prosecutions such as those under the icc and 
the national justice system, that mato oput has value in being promoted both as an informal justice and transi-
tional justice mechanism. others, though, argue that the acholi traditional approach is inadequate for dealing 
with cases that involve grave human rights violations and violations of international law. those who support tra-
ditional mechanisms argue that international courts, such as the icc, do not help in restoring relationships, while 
100 tim allen, Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord’s Resistance Army (london, new york: Zed Books, 2006) as 
referenced in nakayi, 2008, note 7, p. 167. 
101 rose nakayi, ‘reaching out for justice and reconciliation in northern uganda: the Proposed War crimes court and traditional 
justice’, university of notre Dame, center for civil and human rights, Working Paper no. 5, Winter 2008, p. 23
102 allen, pp. 129-133.
103 ‘tradition in transition’, Beyond juba Working Paper no. 1, july 2009, p. 5.
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traditional justice approaches have played a significant role in reintegration of returnees and former combatants 
into the community. however, oversimplification of this dichotomous debate with the icc and international law, 
on one side, and mato oput and traditional systems, on the other, is unhelpful, as it does not provide room for 
layered responses or the acknowledgement that the various systems of justice are not mutually exclusive. the role 
of the ordinary national justice system is sometimes forgotten in this discussion. the discussion recently taken up 
under the jlos transitional justice sub-committee and the national forum is more nuanced and focuses on how 
the traditional practices and mechanisms, as they are written into the peace agreement, can complement the 
national justice system and its structure.
for this to happen on a large scale and to reconcile thousands of perpetrators and victims, modifications would 
have to be made to the traditional mechanisms. it could be argued that communities lack the capacity to imple-
ment such a complex task. however, the government is greatly mistrusted by a majority of the population in 
northern uganda and too much government interference in a traditional system runs the risk of threatening local 
trust and consensus that the informal reconciliation processes rely on to be effective.104 an integrated approach 
using a combination of justice mechanisms over a period of time may be one way forward. however, adequate 
funding, prioritizing and sequencing of this combination would be key to its effectiveness. 
transitional justice does warrant a brief discussion, given that traditional and informal justice mechanisms play a 
significant role in the peace-building process. the purpose of transitional justice in restoring post-conflict justice, 
legitimacy and legality, is to allow for processes of acknowledgement, forgiveness and reconciliation to encourage 
trust and rebuilding of society. transitional justice mechanisms encompass notions of retribution and punishment 
such as the use of trials, criminal tribunals, or the icc, as well as restorative efforts such as truth commissions, use of 
amnesty, reparations or an apology. uganda has used a number of transitional justice mechanisms since the nrm, 
led by President museveni, came to power. truth commissions, an amnesty act, the establishment of a specialized 
war crimes part of the high court and referral to the icc – this is a combination that has arguably served to com-
plicate and hinder the peacemaking process and transition within the country.105 one challenge to the efficacy of 
using such varied mechanisms in the ugandan context is that there is a lack of emphasis on the linkages across 
these justice mechanisms. rather, each initiative has been seen as having a specific purpose. there is also the ques-
tion of how much broad local-level involvement has been integrated into these initiatives. 
in the case of northern uganda, transitional justice processes illustrate the challenges to implementing both 
formal and informal aspects of justice. the unusual use of amnesty in uganda for lra members as an incentive to 
end the war with government forces, coupled with the 2003 icc referral of the lra by museveni, appears to show a 
contradiction: amnesty was seen as an alternative to retributive methods, while referral to the icc foresaw criminal 
investigation and subsequent punishment.106 as discussed in this section, traditional approaches to dealing with 
perpetrators of crime focus on the wrongdoing of the individual and the party harmed. they engage in a process 
of restorative measures and compensation. this clearly is more complicated when multiple individuals are the 
perpetrators and there are countless victims and affected families.
in the context of northern uganda, the discussion on how to deal with fragmented and traumatized communities 
in addressing past atrocities, while ensuring the current safety and security of a population, is an important one. 
the type of justice that should be applied to perpetrators of crimes during war that allow for a society to move 
on and heal in a post-conflict context is different than the everyday justice needed for a functioning law and 
order system within a community. in northern uganda today, the need for both exists simultaneously. however, 
104 scott Worden, ‘the justice Dilemma in uganda’, usiP Briefing, united states institute of Peace, february 2008, p. 10.
105 ‘Peace first, justice later: traditional justice in northern uganda’, refugee law Project, july 2005, p. 17.
106 ibid., p. 4 
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addressing both types of justice needs is complex and requires careful sequencing.107 During the short stay in 
Kitgum, it became apparent that the focus of both donors and implementers so far has been on everyday justice 
and the restoration of law and order. little headway has been made thus far on how to approach justice for crimes 
committed during the lra conflict and donors appear to support differing priorities of what issues need to be pri-
oritized in the region. long-term stability and societal rebuilding will depend on adequately addressing the latter 
based on the needs of the communities.
there has been a strong push from the government to develop a national transitional justice strategy, which is 
currently being drafted under jlos and is supported by many communities themselves, stemming from commit-
ments delineated in the juba peace agreement. this process would translate to an eventual national law on ijs, 
traditional mechanisms and transitional justice processes. 
programming in northern uganda
in the few years following the end of the lra conflict, northern uganda became the recipient of numerous donor 
and ngo initiatives aimed at addressing the gamut of post-conflict justice issues that remain in the region.
Key initiatives relevant to justice and human rights being undertaken by the un agencies and programmes 
include the mass sensitizations on human rights conducted by ohchr in Kitgum and gulu regions. the ohchr 
is also focused on capacity-building of key stakeholders who play a role in human rights, community policing, 
human rights investigations, and in the coordination of human rights protection agencies. the ohchr also con-
ducts human rights investigations in the area through individual cases, community monitoring and detention 
monitoring. unicef and unfPa are currently working on gender-based violence programming in the region, with 
a specific focus on post-rape care. unicef’s program approach for 2010 onwards will focus on access to justice 
for children as well as transitional justice and reconciliation. in april 2010, unDP, WfP and Who launched a joint 
recovery Project in the post-conflict north, with a focus on improved livelihoods, enhanced capacity of local gov-
ernment, and peace-building and conflict prevention.
other ngo initiatives include that of laP and fiDa, which provide legal services, primarily in Kitgum and through 
outreach visits. War child canada has a limited legal aid programme. nrc provides legal aid and counselling, espe-
cially in relation to land matters. advocates international gave training to senior lango cultural leaders on out of 
court dispute resolution. 
Programming implications:
  an immediate need to address land issues in northern uganda – a key element to a durable peace in the north
  a two-pronged approach should be considered and financially supported that addresses transitional justice 
and law and order initiatives simultaneously (not prioritizing one at the expense of the other)
  technical expertise needs to be strengthened in the process of creating a tj strategy and national law that 
ensures an adherence to the principles of natural justice, due process and non-discrimination. 
  fact-finding and analysis of the traditional value systems and how they square with human rights principles is 
essential (ohchr has already started discussions on this initiative).
  effective programming initiatives are needed to address the police challenges to fulfilling their mandate for 
cases outside lc jurisdiction.
  Direct monitoring and evaluation and impact analysis of programming are essential. 
107 see refugee law Project Working Paper, no 17., 2005, which argues that peace needs to come before justice, examining traditional 
justice mechanisms in northern uganda. 
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dispute resoLution in northeast uganda – 
KaramoJa
Karamoja, situated in the northeast of uganda bordering sudan and Kenya, is an arid, sparsely populated region. 
Karamoja comprises five districts: Kaabong, abim, Kotido, moroto, and nakapiripirit, spread over a 27,900-square-
kilometre territory with a population of just over one million.108 economically and politically marginalized through-
out its history, Karamoja is widely perceived by the rest of uganda as a place of perpetual insecurity, lawlessness, 
marauding warriors, weapons, and cattle raiding. much of these perceptions stem from a lack of understanding 
of the Karamojong context and the history of this extremely isolated part of the country. the Karamojong ethnic 
group dominates Karamoja’s population. unique to this area are the predominance of pastoralism and agro-pasto-
ralism as livelihood methods and the characteristic movement of its population. until recently, Karamoja has been 
sidelined by the government, thus remaining underfunded and underdeveloped relative to the rest of the country. 
an estimated 82 percent of the population of Karamoja live in poverty; the ‘global acute malnutrition’ (gam) rate is 
15.9 percent, well above the international emergency threshold of 10 percent.109 since 2008, President museveni’s 
government has devoted more attention to Karamoja. this section of the study on Karamoja is one that represents 
a region with a prevailing dominance of informal justice and thus provides a rich contribution to the complex 
discussion of bridging the formal and informal mechanisms of justice.
the Justice conteXt in KaramoJa
the historical and socio-political context of the people of Karamoja informs the reasons why and how informal 
justice plays such a dominant role in the region. throughout its history, Karamoja has never fit into the ugandan 
political structure or national identity. the Karamojong see outsiders as responsible for the conflict and insecurity 
that has plagued the region since uganda’s colonial period. on the other hand, given the prevalence of cattle 
raiding among pastoral groups that has existed for generations,110 underpinning the regional insecurity, there are 
those within Karamoja who also bear primary responsibility for contributing to the volatility of security and liveli-
hoods of the Karamojong.111
in 1911, Karamoja was declared a closed region by British colonial administrators who found it difficult to main-
tain law and order; thereafter, the administrators were “able to plunder and repress the local residents at will.”112 
Karamoja was once again declared a closed district between 1930 and 1960113 by the government and has consis-
tently been regarded as separate and lagging behind the rest of the uganda. under idi amin’s reign in the 1970s, 
the Karamojong were forced to wear Western dress and to disarm, leaving them socially vulnerable and unable to 
protect their cattle.114 the flow of weapons from sudan and the fall of the amin regime led to the region becoming 
awash in small arms and light weapons, with the Karamojong substituting guns for their traditional weapons, and 
an escalation of cattle raiding. since the museveni-led nrm came to power in 1986, attempts have been made to 
108 ocha- office of the Prime minister, ‘joint fact sheet on Karamoja: humanitarian and Development realities in the region’, april 2008.
109 ibid.
110 traditionally, raided cattle were used to redistribute wealth and food, acquire bridewealth, and form alliances across families and 
communities. see Knighton op. cit.: Kennedy agade mkutu, ‘small arms and light Weapons among Pastoral groups in the Kenya-
uganda area’, African Affairs 106 – no. 102, 2006, pp. 47-70.
111 elizabeth stites and Darlington akabwai. Changing Roles, Shifting Risks: Livelihood Impacts of Disarmament in Karamoja, Uganda, 
feinstein international center, july 2009, p. 9.
112 charles emunyu ocan, ‘Pastoral crisis in northeastern uganda: the changing significance of cattle raids’, cBr Working Paper no. 
21, june 1992, p. 10.
113 for example, under the 1958 ‘special regions (Karamoja) ordinance act’, the provincial commission had the power to declare any 
section of the region a ‘prohibited area’ closing movement of cattle and humans, subject to collective fines if violated. (this act 
was repealed in 1961).
114 frank emmauel muhereza, Deborah ossiya and irene ovonji-odida. Options for Enhancing Access to Justice, and Improving 
Administration of Law and Order in Karamoja. huggo and laBf report, 2008, p. 12.
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‘restore law and order’ in the region. instead, such attempts were met with resistance from the Karamojong, which 
only served to increase lawlessness.115 the creation of a ministry of Karamoja affairs with the president’s wife, janet 
museveni, being appointed as minster, has meant that more attention is being given to Karamoja and the overall 
security of the region is currently more stable relative to previous years. 
During its periods of confinement as a closed region, the Karamojong evolved their own traditional system of 
governance and administration that was intended to “ensure social harmony and collective survival in extremely 
hostile economic, political and ecological conditions.”116 ijs continue to be preferred by the Karamojong, who 
generally view the ugandan government as both ruthless and unresponsive to their needs. as mentioned, this 
structure emerged largely from the fact that a complete lack of a formal justice infrastructure existed for many 
decades, during which informal mechanisms were predominantly used to solve problems. 
traditionaL authorities 
Within the Karamojong, the main responsibility for maintaining justice falls upon the traditional council of elders, 
known as the ‘akiriket’. there are four kinds of akiriket, each serving a different purpose: a spiritual/ceremonial 
akiriket, and three ‘sub-akirikets’ (a fortune-telling akiriket, one for punishment, and one for offerings/appeasement). 
the frequency with which the respective akirikets convene varies from every few years (ceremonial akirikets) to as 
frequently as needed (punishment akirikets). there is a generational hierarchy within the Karamojong that divides 
the community among the senior elders (the ‘mountains’), the elders (the ‘gazelles’) and the younger generation 
(the ‘rats’). Akirikets are composed of ‘mountains’ and ‘gazelles’ only. the convening of the akiriket is typically done 
under a tree specifically designated for this purpose.
in addition, the ‘ekokwa’, a more formal community court, meets on an ad hoc basis when needed to determine 
matters of justice. the traditional system in Karamoja is such that the equivalent of all the various levels of the 
formal courts system of magistrates’ courts and the high court are fused into one, the ekokwa, and convene at the 
same time and place.117 the ekokwa provides a medium through which punishment by senior elders is decided 
and meted out for errant behaviour committed by a member of the community. the traditional court also enforces 
decisions it has sanctioned for implementation. When the ekokwa is convened, it acts as a tribunal and trial court, 
handling cases on such matters as murder, defilement, theft, and adultery. this traditional court also has the power 
to carry out investigations and to enforce decisions it has sanctioned for implementation.
the appLication of informaL Justice in KaramoJa
the need for justice is encapsulated in the traditional community beliefs in vicarious liability and collective pun-
ishment, which exist across traditional justice mechanisms in most Karamojong ethnic groups. Punishment of a 
crime rather than an individual who commits a crime is practiced among Karamojong communities. this means 
collective punishment may be meted out to an entire village (after a cattle raid, for example), serving the purpose 
of collective atonement for wrongs committed. an individual who has committed a crime is considered unclean. 
until that person is cleansed, typically through a traditional ceremony and/or animal sacrifice, the community will 
avoid association with the person and the ‘conflict’ will remain unsolved. in such instances, retributive methods 
such as imprisonment would not be appropriate from the community’s point of view.
interviews and focus group discussions conducted for this study provided insight into how informal justice is 
applied in Karamoja. as mentioned, it is typically the council of elders (akiriket) or the community court (ekokwa) 
that metes out justice in the community on an ad hoc basis for cases that range from verbal abuse against parents 
by their children, to rape, defilement, or murder cases.
115 huggo and laBf report, pp. 12-13.
116 ibid.
117 options for enhancing access to justice, and improving administration of law and order in Karamoja.
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minor offences are usually dealt with using public corporal punishment. in one example, two boys in the village 
who had engaged in a physical fight were brought to the elders for traditional disciplining. the elders made them 
collect reeds from the river with which they were subsequently whipped as punishment.118 stealing is usually 
punished by being beaten, caned, or whipped by the elders or youth of the community in public. the perpetrator 
may also be required to kill a bull that is then shared with the community. often the perpetrator is also smeared in 
chyme from the animal as a way to ward off bad omens, or is required to eat certain organs of the animal, lest the 
community become cursed.
the typical punishment for committing adultery, either by a man or women, is a fine of 60 cows. however, given 
the severe drought and famine conditions in recent times, most people do not have this many, if any, cows and 
therefore a new system of compensation has recently been decided by the elders. a debt system instituted meant 
that the cows owed can now be paid back in the future during more prosperous times. 
according to elder akiriket members, rape cases brought to traditional authorities are typically dealt with in one of 
two ways: in cases of ‘courtship/engagement rape’, there is no punishment for the perpetrator with the agreement 
that he is required to marry the girl he raped. for cases of ‘rape by a non-acquaintance’, if the accused admits guilt 
for the rape, he is fined and caned by the elders. he is then required to collect alcohol for the elders and kill a bull. 
in addition, the perpetrator’s family would be required to give 10 to 15 cows to the victim’s family. if the accused 
claims innocence, the traditional authorities may consider taking the case to the lc i, lc iii or even the police; the 
elders explained they want to abide by the law and occasionally try to use the formal system.119 in another case, 
involving the rape of a married woman, youth from the village were sent to track down the perpetrator, who was 
brought back to the village and severely beaten. he was then required to kill a bull as punishment and to take a 
large ram and a bag of ‘snuff’ (tobacco) to the parents of the victim to ask for forgiveness, after which the case was 
considered solved.120
traditional punishment for murder is a sentence of death for the perpetrator. the death sentence can be carried 
out in three ways: (1) during the rainy season, the perpetrator is taken to a river and drowned; (2) hanging by rope 
from a tree, or (3) beating to death of the perpetrator by his/her family. the latter is reserved for repeat offenders 
and is seen as punishment given to benefit the clan as a whole by ridding the community of a troublemaker.121 
this ‘eye-for-an-eye’ philosophy for murder is considered ‘just’ both as a retributive punishment for a crime com-
mitted and as a way to protect the community from future crimes that would have been committed by that same 
perpetrator. it is also seen as an effective deterrent mechanism for others who may potentially commit offences.
Despite the traditionally powerful position akiriket elders have held in administering ijs, elders reported problems 
with youth in their communities who increasingly do not respect or abide by the justice administered by the 
elders. this may be one reason why not all cases are reported to the traditional authorities. one participant of a 
youth focus group in this study provided an example of settling a murder case without involving the traditional 
authorities. in this case, an intoxicated man shot at three youths from the village, killing one of them. the two who 
survived reported the incident to the family of the deceased youth, who in turn went to the family of the perpetra-
tor and confiscated 150 cows; the family kept 60 of the cows, which they considered just compensation for the life 
of their son, and returned the remaining cows to the perpetrator’s family. this case was then considered settled.122
in a case that illustrates the conflict between traditional and formal justice, a youth was given the death penalty 
by the traditional authorities for committing a rape in the community. upon his death, his family reported the case 
118 female focus group discussion, lpoutiput Village, Badunget sub-county, moroto (24 october 2009).
119 elders focus group discussion, lokilala Village, nadunget sub-county, moroto (24 october 2009).
120 ibid.
121 ibid.
122 youth focus group discussion, lokilala Village, nadunget sub-county, moroto (24 october 2009).
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to the police, who then arrested elders of the akiriket, intending to take them to court. however, the elders were 
subsequently freed, as they reportedly paid the family of perpetrator who had been killed.123
at the time of this research, ‘peace talks’ were taking place between three tribes, the Bokora, jie, and mathenik, 
which have had a long-standing adversarial relationship largely due to cattle raiding. the talks were sponsored by 
two local ngos, and women, youth, and elders from all three ethnic groups participated. the talks resulted in a 
‘resolution’ passed that allowed for joint grazing of cattle in the carrels, exchange visits among the three communi-
ties to strengthen relations (in particular for events such as weddings) and, finally, a resolution for punishment for 
anyone caught cattle raiding. it was decided that the punishment for getting caught in the act would be death. 
this severe punishment was agreed to largely because cattle raids continue to be a major livelihood and security 
issue in Karamoja and this was considered to be useful as a deterrent mechanism.124
in the communities interviewed, the perception toward police and the formal justice system was extremely nega-
tive. the focus group held with the elders, all of whom were part of the akiriket, included one respondent who said 
that ‘human rights protects thieves’ because the use of formal justice failed to address their security needs and 
those who were put in jail on remand rarely saw their day in court.125 their frustration with the corruption inherent 
in the system, coupled with the lack of effective policing and protection against cattle raiders and warriors with 
guns, had led them to reject the formal justice system altogether. Women respondents said they knew that murder 
or cases involving severe injuries should be reported to the police, but maintained they did not do this because the 
process involved took too long and they preferred to settle these issues among themselves.
formaL Justice in KaramoJa
a high percentage of the population in Karamoja has little understanding or access to the formal justice system 
and is generally poorly informed of its rights. the high court is located in moroto, which is geographically inac-
cessible to most Karamojong. there is also no magistrate judge based in moroto; therefore, few cases are taken up 
and then only infrequently. the general perception is that, if the Karamojong opt to use the formal justice system, 
they tend to do so for its retributive aspects. they therefore become frustrated with the system when there is no 
outcome or if a perpetrator is set free. Within the formal justice structure, a number of Karamojong interviewed 
prefer the military court, which, although it lacks transparency, has a higher incidence of sentencing those who 
come before it and is therefore perceived as more efficient. the lc court system exists in Karamoja. however, it 
does not play as important a role in justice provision in the region, relative to more urban areas. the elders remain 
the dominant hand in administering justice. in Karamoja, for example, the lc i most often sits in consultation with 
the elders when cases are brought to him.
given the ongoing tenuous security situation in the region until 2009, most aid agencies, ngos, and programme ini-
tiatives had avoided operations in Karamoja. however, with phase iii of a mandatory disarmament process in place 
since 2006, and increased government engagement in policing and security in the region, more donors have been 
shifting their work to this part of the country. this has meant that, in the past year, donor attention and resources 
previously diverted to conflict-ridden Kitgum and gulu in the north are now beginning to flow to Karamoja.
programming in northeast uganda
the needs of the region are manifold and many of them are acute. Key among them is the basic need for survival 
in a climate that is harsh, a geography that is remote, and an ongoing period of drought and hunger that exacer-
bates cattle raiding and road ambushes. unDP has initiated five broad projects in the region aimed at promoting 
123 interview with Patrick osekeny, unfPa office, Karamoja.
124 elders focus group discussion, lokilala Village, nadunget sub-county, moroto (24 october 2009).
125 ibid.
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livelihoods, income generation for women and youth, capacity building of local government, infrastructure devel-
opment, peace-building, and cross-border sudanese and Kenyan dialogue. un agencies such as unfPa and 
unicef are addressing the challenges that women and children face in Karamoja associated with polygamy, bride 
price, domestic violence and lack of access to education. there are also ngos working in the areas of water and 
sanitation and veterinary medicine.
as mentioned, President museveni’s wife has also been appointed a special minister to Karamoja, drawing increased 
attention to the previously politically ignored region. on the government side, initiatives for the region include the 
Karamoja integrated Disarmament and Development Program (KiDDP), operating out of the office of the Prime 
minister and the minister of Karamoja affairs. this is supported by Danida’s human rights and good governance 
Program. among its objectives are the strengthening of traditional cultural institutions and the implementation of 
the legislative and judicial powers of local Karamoja governance.
With a recent increase in military and police presence (including a special Police constabulary) in the region, 
the government of uganda has signalled an interest in treating Karamoja as part of uganda after many years 
of disengagement. 
Programming implications:
  there is a need to adopt programming approaches specific to Karamoja – the region should be considered 
not just as a part of uganda (in that it deserves government attention and resources), but also as a special case, 
given its history, remoteness and specific ethnic and cultural demography. ideally, programming should be 
based on initiatives that come from the Karamojong themselves, rather than decided at the national level or 
determined by donors. 
  the sequencing of program initiatives is essential to this region of uganda; focusing on ijs programming in 
itself without regard to the context of what may be most needed – such as immediate access to food and 
livelihoods – would be short-sighted and would undermine the effectiveness of any engagement with ijs. as 
a result, programming recommendations here include non-ijs and non-justice elements.
  integrating a focus on livelihoods into programming is key for the immediate term in Karamoja, considering 
that basic human needs for survival are barely being met among the population. this, of course, links to peace, 
security and justice issues. a focus on livelihoods can lead to a discussion of justice provision in relation to these 
livelihood issues.
  there is a need to thoroughly document existing ijs in Karamoja in order to inform justice-related programmes 
in the future.
  Peace-building opportunities and intervention need to be seized upon now, given the relative, though 
extremely tenuous, stability that has prevailed since 2009. 
  the issue of education, especially of girls (who are often stigmatized if they go to school), needs to be addressed. 
human resources (and thereby capacity-building in general) are a problem in the region due to extremely low 
literacy and education.
  Building of needed infrastructure should also be linked with capacity-building of human resources. 
  Disarmament alone is not the key to improved security; there is a need for programs to address the underlying 
causes of what purposes weapons serve in Karamojong society. 
  improving the effectiveness of policing and building community trust in Karamoja is also key.
  although programming should emphasize a holistic approach, replication among donors and agencies should 
be avoided and therefore it is perhaps best that each agency focus on one specific area of intervention in coor-
dination with other actors.
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 local solutions and gradual change. how to improve and change the life of the Karamojong without endanger-
ing their cultural and societal integrity should be a central consideration.
  sexual and gender-based violence is a serious problem in Karamoja, and since programming interventions are 
just starting there, such initiatives including sensitizations should be prioritized.
Women and chiLdren 
uganda is signatory to all relevant international conventions on women and children. article 31 of uganda’s consti-
tution delineates women’s rights at the national level. children’s rights and freedoms are also recognized in the con-
stitution and specifically in the children act. normatively, women and children have recognized rights in uganda 
drawn from various legal instruments and its constitution is credited for being one of the most gender-sensitive on 
the african continent.126 however, in practice these rights continue to be undermined by factors such as harmful 
cultural practices, internal conflicts, poverty, and patriarchal power structures.127 as with many pastoral communi-
ties, insecurity plays a major role in undermining women and children’s rights, freedoms and prospects. in uganda, 
the threats to women and children arguably are most acute in the north and north-eastern regions, due to the his-
tory of conflict as well as threatened livelihoods. these contexts continue to directly affect vulnerable groups.
a discussion on women and children in ijs is useful in illustrating the complexity of implementing policy and 
developing effective programming within such differing cultural and societal contexts. as mentioned, gender 
inequality is prominent in uganda, despite its progressive constitution and legal framework for protection for 
women and children. lack of implementation of laws relating to women’s and children’s rights means that assur-
ance of these rights remains elusive for the majority in uganda.
LegisLation reLating to Women and informaL Justice
uganda’s Domestic relations Bill is aimed at consolidating all national laws relating to marriage, separation and 
divorce, as well as marital rights and duties. the bill addresses issues such as the age of marriage and the right to 
negotiate sex, adultery, and martial rape. the Domestic relations Bill would set the minimum age of marriage at 
18, prohibit female genital mutilation (fgm), and criminalize marital rape and widow inheritance.128 it remains a 
controversial piece of (proposed) legislation due to its challenging of traditional and cultural norms, in particular 
those relating to marriage and domestic violence. officially drafted in 1987, a revised version that included provi-
sions on polygamy was put before Parliament in 2003. the bill was rejected by Parliament that year and again 
in 2008. the bill remains in draft form largely due to strong opposition from religious and traditional leaders, as 
well as some government officials; President museveni, for example, stated in 2006 that the bill “was not urgently 
needed”.129 renewed efforts by civil society advocating for speedy adoption of the bill were made in 2009, but have 
so far been unsuccessful.
although this controversial amalgamation of laws, essential to ensuring the full realization of rights for women in 
uganda remains in draft form, several individual pieces of legislation pertaining to women’s rights particularly in 
the context of traditional customs and practice exist. uganda is a majority christian country, yet has a significant 
muslim population. the issue of application of islamic Shari’ah law, alongside customary law, is much debated in 
the country, particularly concerning proposals that legislation governing christian, hindu, and traditional mar-
riages should not apply to muslim marriages. 
126 Birabwa-nsubuga, christine, Women Under Customary Marriage in Uganda: A Critical Look at Their Property Rights at Dissolution, 
Danish institute for human rights, 2006, p. 14.
127 ‘social justice amidst complex realities: Protecting the rights of children and Women in a traditional Pastoral community – the 
case of the Pokot in northeastern uganda’, transcultural Psychological organization report for Dan church aid, 2008, p. 15.
128 the practice of a woman being inherited by a member of her husband’s family, should he die.
129 ‘uganda: Domestic relations Bill Would save lives’, human rights Watch may 31, 2005. online: http://www.hrw.org/en/
news/2005/05/30/uganda-domestic-relations-bill-would-save-live
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customary marriage
the customary marriage (registration) act from 1973 defines customary marriage as “a marriage celebrated 
according to the rites of an african community and one of the parties to which is a member of that community”.130 
section 2(4) of the act states that customary marriages may be polygamous. under section 11 of the same act, the 
age for customary marriage is 16 years for a female and 18 years for a male. marriages of children under these ages 
are void. section 32 states that, if either party is under the age of 21, “the written consent of the father, or if he is 
dead or of unsound mind, of the mother, or if both are dead or of unsound mind, of the guardian of the party, must 
be produced [and] annexed to the affidavit as aforesaid before a licence can be granted or a certificate issued”. in 
practice, there may sometimes be a misunderstanding on the part of some families and officials that section 32 
allows fathers to override the minimum age for marriage as set out in section 11. Parties to a customary marriage 
are required to register their marriage within six months of having their marriage ceremony or they are considered 
to commit an offence and are liable for a fine up to 500 ugandan shillings.131
bride price
a 2007 court case to abolish bride price, a standard component of customary marriage in uganda, was rejected in 
2010 by a four-to-one ruling by uganda’s constitutional court.132 By ruling in favour of bride price, the practice in 
which the groom and his family pay an amount in property (typically cattle), wealth, or money to the bride’s family 
in exchange for her hand in marriage, remains legally protected in uganda. this includes the requirement of the 
return of a bride price to the husband in cases of divorce or dissolution of the marriage. the women’s rights ngo, 
mifumi, that had submitted the case before the court argues that the practice violates the ugandan constitution 
guaranteeing the equal status of women in society and is degrading to women and that the demand for return of 
bride price as a condition for divorce causes domestic violence.133 the ugandan government and the international 
community have recognized that bride price, in the absence of the right to refuse on the part of the wife, is a form 
of slavery that should be abolished.134 the draft Domestic relations Bill does not prohibit the payment of a bride 
price, but such payments would no longer be essential for formalization of customary marriages and demands for 
return of ‘marriage gifts’ would be considered an offence.135 the Domestic relations Bill also attempts to address 
the issue of full consent by the bride for marriage, thereby helping reduce the cases of women and girls sold for 
bride price by their parents. 
During this research, a rare customary marriage ceremony was observed136 in Karamoja between a Karamojong 
warrior and his bride, who was to become his fourth wife. a significant part of the ceremony involved continued 
negotiation about cattle for the bride’s family, which had previously been established at a bride price of 86 head of 
cattle. the bride did not participate in the negotiation and was not seen during the ceremony. her family carried 
out the negotiations of bride price; only when this was agreed to did the marriage officially proceed. 
130 Part 1(1) customary marriage (registration) act, 1973, chapter 248. ugandan legal information institute
131 ibid.
132 ‘uganda: constitutional court rules in favour of Bride Price’, 27 march 2010: http://www.allafrica.com
133 research findings show that 60 percent of those interviewed wanted reform of the bride price custom, while 28 percent wanted 
to abolish the practice altogether. the vast majority of respondents believed there was a connection between bride price and 
domestic violence. (Bride Price roundtable on constitutional Petition, uganda, may 2009.)
134 see supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery, the slave trade, and institutions and Practices similar to slavery, 
acceded to by uganda in 1964. cited from Von struensee, p. 20.
135 Vanessa Von sruensee, ‘the Domestic relations Bill in uganda: Potential for addressing Polygamy, Bride Price, cohabitation, marital 
rape, Widow inheritance, and female genital mutilation’, 2008. 
136 customary wedding ceremonies are reportedly seldom held today in Karamoja because most Karamojong men cannot afford the 
bride price required; there are few cattle to give due to the continued severe drought and the cattle-raiding problem.
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poLygamy
Polygamy is a common and legally recognized practice in uganda and permitted for customary and muslim mar-
riages. under islamic law, a man is entitled to marry up to four wives. With the commercialization of marriage and 
the required practice of bride price, having multiple wives is often considered a sign of wealth for a man. for a 
woman, the practice of polygamy is often accompanied by the absence of equitable means for justly allocating 
the respective interests among a polygamous man’s wives, often leading to violations of such rights as the right 
to inheritance and property rights. the Domestic relations Bill proposes that polygamy would remain legal in 
uganda, but would be strictly regulated by guidelines set out in the bill restricting a man to two wives and requir-
ing the economic support for all wives, as well as providing for equal sexual rights and more equitable grounds 
for divorce.137
chiLd marriage
under customary law in uganda, the age for marriage is 16 for a female and 18 for a male. in islamic marriages, 
girls can marry upon reaching puberty, at around 13 years of age.138 the Domestic relations Bill would ban child 
marriages and require that parties for marriage be a minimum of 18 years of age; this would apply to males and 
females and to civil, customary and islamic unions.139 Parents are known in some cases to force their daughters out 
of school into child marriage to raise income from the bride price. economic circumstances reportedly force girls 
to marry at a significantly younger age than was traditionally the norm.140 the risk of teenage pregnancy outside of 
marriage is of course also a factor. the issues of marriage age and of child marriage in this regard are linked to the 
law surrounding defilement. 
inheritance
the succession act dictates the legal mechanisms for inheritance in uganda. under this act, women’s rights to 
inherit from their husbands and fathers are recognized. however, these inheritance rights are not equal to those of 
men.141 the legally married wife and children of a deceased person can continue to occupy the house and farm the 
land, although they do not have the right to control or sell the property and, if a widow were to remarry, her occu-
pancy rights would cease. according to section 28(1) of the current inheritance law, 75 percent of a deceased’s 
estate goes to the children and 15 percent goes to the wife.142 in cases when a woman is part of a polygamous 
marriage, she will inherit even less because all the wives are required to share the inheritance. inheritance matters 
are typically decided on an ad hoc basis or according to customary law. forceful evictions of women (and their 
children) from their homes after their husbands’ deaths is reportedly common in uganda. typically, these decisions 
are made by tribal or religious leaders who are not aware of the formal legal system. this provides one reason why 
statutory laws such as the succession act are often not implemented in practice.143
uganda has a muslim population of 12 percent and islamic law plays a substantial role in the lives of many ugan-
dan women. islamic law, as interpreted in uganda, affords women fewer inheritance rights than men; a widow 
with children is only entitled to one eighth of her deceased husband’s property.144 in addition, while both male and 
137 ibid.
138 Von sruensee, p. 5.
139 ibid.
140 ‘giving out their Daughters for their survival’, refugee law Project Working Paper no. 20. april 2007, p. 44.
141 ‘inheritance legal mechanisms’ fao uganda country report, gender and land rights Database: http://www.fao.org/gender/
landrights/report
142 ibid.
143 rachel c. loftspring, ‘inheritance rights in uganda: how equal inheritance rights Would reduce Poverty and Decrease the spread 
of hiV/aiDs in uganda’, 2007, p. 262.
144 ibid., p. 266.
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female children can inherit property, boys are entitled to receive twice as much as girls. the difference in treatment 
is justified by its upholders as reflecting the different responsibilities of men and women towards their families. the 
question of inheritance rights in islamic law is discussed in other case studies, including on niger.
property-grabbing 
as in many other african countries, property-grabbing in uganda is a widespread problem. Property-grabbing is 
a customary practice whereby, upon a man’s death (typically during the mourning period when the family comes 
together), his relatives literally grab his property for their own. this includes property that the husband had before 
marriage and the property acquired by the husband and wife together. under customary law, property and labour 
belong to the entire family and ‘women, as property, cannot own property’.145 the practice of property-grabbing 
often leaves a widow evicted from her home, with no means to provide for herself or her children. this is espe-
cially a problem for women and children who are affected by the stigma surrounding hiV/aiDs; families affected 
by aiDs-related deaths and especially aiDs orphans are vulnerable to property-grabbing.146 orphans often have 
no one to defend their inheritance rights and dispossession of widows and their children is widespread, due to 
patrilineal inheritance customs in much of sub-saharan africa.147 the pluralistic legal systems that exist in uganda 
have tolerated customary norms that limit or simply deny property and inheritance rights of women and their 
children. the problem is exacerbated where the sense of obligation towards the widow’s upkeep on the part of 
the deceased husband’s family, which was traditionally recognized in custom, has broken down. this problem of 
property-grabbing has been documented in both poor and wealthy families in uganda.148
access to property and Land for Women and chiLdren
ensuring the protection of women’s and children’s rights in practice is a challenge in uganda. traditional sys-
tems that provided some (though generally unequal compared to that of men) protection of women’s claims to 
property and welfare in family structures have been weakened by social change and greater individualism, while 
‘modern’ state-based systems have not been able to take over. the inaccessibility (in geographical, cost and culture 
terms), bias, and corruption in the state courts make it difficult to claim rights to property that are protected by 
statutory law. other agencies of the legal system, such as the police, are also failing to protect these rights. once 
again, this demonstrates that traditional authorities and dispute resolution mechanisms are important to work 
with to protect women’s and children’s rights. however, given the existing bias against women and children in 
the traditional system and the weakening role of traditional authorities and customs that would have given some 
protection to women’s interests today, it is clear that state courts and statutory bodies have an important role to 
play as well. 
research shows that the measures of protection in the statutory laws of property and land upon succession for 
vulnerable groups, including widows and orphans are largely undermined by exemptions for property and land 
held under customary tenure.149 state courts in uganda often apply a conservative understanding of customary 
law as a natural and fixed social order rather than take a progressive and dynamic approach. the courts are quick 
145 ibid., p. 257.
146 Duncan mcPherson, ‘Property-grabbing and africa’s orphaned generation: a legal analysis of the hiV/aiDs Pandemic for 
inheritance by orphaned children in uganda, Kenya, Zambia and malawi’. online at www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/ihrp/hiV_
mcpherson.doc 
147 Birte scholz and mayra gomez, Bringing Equality Home—Promoting and Protecting the Inheritance Rights of Women: A Survey of Law 
and Practice in Sub-Saharan Africa, geneva: centre on housing rights and evictions, 2004.
148 ibid.
149 see, for example, Duncan mcPherson, ‘Property-grabbing and africa’s orphaned generation: a legal analysis of the hiV/aiDs
Pandemic for inheritance by orphaned children in uganda, Kenya, Zambia and malawi’, online at http://www.law.utoronto.ca/
documents/ihrp/hiV_mcpherson.doc and christine Birabwa-nsubuga, Women under Customary Marriage in Uganda: A Critical Look 
at Their Property Rights at Dissolution, Danish institute for human rights, research Partnership 2/2006. 
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to cite custom to promote male authority over land. Birabwa-nsubuga cites a high court judgement overruling 
four lower courts in which it was argued that the children could not inherit land given to their deceased mother 
by their father as it could never have been owned by her – only entrusted in her to use for the family’s benefit. it 
would therefore have to revert to the father.150 this view is supported by a view of women as ‘property’ through 
the payment of bride price. Birabwa-nsubuga cites both respondents from her case studies as well as a judgement 
from a chief magistrate stating that a man can sell off land as he sees fit according to customary law, as both the 
land and the wife are the property of the man.151
however, as many point out, changing laws to ensure the rights of women and children in relation to inheritance 
and succession regardless of custom can cause potential tension and conflict because it potentially undermines 
the power and influence of traditional and local leaders. alienating traditional authorities can have the oppo-
site effect, as they often offer the only viable avenue for relief and protection available to the majority of vulner-
able groups who are threatened by land-grabbing or have their access to land and property limited. World Bank 
research carried out in the teso, lango, and acholi regions of northern uganda concludes that the best way to 
encourage property rights reform in sub-saharan africa, including tenure security for women, is to build on cus-
tomary property systems, not to try to overrule them with statutory regimes.152 others doubt that changes to 
customary local norms rooted in patriarchy can be achieved without pressure from a statutory regime: “given that 
african legislators tend to be sympathetic to the patriarchal values that infuse their societies, and customary lead-
ers are a powerful lobby, it has proven very difficult to pass statutory reforms to protect the property of widows 
and (especially girl) children.”  in 1998, for example, women’s groups in uganda engaged in intense lobbying to 
have a clause requiring spousal co-ownership of land included in proposed land legislation. these activists suc-
ceeded in eliciting a promise from the government to include the clause, only to see it removed in a last-minute 
parliamentary debate”.153
the move towards privatization and the implementation of a national land titling system has been accompanied 
by a sense of increased individualization of ownership. arguably, the protection of women’s use of land under the 
customary tenure has not been replaced by other protection systems; titles are typically held by men through the 
patrilineal line of inheritance, simply maintaining unequal gender power relations that already exist. recommen-
dations emerging from research into land and property-grabbing issues in uganda (and other sub-saharan african 
countries) indicate a need to both emphasize and maintain a role for traditional and local leaders. this applies to 
both the administration of land as well as dispute resolution. legislation should also insist on minimum protec-
tions for children and spouses to all types of property. sensitization and information of statutory laws can also 
assist in slowly changing the customs and practices by traditional and local leaders, given the relatively dynamic 
character of the unwritten norms and approaches to decision-making.
a general lack of knowledge of land and property rights and how to claim them amongst people is mentioned as 
a factor contributing to and exacerbating issues relating to access to land and property for vulnerable populations. 
the studies referenced in this section all indicate that few, including lc i courts, have any knowledge either of the 
law or about such built-in protection mechanisms as the consent clause. even misconceptions such as regarding 
registration and titling as potential means of land-grabbing are very common.154 a later section of this study will 
further address the complex and problematic issue of land in uganda as it relates to ijs.
150 christine Birabwa-nsubuga, Women under Customary Marriage in Uganda: A Critical Look at Their Property Rights at Dissolution, 
Danish institute for human rights, research Partnership 2/2006, pp. 30-31.
151 ibid., p. 34.
152 Post-conflict Land Policy and Administration Options, World Bank report no. 46110-ug, may 2009. 
153 ann Whitehead and Dzodzi tsikata, ‘Policy Discourses on Women’s land rights in sub-saharan african: the implications of the 
return to the customary’, 3 Journal of Agrarian Change 67, 2004, pp. 89, 101, & 104.
154 Post-conflict Land Policy and Administration Options, World Bank report no. 46110-ug, may 2009.
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vioLence against Women
the widespread violence against women in uganda takes various forms, including domestic violence (DV), sexual 
and gender-based violence (sgBV), and female genital mutilation (fgm). legal redress for female survivors of such 
crimes is limited; the slow process of law reform, delays in the formal justice system, limited gender capacity across 
criminal justice institutions, logistical constraints, and inadequate legal aid are just a few of the challenges women 
seeking justice in such cases face.
domestic vioLence
the Domestic Violence act, which was adopted in november 2009 and became domestic law in march 2010,155 
criminalizes marital rape and other forms of domestic violence and puts forth provisions for penalties and civil 
remedies for such crimes. in the act, lc courts are given a mandate to try domestic violence cases. courts are 
required to hear DV cases within 48 hours of an application being filed and the act also provides for the issuing 
of protection orders by the magistrate courts. first offences for domestic violence are punishable by up to two 
years of imprisonment. the inherent challenges to enforcement of this law are evident in the fact that societal 
acknowledgement that rape can occur within marriage is culturally not accepted. this is particularly problematic 
considering that women are often considered ‘property’ of their husbands after they are married. 
Domestic violence has been described as rampant in uganda, affecting some 40 percent of women.156 although 
reliable statistics are difficult to attain, largely due to underreporting of cases, national data has shown that approx-
imately 60 percent of ugandan women have experienced physical violence since age 15.157 focus group discus-
sions held with women for this study support the findings of widespread domestic violence. in one focus group 
in Karamoja, all respondents reported domestic violence in their homes; the women added that this happened 
almost on a daily basis and was something they considered normal.158
the cultural normalcy of domestic violence between husband and wife indicates that changes in attitude and 
behaviour are needed in addition to strong enforcement of formal legislation such as the DV bill to protect women 
from this type of violence. typically, cases of domestic violence are usually ‘settled’ informally within the family or 
with the assistance of a traditional leader. the emphasis tends to be on keeping the family together and solving 
problems to maintain the larger communal harmony. moreover, in cases where domestic violence is reported 
to the police, officers often encourage victims to reconcile with their partners ‘for the sake of keeping the family 
together’.159 the child family Protection units within the uPf that handle domestic violence cases are small and 
have few staff. in some cases, local leaders and the immediate and extended families of both parties are invited to 
the police station to mediate the couple’s reconciliation.160
most cases of domestic violence continue to go unreported. many women say they are afraid to report cases 
of violence, including rape, because they fear hostility from the community. they also fear they will be treated 
dismissively by the police and no action will be taken to help them. in a report to the ceDaW committee, the 
155 upon presidential assent from yoweri museveni, who had previously stated that such types of legislation were not an urgent 
priority. ‘i can’t afford justice’ Violence against Women in uganda unchecked and unpunished’, amnesty international report, april 
2010, p. 17.
156 ‘uganda: Domestic relations Bill Would save lives’, human rights Watch, 31 may 2005. online: http://www.hrw.org/en/
news/2005/05/30/uganda-domestic-relations-bill-would-save-live
157 ‘”i can’t afford justice”: Violence against Women in uganda unchecked and unpunished’, amnesty international report, april 2010, 
p. 27.
158 female focus group discussion, lpoutiput Village, Badunget sub-county, moroto (24 october 2009)
159 ‘”i can’t afford justice”: Violence against Women in uganda continues unchecked and unpunished’, amnesty international report, 
april 2010, p. 40.
160 ibid. 
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government admitted that attitude of police officers towards violence against women remains a challenge.161 in 
cases that are reported, police maintain that it is not uncommon for a woman who reports her partner for assault, 
to subsequently request his release from police custody, saying, ‘What good does it do if he is in jail? the children 
are hungry and not going to school’.162 for these reasons, domestic violence remains a problem largely dealt with 
within the community through informal mechanisms such as negotiation and mediation. respondents in this 
research overwhelmingly said that they would not report domestic violence to the formal authorities, deciding to 
either remain silent or to take the problem to an elder in the community. this underscores the point that domestic 
violence remains seen as a social issue that should be dealt with outside the formal justice system.
seXuaL and gender-based vioLence
the problem of sgBV is a serious one for women and girls throughout uganda. the uganda Demographic and 
health survey found that 39 percent (over one in three) of women and girls aged 15 to 49 years had experienced 
sexual violence during their lifetime.163 most sgBV cases go unreported. as mentioned in a previous section, in 
general, police response to acts of sgBV remains poor, as such cases often are not taken seriously. typically, the 
issues such as sgBV are dealt with traditionally according to local custom and rarely enter the formal justice system. 
Women who have been raped say they often face rejection by their families and others in the community, espe-
cially if she contracts hiV as a result of the violation. Women who do chose to bring formal proceedings after sexual 
assault often bear a heavy burden of proof. forensic evidence and proof of assault are difficult to attain due to the 
lack of knowledge, medical resources and personnel.
rape 
rape is a criminal offence defined under section 123 of the ugandan Penal code as “any person who has unlawful 
carnal knowledge of a woman or girl without her consent or with her consent, if the consent is obtained by force or 
by means of threats or intimidation of any kind or by fear of bodily harm, or by means of false representations as to 
the nature of the act, or in the case of a married woman, by personating her husband, commits the felony termed 
rape.”164 Punishment for a rape conviction is death. attempted rape is considered a felony and is punishable with 
life in prison. although rape is punishable by death, few cases ever go through the formal legal system. a report 
by the Bureau of Democracy, human rights and labour from 2008 noted that, of the 477 rape cases recorded by 
police, only 115 were taken to court, and there had been no convictions.165 however, a Police crime report from 
that same year reports 1,536 reports of rape, of which 241 cases proceeded to court and 52 convictions resulted.166
even given these conflicting figures, the number of cases being reported and taken to court is considered low rela-
tive to incidences of such crimes. if the victim is under 18, the offence is considered a defilement rather than a rape. 
in Karamoja, if a boy rapes a girl, it is termed colloquially as ‘putting her down’. the practice of ‘courtship rape’167 is 
reportedly common in the region. 
defiLement
in uganda, statutory rape is referred to as ‘defilement’. Defilement is defined under the Penal code act as ‘sexual 
intercourse with a girl under the age of eighteen’. the maximum penalty for such an offence is death. attempted 
161 ibid., p. 35.
162 ibid., p. 27.
163 ibid.
164 Penal code act – chapter XiV, section 123. 
165 2008 country report on human rights Practices, Bureau of Democracy, human rights and labour, february 2009. online at http://
www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/119030.htm
166 anPPcan website: http://www.anppcanug.org/?page=ugandans_raped
167 this is a practice whereby a boy or man, upon seeing a girl or woman he desires, will rape her with the intention that she will 
subsequently become his wife, often with the help of friends who hold the victim down.
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defilement ‘with or without corporal punishment’ is punishable with up to 18 years in prison.168 an amendment 
to the Penal code act in 2007 states in section 129(1) that “any person who performs a sexual act with another 
person who is below the age of 18 years, commits a felony known as defilement and is on conviction liable to life 
in imprisonment”, newly defining the crime in gender-neutral terms.169 the amendment of the Penal code act also 
provides a distinction between ‘simple’ and ‘aggravated defilement’. the latter applies if the victim is below the age 
of 14, the offender is knowingly infected with hiV/aiDs, the offender is a parent or guardian or a person in author-
ity over the victim, or the perpetrator is a serial offender.170 ‘aggravated defilement’ is punishable by death, while 
‘simple defilement’ (i.e., defilement of a person below the age of 18) is liable to life imprisonment upon conviction. 
however, despite such legislation and harsh punishment for the crimes of rape and defilement, sexual crimes 
against children continue to be a major problem in uganda, with a reported average of 10,000 children defiled 
each year. in 2008, 8,635 defilement cases were reported to the police. of this figure, 4,124 cases were taken to 
court and 333 convictions were recorded. 171 many cases go unreported to the formal legal system, in many cases 
due to the shame and perceived ‘spoiling’ of prospects for a woman in marriage. cases of alleged defilement are 
only brought to the formal justice system when the ‘perpetrator’ has not given payment or dowry to the family. 
justice is perceived to be better served by negotiating and receiving compensation than through retributive jus-
tice in the formal legal system.172 nevertheless, the tendency of ordinary people to negotiate such cases may be 
founded upon a mismatch between the law and prevailing social norms on the age at which children attain sexual 
maturity. Proper consideration of the issue of defilement requires a distinction in respect of the age of the offender. 
While ugandans favour harsh punishment of adults ‘preying on’ teenage girls, one study found that 95 percent of 
ugandans interviewed disagreed with treating sex among children as defilement, yet this is the effect of existing 
law.173 the law on defilement, especially when it penalises consenting relationships between teenagers of a similar 
age, has been criticized for criminalizing teenagers, burdening the justice and penal systems, and serving more to 
protect the economic interests of parents than the well-being of girls. the uganda child rights ngo network, in 
its 2005 report on uganda’s compliance with the convention on the rights of the child, states that: 
“The law on sexual abuse of children in its present form (amendments have been proposed under 
the sexual offences[/]miscellaneous amendments bill 2004) has also been noted to be biased 
against the boy child. For example a 15 year old boy who gets into a sexual relationship with 
a 17 year old girl is imprisoned while the latter is considered a victim and left free. It should be 
noted that the majority of people on remand for defilement are minors who had been engaged in 
teenage love/sexual relationships. Defilement constitutes over 90% of all capital offences in the 
Chief Magistrates Courts.”174
femaLe genitaL mutiLation 
article 32(b) of the ugandan constitution prohibits “laws, cultures, customs, or traditions which are against the dig-
nity, welfare, or interest of women or which undermines their status”. the female genital mutilation act, adopted 
in December 2009, criminalizes fgm, a practice that is common among a number of tribes, particularly in the 
168 ‘Partial justice: formal and informal justice mechanisms in Post conflict West nile’, refugee law Project Working Paper no. 21, may 
2007, p. 9.
169 ‘Where justice is a Dream: a report of a study of formal and informal justice mechanisms in adjumani‘, refugee law Project, 2009, p. 30.
170 section 129 (4) of the Penal code (amendment) act, 2006 – excerpts taken from annex 2: refugee law Project Working Paper no. 
20, p. 62.
171 african network for the Prevention and Protection against child abuse and neglect (anPPcan) statistics. online at http://www.
anppcanug.org/?page=ugandans_raped
172 ibid.
173 see uganda child rights education network, child sexual abuse and exploitation study report, 2004. online at http://www.
commonwealtheducationfund.org/downloads/documents/uganda child sexual abuse & exploitation study report.pdf
174 accessed at http://www.crin.org/docs/resources/treaties/crc.40/uganda_ucrnn_update.pdf
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southeast and northeast of uganda. the act, which at the time of writing has yet to become national law, provides 
for a maximum prison term of ten years for those who perform fgm and up to five years for those who participate 
in the process. 
the status of Women in KaramoJa and achoLiLand: human rights 
Within informaL Justice systems’ conteXts
understanding the role of informal justice and traditional cultural practices becomes clear when looking at the 
context of women in north and northeast uganda. as discussed in the previous section, legislation does exist on 
protection of women, but a key problem is enforcement of existing laws as a result of dysfunctional mechanisms 
to maintaining law and order. law and policy occasionally promise more than state justice agencies can deliver. 
given this justice vacuum caused by inaccessibility of the formal justice system in much of uganda, it is impor-
tant to acknowledge that informal justice mechanisms have filled a large space in this vacuum.175 in the regions 
discussed in this section, the cultural institutions of elders and traditional leaders, which often mediate conflicts 
between families and communities, and the lc system have played predominant roles in providing alternatives to 
formal justice.
the following section describes some of the challenges women and children face in north and northeast uganda 
and the typical way these issues are addressed through the informal system. human rights issues emerge from 
a prevailing inequality of the status of men and women across different ethnic group contexts and from cases in 
which traditional solutions are applied to what are considered criminal offences. it should be noted that the ijs in 
both regions have emerged during protracted periods of armed conflict and insecurity during which there was a 
complete absence of state law and order and a non-functioning formal justice system. although the situation has 
improved in Karamoja and acholiland in recent years, the restoration of justice has been slow to follow.
Women in KaramoJa 
gender roles among the Karamojong are steeped in tradition and inculcated from a young age. Women are pri-
marily responsible for cooking, cutting firewood, building houses, cultivation, fetching water, and cleaning and 
taking care of the children. men have the general responsibility for keeping the cattle and building the fence 
around the village.176 the separation of male and female roles is defined even down to the specifics of food: there 
are parts of a bull that only women or men are permitted to eat. many community meetings are divided into men 
or women-only gatherings. as mentioned previously, informal justice mechanisms in Karamoja are overseen by an 
elders’ group composed of men.
Despite the many societal challenges expressed by female informants of this study, women were considered pow-
erful by a number of male informants in this research. they view the Karamojong social system as separate but not 
unequal for the sexes. “Women are the dictionary of our culture”, affirmed one elder, and “senior mothers especially 
are consulted on most everything”, he added.177 the fact that, in their traditional justice system, the murder of a 
woman is punishable by 100 cows, compared to only 60 required by the perpetrator if a man is killed, also testifies 
to the respect and value of a woman over a man according to the Karamojong.178 in recent years, where the situ-
ation of drought and starvation has increased, both men and women informants reported more equal male and 
female roles; with no cattle to tend to, men now help women build huts and also play a larger role in childcare. 
175 ‘Partial justice: formal and informal justice mechanisms in Post conflict West nile’, refugee law Project Working Paper no. 21, may 
2007, p. 22.
176 consensus response from female focus group discussion in loputiput Village, nadunget sub-county, moroto (24 october 2009). 
the response from the male focus group was similar, but the men felt that they had additional responsibilities to the women, such 
as surveying land, training oxen, officiating ceremonies and solving problems of the community.
177 Key informant interview with Philip ecumar, Karamojong elder (23 october 2009).
178 ibid.
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however, much of a woman’s status among the Karamojong community remains determined by whom she is 
married to; the wife of a ‘mountain’, for instance, has the most power within the community. her value is derived 
from her status as a wife and mother. the intrinsic value of females is specifically determined within the culture by 
the amount of cattle she is able to bring her family in bride price. once she is married, a woman is considered the 
property of her husband. under uganda’s customary marriage act, there is an implicit assumption that the marry-
ing parties would have equal status. however, this assumption does not take into account that the status of most 
women under customary marriage is typically subordinate to that of the man.179
Within the traditional justice system, the right of women to own property such as land or livestock is not recog-
nized. a woman may be given a milking cow by her husband, but she is not able to sell or transfer any interests to 
another party.180 she is considered to have ‘user rights’ of assets as opposed to the ‘owner rights’ that her husband 
possesses, reflecting the patriarchal organization of society. anecdotal justification for this is that, in most cases, 
because women are ‘acquired’ for a bride price during marriage, she is considered property and, once again, ‘prop-
erty cannot own property’.181 as in other patriarchal societies, in distributing property, a boy is always given more, 
as he cannot acquire inheritance in the same way that a girl might expect to ‘inherit’ from her husband’s home 
upon marriage.182
Domestic violence poses a constant threat to Karamojong women. in a female focus group, the women partici-
pants were asked whether they had experienced violence against them from their husbands, how often, and for 
what reasons. a majority of women raised their hands, responding that they are physically abused on a daily basis. 
the women explained that, in most cases, the abuse is attributed to their husband being drunk, that he was upset 
they did not have food prepared for their husbands’ guests or that there was not enough food for the children. 
according to the women, the solution, if ‘the beatings become too much’, is to take her case to an elder mother 
of the village who will then summon the man responsible and order him to ‘change his ways’.183 all the women 
expressed a desire not to be beaten, although they acknowledge that the stress of living in famine and poverty 
meant that such violence against them was inevitable and expected. notably, the highest rates of gender-based 
violence in uganda are found in Karamoja, along with high rates of fgm and forced child marriage.184 traditional 
courts deal with all cases from family disputes, civil cases and criminal cases, but, as these are councils of elderly 
men, they are not gender-sensitive to matters that come before them. furthermore, domestic violence was gener-
ally not considered a priority issue relative to the myriad problems of survival for many women and their families 
in Karamoja.185 
rape is a serious problem in Karamoja and, in many cases, is not treated as a crime, but is considered part of a 
courtship process or a marriage proposal, known as ‘courtship rape’ or ‘engagement rape’.186 under ugandan law, 
rape only applies to women over the age of 18187 and such cases would be classified as a crime of assault. this is 
because the Domestic relations Bill, which would address crimes such as rape, has been under discussion in vari-
ous forms since 1965 but has yet to be passed.188 according to one informant working on gender-based violence 
in the region, in Karamoja, there is nowhere for women to report rape, and cases almost never go to court because 
179 Birabwa-nsubuga, pp. 18-19.
180 , frank emmauel muhereza, Deborah ossiya and irene ovonji-odida, Options for Enhancing Access to Justice, and Improving 
Administration of Law and Order in Karamoja. huggo and laBf report 2008, p. 79.
181 Key informant interview with Patrick osekeny, gBV District coordinator, unfPa (22 october 2009).
182 Social Justice Amidst Complex Realties, tPo/Danchurchaid, p. 49.
183 female focus group discussion, lpoutiput Village, Badunget sub-county, moroto (22 october 2009).
184 interview with Patrick osekeny, unfPa.
185 ibid.
186 elders focus group discussion, matheniko, lokilala Village, nadunget sub-county, moroto (24 october 2009)
187 rape of a female under 18 years of age is considered ‘defilement’ that ostensibly carries a death penalty.
188 Birabwa-nsubuga, p. 16.
382
a
n
n
eX
 s
ev
en
a stuDy of informal justice systems: access to justice anD human rights
the formal system does not function.189 if a rape case is settled by compensation, it will not be given to the woman 
directly, but rather to her family. in addition, health facilities to provide needed medical evidence of rape are not 
available, and at the time of this research only six health units in the whole of Karamoja had a stock of post-expo-
sure prophylaxis (PeP) kits to protect from hiV, most of which were about to expire.190
the challenges inherent in taking cases to the formal justice system are again manifold: police investigations are 
often inadequately carried out; a lack of any witness protection program means that few if no witnesses typically 
come forward to testify in court; the lack of forensic equipment and staff means that the medical proof required to 
prove cases of rape, torture, and murder, is difficult if not impossible to establish; and, finally, courts are backlogged 
and the processing of cases is slow and can take years.191
Women in achoLiLand
During the protracted war with the lra in the north, civilians were primary targets, especially women and children. 
as mentioned in the introduction, during this period rape was used as a tactic of warfare, women and girls were 
forced into marriage and sexual slavery, and child abductions into the lra army were common. Women’s partici-
pation in warfare under the lra was at an equivalent level to that of male combatants.
as a result of decades of protracted conflict, much of the social fabric of the north was destroyed. the legacy 
of this violence has included the perceived normalization of violence among communities, particularly sgBV, 
weakened communal ties especially in relation to traditional authorities, as well as the loss of land and sense of 
home identity.192 
Domestic violence rates are high in the north, as are cases of sgBV such as defilement. as in Karamoja, most cases 
of DV and sgBV go unreported. although referral of cases to the lc system in the north is higher than in the 
Karamoja region, the preference to settle gender-related cases informally remains prevalent. research has found 
that, in the areas of education and literacy, exposure to domestic violence and family community conflict, young 
females in particular demonstrate more difficulties.193 
189 interview with Patrick osekeny, unfPa.
190 ibid.
191 interview with anthony androa, ugandan human rights commission, Karamoja.
192 During the war, a majority of the population in the north was forced to flee and lived in iDP camps. many of these iDP camps have 
since officially closed, although many continue to live in the camps, afraid to go home or hesitant to get involved in a land dispute.
193 The State of Female Youth in Northern Uganda: Findings from the Survey of War-Affected Youth, sWay, april 2008, p. 2.
383
a
n
n
eX
 s
ev
en
a stuDy of informal justice systems: access to justice anD human rights
the status of chiLdren in uganda
LegisLation on chiLdren – the chiLdren act
the role of ijs – principally the lc courts – in dealing with issues of child justice in uganda is described in the fol-
lowing against the more general background of child justice and protection. reference is also made to the text on 
the lc courts earlier in this report.
the children act, chapter 59 of the laws of uganda, was adopted on 1 august 1997. the act provides among its 
113 provisions the right of children to have legal representation in all matters before a family and children’s court. 
such specialized courts should exist in every district of uganda. lauded as “one of the most elaborate pieces of 
law on children on the continent of africa”,194 the act provides detailed provisions of the treatment and rights of 
children in conflict with the law. this includes provisions from raising the age of criminal responsibility in uganda 
from 7 to 12 years of age, to arrest and detention limitations. the act seeks to ensure access to justice by children 
by consolidating and promoting all laws relating to childcare, protection and child and juvenile justice.
chaLLenges to impLementation of the chiLdren act 
the challenges in the act’s implementation underscore some of the salient issues arising from the roles ijs and 
formal justice play in uganda. customary law continues to be ‘a powerful force’ in uganda and falls at times into 
conflict with certain provisions of the act as well as the international crc.195 in addition, uganda does not have 
the institutions or financial resources to fully implement the provisions of the act. this fact, coupled with the role 
of customary law, means that many of the safeguards provided in the children act are, in practice, not realized. 
ensuring comprehensive justice protection for children requires the active and effective role of justice providers. 
for instance, the uPf is mandated (among other stakeholders) by the act to defend, protect and enforce the right 
of the child stated in many of the provisions. yet, in many cases, they do not live up to their role in protecting 
children and fail to exercise their powers when dealing with such cases. for instance, broad discretionary powers 
are given to the police in the use of diversion from courts; however, such powers are often not exercised due to 
political interference, or fear of retribution from individuals or communities.196
child and family Protection units (cfPus), established in 1998, are mandated by police guidelines to handle all 
cases involving children in conflict with the law. this includes conducting investigations of cases where children 
have been charged with a crime. however, assessments of the efficacy of such units have been mixed. cfPus have 
been criticized for being a dysfunctional extension of the police, lacking in staff capacity and the professional train-
ing needed for such specialized work. a study of one cfPu in Pokot in north-eastern uganda revealed that the 
unit did not have a single female police officer to handle sensitive gender-specific cases such as defilement and 
sexual abuse of girls.197
uganda’s family and children court is the court of first instance for cases that cannot be tried by lc courts. these 
courts have the power to preside over all criminal cases against children, except cases that are punishable by 
death and offences for which a child is jointly charged with a person over 18 years of age.198 in practice, they are 
presided over by magistrates who have to deal with both child and adult cases. although designated as juvenile 
194 lillian tibatemwa-ekirikubinza, Juvenile Justice in Uganda: Operationalisation of the Children Statue, 2003, p. 175.
195 uganda summary and analysis ‘representing children Worldwide’ website: http://www.law.yale.edu/rcW/rcw/jurisdictions/afe/
uganda/frontpage.htm
196 asan Kasingye, ‘role of the Police under Diversion: an assessment, success and failures’. available at http://www.unicef.org/tdad/
ugandapoliceroleindiversion.pdf
197 Social Justice Amidst Complex Realities: Protecting the Rights of Children and Women in a Traditional Pastoral Community – The Case of 
the Pokot in Northeastern Uganda, Danchurchaid, january 2008, p. 51.
198 article 94 of the children act
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courts, magistrates only constitute themselves into this court for the purpose of hearing cases in which children 
are involved.199 this may ultimately defeat the purpose of having such permanent specialized courts. 
article 100 of the children act provides that every case should be handled expeditiously and without unnecessary 
delay. however, the large backlog of cases, the infrequency of court sessions held in some regions, and the lack of 
financing mean that cases often are not processed in a timely manner. the previously mentioned case of 17 juve-
niles who have been sentenced to death in uganda’s luzira prison but cannot be executed because the offences 
were committed when they were below 18, and have subsequently remained in jail for years, is an example of this.200
diversion
although the team did not come across any examples of diversion used in practice during their (admittedly very 
limited) time in the field, diversion is accepted and promoted both in the ugandan constitution (article 34) and 
the children act section 91(9). section 89 (2) specifically empowers the police to dispose of cases at their discre-
tion with recourse to formal court hearings.201 the act places emphasis on the need to divert children from the 
formal justice system and includes practices such as referring their cases to lcs or probation officers or holding 
child offenders in special reception centres for children to avoid detention with adults. opportunities for diverting 
child offenders often may be missed in practice. as mentioned, police officers often fail to exercise the discretion-
ary powers to divert cases, children are in reality detained with adults due to limited detention facilities, and inves-
tigations are not carried out expeditiously or before custodial options for children are enforced.202
roLe of Lcs in deaLing With chiLdren
Part iii of the children act details support for children by lcs. it specifies the role of lcs in safeguarding and pro-
moting the welfare of children, among which is the responsibility for child protection (article 10 (6)). 203 allocating 
this responsibility to the lc court level can significantly decrease the number of children’s cases in the formal legal 
system, particularly with regard to petty crime cases.
section 92 of the act provides for the jurisdiction of the lc courts in relation to children. Village-level lc courts204
have jurisdiction in all matters of a civil nature concerning children. this includes all of the major issues dealt with 
in the main report, including paternity, custody, property and inheritance and issues related to marriage. unfor-
tunately, little research is available on the operation of the lc courts in dealing with these issues, as the available 
research has tended to focus more on criminal issues and juvenile justice. there is reason to suppose that the 
resource and knowledge constraints that have sometimes prevented lc courts from fully playing their intended 
role in criminal matters are no less pressing in relation to civil causes.
criminaL Jurisdiction of Lc courts and poWers in chiLdren’s cases
the same section provides that village-level lc courts are the court of first instance for a range of minor criminal 
offences alleged to have been perpetrated by a child. the list of offences is set out in the third schedule to the 
199 tibatemwa-ekirikubinza, p. 205.
200 ’17 children on death row’, The New Vision, 15 september 2009. at http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/694877
201 Kasingye, p. 4.
202 ibid., p. 5.
203 ‘article 10 (6) ‘each local government council shall provide assistance and accommodation for any child in need within its area of 
jurisdiction who appears to the committee to require assistance and accommodation as a result of his or her having been lost or 
abandoned or seeking refuge.’
204 formerly called ”executive committee courts”.
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act.205 many of the offences that child offenders might commonly commit, including those typically committed 
against other minors, are included, though accusations of defilement by teenagers are absent.
it is specifically provided in section 92 (7) that lc courts do not have the power to commit children to remand detention. 
While having the power to impose the penalties provided for in the Penal code act for these offences, the lc 
courts also have the power to make certain other orders having more of a restorative character. these include (a) 
reconciliation, (b) compensation, (c) restitution, (d) apology, or (e) caution. the lc court can also make guidance 
orders, requiring offenders to submit themselves to the supervision and guidance of a suitable person designated 
by the court. these provisions are in line with the idea that whole communities are responsible for children. as 
tibatemwa observes, however, lc courts are not always familiar with the provisions of the act.206
proceduraL issues and rights of chiLdren before the Lc courts
While the procedural rights of children before the lc courts are in general the same as those of adult litigants 
before those courts, section 92 (8) of the act provides that the lc court shall have “due regard” to certain proce-
dural rights set out in section 16 (b) (c) (d) and (f ) of the act, that apply in the family and children’s courts set up 
under the act. these sections respectively provide for: (b) proceedings to be held in camera; (c) proceedings to be 
as informal as possible and by inquiry rather than by exposing the child to adversarial procedures; (d) for parents 
or guardians of the child to be present whenever possible; and (f ) the obligation to explain the right to appeal to 
the child. 
While the obligation of ‘due regard’ appears to be somewhat less than full respect of these provisions, it would 
seem to impose on the lc court a duty to respect these obligations to the highest possible degree practicable. it 
should be noted that the right to legal representation is not included among these procedural rights. as discussed 
earlier, this right generally does not apply in lc courts in uganda except where violation of by-laws is concerned. 
even in these cases, legal assistance is highly unlikely to be readily available outside of urban areas. 
the second schedule to the act specifically provides that children have all the rights set out in the crc and the 
au charter on the rights and Welfare of the african child, with ‘appropriate modifications’ to respect the circum-
stances prevailing in uganda.
preferences in chiLdren’s cases
one 2003 study that surveyed children and parents indicated strong support for lcs as the main point of contact 
for children who commit crimes. the study examined to what extent the law on juvenile justice was consistent 
with societal perceptions in uganda. child offenders interviewed felt that the lc system was better suited to deal 
with child matters than the police due to the fact that lcs were part of the community and knew the individuals 
involved and were therefore more likely to deal appropriately with the offences within their context.207 Discussions 
held with parents of children who had committed offences also provided the general view that child offenders 
should be dealt with outside the formal criminal justice system as much as possible. indeed, support for this view 
was so strong that some believed that, if possible, cases should be resolved between the victim and parents of 
the child offender before considering taking a case to the lc.208 in general, respondents viewed the police very 
205 the third schedule to the act was not available. the information here is taken from tibatemwa-ekirikubinza, footnote 41. the 
offences are: affray (fighting in public), common assault, occasioning actual bodily harm, theft, criminal trespass, malicious damage 
to property, and “soliciting or loitering for immoral purposes”.
206 id.
207 tibatemwa-ekirikubinza, p. 187.
208 ibid., p. 187.
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negatively, citing that they were too harsh in dealing with children and were also corrupt.209 reference is made in 
an earlier section to the views of a sample of the population on the issue of minors involved in (often consensual) 
sex with another minor.
the field research conducted for this study found that using formal justice mechanisms such as the police and 
court system would come only after exhausting options within the community itself. During focus group dis-
cussions held both in Kitgum and moroto, participants indicated an overwhelming preference for bringing all 
cases, including those involving children, to the traditional leaders first before lcs or the police. While lc i courts 
appeared to play a prominent role in northern uganda, they played a much less significant role in Karamoja in deal-
ing with family issues or crimes relating to children. solutions in such cases were more likely to be ‘solved’ within or 
among families themselves or within the village context.
chiLd rights issues in KaramoJa and achoLiLand
in a country where 50 percent of the population of 33 million is under the age of 14 years,210 the welfare of children 
and their ability to access justice is a measure of the larger picture in uganda. many of the issues addressed in detail 
in the previous section concerning women apply to children as well, including land, property and inheritance 
rights, child marriage, and sgBV. according to anPPcan uganda chapter, a regional ngo working to protect 
children from abuse and neglect, child sexual abuse is the most rampant form of crime against children in uganda. 
Defilement, mentioned in a previous section, is tied in with the issue of child marriage of girls and the social status 
of girls in general, but also in the criminalization of consensual relations among teenagers.
in acholiland and Karamoja, two regions with protracted conflicts, most children have not been able to go to 
school. many were abandoned, orphaned or abducted and exposed to extreme cruelty. During the war in north-
ern uganda, children experienced some of the worst human rights abuses ever reported against children at the 
hands of the lra. thousands were abducted, enslaved, tortured, mutilated, forced to commit atrocities against 
their own families, raped and infected with sexually transmitted diseases including hiV, became orphaned and 
were forced to live on the street, and suffered from severe malnutrition and disease. girls endured forced mar-
riage and forced pregnancy, the repercussions of which have left them with their own children who have become 
highly stigmatized among their communities.
With a tangible peace since 2007, addressing the psychosocial repercussions and justice for children in this region 
remains a huge challenge. children who were traumatized by their direct experience with the lra, or who grew 
up in camps, have difficulty adjusting to post-conflict life as young adults. child offenders are common, as is the 
practice of locking up children. according to jlos prison statistics, children make up approximately one fifth of 
prison population (an estimated 2,000 of the 10,000 prisoners in uganda).
in Karamoja, the status of children poses many human rights concerns. children often have difficulty accessing 
their right to education, health care, food and shelter. child labour is the norm and widely believed to be a neces-
sary form of training for them to become responsible adults.211 Karamoja society is based around labour, especially 
in the caretaking of cattle. at a young age, children, especially boys, are grazing cattle and assisting the family in the 
manual tasks involving the animals. they are accorded more freedoms than girls. girls are treated with a privileged 
status growing up, sheltered and provided for more than boys, due to the value attached to them as future sources 
of wealth. however, if a girl were to become pregnant before marriage, she would forfeit this privileged status and 
be discounted as a loss to her family.212
209 ibid., p. 191.
210 cia factbook: uganda. online: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ug.html
211 muhereza, ossiya and ovonji-odida. huggo and laBf report, 2008, p. 83.
212 Social Justice Amidst Complex Realities: Protecting the Rights of Children and Women in a Traditional Pastoral Community – The Case of 
the Pokot in Northeastern Uganda, tPo/Danchurchaid, p. 49.
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an educated girl in Karamojong society ‘cannot fetch a lot of cow’. By virtue of being educated, she may even be 
considered to be a prostitute and is subsequently given a lower dowry price than an uneducated one.213 this is 
because education is considered to undermine her role as a homemaker, mother, and wife. this stigmatizing of 
educated girls is a great social deterrent for those who might want to attend school. amongst both sexes, illiteracy 
rates are high in Karamoja. among a focus group of a dozen Karamojong male youths during the field research, 
only one had received even basic schooling. those who had not received any schooling indicated a great interest 
in doing so. however, they would only do so if adult classes were offered and also acknowledged the difficulty in 
being able to attend given their need to work to bring food to their families.214
street children in Kampala are becoming an increasing problem. many of them are from Karamoja where, due to 
famine and insecurity, they left for the capital in search of better livelihoods. in Kampala, the children survive on 
begging and scavenging and living in the streets. if caught by the police, they are typically taken into custody and 
eventually deported back to Karamoja.
programming 
unicef uganda has begun a new country program for the period 2010-2014 focused on access to justice for 
children, particularly with regard to child-friendly procedures in the formal justice system, gender sensitivity, and 
procedure guideline training. on the policy level, there is engagement with jlos that advocates for diversion. this 
follows their previous programming cycle (2006-2009), which had focused on children and armed conflict.
Land issues and informaL Justice systems  
in uganda
as in most sub-saharan african countries dependant on agriculture, land and property in uganda are among the 
most important factors in the livelihoods of ugandans. the constitution provides that everyone has a right to own 
property, and the high court of uganda has long maintained that women, whether married or unmarried, have a 
right to own property in their own right.215 the statutory legal framework for the administration and management 
of land is generally seen as relatively progressive with regard to protection mechanisms for women. however, 
under customary law in uganda, women cannot freely own property and, in most instances, have little recourse 
to protect their property and land rights. most land is under customary tenure and the decision-making power in 
relation to administration and dispute resolution rests with the male-dominated traditional systems. land disputes 
are among the most predominant type of cases brought to the ijs in uganda. this section takes up some of the 
general issues relating to property and land within the plurality of legal orders in uganda. this discussion will also 
address vulnerable groups and their access to land, as well as the post-conflict situation in northern uganda. Due 
to the key role land plays in uganda, this issue should be acknowledged and integrated into future programmatic 
efforts towards both informal and formal justice systems. 
Land tenure in uganda 
During colonial rule, the British introduced a system of freehold title. under this system, chiefs and kingdoms were 
granted formal land rights rather than the customary tenure system(s) and all untitled land was considered ‘crown 
land’. following independence in 1962, crown land became public land and a period of nationalization of land 
213 Patrick osekeny, unfPa
214 focus group discussion with matheniko youth, lokilala village, nadunget sub-county, moroto (24 october 2009).
215 christine Birabwa-nsubuga, Women under Customary Marriage in Uganda: A Critical Look at Their Property Rights at Dissolution, 
Danish institute for human rights, research Partnership 2/2006, p. 26.
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began. nevertheless, the customary tenure systems continued to operate, albeit without legal status. under the 
current government, land reform was made a priority. this resulted in chapter 15 of the 1995 constitution and the 
1998 land act. 
according to the constitution, land in uganda can be owned in accordance with customary, leasehold, mailo and 
freehold tenure systems. With the constitution and the land act, private individual freehold was introduced and 
customary ownership was given full legal recognition as private property with the possibility of all citizens owning 
land under customary tenure to acquire a certificate of ownership and the possibility of converting land under 
customary tenure to freehold land ownership by registration and titling.216 
customary and communaL oWnership
communities can own land communally on their own terms, and individuals, families, and clans can obtain a cer-
tificate of customary ownership. however, the issue of whether customary tenure means communal ownership is 
another issue. how communal ownership is defined (and regulated) clearly has an impact on the individual secu-
rity of tenure, as does the size of communal land (for example, communal grazing and hunting grounds), which, in 
northern uganda, has declined dramatically. Despite the increasingly private nature of ownership with exclusive 
user rights, including in respect of land held under customary tenure, it is still the general view of communities 
and clan leaders that their land belongs to the clan. this creates a tension between customary and statutory law.
groups (communities, clans, or families) can also own land together by forming communal land associations 
(cla), with a constitution providing rules for the management of land. at least one third of the membership of a 
cla must be women. the land and equity movement in uganda (lemu) sees these institutions as having a great 
potential for protection of women’s rights, as their rights under the customary law of the area can be written into 
the cla constitution. the protection and enforcement of these rights can thereby be provided under both cus-
tomary and state judicial systems.217 there are, however, some issues currently preventing this system from being 
implemented. these relate to both the functioning of the institutional framework as well as the plurality of systems 
and the traditional patrilineal system. 
the ‘consent cLause’
another protection mechanism for vulnerable groups that was introduced in the land act is the so-called ‘consent 
clause’. according to this, land upon which the owner of the land resides with his or her family and children cannot 
be sold, transferred or given away without the written consent of the spouse and dependent children. for children 
below the age of majority, the consent must be given by the land area committee.218 the act also provides for 
every spouse to have security of occupancy of family land and a right to use family land, and can give or withhold 
consent to any transactions of family land that affect his or her rights.219 it is not clear how the consent clause is 
administered with regard to polygamous marriages, as it is only “the” spouse, dependent children of majority age, 
and children below the age of majority that are mentioned in the article. the consent clause does, however, apply 
to customary marriages. these are formally recognized in line with civil marriages irrespective of whether a certifi-
cate has been obtained from the district authorities.220 
customary ownership of land as private property is recognized together with the customary tenure system, which 
is given full legal status with all its institutions and rules for all land held under customary tenure. those who wish 
216 constitution of uganda 1995, article 237 (3, 4) and the land act 1998, chapter 227, sections 2-9.
217 judy adoko & simon levine, ‘falling Between two stools’ in Birgit englert & elizabeth Daley (eds.), Women’s Land Rights & 
Privatisation in Eastern Africa, 2008 and the 1995 constitution of uganda and the 1998 land act.
218 the land act 1998, chapter 227, section 39 (1).
219 ibid, section 38a (1).
220 christine Birabwa-nsubuga, Women under Customary Marriage in Uganda: A Critical Look at Their Property Rights at Dissolution, 
Danish institute for human rights, research Partnership 2/2006, p. 19.
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their land to remain under customary tenure can do so and their rights must be upheld by the courts (irrespective 
of formal titling). according to adoki and levine from lemu, this means that “the existing protection of women in 
customary law thus remains, but with two additional advantages: first, those customary rules of protection now 
have full judicial force in state law; and secondly, protection has been added by bringing customary land into the 
framework of national law, because women now enjoy additional safeguards (notably from the constitution and 
the consent clause).” however, it is the view of adoko and levine that, in practice, the government has primarily 
directed its energies and resources into converting customarily held land to freehold tenure rather than to efforts 
in respect of customary tenure or non-individuated rights. they argue that, with support only to customary owners 
and not customary ownership, the protection of women’s rights, in particular, is failing because protection through 
privatization ‘falls between two stools’: customary and state law. from the outset, the government’s aim has been 
to incorporate customary ownership into a privatised freehold ownership by giving titles to any customary owner 
who wants it – thus freeing them from the ‘constraints’ of customary law, but thereby also its associated obligations.
most of the land in the northern region (approximately 80 percent) is held under customary tenure, most of it 
without official documentation of title. land boundary disputes are considered amongst the most common types 
of disputes,221especially given the return of large numbers of iDPs to their homes. a recent World Bank study indi-
cates that 85 percent of respondents have experienced threats to their security of tenure following the return and 
resettlement of iDPs, as well as a subsequent rise in land ownership and boundary disputes.222 the majority of dis-
putes reported concerned land abandoned upon displacement (with a prevalence rate of 65 percent) and relate 
mainly to inherited land.223 given the centrality of customary tenure in northern uganda, the World Bank study 
recommends that it should be the traditional structure that is the first point of jurisdiction for dispute resolution 
and land administration and that these institutions are integrated into the statutory system.
institutionaL frameWorK for Land administration  
and dispute resoLution
statutory bodies
the ugandan constitution establishes the basic land institutions: the uganda land commission (ulc), the District 
land Boards (DlB) and the District land tribunals (Dlt). the latter have the jurisdiction to determine land disputes 
by individuals, the ulc or other authorities, with responsibilities relating to land. the decentralized structures for 
administration and management of land are the District land Boards, District land officers, area land committees 
and recorders. it should be pointed out that, as part of efforts to secure better protection of women’s land and 
property rights, a third of the members of the DlB must be women. the lc iis are the formally recognized court of 
first instance for land disputes with appeal to the land tribunals at the district level,224 but, in practice, lc i courts 
are actively engaging in land dispute resolution as well.225 land boundary disputes were reported in the case study 
as well as in other research as some of the most frequently heard cases at the lc courts.
in general, the institutional framework set out in the constitution and land act is not in place on the ground, 
especially in the north of the country. the function of the District land Boards is meant to be the surveying of 
land, but this has not taken place, and the area land committees (alc) responsible for processing the certificate 
221 Based on interviews with ohchr, resident state advocate, magistrate, DcP, lc ii chair. see also international alert, Contributing 
to a Peace Economy in Northern Uganda: A Guide for Investors, 2009, and judy adoko & simon levine, ‘falling Between two stools’ in 
Birgit englert & elizabeth Daley (eds.), Women’s Land Rights & Privatisation in Eastern Africa, 2008.
222 World Bank: Post-conflict Land Policy and Administration Options, 2009.
223 ibid.
224 the functions of the Dlt has since 2006 been transferred to the District magistrates’ court.
225 interviews conducted with lc i representatives in october 2009 and World Bank, Post-Conflict Land Policy and Administration 
Options – The Case of Northern Uganda, 2009 and World Bank, Analysis of Post-conflict Land Policy and Land Administration: A Survey 
of IDP Return and Resettlement Issues and Lessons: Acholi and Lango Regions, 2008.
390
a
n
n
eX
 s
ev
en
a stuDy of informal justice systems: access to justice anD human rights
of customary ownership are not in place in many areas. in Kitgum, for example, the alc was established only 
recently (in july 2009) and was only starting to consider cases at the time of the research. in addition, the possibil-
ity of owning land as a community through a communal land association faces challenges, as the District land 
registrars that would set up the clas are not in place. the statutory dispute resolution structure is weak, with the 
lcs ii and iii not able to perform their assigned role in many places.226 one magistrate interviewed believed the lc
courts were mishandling land disputes by not remaining impartial by being susceptible to political influence as 
well as by showing corrupt tendencies. 
the Lcs
there is no doubt that the mix of governance and judicial powers at the lower levels of the lc system contributes 
to the lack of clarity and impacts on the efficiency with which the system can help resolve conflict and tension. the 
District magistrates’ courts have a severe backlog of land dispute cases because the lc system is unable to handle 
them and other parts of the institutional structure are not in place. it seems that many lc courts do not know the 
scope of their jurisdiction, including in land matters, as evidenced by the cases they choose to handle. even at the 
lc iii court level, many are reportedly unaware that the lc court can only hear land matters on appeal, with lc ii 
being the court of first instance.227
other issues relate to insufficient knowledge and understanding of the procedures prescribed for lc courts and 
other bodies. it was, for example, mentioned by several respondents that an additional 10,000 shilling fee for land 
inspections is often charged and set-fee rates not always followed.228 the norwegian refugee council currently 
supports activities in the north aimed at informing the communities of their possibilities for documentation of 
ownership. few ugandans are aware of the possibility and process of obtaining a certificate of customary owner-
ship and most have been interested in obtaining a freehold title to their land because of the land market. however, 
the process of titling for landowners (which is strongly encouraged by the government of uganda) can take years 
to complete and, as applications are processed centrally, requires travelling to Kampala. 
traditionaL Leaders
traditional mediation and arbitration systems also exist, typically starting with the lowest level chiefs and tra-
ditional land committees. according to custom and practice, these can forward disputes on to senior chiefs if 
unsuccessful in solving a matter. there is, however, a gap or disconnect between the recognition of customary 
title without any corresponding recognition or role for the customary institutions that deal with customary land 
issues. the current (formal) institutional framework, as described above, does not include the roles and functions 
of customary land administration and dispute resolution. nevertheless, certain overlaps between the traditional 
and the statutory system exist. the lcs, though considered to be part of the statutory system, often have elders as 
members, and the lc (and magistrate) courts often invite the elders to advise and guide the court on land matters. 
this is especially the case in the north, where the traditional systems are stronger than in other parts of the country 
and with the specific issues surrounding the resettlement of iDPs. 
the World Bank study of the teso, lango and acholi229 areas found that both strengthening of the customary land 
administration systems and dispute resolution mechanisms as well as further clarification of the lc courts’ role in 
dispute resolution and land administration would be beneficial. With respect to the management of land conflict 
and dispute management, the study found a complete lack of institutional capacity to manage land disputes and 
that targeted efforts to strengthen both formal and informal/customary conflict resolution would be necessary.
226 international alert, Contributing to a Peace Economy in Northern Uganda, 2009 and World Bank, Post-conflict Land Policy and 
Administration Options – The Case of Northern Uganda, 2009.
227 interview with magistrate, Kitgum, october 2009.
228 according to interviews with norwegian refugee council, District land officers, lc officials, october 2009. the area land 
committee in Kitgum charged 50,000 ugandan shillings for the verification process, which it believes is affordable for town people.
229 World Bank: Post-conflict Land Policy and Administration Options, 2009, pp. iv-v.
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clarification of the lc system’s role would also need to take the current practice into consideration and thus per-
haps consider amending the law to allow lc i courts to handle simple land disputes. it is emphasized that this is 
not in itself a recommendation to take this step, but merely to study whether this step should be taken, including 
its positive and negative consequences. it is also emphasized that the issue of the influence that the exercise of 
executive powers could have on the use of the judicial mandate of lc i courts would have to be solved for the lc
system to be able to effectively play a part in resolution of land disputes. some donors pointed out that, despite 
great interest in supporting the lc system, it was exactly the politically sensitive issue of land that led to some hesi-
tance among donors. the role of the lc system should be combined with identification of legitimate traditional/
informal institutions such as clan councils to assist in managing land disputes. the alternative dispute resolution 
methods used by customary and community based mechanisms, such as mediation, conciliation and arbitration, 
are seen as beneficial in this regard. the lack of capacity to perform very basic functions such as record-keeping 
on the part of both the lcs and the clans is, of course, an issue to address, but actual institutionalization of tradi-
tional institutions similar to the statutory ones are mentioned by many as a prerequisite to progress in arriving at 
an integrated system that provides legal protection. although some traditional leaders feel sidelined by the local 
government structures, it is also recognized that many traditional leaders have immense powers over land and 
natural resources, which, of course, has implications for conflicts.230
the push for individual land ownership in the particular context of northern uganda is seen by many as a factor 
involving potential risk of spurring further conflict. Discussions of what communal land and state land can be 
sold to potential investors have given rise to some tension over land in the region and raised questions of vested 
interests.231 it is a generally promoted view in the studies referred to in this section as well as the respondents 
interviewed that titling should be pursued in a manner that complements customary tenure rather than replaces 
it, as it is better at protecting and managing communal and collective rights. similarly, it is important to establish 
an institutional framework that includes both the customary/traditional and the statutory institutions and that 
the institutional framework reflects the reality and practice on the ground, including the human and financial 
resources made available through the local government system.
use of formaL and informaL Justice systems in Land matters
the extent to which customary law and the customary tenure system protect women and vulnerable groups’ 
rights is an issue of debate. according to one interpretation of customary law, a woman (in a patrilineal culture) 
enters the clan of her husband when married and gain the rights to benefit from the land of the family and clan, 
with the protection of her rights by the family of her husband. this means that, even where there is more than one 
wife, she is entitled to enough land to provide for herself and her children. unmarried or divorced women have 
rights to be allocated land by their own parents’ clan. a widowed woman still has rights under her late husband’s 
clan, perhaps by being married to her late husband’s brother, but, even if choosing not to re-marry, she would 
maintain full rights over the land that her husband has allocated to her.232 in practice, most research has found 
that a woman loses her right to any property and land upon dissolution of marriage (for reasons other than death) 
and will have to return to her family, who will have the responsibility to provide for her. under customary tenure, 
neither the husband (as the steward), nor the wife in principle, has the right to sell the land. 
family land is usually vested in the head of the family, who acts as the steward of the land with the responsibility 
of looking after it on behalf of all family members’ interests. When land is sold, it becomes individually owned and 
is no longer under clan control. Previously, selling of land was forbidden according to customary law, but has been 
230 ibid., pp. 33-36.
231 international alert, Contributing to a Peace Economy in Northern Uganda, 2009, and World Bank, Post-Conflict Land Policy and 
Administration Options – The Case of Northern Uganda, 2009.
232 this particular principle has however been contested. the interpretation outlined here is mentioned in lemu’s work.
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taking place for many years (in uganda as in other african countries), with acceptance of the clans. the clan control 
over land varies from district to district, in general, across the country, but also within the northern region. 
sales of small portions of land owned under customary tenure (without written documentation) are becom-
ing more frequent to meet short-term consumption needs due to socio-economic reasons. these types of land 
sales have a potentially negative long-term impact on the economy of the family. according to lemu, taking into 
account the duty to protect women and children, customary law and the customary tenure institutions should in 
principle have prohibited these sales. an eroding respect for clan elders and customary institutions, due largely to 
the long-term displacement and life in iDP camps, is cited as one explanation for the lack of protection exercised. 
additionally, an increasing tendency to charge for services and ‘corruption’ of the clan structure can also be identi-
fied as relevant factors.233 
moreover, with the use of the statutory system, especially the lc system, and the overlap or even confusion 
between the two, the statutory system is sometimes used to ‘trump’ the traditional system, which undermines 
the traditional system’s potential role in land administration and dispute resolution management. lemu studies 
in the region234 show that men tend to go to the state administration, in the form of the lc i, to appeal over the 
head of the clan, claiming the right under the statutory law to sell land. this takes place even though the lc i has 
no authority in land matters under the land act; indeed, Parliament granted this authority to customary authori-
ties without specifying who or what those customary authorities are. in practice, this enables approval of a sale of 
customary land because legal recourse is unavailable or because clan leaders or those who disagree with the sale 
may be reluctant to oppose the lc. adoko and levine argue that giving decisions of clan judges the full backing of 
police and courts in practice could support the customary system’s ability to protect women and children’s rights, 
as provisions of legislation enacted by Parliament and the constitution are superior.235
the studies carried out by lemu showed that none of the sales approved by the lc i contained consent of the 
spouse, despite the ‘consent clause’ in the land act. this is mostly attributed to a lack of knowledge of the law and 
of the clause, but also to the fact that many of the lc i representatives interviewed maintained that women have 
no right to oppose a sale, as ‘women do not own land under customary law’. the current mix of practices and use of 
systems and institutions indicate how the plurality of systems can lead to overlaps and abuse of the situation and 
not only to alternatives and choice. the research that the study team is familiar with all points to a strong need for 
better complementarity and integration between the existing systems to achieve protection, especially of vulner-
able groups and women, as the current situation seems to render them less protected.
it has been argued by many (including in interviews with respondents in Kitgum) that one of the main challenges 
is the population’s lack of memory and knowledge about the traditional ownership and boundaries of land. this 
is attributed to the many years of displacement and the breakdown of customary structures. others argue that it 
is rather an interest in being able to push or trace land to the clan jurisdiction that is at stake. in some areas, tra-
ditional leaders still wield immense power over the administration and management of customary land. in such 
contexts, self-interest and an increasing politicization of the system play a role. although it is predominantly the 
customary systems that are currently addressing land issues, it was the view of some respondents in this study that 
an increasing number of people prefer the lc system because of the possibility to influence the outcome.
233 judy adoko & simon levine, ‘falling Between two stools’ in Birgit englert & elizabeth Daley (eds.), Women’s Land Rights & 
Privatisation in Eastern Africa, 2008, p. 110.
234 lemu, Land Matters in Displacement – The Importance of Land Rights in Acholi land and What Threatens Them, 2004; lemu, Land 
transactions in land under customary tenure in Teso, 2005; lemu, A Land Market for Poverty Eradication, 2005.
235 judy adoko & simon levine, ‘falling Between two stools’ in Birgit englert & elizabeth Daley (eds.), Women’s Land Rights & 
Privatisation in Eastern Africa, 2008, pp. 111-112.
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there has been a tendency towards a weakening of the customary institutions. no measures have been taken 
to help reinforce them in areas where they could help implement state law and government policy, for example, 
through a system for registering spouse consent and thus enforcing the consent clause.
several respondents interviewed and other studies indicate that a politicization of land administration and man-
agement structures potentially has significant ramifications for land issues and conflicts. it is exacerbated by lack 
of knowledge of rights, making it easy to exploit and convince people that they do not have any rights. given the 
lack of trust in the state system in the north, coupled with a lack of resources and institutional corruption, deci-
sions are ignored and rarely enforced even where matters are pursued in the courts. the police typically do not get 
involved in land disputes, unless they escalate to a point where criminal offences are committed. it is still the tradi-
tional system, combined with the lowest layers of the statutory system (the lcs) that handle most disputes and it 
was generally the view of respondents for this study that the formal institutions are the very last resort. if a matter 
reaches the District magistrate, it is likely that it has not been solved through the layers of resolution provided by 
the traditional systems and the lcs. however, this has to be seen in the light of a continued breakdown of the 
traditional family and clan structures that give security of access to land at the household, family and community 
levels. When this takes place, the traditional conflict resolution mechanisms become unavailable, weakened as a 
forum for dispute resolution in uganda in general.236
programming
as issues relating to land are most pertinent in the northern region of uganda with the resettlement of a large 
number of iDPs, there is an increased focus on programmatic interventions to secure especially land rights, partic-
ularly those of vulnerable groups, as well as security of tenure in general, in order to avoid tension and a potential 
scale-up of conflict again in the region. 
attempts have been made in acholiland and lango to document customary tenure principles. in acholiland, the 
Ker Kwaro acholi has produced the publication Principles and Practice of Customary Tenure in Acholiland in acholi 
and english with support from the norwegian refugee council and the eu. this document outlines the interpre-
tation of key terms related to land tenure and the rights and responsibilities of all actors in relation to ownership, 
acquisition, transfers, and conflict resolution. similarly in lango, the lango cultural foundation has produced Rules 
and Regulations on Land Use and Management of Land in Lango in luo and english with support from lemu. Both 
publications have been developed through broad consultative processes.237 however, through the interviews in 
Kitgum, it became clear that the Ker Kwaro acholi’s version of the principles had been contested by other acholis 
despite a relatively broad consultation process. the main elements of contestation relate to the ‘prohibition’ against 
the selling of customary land and the land rights of widows (in the husband’s clan), unmarried girls and children 
born outside marriage. moreover, the resident District commissioner wanted it to go through the lc system while 
the council lobbied for it to be passed as a by-law. these discussions have led to a stall in its dissemination and 
related sensitization activities. in apac, the initiative supported by lemu has had more success and the district gov-
ernment is passing by-laws to ensure customary rules are followed, forming a partnership between the traditional 
and state system.
236 christine Birabwa-nsubuga, Women under Customary Marriage in Uganda: A Critical Look at Their Property Rights at Dissolution, 
Danish institute for human rights, research Partnership 2/2006, p. 25.
237 Ker Kwaro acholi, Principles and Practice of Customary Tenure in Acholiland, 2008, and lango cultural foundation, Principles, Practices, 
Rights and Responsibilities (PPRR) of Customary Land Tenure in Lango Region, 2009.
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lemu suggests that the customary land judges in the villages in northern uganda, who know the boundaries 
and ownership of land, could be used in a local public process to record the boundaries and potentially could 
be mandated to record all land sales (including customary land). local land judges and/or the state administrator 
registering the sales could be responsible for ensuring spouse (wife) consent. 
attempts to document the principles of customary tenure in various areas and clans could be undertaken to 
facilitate complementarity between the customary and statutory systems. the process of documenting principles 
should, however, include the process for changes to allow continuous dynamics to customary law. to the greatest 
extent possible, it should be a participatory process involving the community in order to avoid later contestation. 
such documentation could include the principles for customary land judges to adjudicate matters. this would 
allow for a partnership between the traditional system (the clans) and the state, which would also mean the 
customary authorities could rely on the state to enforce decisions. however, as described above, the attempts so 
far illustrate the difficulties involved when competing interests are at stake, including those who favour a lack of 
‘codification’ of the traditional principles and practices. 
land is one of the key areas within the northern ugandan context that is being addressed by current donor pro-
gramming. the process is complex because it involves a struggle for land and natural resources that inherently 
involves local and national politics. the norwegian refugee council (nrc) is providing training to lc i, ii and iii 
courts, but especially targeting the lc ii at the sub-county level because of their jurisdiction in land matters. the 
training is based on the local council courts manual by the ministry of local government and with a special 
focus on land rights. nrc is also focussing on elders, clan leaders and family heads and has, as a part of this focus, 
assisted with the development of the publication on principles and practices of customary land tenure to promote 
peaceful dispute resolution in land matters, but also other dispute areas, such as family-related matters. through 
its work with dissemination of information on land rights, and hereunder information on documentation of land 
ownership, nrc also assists with payment of fees for obtaining certificates of customary ownership. nrc also 
runs a legal aid programme, which includes research, capacity-building of legal aid providers and advocacy. legal 
counselling advice and representation by lawyers is provided through the programme, and advice centres have 
been established in eight sub-counties.
the association of Women lawyers in uganda (under the international federation of Women lawyers: fiDa) has 
a strong presence in the north. fiDa activities include the provision of information and sensitization campaigns 
in the region as well as of legal advice and litigation in land matters for women. the organization is mentioned 
by many as having an impact in the areas they reach, but, as with civil society efforts in general, outreach is 
a challenge. 
395
a
n
n
eX
 s
ev
en
a stuDy of informal justice systems: access to justice anD human rights
related to the discussion of increased individualization and privatization of land in general and the potential 
impact it has on the vulnerable situation in the north, international alert has developed a guide for investors in 
the post-conflict context in northern uganda.238 the guide was developed by a group of local business leaders in 
acholi and lango regions and with input from other stakeholders. the guide explains the statutory legal frame-
work, central issues arising from the pluralistic legal orders and how the institutional set-up is envisaged in the 
legal framework and the actual mix of an institutional framework in practice, and the overlaps with the traditional 
systems. it provides suggestions about what to be aware of and how to try to cooperate with both systems.239
a national land Policy to address the implementation of the protection of rights under the different tenure sys-
tems and the institutional framework is being drafted. the policy has been underway for a while, with the fourth 
draft having been presented in september 2009 (the third draft is from 2007). the non-functional statutory system 
for land administration and management should be addressed in the policy, and the re-institutionalization of the 
land tribunals together with the establishment of special land divisions under the magistrate and high courts are 
mentioned. moreover, the draft policy addresses dual operations of the customary and statutory systems by legally 
empowering the customary authorities to perform functions relating to land rights administration, land dispute 
resolution and land management.240
for future programming, the normative basis for land policies on land administration and management has to 
be taken into consideration, including views on customary law and institutions, privatization and land market 
creation, and ownership of land in different regions of the country. Programming initiatives will inevitably support 
different aspects of these areas, incorporating the interests of stakeholders locally and centrally. With regard to 
parajudicial types of ijs, such as the lcs, consideration should be given to the complementarity between custom-
ary and statutory systems and whether checks and balances can be instituted. 
238 international alert, Contributing to a Peace Economy in Northern Uganda: A Guide for Investors, 2009.
239 the guide is relatively new (2009). unfortunately, it has not been possible to obtain any information of the use and impact of the 
manual in practice.
240 http://allafrica.com/stories/200912160781.html
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concLusion 
this study has aimed at providing a comprehensive overview and analysis of ijs context in uganda and the varied 
landscape of justice mechanisms – both formal and informal – currently in practice. the usefulness of this study 
stems from examining how a plurality of justice mechanisms function and address starkly different contexts within 
a single country; from the strength of the lc court system in the central region and urban areas of the country, 
to the predominance of informal traditional and transitional justice mechanisms used in the north-eastern and 
northern regions. although the varying contexts illustrated in this study may not exist to the same degree in 
other developing countries, the challenges revealed and lessons learned contribute to informing a more holistic 
approach to justice programming. moreover, the ways and degrees to which these systems are employed reveal a 
necessary departure from the traditional dichotomous discourse between formal and informal systems of justice.
the programming chapter of the main ijs study emphasizes the importance of harmonizing interventions with 
one another to acknowledge and include other development and justice initiatives. this is particularly relevant 
in the ugandan context, where holistic approaches to address the manifold and complex regional challenges to 
primary justice are needed in order to bridge the various formal and informal justice mechanisms. Despite the 
funding pressures and time-bound nature of most donor programs, a thorough assessment of the ijs context 
on the ground is essential before any programming takes place. efforts should be made to improve coordination 
with other programming initiatives to avoid duplication and to promote complementarity and effective sequenc-
ing. addressing the broader justice dilemmas in countries with a history of conflict – particularly issues relating to 
retributive justice, transition justice, and peace and reconciliation – should also be part of this discussion. 
in addition to examining the ijs in uganda, this study included sections on the formal justice structure not covered 
in the other country studies, which focused primarily on the valuable quantitative data collected. although unsur-
prising, it is important to underscore that a major reason that ijs continue to be used is the inaccessibility, mistrust, 
and weakness of the various branches of the formal justice system. therefore, in order to holistically address justice 
solutions, an examination of the challenges to the existing formal system and underlying weaknesses is important 
when exploring potential programming channels that can serve to connect the informal and formal justice sys-
tems. as mentioned in the main study, formal justice actors often have little understanding of ijs or customary law 
in their countries, despite their acknowledgement of the widespread use of these systems among the population. 
the programming implications and recommendations from this uganda study have already been addressed in the 
previous geographic and thematic sections and thus do not need to be repeated. Drawing on the experience of 
uganda’s long-standing jlos and its nDP provides useful examples of how inclusion of ijs and justice program-
ming at a sector level can take place. however imperfect, the evolution of the parajudicial lc court system – from 
its foundations as an executive organ towards a decentralized system that is more inclined to be respectful of 
judicial independence and connection to the ordinary judiciary – illustrates the growing potential for alternative 
solutions to the traditional ‘formal versus informal’ models of justice. expanding programming focused on the lc 
system is recommended. however, simultaneous programmes aimed at increasing knowledge and documen-
tation of ijs’ practices are also necessary. generally speaking, ‘users’ will pick their engagement with the formal 
justice systems and ijs based on their assessment of which is best perceived to provide them access to ‘justice’. 
thus, imperfect systems can be used together if overlaps are properly addressed and areas of complementarily 
adequately explored; examining one system in isolation from another will only undermine the effect of program-
ming initiatives. meanwhile, active engagement and consultation with ijs’ providers and users (especially women 
and children) to form these linkages remain imperative.
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